

CHAPTER I

1. The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds,

It¹ is solemnly declared here that Brahman is beyond all representation;² it is endowed with all powers which are neither identical with it nor different from it; it has two aspects, that of unity (*vidyā*) and that of diversity (*avidyā*); (even in its aspect of *avidyā*), it is really free from all diversity; it is, in all states, unaffected by beginning and end, even though the manifestations appear in wordly transactions³ in a temporal and spatial sequence. The Brahman is both effect and cause, it is many and one and in all the different systems, the manifestations are not conceived as having nothing before them and nothing after them. Nor is any limit admitted, above below, or sideways, to its spatial differentiation. All its manifestations, though they appear to be distinct from one another, are in the nature of the word (*śabda*), because in all of them, the original material persists. Because, in our cognitions, we identify objects with their words (*śabdopagrāhi*) and our cognitions are intertwined with the words (*śabdopagrāhya*), they are essentially of the nature of the word.⁴ All divisions such as the beginning, the sustenance and the end of things can be determined only through words. The Brahman is called phoneme (*akṣara*) because it is the cause of the phonemes.⁵ The manifestation of the word which is in everybody as one with the spirit is for the purpose of communicating what is within. It has been said:—

“Some declare that the Word which is really subtle, identical with the meaning, One and identical with the Self when not manifest, appears as something else and differentiated.”

What is meant by 'it appears as the objects' is this—what is called appearance (*vivarta*) is the assumption by the One, without losing its one-ness, through apparent diversity, of the unreal forms of others.⁶ It is like the appearances in a dream. It has been said—"The spatial and temporal manifestations are no more than the functioning of the powers of Nescience, they are neither identical nor different from the one which is the Truth. The fact of being Nescience consists just in that. What is meant by "from whom the creation of the world proceeds" is this:—The transformations, that is, the Universe proceeds out of Brahman which is the Word, devoid of all inner sequence; from that involution (*samvarta*) in which all diversity has merged and is undifferentiated and is inexpressible, all transformations being in a latent stage.⁷

(a)⁸ The Self which, though all representations are of it, does not come within their range and which, on the basis of guess, authority and inference, appears in different ways.

(b) The all-embracing, beyond all differentiation and unification, existence and non-existence, sequence and absence of it, truth and falsehood, shines as distinct from everything.

(c) He, the inner Controller of Beings, is seen near and far. He is utterly free and is sought by those who desire liberation.

(d) He is the creator of those objects which are looked upon as ultimate causes, just as the lustre of the seasons is the creator of the masses of clouds at the end of summer.

(e) That one spirit is differentiated in many ways, like the waters of the ocean, which are impregnated with heat at the time of dissolution.

(f) From that spirit which is like a universal and liable to be differentiated, legions of particulars are produced, like rain-laden clouds from special winds.

(g) That supreme light appears first as the three Vedas and is the cause of different views among the followers of different systems.

(h) That aspect of it which is really the truth, full of peace, is, however, always accompanied by Nescience, which is indefinable.⁹

(i) There is no limit to the number of transformations of it (Nescience). When the soul has realised it, it does not exist for him any more.

(j) Just as one having a defect in the eye sees the clear sky as being clouded with many forms, in the same way, the immortal

Brahman, free from all change, is soiled by Nescience and appears to have many forms.

(k) This Brahman creates everything as having the nature of the word; it is the source of the illumination power of the word. This universe emerges out of the word aspect of Brahman and merges, into it.

[1. Sometimes, where the text consists of a long sentence, the translation is in the form of short phrases. It is hoped that it will be clear to the reader of which part of the long sentence each short phrase is a translation.

2. The word so translated is *parikalpa*. An attempt will be made to use the same English word for translating a Sanskrit word occurring in different contexts; but in some cases, other more suitable English words will be found to have been used.

3. *Vyavahāra*. This word occurs frequently. Here it has been translated as 'worldly transactions'. Often it means the use of words to communicate one's thoughts, verbal usage, or exchange of ideas. As Helārāja puts it—*pratipādyapratipādakayoḥ hi parasparābhīprāyasaṅkrāntir vyavahāraḥ* (He. on Vāk. III. Saṃ. 32). On another occasion, he says—*Jñānasyaiva parasparasāṅkrāntir vyavahāraḥ* (He. on Vāk. III. Saṃ. 2), *prakhyopākhyaṭmakatvācca vyavahārasya...* (He. on Vāk. III. Dra. 14).

4. *vikārāṇāṃ prakṛtyanvayitvāc chābdopagrāhyatayā śābdopagrāhitayā ca śābdatatvam*. This is one of the important arguments in the chain of reasoning meant to prove śābdādvaita, the doctrine that the ultimate reality from which everything comes is in the nature of word. The argument is used in the different systems of philosophy also.

5. *akṣara* ordinarily means 'imperishable', but the Vṛtti gives a special meaning to the word.

6. The Vṛtti gives here a definition of the important word *vivarta*, in connection with the explanation of the word *vivartate*. According to the Vṛtti, the word, though a verb, also conveys the same idea.

7. *pūrvam vikāragranthirūpatvenāvyapadeśyāt* (Vṛ). Even with the help of the Paddhati, the meaning is not clear. The word *granthi* occurs several times in the text, both in the Kārikā and in the Vṛtti:—Vāk. I. 115; Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 4, 5, 142; 145. Usually it has the meaning of transformation (*vikāra*) but here it comes in the same compound with the word *vikāra* and so it must have a different meaning. As Vṛṣabha puts it—*granthiśābdo* 'nyatra yadyapi vikāravacanaḥ tathāpi vikāraśābdena saha pratyujyamāno' pekṣitapravṛttinimitto draṣṭavyaḥ (Vṛ. on Vāk. I. 1. p. 10, l. 14). Here the whole expression in question qualifies *brahmaṇaḥ*. The translation is very tentative.

8. This and the following verses are called *āgama* by Vṛṣabha and, according to him, they elaborate the idea of the Kārikā which is being

explained. As he puts it—*idānīm sarvasyaiva kārīkārthasyāgamenānugamaṃ darśayati*. (Vṛ. on Vāk. I.1. (p. 10, l. 17).

9. *śāntarīdyātmakam* etc. The construction of this verse is defective. In view of *aṃśaḥ*, one would expect *ātmakaḥ* and *grastaḥ*, but all the mss of the Vṛtti and the Paddhati have the neuter form).

2. Who has been taught as the One appearing as many due to the multiplicity of his powers, who, though not different from his powers, seems to be so,¹

It has been revealed that the diversity of the transformations and the unity of what is transformed do not go beyond the unity of the Ultimate (*prakṛtyekatva*).² As has been said—‘It is like Water, the Seer, One without a second.’³ Similarly: ‘O gentle One!, in the beginning, Being alone was, One without a second’.⁴ Then again—‘The one Praṇava was divided into three’. Similarly, ‘In the beginning, there was non-being. What was that non-being? It is the Ṛṣis who were non-being at the beginning, the Ṛṣis who were the *prāṇas*.’⁵ What is meant by ‘due to the multiplicity of his powers’ is—Appearing as many, the powers which are mutually opposed and are identical with Brahman accumulate in it which is essentially the Word. In a cognition in which many objects figure, the different objects which figure such as earth, people, etc., do not affect the unity of the cognition. There is no contradiction between the multiplicity of the things like trees which are cognised and the unity of the cognition. The form of the cognition does not really differ from that of the object, because different forms of the objects are not beyond the unity of the cognitions. Similarly, the powers which appear to be different from one another are not really so. The text ‘though not different from his powers’ means: the powers are not different from Brahman as the universal and the particular are from each other. But it appears to be different when it assumes the form of the different objects which figure in it.⁶

[1. *Bhinnaṃ śaktivyapāśrayāt* would perhaps be a better reading but all the mss and the Paddhati have the text as printed.

2. *prakṛtyekatvānatikramaṇa*. By ‘oneness’ of Brahman, only absence of all differentiation is meant and not association with the number

one. As Vṛṣabha says—*na tvekatvasaṃkhyāyogena*. 'Oneness' due to association with the number one belongs to manifestations and not to the ultimate. There are two kinds of oneness, says Vṛṣabha: *dvidham ekatvaṃ prākṛtaṃ vaikṛtaṃ ca* (Vṛ on Vāk. I. 1. (p. 15, l. 2).

3. Cf. Br. Up. 4.3.32 where the text is—*salila eko draṣṭā dvaito bhavati*.

4. Ch. Up. 6.2.1.

5. Ś. Br. 6.1.1.1.

6. The word *śakti* is used twice in this verse. Vṛṣabha explains it—*ghaṭādayaḥ padārthāḥ योग्यातृवा* (Vāk. I. 2. (p. 14, l. 20). In other words, both the power to bring about appearances and the appearances themselves can be called *śakti*].

3. Depending on whose Time-power to which (though one) differentiation is attributed, the six transformations, birth etc. become the cause of all variety in Being.

All powers¹ depending on their causes and having a starting point are governed by the creative power (*svātantrya*) called Time; they follow the modes of this Time-power. Because of the regulation of the immense diversity of each object by means of prevention and permission, its appearances seem to have a sequence. Time, by allowing them to come to be, is the secondary cause of all transformations which depend on their own other causes also and whose production had been delayed.² Its causal power being thus differentiated by the manifestations which have a sequence, the differentiation which exists in the manifestations is attributed to it. It is like attributing to the balance the divisions marked by lines on it at the time of the balancing of the weight of the material which is in contact with it.³ Thus when sequence is attributed to something which is neither prior nor posterior in the form 'it was' or 'it was not,' the six transformations birth etc., become the source of the modifications, the changes in Being. Transformation of action will be dealt with in detail in the section devoted to 'Being' under the subject of universal.

[1. Vṛṣabha explains *śaktayaḥ* as *padārthāḥ* by identifying cause and effect.

2. *pratibaddhajanmanām*. Though all the mss of the Vṛtti have *pratibandha*,^o the text adopted is probably the genuine one. The explanation of Vṛṣabha—*yeṣāmevānena prathamata utpattau pratibandhaḥ kṛtaḥ te pratibaddhajanmānaḥ*’ also supports the emendation.

3. While explaining the analogy of the balance, Vṛṣabha uses the terms *tulāsūtra*, *tulādaṇḍa*, *tulāpaṭala* and *daṇḍalekhā*. The rod type of balance seems to be referred to. The thing to be weighed is placed on a pan (*tulāpaṭala*) which hangs from one end of the rod (*tulādaṇḍa*) which is held by a string (*tulāsūtra*) at one of the points marked by a line on the rod (*daṇḍalekhā*) according to the weight of the thing weighed].

4. Of which one that is the seed of all, there is this state of multiplicity, that of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and enjoyment.¹

The One Brahman is the substratum of powers which cannot be defined as identical or different from it, as existent or non-existent and are not opposed to one another;² it is differentiated into unreal forms which, like the beings appearing in a dream, have no external reality, are different from one another and are knots of the nature of enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment. When the predispositions towards differentiation mature, this worldly arrangement with its multiplicity comes into being.³

[1. The main purpose of this verse is to point out that nothing is different from Brahman and that, yet, all appearance of differentiation is due to it.

2. Even though the powers produce opposite effects and are, in that sense, opposed to one another, yet they are said to be not so, because they all exist in the same substratum at the same time. (*ekasmiṇ ādhāne yaugapadyena vṛtteḥ—Vṛ.*)

3. *tasya granthyantarasamatikrameṇa vivṛttagranthiparicchedasya*. This is rather obscure. The word *granthi* comes twice. See note, 7 on verse 1. The commentary ‘Ambākartrī’ explains *granthi* as *vāsanā*, the predispositions leading to differentiation, whereas Vṛṣabha takes it to mean the differentiated objects themselves. Something which appears as a differentiation within something which has no differentiation is a

granthi. As Vr. puts it, *ata eva paramātmano vikāratvād granthayaḥ*. I have used the word 'knot' suggesting a distortion of reality. The translation is very tentative].

5. A means of attainment and a symbol of that One is the Veda, which though one, has been handed down as though in many recensions by the sages.

The attainment of Brahman is nothing more than going beyond the knot¹ of the ego-sense in the form of 'I' and 'Mine'. Others say that it is the resolution of the effects into the original cause,² the cessation of the activity of the senses,³ satisfaction without the aid of external means, one's own self,⁴ the yearning for the supreme Self, the absence of craving for any adventitious object, the fact of possessing complete power,⁵ escape from the influence of the functions of Time,⁶ the complete cessation of the self.⁷ Such are the alternative ways of conceiving the attainment of Brahman. The means of attainment is the collection of the Vedas. Just as making gifts, performing austerities and practising continence are means of attaining heaven. It has been said: When, by practising the Vedas, the vast darkness is removed, that supreme, bright, imperishable light comes into being in this very birth. By the word symbol (*anukāra*) the idea contained in the following ancient saying (*purāṅkalpa*) is meant: The Ṛṣis the seers of the mantras, those who have realised the truth (*dharma*) see that subtle, inaudible Word and, wishing to communicate it to those who have not realised the truth, teach the symbol of it which is like a dream⁸ in their desire to tell what they have seen, heard and experienced. It has, indeed, been said:— The Ṛṣis realised that truth (*dharma*); they taught the mantras to those who had not realised the truth; these others, also anxious to teach, proclaimed the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas, in order that the symbol of Brahman may be understood (*bilmagrahaṇāya*). Bilma is bhiḷma which means something which illuminates (*bhāsanam*).⁹ By the words 'The Veda, though One, has been handed down in many ways by the Ṛṣis,' what is meant is this: The object

called Veda, as seen by the Ṛṣis in their vision, is One. As the One cannot be communicated through the many, the Ṛṣis first transferred it to the Word to which diversity is attributed because of the diversity of the manifesting agents (i.e., the *dhvanis*). The Word, then, without giving up its unity, assumes different forms such as *Samhitā*, *Pada*, *Krama* etc. It is handed down by the Ṛṣis in different branches, established for the sake of convenience of study. Another view is: The Word varies in the different regions and has, therefore, many forms; but it does not deviate from its purpose of conveying the same thing everywhere. In its different forms, it becomes the cause of regional and other diversity. In the same way, the words of the Vedas, though handed down in different branches, do not deviate from the fact that everywhere they convey the same thing. The diversity in the branches is based on the diversity of forms. Others are of this view: In the old days, the Āyurveda, with its eight sections,¹⁰ was one. In the Kali era, due to the reduced capacity of men, it has been divided into sections. In the same way, the Veda, the collection of Brahman, includes an infinite number of ways and powers.

[1. *Granthi*. See n. 7 on verse 1 and n. 3 on verse 4.

2. *Āmbākartrī* understands this as the *Sāṅkhya* view.

3. *Āmbākartrī* sees here the *yoga* view. The word *vikarāṇabhāva* occurs in *Yog. Dar.* 3.48 in connection with the attainment of supernatural powers.

4. *ātmatattva*. While explaining this, *Vṛ.* gives reference to *Br. Up.* 4.3.21. where the text, in a slightly modified form, is as follows: *tad yathā priyayā striyā sampariṣvāko na bāhyaṃ kiñcana veda*. The idea is that when Brahman is attained one is aware of nothing else.

5. *paripūrṇaśaktitvam*. *Vṛ.* explains *śakti* in the sense of the eight supernatural powers attained through *yoga*. They are: *aṇimā*, *mahimā*, *garimā*, *laghimā*, *prāpti*, *prākāmya*, *īśitvam*, *vaśitvam*. See *Y. Dar.* 3.45.

6. *Kālavṛtti*. The two functions of time, prevention (*pratibandha*) and permission (*abhyanujñā*) by virtue of which only certain effects appear at certain times and not others.

7. *sarvātmanā nairātmyam*. *Vṛ.* understands this as referring to the extreme indefinability of Brahman: *naiḥsvābhāvyam*, *brahmasvabhāvasya nirūpayitum vaktum cāśakyatvāt*. Some scholars, however, take it as referring to the *Bauddha* view.

8. *Svapnavṛttam* *iva*. Just as one's experience in a dream is a kind of reflection of our experience in the wakeful state, in the same way, the Vedas are a kind of reflection of what the Ṛṣis saw in their vision.

9. Ni. 1.20.2.

10. The eight sections of Āyurveda, as given by Vṛ. are: *śalyacikitsā*, *śālākyaṃ*, *kāyacikitsā*, *bhūtacikitsā*, *kaumārabhṛtyam*, *agadatantram*, *vājīkaraṇatantram*, *rasāyanatantram*].

6. Its divisions follow many recensions, but they are all subsidiary to the same action. Also a certain fixity in the power of words is seen in these different branches.

Once the Veda has been divided into four, there are the one hundred branches of the *adhvaryus* (*Yajurveda*), the thousand paths of the *Śāmaveda*, the twenty-one kinds of *Ṛg-Veda* or fifteen as some say and the nine kinds of *Ātharvaṇa veda*. Thus every Veda has many paths. What is meant by 'subsidiary to the same action' is: All branches lead to the same ritual. It is like this: all the branches of the physicians ultimately practice one treatment. What is meant by 'fixity in the power of words' is: Words, as, taught for a particular branch, convey their meaning in that branch and also lead to merit. What is meant by 'it is seen in the different branches of Veda' is seen in the following examples "Long *ā* is substituted for the final of *deva* and *sumna* when the suffix *kyac* follows in the *Kāṭhaka* branch of the *Yajurveda*." (P. 7, 4, 38.) and 'the final of the word *śima* bears the acute (*udātta*) accent in the *Ātharvaṇa Veda*' (*Phitsūtra* 79.) All this is according to the view of those who hold that the division of the Veda into branches takes place again and again and that, before the division, the word invariably exists in an undifferentiated state.¹

[1. Vṛ. points out that what has been said in the verses 5 and 6 is based on the view that the Veda manifests itself as one from Brahman. Later, due to the reduced capacity of men, it is divided into branches. At the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) it again becomes one. When crea-

tion begins again, it manifests itself as one but it is again divided into branches when the capacity of man diminishes.

The other view is that the Veda manifests itself from the very beginning with divisions. According to this, there is no undifferentiated word. As Vṛ. puts it: *teṣām upasaṃhṛtakramā vāg durlabhā*. (Vāk. I.6. (p. 27, l. 24).]

7. The various Smṛtis, some having visible utility and others invisible utility, have been propounded by the sages, well-versed in the Veda on the basis of this very Veda, with the help of indications.

Some traditions have a written basis while others have no written basis, but are known from the conduct of the cultured. Traditions relating to medical treatment etc., have a visible purpose to serve. Traditions relating to what can be eaten and what not, which woman one can marry, or otherwise, what can be said and what not have an invisible purpose. Where two traditions relating to the same subject go against each other, there is option, provided that there is no visible purpose to be served.¹ Where two traditions relating to the same subject go against each other and there is a visible purpose and disapproval by the cultured, there, the traditions having visible purpose have no authority.² Where two traditions relating to the same subject differ from each other and there is visible purpose, but no disapproval by the cultured, there there is option. For example, in the matter of the penance to be observed for killing a frog.³ What is meant by 'on the basis of this very Veda, with the help of indications,' is that the indications found in the Scripture make us know that the actions taught in the Scripture and the written Tradition have the same agent. Those persons who are entitled to perform the action taught by Scripture, having a visible or invisible purpose, are made known by the Scripture itself as being entitled to perform the actions taught by the written Tradition. For example, the injunction: 'the sacrificer should cook for a guest who has arrived a big bull or a big ram.'⁴ Sometimes (i.e., when no indica-

tion is found in the Scripture in a particular case) the indications found elsewhere are enough on the analogy of the rice in the cooking pot,⁵ to establish the authority of the traditions which do not go against Scripture.

[1. G.Dh.S. 22, 3 and Manu. 11. 73 prescribe two different penances for one who is guilty of having killed a Brāhmaṇa. As the purpose of the penance is invisible and as both texts are authority, there is option. Another example is G.Dh.S. 23, 8-10 where two penances are taught for one who is guilty of having committed sacrilege with the wife of the Guru.

2. Even where a tradition has a visible purpose to fulfil, if it is disapproved by the cultured, it should not be followed. Drinking of liquor as a medicine has a visible purpose, namely, the curing of the disease and it is, therefore, prescribed by Āyurveda. But drinking liquor is prohibited in the Dharmaśāstra i.e., by the cultured. This prohibition has greater authority than the prescription of Āyurveda. That is why one has to do penance after drinking liquor as a medicine.

3. Yā. Smṛ. 3. 270.

4. Ś. B. 3. 4. 1. 2.

5. See JACOB. *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, I, p. 52].

8. Based on the explanatory comments and similar passages, conflicting views have been set forth by the exponents of Monism and Dualism according to their own taste.

It is generally seen that human speculations are based upon explanatory comments and similar Vedic sentences.¹ Because of the diversity of the human intellect, diversity of speculation takes place. For example, there is the explanatory comment (*arthavāda*): "In the beginning, all this was nothing," meant to praise the place where the fire is to be kindled.² On the basis of an imaginary interpretation of it, the following Absolutism is constructed: "The non-existent is born of the non-existent, the action-less from the action-less, the non-substratum from the non-substratum, the inexpressible from the inexpressible, the essenceless from the essenceless."

"The One Self is differentiated by means of existence and non-existence, neither of which is prior or posterior. How can the undifferentiated One be both expressible and inexpressible?"

Similarly

"There was no non-existent nor was there the existent."³

"In the beginning, all this was only darkness."⁴

"This (the world) is like foam, it is nothing, it is like bubble, it is nothing. It is mere illusion, not easily set aside. So do the learned see it."

"The blind one saw the jewel, the finger-less one thread-ed it, the neck-less one wore it and the tongue-less one praised it."⁵

The sentence

"In the beginning, all this, was water".⁶

is an explanatory comment relating to the new and full moon sacrifice. From that arises the following speculation:—

"Of these waters, there is the effect (*pāka*) in the form of consciousness and there is the effect in the form of matter. And life (*prāṇa*) is the essence of the waters and that comes back and also does not come back."⁷

Really speaking, it is the one having the form of all knowledge and appears in all this diversity. Dualists also have their views:—

"There are the eternal things and the non-eternal things, the causes of all objects, things which have a form and things which have no form, subtle and gross, in which the

Similarly

"Two birds, companions, united together, occupy the same tree. Of the two, one eats the tasty fig fruit, the other one does not eat, but shines."⁸

"By 'two birds', the senses and the inner Controller, the intelligence and the soul are meant." Others,⁹ on the other hand, say:—

"The differentiated and the undifferentiated consciousness, full of seeds, are meant."

"It moves, it does not move, it is far, 'it is near, it is within everything and so is it without.'"¹⁰

[1. The Vṛtti explains *arthavādarūpāṇi* in the verse as *arthavādān arthavādaprakārāṇi*. Thus the word *rūpāṇi* is explained as *arthavāda-prakārāṇi*. For Vṛ., the word *arthavādarūpāṇi* in the verse is an *ekaśeṣa*; *arthavādān arthavādarūpāṇi cety arthavādarūpāṇi* on the analogy of the *ekaśeṣa* in P. 7. 4. 82. *guṇo yaṇlukoh* which means: *yaṇi yaṇluki ceti yaṇlukoh*.

2. Vṛ. quotes the following prescription —

Sa vai saptapurūṣo vā

He adds: *catvāra ātmānaḥ, trayasḥ pakṣapucchānūti, te ca puruṣā prāṇat-vena stūyante*. Cf. Ś. Br. 6. 1. 1. 6.

3. RV. 10. 129. 1. Vṛ. calls this passage also an *arthavāda*. The idea is that by giving the place of kindling the fire the same attributes as Brahman, one is praising it.

4. Cf. Mai. Up. 5. 2. where the text is: *Tamo vā idam agra āsīd ekam*.

5. Tai. Ār. 1. 11. 5. runs as follows —

*Sa taṃ maṇim avindat,
So' naṅgulir āvayat;
So' grīvaḥ pratyamuñcat
Śo' jihvo aśāscata.*

6. Ś. B. 14.8.6.1. See also Jai. Up. 1.56.1.

7. Vṛ explains *āvarttī* and *anāvarttī* as 'coming back' in the case of those who have not yet attained '*mokṣa*' and 'not coming back' in the case of those who have attained it.

8. Cf. RV. 1. 164. 20 and Śve. Up. 4.6. where the text is:

*Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṃ
vṛkṣaṃ pariśasvajāte.
tayor anyasḥ pippalaṃ svādvatti
anaśnann anyo' bhicākaśīti.*

9. According to Vṛ, these are again the Monists who hold this view.

10. ŚYV. 40. 5.]

Since there are these different speculations in regard to the one Brahman beyond all differentiation on account of its being endowed with all powers, therefore it is that

9. The true and pure essence has also been taught there, the knowledge capable of being grasped through one word, having the form of *Praṇava*, and in no way contradicting the different views.

No representation in regard to the one all-embracing Brahman is different from the other representations considered to be opposed to it.¹ Knowers of Brahman have declared:—

“Even a particular manifestation of Brahman, is not beyond its all-comprehensiveness nor is it different from another.”²

Again

“All vision is complete and is really not different (from the others) but the experiencer looks upon it as different.”³ The mystic syllable (*Praṇava*) allows for all points of view, it is the source of all Scripture,⁴ it is the common factor of all original causes, it is the cause of the rise and fall of doctrines, it accepts within itself all mutually contradictory ideas of Brahman or disallows all of them. The object of this allowance and disallowance does not, therefore, vary.

It has been said:—

“It is one and it is not one; it is both and it is not both. Those who are for action speak of diversity (*viśama*) and those who are for knowledge see unity (*sama*).”

[1. According to Vṛ. as all representations are about the same subject, so they are not opposed to one another: *sarvāsāṃ viśaya-mātrāṇāṃ satyatvād brahmaiva viśaya iti viśayābhedāt parikalpāntarāṇāṃ na bhidyante.*

2. This is given as a statement of Brahmanavidaḥ but it is not found in the old Upaniṣads.

3. *Vṛ* explains *anyūnam* as follows — *Darśanāntarāṅgikṛtair padārthair darśanāntaram api yuktaṁ, sarveṣāṁ sarvarūpatvāt*. The idea seems to be that, as all systems are speculations in regard to Brahman which includes everything, they include one another.

4. *Sarvaśrutirūpah*. *Praṇava* is the source of all Scripture (*śruti*) as the *Vedas* are manifestations of it. *Yataḥ praṇavo Vedarūpeṇa vivṛtataḥ*. (*Vṛ*). It is also the source of all words (*śruti*): *sarvaśrutirūpah sarvaśabdasvabhāvaḥ sarvaśabdarūpeṇa tasya vivṛtateḥ* (*Vṛ*).]

10. All the different sciences which impart knowledge and bring culture to man proceed from the major and minor limbs of that Veda, the creator and organiser of the worlds.

The Veda, as the source and teacher of the world, is the creator in regard to the appearances and organiser in regard to the organisations. Some say that *Praṇava* is the Veda. It is the source of all words and all things. According to this view, the different sciences, being essentially elaborations of the *Praṇava*, do not go beyond the Veda.

It has been said:—

“All the words are included in the Veda.

One who does not know the Veda cannot understand Brahman at all.”

It has also been said:—

“The injunctions, what is enjoined and the reasoning constitute the Veda.”¹

From the major (*aṅga*) and the minor (*upāṅga*) limbs of the *Praṇava*, from the Scripture, written Tradition and the final portion of the three-fold Veda are derived the different sciences which are the cause of right knowledge and the culture of man.² Or they may be looked upon as the cause of the culture of man because man consists essentially of knowledge (*jñāna*).³ From the major auxiliary sciences like astronomy-astrology etc., of the well-known Brahman called Veda come the science of omens etc., and from the minor auxiliary sciences of the same Veda proceed dream-lore etc,

[1. To the question: What is the Veda?, two answers are recorded in the Vṛtti: (1) *Praṇava eva veda ityeke*, (2) *Vidhir vidheyas tar-kaśca vedaḥ*.

2. *Praṇava*, *aṅga* and *upāṅga*. The Vṛtti understands these terms as standing for *śruti*, *smṛti* and *trayyanta*, i.e. the explanatory comments (*arthavāda*), the auxiliary sciences, Grammar etc., and the Upaniṣads. According to another view, *śruti* is *praṇava*, *smṛti*, is either *aṅga* like Grammar or *upāṅga* like Āyurveda and *trayyanta* is the Upaniṣads. Usually, the word *aṅga* stands for the six auxiliary sciences of the Veda: *Jyotiṣa*, *Śikṣā*, *Kalpa*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta* and *Chandas*. From them, the science of omens (*śakunajñāna*) etc., are derived. The word *upāṅga* stands for *smṛtis*, *purāṇa*, etc., from which are derived dreamlore, etc.

3. *Jñānasamśkārahetavaḥ* in the verse is explained in two ways in the Vṛtti: (1) *samyagjñānahetavaḥ puruṣasamśkārahetavaśca*; (2) *jñānātmakatvād vā puruṣasyaiva samśkārahetavaḥ*. This is not the only place where the Vṛtti contains alternative explanations of the text of the verse. The questions which this raises will be discussed elsewhere.]

11. The best of all the austerities, the one that is nearest to that Brahman is the discipline called 'Grammar', the first among the auxiliary sciences of the Vedas, so have the sages declared.

That auxiliary science through which the form of the Word—Brahman¹ is determined in order that correctness may be understood is the nearest (to the Vedas) because it helps directly. Proximity is known to depend upon special service rendered. There is also the Scripture to be restored.² Once it has been settled by the reasoning (of the Mīmāṃsā) what is to be restored and what not, the science of Grammar is the basis for the correct modification of gender, number etc. It is said to be near because it is through it that the other scripture (which is not available) is understood. What is meant by 'the best of all austerities' is this: Compared to what are considered to be austerities in the world like continence, sleeping on the ground, standing in water and progressive reduction and increase of nourishment according to the course of the moon³ and compared to what are considered to be the

holiest forms of study, the study of the science of Grammar is the best form of austerity, because it leads to special results, visible and invisible. Concerning which the tradition has declared that a mere knowledge of whose enumeration of phonemes (*akṣarasamāmnāya*) leads to the same holy fruit as the knowledge of the whole of the Veda,⁴ that, indeed, is the first auxiliary science of the Vedas, because it is the most important one. It has been said:—

“Of the six auxiliary sciences, the most important one is the Science of Grammar. Effort made in regard to the most important one surely yields fruit.”⁵

[1. Vṛ explains *śabdabrahmaṇaḥ* as: *śabdarūpeṇa vivṛttasya brahmaṇaḥ*.

2. *Ūhyaṃ cāmnūyāntaram asti*. See Mī. Sū. 2.1.34.

3. Cf. *Brahmacāryaṃ satyavacanam savaneṣūdakopasparśanamādravastratā-dhaḥśāyitānāśaka iti tapāṃsi*, G.Dh.S. 3.1.15,

4. M.Bhā. I. p. 36.

5. M.Bhā. I. p. 1.]

12. This discipline is the shortest route to the attainment of that supreme essence of the Word which has assumed differentiation, of the holiest of all lights.

What is meant by ‘Of the word which has assumed differentiation’ is: Of the word which has been differentiated into phoneme, word and sentence on the basis of the place of articulation etc., from the undifferentiated sequenceless inner word-essence. Or ‘of the word which has assumed different forms like cow etc., as meanings on the basis of the eternal relation between word and meaning. Or it might be said that the divisions of the word assume the form of cow etc. Or rather, cow etc., apparent external divisions, are transformed into words. Some hold that only causality is the relation between word and meaning.¹ It has been said:—

“It is the name which appeared as the form and it is the form which appeared as the name. According to some, they

were one at first and were differentiated later. According to others, the differentiation was already there before.

What is meant by 'the supreme essence of the word' is: the collection of words, the correctness of which has been established, both because of its expressiveness and its capacity to bring about happiness, is spoken of. It has been said: "words devoid of correctness are just the sediment." What is meant by 'the holiest of all lights' is: In this world, there are three lights, three lamps which illuminate themselves and others. They are as follows:—

"What is called *jātavedāḥ* (i.e., fire) the light which is within man, and the light called the Word which illuminates both the sentient and the insentient. In the last one is the whole of this world established, both that which moves and that which does not move."

What is meant by 'the shortest route' is: The Science of Grammar (*lakṣaṇa*), consisting of general and special rules,² is the means of learning the whole of the word—Brahman in an easy manner, by means of the main rules and their elaborations. It is the means of inferring that those who, without being taught, are well acquainted with the true word endowed with correctness and free from corruption, are the cultured people.³ Once it has been inferred who the cultured persons are, the Science of Grammar is the agent for declaring the correctness of words like *prṣodara* on the ground that they are used by the cultured.⁴ It has been said:—

"He who does not know the Science of Grammar does not know the word, the meaning, their mutual relation and the occasion for use nor what is correct and what is not, even when the meaning is the same nor who is cultured, inferred from their use of the correct forms of the words."

[1. It is the Word which appears as the objects. The objects are merged in the word, exist in the form of the word. Thus, there is the relation of cause and effect between words and things. The things existing within in the form of the word are the cause and the externalised word is the effect. Or, the inner word is the cause and the externalised objects are the effects. The same idea is set forth in the following verse.

2. *Sāmānyaviśeṣavāddhi lakṣaṇam*. Vṛṣabha explains this as follows — *Utsargāpavāda - vidhipratīṣedha - niptātanātideśasthānyādeśa-līnganīyamaiḥ saptabhiḥ sāmānya-viśeṣaparakāraiḥ*. As ten things are mentioned in the long compound word, but only seven things are meant to be conveyed, one can, according to the Ambākartī, understand the following: *utsargāpavāda, vidhipratīṣedha, vidhīnipātana, vidhyatideśa, sthānyādeśa, līṅge sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa* and *vidhīniyama*.

3. See M.Bhā. on P. 6. 3. 109. where a description of Śiṣṭāḥ, cultured people, is given.

4. P. 6. 3. 109.]

13. The expression of what one wants to say (the principle of the use of things) depends upon words and the truth concerning words cannot be understood except through Grammar.

(a) The basis for the expression of a meaning is that the speaker wants to communicate it, not whether it has an external existence as an object or not. Desire to communicate depends upon the existence of a suitable word. The speaker uses a separate suitable word for every meaning which his desire to communicate brings to the mind. It is like a person applying the right sense when he wants to cognise anything directly.

(b) Another explains differently. What is meant by the truth (*tattva*) in the use (*pravṛtti*) of an object (*artha*) is the ground for the application of a word to that object. When, due to the presence of that ground in an object, a cognition of that object corresponding to that ground arises, then one can bring that object into verbal usage. In the absence of that ground inhering in the object, there cannot be any verbal usage in regard to the bare object. As words acquire their form in relation to the universal (*jāti*) it is the universal (*sāmānya*) which is the basis of words.

(c) Or one can say that interconnection (*samsarga*) is the basis (*tattva*) of verbal usage. As the meanings of words

are closely connected with one another, even though they appear to be unconnected, verbal usage depends upon the sentence. When the cognition of interconnection ceases, no verbal usage in regard to the word-meaning is possible.

(d) Another meaning is this: A bare object comes only within the range of *tyad* (that) etc., which just point to things. The basis of its verbal usage is interconnection. That which is connected enters into relation with action in a primary or secondary capacity.

(e) Or activity (*pravṛtti*) means an action like 'being born' conveyed by the verb. The essence (*tattva*) of this thing which is called activity is the fact of being something to be accomplished, its requirement of means, its assuming the form of sequence, its being the cause of suggesting time. The other object is a mere thing which remains the same in all the three times. It is conveyed by the noun and is free from all inner sequence.

(f) Or again, what is the basis (*tattva*) of the verbal usage (*pravṛtti*) of an object (*artha*)? The cognition, having the form of an object, which is projected as an external object. And that depends upon the word.

What is meant by 'the truth concerning words' is its completeness (*avaikalya*) its correct form in which its purity has not gone. That is its complete form. The others, the corrupt forms, used by those who really intended to use the correct ones, are its incomplete forms.

[The main word in this verse is *arthapravṛttitattvānām*. This compound word is analysed in six ways in the *Vṛtti*: a. b, c, d; e; f. In a, it is analysed thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam*; in b, thus: *arthasya pravṛtttau tattvam nimittam*; in c, in the same way as in b; in d, thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam*; in e, thus: *arthasya pravṛtteṣca tattvam*; in f, thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam*. In all the explanations except e, *pravṛtti* means *vyavahāra* = verbal usage. In e, it means action.

The fact that as many as six alternative explanations have been given raises some questions which are discussed in the Introduction.]

14. It (Grammar) is the door to salvation, the remedy for all the impurities of speech, the purifier of all the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge.

¹One, who, with a previous knowledge of the correct forms of words, realises the unity of the real word, goes beyond sequence and attains union with it. By acquiring special merit through the use of the correct word, he is united with the great Word and attains freedom from the senses.² After having reached the undifferentiated state of the word, he comes to the source of all differentiation: Intuition (*pratibhā*). From that Intuition in which all Being is latent and which, due to the repetition of the union (mentioned above) tends to produce its result, he reaches the Supreme Source in which all differentiation is completely lost. What is meant by 'the remedy for all impurities of speech' is that it is like the science of Medicine (Ayurveda) in regard to the defects of the body. One who knows grammar does not use the corrupt forms which are the cause of sin. It has been said that.

"Knowledge (of the correct forms) is his refuge"
(M. Bhā. I, p. 2, l. 28.).

What is meant by 'purifier of all the sciences' is that correctness (*saṃskāra*) is known through it. In all the sciences, it is the (correct) words which convey the meaning. It has been said:—

"Whatever is learnt and not understood but is merely uttered as it is, is like dry fuel without fire; it will never burn."³

There is also the following verse cited by those who have not gone astray:—

"On the earth, water is the purest of things; of the (purified) waters, it is the sacred hymns (*mantras*) which are the purifying agents and the sages have declared that it is the science of Grammar which reveals the purity of the sacred hymns, Sāman, Ṛk and Yajus."

What is meant by 'shines in every branch of knowledge' is that everybody follows the science of grammar even for composing a work on his own special subject and is very careful to avoid the use of corrupt forms.

[1. This verse is understood in the Vṛtti as describing the stages through which the grammarian goes in attaining *mokṣa*. Vṛ. says: *etasyā eva brahmaprāpteḥ kramam idānīm varṇayann āha avyavakīrṇām iti*. Some, however, think that different forms of liberation are set forth here.

One thing to be noted is that Bhartṛhari, in the Vṛtti, speaks about going from *pratibhā* which is understood by Vṛ. as *Paśyantī*, to *Parā Prakṛti*. In other words, there is a stage beyond *Paśyantī* called *Parā Prakṛtiḥ*. *Paśyantī* itself is called *sarvavikārāṇām prakṛtiḥ*. Thus *Paśyantī* is *prakṛti* and after that comes *parā prakṛtiḥ*.

2. *Vaikaranyam* = *apagatendriyatām* (Vṛ.). The same word is used in the Vṛtti on verse 5 to describe one of the alternative conception of *mokṣa*.

3. Ni. 1. 18.]

15. Just as all the universals of things depend upon the form of their words for their communication, so is this science the basis of all the other sciences.

[*Śabdākṛtinbandhanāḥ*. By *ākṛti*, it is the *jāti* which is meant here. In other words, the universals of words convey the universals of meanings. (See Vāk. III. Jā. 6).

16. This is the first step in the ladder leading to liberation, this is the straight royal road for all those who desire salvation.

17. Here the Self, being free from errors and thus fit to study the Vedas, sees the very basis of the Vedas, their pure form.

[*Chandasyaḥ*. This word can be explained according to P. 4. 4. 98: 'Tatra *sādhuh*'. It would then mean 'fit in regard to the *Chandaś*, i.e.

fit to study it or protect it. Vṛ, however, explains it thus: *Chandasyaḥ iti. Chandasām samūhaḥ, samūhārthe aupasaṃkhyānikah taddhitaḥ*. He has probably in mind P. 4. 2. 42 according to which the suffix *yan* is added to words in the sense of collection.]

18-22 ¹That which² is the highest form of undifferentiated speech, the pure Light which appears differentiated only in the midst of all this darkness.

The Light which those worship who have passed beyond the manifested state consisting of the cognition of things and actions and beyond light and darkness.³

That in which the manifestors of speech, like the signs of the alphabet appear, through Yoga preceded by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, like reflections in a mirror.

That of which the different phonemes⁴ of the Atharvans, the Sāmans, the Ṛks and the Yajus are the symbols.

That which, though one, is variously interpreted in the different traditions, that supreme Brahman is attained by a knowledge of Grammar.

[1. No Vṛtti is available on verses 15-22. This naturally raises the problem whether they are integral parts of the Vākyapadiyam or quotations in the Vṛtti on verse 14. Usually, quotations are immediately preceded by some word like *tad yathā* or *evaṃ hyāha* which indicates that what follows is a quotation. There is no such word here. The fact that Vṛ. comments on them settles nothing as he comments on all obvious quotations also. There is, however, one indication that they are integral parts of the work: The word *tatra* occurring in verse 23 refers to the science of Grammar mentioned in verse 22 which shows that the former is a continuation of the latter. As verses 18-22 form a group and constitute one sentence, verse 23 is a continuation, not only of verse 22, but of all of them.

2. Some form of the relative pronoun *yad* occurs in all the verses from 18-22 and it is to be correlated with the word *tad* occurring in

verse 22. What do these words refer to? to Brahman or to Vyākaraṇa? Some of the points mentioned in the description seem to be equally applicable to both. I think, however, that they refer to Brahman. Vṛ. also makes it clear when he says in his commentary on verse 18. *Brahma adhiḡamyate iti vakṣyati. Tat sarveṣūttaraślokeṣu saṃbandha-nīyam.*

3. *Vaikṛtaṃ mūrtivyāpāradarśanaṃ samatikrāntāḥ.* Vṛ. explains: *Yogina ityarthah.*

4. *Prthaksthiti-parigrahāḥ:* *Etad āha. nānājātīyavarṇapratiṭibimba-parigraheṇa sthītāḥ iti. (Vṛ.).]*

23. There, the great sages who are the authors of the sūtras, vārttikas and the Bhāṣya have declared words, meanings and their relation to one another to be eternal.

The very basis of the science of Grammar is that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. In it, by 'word' is meant the universal (*ākṛti*) of the word. It has been said:—

"As the universal is eternal, so is the word eternal."¹ This science proceeds on the basis of the universal. In fact, it has been said:—

"That is already established, because it is the universal which is taught."²

This universal is different from the particular universal called 'wordness'. Wordness is a universal which coexists in the same thing with other (lesser) universals which cannot co-exist in the same thing. Universals of words, like the universal of the word tree, when there is vagueness, are mixed up with the causes of the manifestation of the individual word and when manifested by the individual word, are called words.³ Just as, in a pot, the facts of being substance, earth and pot can co-inhere, in the same way, in the word 'tree', universals like those of being an attribute, a word and the word tree can co-inhere without mutual opposition,

(Objection) In the case of objects like the pot, the parts of which exist at the same time, one can see that the whole (*avayavī*) is the cause of the manifestation of the particular universal (pot-ness). But the parts of a particular word cannot co-exist, they are not produced at the same time, they do not exist at the same time, they are unnameable (*avya-padeśya*) and so they cannot produce the whole word, the many material parts of which do not co-exist and where the universal can inhere. The universal word-ness exists in each part. If, similarly, it is maintained that the universal of the particular word tree also exists in each part, then the cognition having the form of the word tree would occur even after the first part is uttered, i.e., when parts like 'v' are uttered in isolation (and that does not happen).

This is not a valid objection. It is as in the case of actions like lifting, revolving, pouring etc., which are produced and perish and whose parts do not produce another action corresponding to the whole (*avayavī*). Nor is the inherence, in the parts, of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., distinct from the fact of being action, not accepted.⁴ Nor do cognitions having the form of particular actions like lifting arise when only a part is seen. 'These parts of actions are due to special efforts and each of them is the substratum of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., but as this particularity is difficult to grasp, they do not produce a cognition having a particular universal as its object. All the manifesting factors of that particular cognition have not yet come into being. Therefore, there cannot be any verbal usage based on it. But when these actions, involving contacts and separations, determined by a particular direction, are perceived in succession, then verbal usage, characterised by a particular universal, becomes possible. In the same way, in the case of words like 'vṛkṣa', distinct parts like 'v' are produced by special effort, but their distinction is difficult to grasp and even though they, at the time of the utterance of each part, suggest the universals of particular words, one cannot perform any verbal usage with them, because universals do not, at that time, have many elements to suggest them. But when a

succession of the parts is gradually perceived, verbal usage based on particular universals becomes possible.

Grammarians do not necessarily accept the view current in other śāstras regarding the mode of suggestion of the universals.⁵ Suggestors do not necessarily suggest what inheres in them. Even though the universal of a word may not inhere in the word, when the mind is prepared by the successive impressions left by the cognition of the previous phonemes of a word, the universal of the word, previously not cognised or indistinctly cognised, is perceived through the cognition of the last phoneme.⁶ One infers the existence of the universal of a particular word from the recognition which one makes in the form 'This is the same as that' when words like 'vrkṣa' are uttered by parrots, *sārikās*, men etc.

Even those who do not accept the existence of such a universal declare that there is one eternal word which is suggested by the many sounds of a word.⁷ Others still accept divisions in the form of phonemes within the word.⁸ Some others hold that the word is one, whether it be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, but appears to have parts produced in a sequence. Others still hold that, due to the continuity of tradition, there is constant usage and the speakers are not aware of the beginning of words which are eternal because of uninterrupted usage.⁹

The eternity of meanings is also accepted by some on the basis of the eternity of universals. It has been asked:—

"According to what conception of word-meaning would the analysis "siddhe śabde arthe saṁbandhe" be proper? And the answer is:—

"That it is the universal."¹⁰

In this Bhāṣya passage, the eternity of meanings has been variously explained, according to all the views. It has to be understood according to the Bhāṣya.

The relation is also eternal. What is meant in this: where there is the idea of mutual appurtenance, the relation between word and meaning in the form 'It is this' is. since meaning

cannot be assigned (by grammar)¹¹, eternal, self-existing and not something not known before and made for the first time by some speaker for the benefit of some listener. Therefore the relation between word and meaning is beginningless and unbroken. Or, it may be stated that the relation between word and meaning is that of the illuminator and the illuminated (*prakāśyaprakāśakabhāva*), based upon convention (*samayopādhiḥ*) a kind of fitness, like that between the senses and their objects. Or it may be said that the relation between word and meaning is causality based on unbroken tradition, considering that the cognition (arising from words) having the form of external objects, thought of as external and accepted as having a mental as well as an external object, just as the letters of the script are thought of as the phonemess of the alphabet, because they bring the latter to the minds. It has been said (in order to show that the meaning is essentially mental):—

“They, while explaining their deeds from birth to death, make them present to the mind, objects of the mind.”¹²

What is meant by ‘taught there by the great sages’, is: by the authors of the sūtras etc. Those who have composed the sūtras etc. of the science of Grammar are referred to. The very fact that the sūtras have been composed shows that they considered the words to be eternal. There would be no purpose in composing the science of Grammar if the words were not eternal. Because they would be a matter of mere usage and great cultured persons would not take the trouble of expounding them. Therefore, the science of Grammar proceeds only when the correct forms of words are well established. Others bring forward sūtras like

Tadaśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt.

“This, (the concord of gender and number taught in P. 1, 2, 51.) need not be taught because names are to be accepted as they are (*pramāṇa*).”¹³

as proof that the words are eternal. In the vārttikas also, there are the following statements which show the eternality of the word.

"On the basis that the word, the meaning and their relation are eternal."¹⁴

"That is already proved because the word is eternal."¹⁵

"It is *sphoṭa* which is the word, the sound is only the product of effort"¹⁶ (*vyāyāma*).

"The whole word takes the place of the whole word."¹⁷

In the Bhāṣya also, it has, indeed, been said:—

"This matter has been specifically considered in the Saṅgraha, namely whether the word is eternal."¹⁸

It has also been said in a Bhāṣya passage.

"Word being eternal, the phonemes also should be eternal and changeless."¹⁹

Even if eternity is taken as something merely practical (the teaching of augments and substitutes does not violate it). As has been said:—

"(As) both Khadira and Barbura have fine leaves and yellow stalks, (when one says) 'the Khadira has thorns', (what happens is not that the statement adds thorns which were not there, but that the idea of Khadira which might have extended to both is now restricted to Khadira only.)"²⁰ Similarly, when one, after having said:—

"To the east of the village are the mango-trees" (one adds), "the banyan trees have milk, downward growths and wide leaves".

(all that happens is that the idea of mango-trees which might have been wrongly extended to the banyan trees also now disappears and, in its place, the idea of banyan tree comes).

Or (it might be said) those very sages who have realised the truth and have, in the course of their different teachings, composed Sūtras, Anutantrā (*vārttikas*) and Bhāṣya, have, in the science of Grammar also, declared that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. And their authority in the world is established.

[1. Though the idea is found expressed in the M.Bhā, the actual words are not traceable.

2. *M. Bhā I, p. 13.*

3. *Śabdākṛtivyāpāra hi* etc. This sentence is somewhat obscure. The previous sentences told us that the word stands for the universal and that the universal of a word can co-inhere in it with other lesser universals. If the word stands for the universal, why do we say 'word' instead of saying 'wordness'? This sentence is apparently an answer to that question. The main part of the sentence is *vrkṣaśābdatvādayaḥ śabdā ityapadiśyante* = The universals of words like *Vrkṣaśābdatva* are merely referred to as the words. That is because they are identified (*sarūpatām āpannāḥ*) with the cause of their manifestation (*nimitta*), namely, the individual words. This manifestation is necessary. Otherwise there would be extreme vagueness (*sati vastusampramohe*) and there would be no verbal usage at all.

4. *Karmatvasāmānyādanye utkṣepaṇatvādayasteṣu karmakṣaṇeṣu samavetā abhyupagamyanta eva vaiśeṣikāḥ*—Vṛ.

5. *Na cāvaśyaṃ śāstrāntare pariḍṛṣṭā jātyabhivyaṅgiyā vaiyākaraṇāḥ parigrhyate*. The usual view connected particularly with the Vaiśeṣikas, is that the universal (*jāti*) inheres in the particular which, therefore, reveals it. Though the universal is eternal according to them, it exists in the particular and it can be perceived only as existing in the particular. The latter, therefore, is said to reveal it (*abhivyaṅjaka*). When such a process is described, universals like *ghaṭatva*, existing in *ghaṭa*, are kept in mind. The universal *vrkṣaśābdatva* does not exist in the word *vrkṣa* exactly as *ghaṭatva* exists in the *ghaṭa* and its perception is also a different process which is described in greater detail in the course of the work. For the present, it may be noted that when light and the senses reveal objects, they reveal things which do not inhere in them, but are external to them.

6. There are two views on this question: (1) cognition of the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions left by the cognitions of the previous phonemes, cause the cognition of the universal, (2) the cognition of the last phoneme, together with those of the previous phonemes, leave impressions which cause the cognition of the universal.

7. *Yair apyākṛtivyavahāro nābhyupagamyate* etc. The same word, uttered by different persons, at different times or even by parrots etc, is recognised as the same word. But this recognition of identity must not be confused with the universal. If it were the universal it should rest on a particular word as *ghaṭatva* rests on, a particular *ghaṭa*. But it seems to be somewhat independent of it. So it is conceived by some as an eternal independent entity and not as a universal. The fact that it is suggested by the impressions left by the different phonemes of a word also points to the same conclusion.

8. Vṛ. remarks: *parasparavyāvṛttī varṇāstatreṭi bhāgavantaṃ sphoṭaṃ manyante*.

9. *Vyavahāranityatayā nityāḥ śabdā iti. Vyavahāranityatā, vyavasthānityatā, pravāhanityatā*, all mean continuity as distinguished from *Kūṭasthanityatā*, absolute eternality or changelessness.

10. M.Bhā. I, p. 7, l. 8.

11. *Arthānādeśanāt. tacca laghvartham. ko hi samartho dhātuprātipadikapratyayanipātānām arthān ādeṣṭum.* (M.Bhā. I, p. 363).

12. M.Bhā. on P. 3.1.26.

13. P. 1.2.53.

14. M.Bhā. I.1.

15. Not traceable.

16. Not found in the Vārttikas nor in the M.Bhā.

17. M.Bhā on P. 1.1.20 (I, p. 75).

18. M.Bhā. I. p. 6, l. 12.

19. M.Bhā. I. p. 18, l. 14-15.

20. M.Bhā. I. p. 113, l. 12.]

24-26. The meanings which have been obtained by abstraction, those which are of a fixed character, the forms which have to be grammatically analysed and those which are used as means for this purpose, the relations consisting in causality and fitness which lead to merit and understanding of meaning in the case of correct forms and to the understanding of meaning only in the case of incorrect ones, these have been described in this śāstra through indications and direct statements. These are only some which have been dealt with here according to tradition, in order that they may be fixed in memory.

These three verses give the whole of the subject-matter to be dealt with. The abstracted word-meaning is that which was closely connected, but being freed from that connection by an inferred postulated form, it is now abstracted. The form of that separated thing is beyond the range of usage. It is generally established on the basis of postulation, by

following tradition, according to one's understanding and through repeated practice. Similarly, the essence of the word being indivisible, in order that the work of Grammar may proceed, by adopting the method of positive and negative reasoning and postulating their recurrence, the words are separated from the whole and the separated word-meaning is looked upon as what is expressed by them. This separated word-meaning serves the usage of the science of Grammar and also worldly usage based on difference and is similar to usage in Grammar. When this separated meaning rests on one single word, it cannot be determined as true or false. When the mere word tree (*vrkṣa*) or fig-tree (*plakṣa*) is uttered and it is not completed by the addition of a verb, the meanings conveyed by the words cannot be clearly defined. As long as specific actions which keep out others do not set aside the act of mere existence which is the cause of the very use of a word,¹ the verb 'it is' (*asti*), in the third person, denoting existence, though not used, is brought to the mind by the words tree etc., and is understood. These words, looking like single words, when completed by some word or other, are called sentences. Similarly, such divisions as the meaning of the first word (of a compound) the meaning of the second word, the meaning of an outside word, the meaning of the stem, the meaning of the root, the meaning of the suffix etc., are abstracted somehow in many ways from a single word by some scholars without any clear line of demarcation.² The meaning with a fixed character is that which is conveyed by the sentence, it has fictitious divisions, it is specific, one, of the nature of action. It is conveyed by means of the cognitions of the separated word-meanings. Even though the separated elements are cognised, the meanings understood from *namasyati*, (he pays homage) *saṅgrāmayate* (he offers battle) *munḍayati* (he shaves the head) *kutṭayati* (he powders) *carvayati* (he masticates) etc., at the time of the comprehension of the whole, is not complex.³ That is why it has been said:—

“Or it is not necessary, because it is the (complete) word which is used to convey the meaning.”⁴

'Word' here stands for that in which an action is merged. Or one might say that it is only the apparent persistence of the cognition (*sampratyaya*) (of the separated elements) which is referred to here. Accepting the use of the indivisible word to convey the (indivisible meaning, the Bhāṣya-kāra) again says:—

"It is the word which ends in a primary or secondary suffix which has a meaning and not the bare primary and secondary suffixes."⁵

What is meant by 'forms to be grammatically analysed' is this: According to some, it is the individual word which is the limit of grammatical analysis, while according to others, it is the sentence which is the limit.⁶ According to the view that it is the word which is so, when, because of the identity of sounds, the same form of the word is taken, words which have acquired their correct form on the basis of the universal, even when the particulars come on the scene because of connection with other words, would continue to have the form based on the universal, which is an inner factor. The result would be that a word like *śukla* (white), in the singular number and neuter gender, would be connected with other words expressive of the substratum, having some other gender and number. In order that this may not happen, the rule,

"Of the adjectives also, except the universal".⁷

lays down that when words expressive of the substrata which are external factors are to follow, words expressive of quality, should take the gender and number of the words expressive of the substrata. According to the view that grammatical analysis has the sentence as the limit, considering that a quality always exists in something, it is not possible to separate it from its substratum and so, being fully determined, it does not denote the general idea at all. On this point, it has been said:—

"That is natural."⁸

Similarly, it is according to the view that each word in a 'dvandva' compound gets its correct form separately that the vārttika

"In a dvandva compound, the gotra suffix must be elided even in the numbers other than plural?"⁹

has been taught. On the view that it is the whole which gets the correct form, it has been said:—

"Or it may not be taught, as, in a dvandva compound, every word is in the plural number."¹⁰

Similarly, all the sūtras beginning with

"A qualifying word ending in a case-affix, is variously combined with a qualified word ending in a case-affix"¹¹ and

"Words expressive of the standard of comparison and ending in a case-suffix are combined with words expressive of the common property ending in a case-affix,"¹²

are to be understood as having been composed on the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis. It is after accepting that it is the word which has to be grammatically analysed that such divisions as *bhū ti*, *bhū ati*, leading to the understanding of groups of other words (than the sentence) have been postulated and accepted as means (*pratipādaka*).

What is meant by 'causality' is this: when the cognition which has parts of the appearances of the object and is superimposed on the object is taken as the object, then, of that object, the word is the cause. Since the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' is established, that cognition of the meaning is the cause of the application of the word which is within and which is manifested by the sounds. Because of the relation of illuminator and illuminated between particular words and particular meanings, as in the case of the senses and their objects, there is an eternal fitness, not created by anybody, of the expressive words possessing unvarying and well-established correctness in regard to the meanings expressed by them.¹³ In the case of words whose relation with their meanings is not established at the time of their first application, the fitness depends upon convention.

The relation of the correct word with its meaning becomes auxiliary to the understanding of the meaning and when it is used with a knowledge of Grammar,¹⁴ it becomes auxiliary to the manifestation of merit. In the production of special knowledge of the meaning, it brings about a condition similar to perception. Corrupt forms, on the other hand, become, like winking etc., auxiliary to the production of special knowledge in the manner of inference, by their connection with what is connected with the meaning.

What is meant by "These have been described through indications" is this:—When, in order to carry on the work of Grammar, the analysis of some unified meaning is made, there can be difference of opinion among men regarding the different limits of the (analysed) meanings. How is it to be known whether the suffix 'ñic' is to be added to the root when the causative is to be expressed or whether it is to be added to the root of which it is the meaning?¹⁵ Similarly, in regard to the sūtra

"When the idea of the feminine is to be expressed"¹⁶ the doubt arises whether the suffixes 'tāp' etc., are to be added to a nominal stem when the idea of the feminine gender is to be expressed or to a stem which includes the feminine gender in its own meaning. Similarly, the doubt arises: the meaning of which element is important in a compound-word formed according to the rule.

"The negative particle 'na' may be compounded with a word connected with it in meaning and the resulting compound word is to be called tatpuruṣa."¹⁷

These options do not exist in the world, because the worldly meaning is the whole and in regard to that, there is no deviation. The alternatives adopted by men being thus indefinite, that option is accepted by which the decisions of the Science of Grammar are not affected. Similarly, that the meanings of the inflectional suffixes are the numbers one etc., or the accessories to the actions like the object, that the meaning of a nominal stem is the group of five or of four or of three, such alternative views are due to the variations in human intelligence.¹⁸ Action, accessory to action

and time are also analysed as the expressed meanings in different ways by different people. It has been said:

"The root stands for the accessories, action and time, person and number, that is the verb; gender and number, accessories to action, this is what the nominal stem stands for."¹⁹

That the ātmanepada suffix comes after a root which expresses mere action or the object of action, that the parasmaipada suffix is added to a root which expresses the agent has been said on the basis of an imaginary separation. The statement

"After conveying its own meaning (the universal) which inheres (in its substratum) the word, (though) free from any further requirement, denotes the substance"

is nothing more than the following of the order in which the understanding takes place.²⁰ A word does not convey its own meaning and others by pausing again and again, because it is uttered only once. Nor is it ever separated from its meaning. Nor is there any fixed sequence in the understanding of the meaning by the hearer or the speaker.²¹ The object, qualified by all the attributes, a bundle of all the parts, which are closely linked, comes at one and the same time within the range of a single cognition and later, one deliberately analyses it into different cognitions. But, since an intuition leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the reunification of what has been divided, one again understands the connected form. The sequence of the cognitions of the speaker or the hearer who understands the parts separately, through considerations of proximity, width of scope, abundance of the causes of manifestation, the desire to know and the tendency to awaken the seed of another cognition²² is not fixed in regard to the parts which are to be understood. For it has been said:—

"The one object is divided in many ways on the basis of difference of powers, by following the different forms of cognition, by those who know the nature of knowledge."

The meaning with a fixed character in the Science of Grammar is either the word-meaning or the sentence-meaning. For it has been said:—

“Or no, for it is the word which is used to convey the meaning.”²³ and

“What is extra, that is the meaning of the sentence.”²⁴ In the Saṅgraha also, it has been said:—

“What is called the word is not fixed in its form. The form and the meaning of a word are born from the meaning of a sentence.”

Even though the form of the word to be explained is determined, according to the view that the sentence is the limit of analysis, there is no fixity in the form to be accepted when it comes to division into stem and suffix, of words like *marutta*, *indrāṇī*, *aikāgārika*, *giriśa*, *śrotriya*, *kṣattriya* etc.²⁵ It has been said:—

“The word with its meaning comes from the meaning (of the sentence). It is through the word that the meaning of a sentence is determined. The sentence is born of a collection of words and the word is born of a collection of phonemes.”

At the time of derivation, it is stated that the word exists in the sentence and that the word is born of a collection of phonemes.

The relation has also been shown as that of cause and effect. For example:—

“They, describing their fortunes from birth to death, reveal them as existing, as figuring in the mind.”²⁶

Here and there, the relation has also been described as fitness. For example:—

“Expression, on the other hand, is natural.”²⁷ While the colour remains the same, the words *śoṇa*, *karka* and *hema* are applied to a horse and not to a cow and others.²⁸

Similarly, it has been said:—

"Among those who work and study equally, some are rewarded with understanding while others are not"²⁹ and so on.

"Such roots having the circumflex accent and \tilde{n} as indicative letter have been taught by the Teacher which are both, i.e., the fruit of whose action is meant for the agent and not meant for the agent."³⁰

The author of the Saṅgraha says:—

"When the word and the meaning are separated, there is division in usage. Because (really speaking) the unity of the word and the meaning is established."

Again he says:—

"Neither in the world nor in the Veda is there any person who creates the relation. How can the relation of words (with meanings) be created through words?"

[1. *Yeyam aupacārikī sattā sā sarvaśabdapravṛttikāraṇam* (Vṛ.).

2. It is not merely the indivisible meaning of the sentence which is artificially divided but the meaning of a single word can also be so divided. The addition of the verb *asti* to the single word *vṛkṣa* shows that even sentences consisting of single words are artificially divided.

3. *Namasyati* etc. Even though *namasyati* is explained as *namaḥ karoti*, 'he pays homage' as involving an agent' an object and an action, what is understood from it in the end does not involve such differentiation, but is a unified whole. The separation of the elements at the time of the explanation is artificial. When grammar speaks about primary and secondary suffixes and their meanings, it is all artificial. It is the whole word ending in one of these suffixes which has a meaning. See P. 3.1.17, 19, 21; 25.

4. Vā. 19 on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).

5. M.Bhā. I. p. 319, I. 6.

6. *Padāvadhikam anvākhyānam*. The word *śukla* ordinarily denotes the quality white. When one wants the word to denote, not the quality, but the thing which has that quality, the suffix *matup* has to be added to the word according to P. 5.2.94. But the elision of this suffix after words expressive of quality has also been taught. Thus when the word means 'a white thing' the form would still be *śukla*. Thus the word *śukla* denotes two different things: the quality white and the thing having that quality. The fact of being white

(*śuklatva*) exists in both and, on that basis, the word gets its form; namely, its singular number and neuter gender: *śuklam*. Even when a word expressive of the thing or things in which the quality resides is used like *paṭāḥ*, the word *śuklam* which has already acquired its form according to the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis, would retain it and we would get the expression: *śuklam paṭāḥ*. But as the expression is wrong, Pāṇini, in order to prevent its occurrence; says: *Viśeṣaṇānām cājāṭeḥ* (P. 1.2.52). According to this rule, adjectives take the gender and number of the words which they qualify. The very fact that he makes such a sūtra shows that he considers the word to be the limit of grammatical analysis.

Vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam. According to this view, a quality always resides in its substratum. It cannot be thought of in isolation. The gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum would inevitably belong to the word expressive of the quality. Therefore words like *śukla* never express the quality white, in isolation. So it would never have the singular number and neuter gender in isolation. It would have the gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum where it resides. Therefore, no special sūtra is necessary to bring it about. That is why it has been declared unnecessary in the sūtra *Tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt* (P. 1.2.53).

7. P. 1.2.52.

8. M.Bhā. I. p. 430, l. 11.

9. Vā. 5. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 490).

10. Vā. 8. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 491).

11. P. 2.1.57.

12. P. 2.1.55.

13. See the Vṛtti on Kā 23.

14. *Sabdapūrvake vā prayoge*. See Vā. 9, Paspasāhnikā and the M. Bhā thereon. But *śabdapūrvaka prayoga* which leads to *dharma* and *abhyudaya* must be distinguished from *śabdapūrvā yoga* which is mentioned in several places in the Vṛtti. See the Vṛtti on Kā 14, 131, 142. It must also be distinguished from *Vāgyoga* which is already mentioned in the M. Bhā, Paspasāhnikā and here in the Vṛtti on I. 130.

15. P. 3. 1. 26.

16. P. 4.1.3.

17. P. 2.2.6.

18. There are different views current among grammarians as to the number of meanings which a bare stem (*prātipadika*) can convey. Some hold that it can denote five things (*pñcaka*): *svārtha* (the universal), *dravya* (the particular) *liṅga* (gender), *saṃkhyā* (number) and accessory to action (*kāraka*). For example, in the sentence *dadhy ānaya*, the word *dadhi* denotes all the five things, even though, in form,

it is no more than the bare stem. Others think that the accessory to action is conveyed by the suffix and so attribute only four (*catuṣka*) to the bare stem. Others think that number also is the meaning of the suffix, in which case only three (*trika*) remain for the bare stem. If the feminine gender is considered to be the meaning of the feminine suffix, the bare stem would convey only two ideas (*dvika*).

19. According to Vṛṣabha, this is a sūtra belonging to the Kāśakṛtsna school. He is also our sole authority for the meanings of the technical words used in the sūtra. From his explanation it follows that, according to Kāśakṛtsna, the suffixes do not express any meaning apart from what the root or the nominal stem expresses. As Vṛ. puts it: *pratyayānāmavyatirikṭārtābhīdhānāt*. It is also to be noted that, in the supposed sūtra of Kāśakṛtsna, which verbal element expresses which meaning is directly stated, so that one does not have to depend on indications.

20. *Pratipattikramaniyamānugamamātram—Na śabdagato' abhīdhānakramo' pi tu pratipattiyapratipattikramah* (Vṛ.).

21. *Pratipattikramo hy ayaṁ śrotur abhīdhātur vā na vyavasthitaḥ*. The idea is that there is no sequence at all. The following sentence makes it clear.

22. In understanding the parts abstracted from the unified whole, the speaker or the hearer is guided by the following factors, as explained by Vṛṣabha:—1. *Pratyāsatti*=proximity. It is the universal which exists in a particular that helps one to distinguish the latter from other kinds of particulars. So that universal is proximate to the particular and, therefore, it is understood first. But the universal cannot be understood except through the particular in which it inheres nor can gender be understood except through the particular in which it resides. So, through the desire to cognise the universal and proximity to gender, the particular is grasped. Gender is understood before number and accessory because it does not depend upon any other particular for its comprehension and it also helps to distinguish the particular in which it exists from other particulars; 2. Width of scope (*mahāvīśayatva*) can be seen in the universal which inheres in all the particulars. Compared to gender, the particular has a wider scope, because all the genders can exist in the particular. One gender excludes the others and so it has a narrower scope. Gender is wider in scope than number, because the same gender can cover all numbers, whereas one number excludes the other numbers. As all the particulars can manifest the universal, the latter has abundant causes of manifestation; 3. (*abhi-vyaktinimittopavyāñjanaprakarṣa*). The universal has more manifestors compared to the particular which is manifested by its own parts only; 4. The desire to know (*upalipsā*) is also a factor: what is desired to be known first is known first. Finally, all cognitions have inner dispositions (*bīja*) among their causes. They are awakened (*vytilābha*) before the cognitions take place. The cog-

niton of the universal tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise the particular while that of the latter tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise gender etc. This is what is called; 5. *bijavṛttilābhānuṣṇyam*.

23. Vā. 19, on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).

24. M.Bhā on Vā. 2. on P. 2.3.49. (M.Bhā. I. p. 462).

25. These words can be analysed in different ways —

Marutta: *Marut* + *tap* (Vā. 10 on P. 5.2.122) or *Marut* + *dā* + *kta*, in the sense of *marudbhir dattaḥ*, the root *dā* being elided.

Indrāñi: *Indra* + *ānuk* + *ñiṣ* or *Indra* + *ān* (causative of *an*) + *añ* + *ñip*.

Aikāgārika: *Ekāgāra* + *ṭhañṭ* or *Ekāgāra* + *ṭhañ*.

Giriśa: *Giri* + *śi* + *ḍa* (*aunādika*) or *Giri* + *śa* (*matvarthīya*).

Śrotṛiya: *nipāta* according to P. 5.2.84. or *Chandas* = *śrotra* + *ghan* (*adhīte ityarthe*).

Kṣatriya: *Kṣatra* + *gha* or *Kṣatra* + *iya*.

26. M. Bhā on Vā. 15 on P. 3.1.26.

27. Vā. 15 on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 433).

28. Cf. M.Bhā. Vol. I. p. 433. It is there pointed out that the words *śoṇa*, *hema* and *karka* which mean red, black and white respectively, can be applied only to a horse of that colour and not to other animals of the same colour.

29. M.Bhā. on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 430, l. 12).

30. M.Bhā. on P. 1.3.72. (Vol. I. p. 292, l. 22).

27. The correct words, acquired from the cultured through tradition, are the means of obtaining merit. The incorrect words, while not differing from them as far as conveying of the meaning is concerned, are of an opposite character.

Just as other means of attaining merit, received through uninterrupted tradition consisting of successive teaching of the cultured, or just as prohibited things like injury to others, telling lies, stealing etc., or things neither allowed nor prohibited like hiccup, breathing, scratching etc., are well established and are not to be doubted, in the same way, the distinction between what is correct and what is not is based on unbroken tradition and is not to be doubted, but is to be accepted according to tradition.

28. Whether words be eternal or otherwise, their beginning is not known. As in the case of living beings, there is what is called continuity (*vyavasthānityatā*).

¹Whether one accepts the view that the words are eternal and manifested or the view that they exist beforehand and undergo modifications like birth etc., or the view that they do not exist beforehand but are made audible and become inaudible again (*sopākhyanirupākhyatvam*), in any case, there was no first stage in which verbal usage did not exist nor will there be a future stage when it will not exist. For those who declare that God, Time, the Puruṣas,² knowledge, the individual soul (*kṣetrajñā*) to be different (from the effects and their causes), for those who declare this (universe) to be without God, Time, the Puruṣas, knowledge or the individual soul but entirely based on nescience, for those who maintain that the universe, without a before and after and without going beyond the unity of the ultimate, consists of the manifestation of the different forms due to the combined, mutually opposed and indefinable powers, for all of them, there was no first period of time when there was no activity of the living. This is what is called continuity, without a beginning and without an end. It has been said—

“That is also eternal, in which the identity is not destroyed.”³

[1. According to Vṛṣabha, two views are here expressed in regard to words: (1) that they are eternal and, therefore, already existent and manifested at the time of use, (2) that they are produced at the time of use and disappear again. The first view is associated with the Sāṅkhyas, especially Vārṣaganya. The second view seems to be that of the Naiyāyikas. In regard to the universe, the view that it is without God etc., but based entirely on nescience is attributed by Vṛ. to Brahmvādīnaḥ. Some, however, attribute it to the Buddhists and the view expressed in the latter part of the sentence to the Advaitins.

2. Puruṣa — *Puruṣa iti kecit prthivyādisaṃghātām āhuḥ* (Vṛ.).

3. M.Bhā. I. p. 7, 1. 22.]

29. Nobody would establish this system of rules without a purpose. Therefore, this tradition relating to correctness is being composed by the cultured.

Which cultured person, even if he has a confused mind (*saṃbhinnabuddhiḥ*) and no sympathy towards the world,¹ would undertake the regulation of the accent and other signs of correctness of the words of the Veda and of the world which are so difficult to know and to learn and which are the very purpose of Grammar? And such a regulation would not be useless. (If it were) such a regulation made by the cultured would be unacceptable to the others. And it would not be authority in the world for scholars. Therefore, this tradition (relating to words) beginningless, handed down from teacher to pupil, the means of inferring who the cultured persons are, infallible, consisting of general rules and their elaborations, is being composed in different ways, through direct statements and by implication.

[1. *Samhinnabuddhir api lokam pratyabhinivīṣṭaḥ*. The reasoning behind this expression is not clear. The purpose of this verse is to justify the composition of the science of grammar. Four reasons are put forward justifying its composition: (1) that it is eternal, (2) that it has been handed down from teacher to pupil, (3) that it helps us to infer who is cultured and who is not, (4) that it gives an infallible knowledge of correctness. Those who are confused as to what is right and what is wrong (*saṃbhinnabuddhiḥ*) and have no sympathy for the world (*lokam pratyabhinivīṣṭaḥ*) would not be able to undertake the composition of the science of grammar. Vṛ. seems to have had the reading: *lokam pratyabhinivīṣṭaḥ* which can mean, according to him, "*api nāmāyaṃ lokaḥ khedāyāsābhyāṃ yuyeta iti vyutthita-buddhir abhinivīṣṭaḥ*" = one who would like the world to be troubled by pain and fatigue. But Vṛ. considers the former reading easier to explain.]

30. Dharma cannot be determined by reasoning alone, without the help of tradition. Even the knowledge of the Seers is due to their previous observance of the tradition.

All thinkers, when they reach the extreme, have recourse to the own nature of things. The determination of the own nature of actions having invisible fruits can be made only with the help of tradition. How can one trust human reasoning in which the similarities and differences of things are never certain and which is, therefore, always doubtful? Even in the case of those individuals who have adopted a particular mode of intellectual and spiritual life and are known to have acquired qualities which reasoning cannot explain, it is said that, because of their adherence to the injunctions of the Āgama (Tradition), their souls are purified and a divine knowledge is manifested in them.¹ To assume that such knowledge is natural to them would be to condemn all special effort² as fruitless and obstacles to such knowledge would also arise naturally.

[1. Sage Kapila is usually given as the example of one, who possessed divine knowledge capable of seeing the past, the present and the future, the subtle (*sūkṣma*), the distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*) and the hidden (*vyavahita*).

2. The effort made by persons to acquire the kind of knowledge that Kapila had is meant here. *Vṛ.* says: *yatna ity abhyāsādikaḥ.*]

31. Nobody can violate, on the basis of reasoning, those paths of Dharma which have come down without a break, because they are accepted in the world.

In spite of many variations in the doctrines of the cultured, there are well-known beneficial modes of conduct, common to all; to go against them would not be liked by the people. They have never been refuted by mere reasoning. It may be that some do, on the basis of some passage in the tradition itself,¹ resort to a reprehensible mode of conduct, opposed to what is accepted in the world.

[1. *Te'pi hi vedāntadarsanam anyathā parikalpya pravṛttāḥ*—*Vṛ.* According to this, it is some passage of the Vedānta, i.e., the Upaniṣads, which is misunderstood by some people and made the basis of reprehensible conduct. Could it be such a passage as *na kāñcana pariharet* (Chā. Up. 2.13.)]

32. It is extremely difficult to establish by reasoning the nature of objects, because their properties differ according to difference in circumstances, place and time.

The inference, after seeing what is connected and considered invariably concomittant or something similar to it, of another thing which is not visible, does not lead to any certainty in regard to that invisible thing. One sees that the nature of things of proved strength and quality in certain circumstances, varies, in other circumstances, visible or invisible to ordinary persons. Even the properties of external things like seeds and plants are suspended in certain circumstances. Similarly, properties of things change with change of place. Waters of the Himalayas are very cold to the touch. But similar waters found in clouds, a water-boiler and the like are warm to the touch. The ordinary man (*arvāgdarśana*), misled by external resemblance, is unable to see the difference and can see it only with the help of tradition. Similarly, properties of things change with time. The temperature of the waters of a well and the like, is very different in summer and winter. Which intelligent man would try to demonstrate, by mere reasoning, this subtle difference in nature, imperceptible to the ordinary man, unascertainable by inference and incomprehensible except through knowledge derived from tradition?

33. The known power of an object to produce different effects is inoperative when it comes into contact with particular objects or factors.

The proved power of fire etc., to bring about destruction in wood etc., is inoperative in regard to such things as masses of clouds. Similarly, due to the action of magical formulae, special herbs or chemical products, the power (of fire) to burn even inflammable objects is suspended. Substances whose powers are proved in some cases are of doubtful effectiveness in other cases.

34. Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones.¹

Substance is different from quality because the latter qualifies the former. It is like this. Even though there would be the difference of qualifier and qualified in both cases, the word 'king' can qualify the word 'kingdom' (as in the phrase 'the king's kingdom' = *rājñō rāṣṭram*) but not the word 'hermit'. The word sandal can qualify the word 'smell', but not the word colour. Therefore, substance is different from quality. Even though the separate identity of substance is thus established, it has been said that the argument is not sound. The fact is that words sometimes convey the general and sometimes the particular. To qualify the word smell or the like with the word sandal which stands for something having a particular colour, shape etc., has a purpose. To qualify it with the mere word colour would be useless, because colour is a general word and as much as it conveys was already known. When the question 'whose man is this' is asked the answer 'the king's' is given in order to exclude other possible masters. Nobody would answer 'of some person', because that much was already known. Others give another example: Even though a word and a stanza have this much in common that both are parts of a hymn (which is a collection of words), a stanza can qualify a word (as in the expression 'the word of a stanza' = *ṛcaḥ padam*) but not vice-versa (one would not say: the stanza of the word). Another argues differently: It is on the assumption of identity that the word sandal qualifies the word smell and the word colour does not. So the reason given: 'because the latter qualifies the former' to prove difference (between substance and quality) should prove the opposite. The problem arises because of particular meanings which figure or do not figure in the mind when words are uttered. Therefore, the inference of something which is invisible from what is visible is alright if it is not opposed to tradition. It is a fact that minor acts, closely connected with particular major acts like

cooking and ordinarily leading to their inference, may be performed by some for deceiving others.²

[1. Cf. *Tathā hi kaiścid abhiyuktair yatnenotpreksitāstarkā abhiyuktāntarairanyairābhāsyamānā dṛśyante*—Śaṅk. Bhā. on Br. Sū II. 1. 11.

2. The purpose of this kārīkā is to show that reasoning, unsupported by tradition, is unreliable and that the reasoning of one may be upset by another. The argument of the Naiyāyika to prove that substance is different from quality is taken as an example. His argument, briefly, is: Substance is different from quality because the latter can qualify the former. Against this, others point out that the argument is weak because both what is different and what is not different from another can qualify it in some cases and cannot qualify it in other cases. A king and a kingdom are different from each other and we can say: the king's kingdom (*rājño rāṣṭram*). Here 'king' qualifies 'kingdom'. But, on this analogy, we cannot say: the hermit's kingdom, even though the hermit and the kingdom are also different from each other. Similarly, we can say 'the smell of sandal', but we cannot say 'the smell of something having colour', even though in both cases, there is difference between the two things. To come to cases where there is no difference, we can say: *āmrāṇāṃ vanam* = a grove of mango-trees. Here mango-trees qualify grove, though the grove is not different from the trees. That which qualifies must keep out something. When we say, the smell of sandal, the word sandal keeps out other things having smell like flowers. When we say, the king's man, the word 'king's' keeps out other possible masters. It is not, therefore, the fact of being different which enables qualifiers to qualify a substance. Sometimes, the whole qualifies a part as in '*ṛcaḥ padam*' = the word of a stanza or *grhasya dvāraśālā* = the parlour of the house. Here the house qualifies the parlour, because parlour is part of the house. In other words, the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot prove that two things are different from each other.]

35. The experts' knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones and coins, uncommunicable to others, is born of practice and not of reasoning.

Expert examiners of coins, goldsmiths etc., even after having found out the subtle reasons for deciding the genuineness of coins like a *kārṣāpana*, are not able to communicate them to others, because these reasons have no words to express them. Even experts, full of concentration, do not understand, without long practice, the distinction between

ṣaḍja, *ṛṣabha*, *gāndhāra*, *dhaivata* etc., even though, it comes within the range of perception.¹

[1. The purpose of this verse seems to be to point out that, in order to understand certain things, it is necessary, not only to make use of perception, inference and tradition, but a fourth thing called, *abhyāsa*, practice. The knowledge which the expert acquires about the genuineness of precious stones is something which he cannot communicate to others nor has it been communicated to him by others. That is why it is said to be different from tradition which can be communicated to others.]

36. The extraordinary powers of the *Pitṛs*, the demons and the goblins, going beyond perception and inference, are the results of their previous deeds.

In all circles of thought, it is admitted that deaf people and others hear sounds in their dreams and that some persons can see minute things inside houses through thick walls, without breaking them. When the question arises as to the means by which this is done, one cannot think of anything else than the indefinable power of *adr̥ṣṭa*, the result of deeds done in previous births.¹

[1. Vr. points out that those who become deaf after birth may hear sounds in dreams because of the impressions of sounds heard before becoming deaf. But those who are born deaf also hear sounds in dreams. And then there are the manes, demons and goblins who can see the past, the distant and the hidden. All this is due to the effect of deeds done in previous birth. This faculty is called *adr̥ṣṭa* which must be distinguished from perception, inference, tradition and practice.]

37. The knowledge of the past and the future of those whose insight has manifested itself and whose mind is in no way tainted differs in no way from perception.

According to the view that the effect is a totally new product (*asatkāryavāda*) it is, before its creation, without

a basis, without a form, without an essence, something in regard to which the causal power of something cannot be determined nor specified. How then can it be understood? According to the other view (*satkāryavāda*) its specific form (before creation) is not manifest, it is unknown for the purpose of worldly transactions, it is as good as totally non-existent. But cultured persons, whose impurities have been burnt away by austerities, whose cognitions are free from all limitations, see everything vividly reflected in their cognitions.¹

[1. Vṛ. points out that the purpose of this Kārikā is to state that in addition to ordinary perception, there exists another. Only those whose impurities have been washed away have it. It is the result of their good deeds in previous births. Through that, they can see the past and the present.

While explaining the expression: *adṛṣṭāpratiniyata-kāraṇaśakti-parigrahaṃ*, Vṛ. points out that the different kinds of inference: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatoḍṛṣṭa*, cannot enable us to determine what has causal power in regard to which effect, no matter what view of causality we adopt, whether it be *asatkāryavāda* or *satkāryavāda*.]

38. The words of those who, with their divine vision, see things which are beyond the senses and unknowable, cannot be set aside by reasoning.

The supreme inner Controller, the atoms which are the abode of the initial cause of creation, the unmanifested Word—Absolute which is the substratum of its powers, the gods,¹ the residual forces² generated by action, leading to particular results and not to others, in their maturity, the divine other-worldly body,³ and other such things known in all scholarly circles, imperceptible to the senses like colour and beyond the range of inner experience like happiness are undoubtedly perceived by the sages with their extraordinary eye. The words of these sages, dealing with matters beyond the range of inference, cannot be upset by reasoning which is so liable to err.⁴ People born blind cognise colour and as they had never seen colour before, it cannot be a case of inference.

[1. Those who have a visible or concrete form and those who have not—Vṛ.

2. *Anubandha-pariṇāma-śaktivaikalyāni*. The residual force of action is *anubandha*; when under favourable circumstances, the force yields the result of the action in question, it is *pariṇāma*; its inability to yield any other result is *śaktivaikalya*.

3. *Sūkṣmamātivāhikaṃ śarīram*. Vṛ. says that this refers to the intermediary body which the dead person acquires before he gets his next body. It is called intermediary, because it enables the person to cross over.

4. *Vyabhicāribhir anumānaiḥ*—This is a reference to the point already made in Kā. 32 and 34 that all reasoning is unreliable and liable to be upset by other reasoning.]

39. How can one who does not question the authority of such persons any more than his own experience and has, therefore, taken his stand on direct vision, be set aside by others (who follow reasoning)?

There are in every branch (of the Veda) and for everybody, some trustworthy persons. Their words are not scrutinised and are not to be doubted any more than one's own perception. Whose actions, like making stones float on water, though not actually seen, can be believed on the authority of trustworthy persons who follow them. It is like this. That actions done in this world lead to desirable or undesirable fruit after death is accepted in the world on the authority of trustworthy persons and even without such teaching in the Scripture, all persons usually accept it.

40. In order to decide what is good and what is bad, all men, including the lowest, have very little use for scripture;¹

Therefore, direct perception and extra-sensory cognition (of the sages) set aside reasoning even when there is contradiction between the two.

[1. This verse is found in the Śl. Vār. (verse 3, p. 209. (Chowkhambha edition). It is there given as that of Pārāśarya, i.e., Vyāsa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, in his Nyāyamañjarī, also gives it as a quotation from Vyāsa. Here, however, it is not given as a quotation, but as an integral part of the Vākyapadiya itself.]

41. One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the 'I' consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning.¹

The spontaneous and eternal consciousness which is attested by our sense of 'I am' and the like, is not set aside even by the teaching of authoritative persons that there is neither 'I' nor 'mine' even in the case of liberated souls as far as worldly life is concerned. Such is the case with Tradition in the form of Scripture and written tradition accepted by all cultured people. It is not violated in the matter of what should be done and what should not be done, what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which woman one cannot marry by the followers of different doctrines. One who closely follows such a tradition observed by the elders cannot deviate from the right path by accepting the reasoning of logicians. Thus, he remains irreproachable in the eyes of the world.

[1. Mere reasoning such as that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation being eternal and known from the world, it is not necessary to compose the science of Grammar.]

42. Fall is not unlikely in the case of one who relies on reasoning, as in the case of a blind man who walks along a difficult path by groping with the hands.

Just as one, who, after seeing a sample, accepts the rest according to the maxim of the rice in the cooking pot (*sthū-līpulākanyāya*)¹ is like a blind man who goes hurriedly on a difficult hilly path without the help of one who can see,

understands a part of the path by groping with his hands, traverses it, and, on that basis, takes the rest of the path also to be similar and comes to grief, in the same way, one who, without the help of the eye of Tradition, relies on reasoning and, after having attained confidence in some matters through inference only, proceeds, without the help of tradition, to perform acts having visible and invisible results, inevitably incurs great sin.

[1. *Sthālīpulākanyāya*. See JACOB—*A Handful of Popular Maxims*—1, p. 53.]

43. Therefore, on the basis of eternal Scripture and authoritative tradition, the cultured have composed this science of the explanation of the words.

Therefore, teachers have composed this science of the explanation of words (Grammar) after having taken as authority the tradition which is not connected with any person, not to be doubted and calculated to teach man what is good for him, after having accepted, as in the case of words like *prṣodara*¹ the uninterrupted practice of their own schools, acceptable to the cultured, in regard to the use of the correct forms of words and after having taken as authority, the works of earlier sages in which option is allowed where there is contradiction between two teachings, in which there are main rules and their exceptions and in which there is great variation, according to time, in the manner of presentation of the forms of words.²

[1. *Prṣodara*. See P. 6.3.109—*Prṣodarāṇi yathopadiṣṭam*.

2. *Pratikālaṃ drṣṭaśabdasvarūpavyabhicārāṇi* Vṛṣabha understands this in two ways: (1) during periods when men are intellectually strong, everything is taught in great detail; at other times, briefly. This is one variation according to time. (2) At one time, one form of a word is taught as leading to happiness (merit) and another form at another time. At one time, *nyāṅkavam* was correct but now *nai-yaṅkavam* is correct.]

✓44. In the words which are expressive the learned discern two elements: one is the cause of the real word which, the other, is used to convey the meaning.

That is called the expressive word which takes over the meaning, imposes it on its own form, makes it identical with itself, as it were. It has been said in the Saṅgraha.

“According to the view that it is the undivided word which conveys the meaning,¹ the expressive word has its own form (which is the basis of its usage and grammatical explanation). According to the view that the word can be divided into meaningful parts,² the basis of the formation of the word is the element delimited by meaning. Others are of the view that the word which conveys the meaning (does not express it but only) suggests it, because in that way, the use of the relation of the identity of the word and the meaning in the form ‘It is this’ would be possible.³” Or the word *upādāna* may be taken to mean the whole which is to be accepted (for the operation of the rule). It is like this: where a word stands for its own form, its parts are not taken into consideration and no division is, therefore, cognised.⁴ What is meant by ‘one is the cause of the real word’ is: the cause of that, standing on which or resting on which or based on which the sounds convey the meaning. What is meant by ‘the other is used to convey the meaning’ is—By the activity of the articulatory organs, it attains modification, becomes audible, depends, as the illuminator, always on the illuminated⁵ and is used to convey the meaning. According to others, that in which there is no inner sequence is the cause, that which has acquired sequence conveys the meaning. They proclaim that even that conveys the meaning when it enters the mind of the listener with all sequence suppressed. Another maintains that what has sequence is the cause of what has none. In the sequenceless word are merged both the expressive power (*śrutiśakti*) and the power of being expressed (*arthaśakti*). It has been said—

"From the differentiated, the undifferentiated word is born and it expresses the meaning. The word assumes the form of the meaning and enters into relation with it."

[1. *Avyutpattipakṣa*. When a word cannot be divided into meaningful parts, the whole of it is associated with a meaning which is not related to the meanings of its parts, because there are no parts.

2. *Vyutpattipakṣa*. Where a word can be divided into meaningful parts, the meaning of the whole is sought to be connected with the meaning of the parts.

3. *Dyotaka*. Those who hold that the word is suggestive (and not expressive = *vācaka*) seem to mean that the relation of expressive and expressed presupposes difference between word and meaning. But there is *abheda* between the two. Therefore, the word cannot be *vācaka*, it can only be *dyotaka*.

4. Sometimes, a word stands for its own form and not for a meaning different from the form. That is mostly the case in grammatical rules. P. 4.2.33 "*agner ḍhak*" says that the suffix *ḍhak* (= *eya*) is to be added to *agni*. Here *agni* naturally stands for its own form and not for what it means. Therefore, it cannot be divided into parts. The suffix can be added only to the word as a whole and not to any part of it. *Agni* is *svarūpapadārthaka*.

5. *Pratyāyaparatantra*. "*Tadākāropagraheṇopasthānāt*"—Vr. The word as *prakāśaka*, naturally depends upon the meaning which is *prakāśya* or *pratyāyā*. It is supposed always to carry the reflection of the meaning.]

45. That there is an essential difference between them is the view of some followers of tradition. Others, on the other hand, think that they are one but appear to be different owing to difference in the point of view.

When the word 'essential difference' is the object of the verb *brū* (*āhuh*), it takes the second case-affix (*dvitīyā*) but when the whole sentence as uttered by the followers of tradition is imitated, it takes the first case-affix (*prathamā*). According to the view that the effect is different from the cause, the difference between the two (kinds of words mentioned in the previous verse) is clear. According to the other view (that the effect is not different from the cause)

one and the same thing is thought of as two on the basis of difference in point of view resulting from its two powers. Or the difference of opinion among ancient thinkers may be based on their difference of opinion regarding the identity or difference of the universal and the particular of words.¹ This matter will be discussed in detail later.

[1. *śabdākṛtivyaktibhedābheda*—“*Tatra keṣāṃcie chabdākṛtir nimit-
taṃ śabdavyaktir vācikā. Apareṣāṃ etad eva viparītaṃ. Tayoś ca kecid
bhedaṃ abhedaṃ cāpare pratipannāḥ.* (Vṛ.)]

46. Just as the fire which is within the churn-sticks is the cause of the other fire (which is kindled), similarly, the word which is in the mind (of the speaker) becomes the cause of the different expressive words.

Just as one sees that, both according to the doctrine of identity and that of difference,¹ the fire, at first in the form of seed and unmanifested is later kindled into a flame and its capacity to illuminate itself and others, previously imperceptible, becomes later perceptible, in the same way, the word in the mind which has the seeds of differentiation in it, comes near to manifestation when the seeds become mature and is manifested by the movements of the articulatory organs and due to differentiation in the manifesting sounds, appears to have divisions and is perceived as having inner sequence and illuminates its own form and others.²

[1. *Ekadvapakṣa* and *nānadvapakṣa* stand for *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* respectively.

2. The word exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity. When he utters it and produces the different sounds by the movements of the articulatory organs, it appears to have differentiation. But the listener ultimately perceives it as a unity and it is then that it conveys the meaning. In this verse, the word which exists in the speaker's mind as a unity is described as the *nimitta*. As Vṛ. puts it: *Sa eva vaktṛbuddhistho'nabhivyaṅkto nimittam.*]

47. First conceived in the mind and applied to some meaning or other, the word is suggested by the sounds which are produced by the articulatory organs.

When the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' (*so'yam*) is analysed, the word which is sought to be superimposed on the meaning and into which the meaning enters as a kind of reflection (*upayogenānupraveśaṃ labhate*) is, before its utterance, visualised by the mind, applied to a meaning according to the intention of the speaker, seems to change its form into that of another and projects it (on the meaning). What is meant by 'produced by the articulatory organs' is that the word whose nature it is not to change, appears to change, following the manifesting sound whose nature it is to change. The word which is entirely without change appears to change in terms of the gross *nāda*, perceptible like a mass of clouds, brought into being when the subtle all-pervasive sounds (*dhvani*) are amassed (*pracīyamāṇe*) by the movements of the articulatory organs¹.

[1. Three words are used in the *Vṛtti-śabda*, *dhvani* and *nāda*. The first stands for the word which conveys the meaning. The *dhvanis* are conceived of as something atomic, all-pervasive and imperceptible. When amassed by the movements of the articulatory organs, they become gross and perceptible and are then called *nāda*. It is they which suggest the word. The word is first conceived as a unity in the mind of the speaker. In order to utter it, he makes movements of his articulatory organs which have the effect of progressively collecting the subtle, atomic, all-pervading *dhvanis* and bringing into being the *nādas* which are gross and audible. These have divisions and sequence and so the word, suggested by them, though changeless and sequenceless, also seems to have them. The process of accumulation of the atomic *dhvanis*, resembling the accumulation of clouds (*abhrasaṅghātavad*) is referred to in verse 111—"abhrāṇīva pracīyante śabdākhyāḥ paramāṇavaḥ".]

48. Because the gross sound (*nāda*) is produced in a sequence, the word which is neither prior nor posterior nor has any sequence, is manifested as having sequence and parts.

The gross sound (*nāda*) which is in the form of an accumulation on account of the sequential activity (of the articulatory organs) suggests the word (*sphoṭa*) by means of the functions of prevention and permission.¹ Though the word (*sphoṭa*) is one, it appears to have different parts. It has neither sequence nor simultaneity, both being opposed to its one-ness and eternality. Therefore without giving up its one-ness, it appears to have differentiation which is a property of the gross sound associated with it. Such is the nature of what is associated with it. It is like the whole (*avayavī*) which is an absolute unity appearing to be differentiated because of the differentiation of its parts.

[1. *Sapratibandhābhyanujñāyā vṛttyā*. *Pratibandha* (prevention) and *abhyanujñā* (permission) are usually given as the two functions of time, by virtue of which everything happens at its proper time, neither before nor later. Growth, for instance, means that at any of its stages, the later stages cannot appear. Similarly, when a word is uttered, the manifesting sounds can only appear in a sequence. When one appears, the later ones cannot. This is *abhyanujñā* for what appears and *pratibandha* for what does not.]

49. Just as a reflection, found elsewhere (as in water) seems to have movement because of the movement of water, such is the relation between *sphoṭa* and *nāda*.

According to the view that the reflection is identical with what reflects it or according to the opposite view (*anyatvapakṣe*), the reflection of an object like the moon appears to be connected with and to have the properties of its substratum, but it is not really so. Though it has no movements of its own, it takes on the property called movement of water, wave etc., and appears to have the various movements of water etc. Similarly, the word (*sphoṭa*) takes on the properties of the primary sound (*prākṛtadhvani*) when it is looked upon as short, long, or protracted and those of the secondary sound (*vaiṅkṛtadhvani*) when it is looked upon as having quick, medium or slow speed.¹

[1. There are different views about the nature of a reflection: (1) In the presence of the original, a luminous object like water is affected and seems to reflect the original, but it is only a change in the water. There is no reflection apart from the water. (2) The reflection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its material cause. (3) The rays of the eye, turned back by luminous surfaces like those of a mirror, water etc., see the original and that seeing is the reflection. According to the first view (*tattvapakṣa*) the reflection appears to be in the water and to have its movements, but it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second and third views (*anyatvapakṣa*), the reflection is something different from the water. There is no contact between the wind and the reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself. Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection. According to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the word (*sphoṭa*) appears to be short, long or protracted because the sounds which manifest it (*prākṛtadhvani*) are either short, long or protracted or it appears to be of quick, medium or slow speed, because the secondary sounds (*vaiakṛtadhvani*) are such.]

50. Just as, in knowledge, its own form and that of the known are cognised, in the same way, in verbal cognition, the form of the object and that of the word are cognised.

Knowledge is dependent on the object because it is there to illuminate it. Though it is not meant to show its form also, still it does show it separately as another knowledge would.¹ That is how a previous knowledge, not cognised by another knowledge, becomes the object of remembrance. In the same way, the word, in so far as it is secondary to the meaning, is dependent upon it and assumes its form. It also conveys its own form, as a primary thing. Though it is present, it is not resorted to in the world, because it cannot have any relation with actions like eating. In Grammar, on the other hand, the external object is opposed to (grammatical) operations and the own form of the word appears as the meaning of a word and, therefore, there is no opposition between it and action.

[1. Knowledge becomes known in two ways, according to the Vṛtti. It can become the object of another knowledge as in the *anuvyavasāya* of the Naiyāyikas which takes a form like: *ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi* = I have the knowledge of the pot. But even in ordinary forms of knowledge, when an outside object is illuminated, the knowledge itself is also revealed without its becoming the object of another knowledge. That is why we can remember a previous knowledge. Only that which had become the object of a previous knowledge can be remembered.]

51. The energy (*Kratu*) called the word, existing within, as the yolk in the pea-hen's egg, has an action-like function and assumes the sequence of its parts.

The external (audible) word, employed in verbal usage, is merged in the mind after suppressing all assumption of differentiation, without, however, abandoning the residual force of the differentiation, as in the case of the yolk in the egg of the pea-hen.¹ Just as one single word can merge, so can passages consisting of as many as ten parts.² The word, thus merged, with all differentiation suppressed, again assumes differentiation and sequence, when, through the speaker's desire to say something, the inner word is awakened and it becomes the sentence or the word, each with its divisions. It is this merging and emerging of the word which is looked upon as its activity.

[1. *Mayūṛāṇḍarasavat*—a comparison usually brought in to explain how what looks one and simple may actually contain all the potentialities of multiplicity and complexity. See K. A. Subramania Iyer—Some more Nyāyas (*JOR.*, Madras, Vol. 6, p. 342).

2. *Dāśataya*. This word occurs in the Vṛtti on verse 82 also. In both the passages, Vṛ. says that it means *Catuḥśaṣṭiḥ*. See He.'s commentary on Vāk. C. Kā, 66, where the word occurs: *Daśa avayavā yeṣāṃ te daśatayāḥ samudāyāḥ ṛgātmānaḥ. Teṣāṃ śamūhasya daśatayasya catuḥśaṣṭyātmakasya* etc.]

52. Just as the unified image of an original figure is drawn on cloth (in three stages), so does one see the three stages in the case of the word also.

When a painter wishes to paint a figure having parts like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence, then as the object of a single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on a wall in a sequence. In the same way, the word in verbal usage is first perceived in a sequence, then cognised as a unity with the sequence suppressed. This partless and sequenceless mental form is superimposed, i.e., identified with the previous appearance having sequence and seeming to be separate. It again enters into verbal usage by displaying the characteristic of the sounds, namely, differentiation and sequence, produced by the movements of the articulatory organs. In the same way, the word goes again and again through three stages and does not fail to become both the illuminator and the illuminated.¹

[1. It has been said in verse 44 that there are two kinds of words, of which one is the *nimitta* and the other, the expressive one. As to which is the *nimitta* and which the expressive one, is a question of point of view. Different points of view have been indicated in the *Vṛtti* on verse 44. Of the two kinds of word, one is a unity, with no differentiation and inner sequence and the other has differentiation and sequence. Either of the two can be looked upon as the *nimitta*, but only the word which is a unity and has no differentiation can be expressive.

The three stages mentioned in the verse and the *Vṛtti* are described as follows by Vṛṣabha—*Prathamataḥ śravaṇe kramavān, tato'lpabhūtaḥ kramaḥ, tataḥ parapratiṣṭhānāya kramavān iti.*]

53. Just as the mind of the speaker first turns towards the words, in the same way, the attention of the hearers also is first directed towards them.

Just as the speaker, wishing to make an effort to utter a particular word, concentrates his mind on it, isolating it, as it were, in each case, from all the other words around it,¹ in the same way, the hearer also, knowing that the understanding of the meaning depends upon a clear grasp of the form of the word, ascertains it as associated with all its attributes.² This stage consisting in grasping the form of the word, is

not thought of as a separate thing because of one's habit of concentrating on the understanding of the meaning.³ Therefore, all words capable of conveying all meaning, first attain supreme importance (*śeṣibhāvakāṣṭhām*) and then become secondary to the conveying of the meaning.

[1. *Pratiśabdaṃ paritaḥ paricchinnān śabdātmanaḥ saṃsprśanniva* – When one wants to utter a particular word, one has to grasp its form clearly, i.e., one has to separate it, as it were, from the other words which are also lying dormant in one's mind. But the other words cannot all come up in his mind at that time. His mind does not touch them at that time (*saṃsprś*). That is why the word *iva* is used: *saṃsprśann iva*. At the most, the speaker would think of the other words in the sentence which he is about to utter, but not to the same extent as the word which he is actually pronouncing. In either case, the word *iva* is significant.

2. *Taṃ śabdaṃ sarvair saṃbandhibhir viśeṣanair āśritasaṃsargānugrahaṃ*. What the author means is: *taṃ śabdaṃ āśritasarvasaṃbandhiviśeṣaṇasaṃsargānugrahaṃ*.

3. *Arthapratipattibhāvanābhyāsāt*. According to Vṛ. this means: on account of one's habit of understanding the meaning and acting accordingly. *Bhāvanā kriyānuṣṭhānam*.]

54. Being meant for something else, the world does not pay attention to the forms of the words which, being primary in some cases only, are ordinarily secondary to the meaning.

Just as, in an expression like 'this is a white one (*ayam śuklaḥ*) where something having a quality is understood, connection of the quality with a particular action takes place only sometimes as taught elsewhere, in the same way, when the identification with the form of the word takes place as in the expression: 'this thing which is the word *gauḥ*' and when action is meant to be connected with it, its purpose is fulfilled and when, therefore, it becomes secondary to the object, people do not connect it with action as they do connect the object with it.¹

[1. In order to show that the form of the word becomes connected with action only sometimes, the analogy of action is given. Statements

present a quality as connected with action only sometimes. There is a difference between *śuklām gāṃ paśya* and *śuklām gāṃ bhojaya*. The former sentence presents the quality white also as connected with the action of seeing. *śuklām* is a *viśeṣaṇa* of *gām*. But in the latter sentence, it is the object cow which is to be fed. It happens to be white, so the white cow is fed. But the quality 'white' is not connected with the action of feeding. It is only *upalakṣaṇa* and not *viśeṣaṇa*. Similarly, where actions are performed on objects conveyed by words, as usually happens in the world, the form of the word is not so connected. But a word conveys its form also and it must also have its scope for being connected with action. It is in the science of Grammar that the form of a word finds its full scope for being connected with action. Where the form is secondary to the object which it conveys, people do not connect it with action.]

55. Just as light has two powers, that of being revealed and that of being the revealer, similarly, all words have two distinct powers.

Pots and other such things are always the cognised and, therefore, at the time of their cognition, they do not bestow the slightest benefit, either on the sense or on the object, as an aid to their cognition.¹ In the same way, all the senses become the cause of the cognition of the object without themselves being cognised. Light, on the other hand, being endowed with a form opposed to that of darkness, becomes the cause of cognition, as a helper, when its own form is cognised. In the same way, the word, grasped in its form² which is distinct from that of other things and other words, with its special form which is fully cognised, illuminates the object to be cognised. These two powers of the words, that of being the revealer and that of being the revealed, are always identical (*ātmabhūte*) but appear to be different.

[1. *Grāhyatvenaiva*—The object is always the thing to be cognised (*grāhya*) in the process of its cognition and never the *grāhaka*. It is always the *karma*, the object, in the process of cognition. Though in Grammar, the *karma* is a *Kāraka*, that does not make it a *grāhaka*, it is always *grāhya*. The object which is cognised does not bring about the cognition. It does not cause the *utpatti* of the cognition, even though it is the *grāhya*.

2. *Svarūpeṇāvadhriyamāṇabhedah* and *parigrhītaviśeṣaśabdasya-rūpaḥ* mean the same thing. Vṛ. points out that the former expression emphasises the distinction from other things and words while the latter stresses its character as the conveyor of the meaning.]

That being so,

56. No meaning is conveyed by words which have not themselves become the objects of knowledge. By their mere existence, even though not understood, they do not convey the meaning.

If words could, without becoming primary as the thing to be conveyed, become secondary to the conveyance of the meaning, then, they would, by the mere fact of their presence, whether cognised or not, without becoming the object of a cognition, convey their respective meanings. But they do not do so. Therefore, in the process of the words becoming secondary to the meaning, their assuming the form of the primary, is a necessary part.

57. Therefore, when the own form of the word is not understood, one asks the speaker 'what did you say?' When an object is to be revealed, the form of the senses is not similarly perceived.

People in the world, knowing that the understanding of the meaning is dependent upon the understanding of the form of the word, ask: what did you say? in order to understand the form of the words when, after the words have been uttered, their form is not grasped. The senses, on the other hand, become secondary to the understanding of the meaning, without being connected, even slightly, with the state of being primary, without their own form being cognised.¹

[1. *Śeṣibhāvamātrāsamsparsenāsamśrṣṭāni*. Here *mātrā* seems to have the meaning of 'slight', 'little'. Ordinarily, in the *Vṛtti*, it means 'a part'. The word occurs frequently in the *Vṛtti* and has several shades of meaning.

Aparicchinnasvalakṣaṇāni. Here *svalakṣaṇa* means the same thing as *svarūpa*. Ordinarily, in the philosophical literature, *svalakṣaṇa*, the particular, as used as opposed to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, the universal.]

58. These two abstracted powers of words, treated as different, become, without opposition, the cause of operations depending upon difference.

Just as, both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, we perform, in regard to things within which difference has been artificially made by the mind on the basis of difference in point of view (*nimitta*) all the operations which depend on real difference, in the same way, in regard to words also, when one separates by abstraction (*apoddhāra*) their powers of being revealer and revealed all the operations such as the application of names like 'designation' (*saṃjñā*) and 'designated' (*saṃjñin*) have been taught in the science of Grammar!

[1. In the world, when we say 'a gold ring', we are applying the words 'gold' and 'ring' to the same thing. When we think of the material with which it is made, we call it gold, when we think of its shape, we call it ring. This is what is called *vyapadeśivadbhāva*. On account of this difference in point of view, we can say: *suvarṇasya aṅgulīyakam*, ie. we can use the sixth case-affix (*ṣaṣṭhī*) which we ordinarily do only when there is real difference as in *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. The sūtra *svaṇ rūpaṇ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā* (P. 1.1.68) tells us that, in the Science of Grammar, grammatical operations are ordinarily on the basis of this difference by artificial abstraction.]

59. Just as words like *Vṛddhi*, having conveyed their own forms enter into relation with their named, the phonemes conveyed by the contractions *āt*, *aic*,

In rules like

"*Yaṇ* comes in place of *ik* when a vowel follows"¹ where the names are different (from the named) it is not the verbal element *ik* which is the original nor the verbal element *Yaṇ*

the substitute. It is between the named having a different form conveyed by these verbal elements that the relations of original and substitute is taught in the Science of Grammar.² Even where the named have the same form as the names, it is clear that such a relationship is understood. Just as words like *Vṛddhi*, standing for their own form, meaningful with their meanings, wanting to convey other sounds with their form, enter into relation with *ā* etc., varied by accent, nasalisation etc., conveyed by *āt*, *aic* etc., in the same way (the name conveys the named) even when the difference between the two is not easily perceived.

[1. P. 6.1.77.

2. *Rūpāntarayuktānāṃ saṃjñānām*. If *ik* and *yaṇ* are names (*saṃjñā*) the sounds conveyed by them would be the named, *saṃjñin*. Therefore, one would expect in the text *saṃjñinām* and not *saṃjñānām*.]

60. In the same way, the word *agni* (in the sūtra P. 4.2.33) having first conveyed its own form *agni*, enters into the relation (of name and named) with the word *agni* (used in speech) and conveyed by the word *agni* (in the sūtra).

*In the sūtra*¹

"The own form of a word" etc. (*svaṇ rūpaṇ śabdasya*), the name and the named are separately mentioned. There, there are two words which are heard and which are meant to convey another, and the words which are to be conveyed are also two in number and they stand to each other in the relation (of name and named) and are (therefore) the object of grammatical teaching. Therefore, (the sūtra in question), makes that word *agni* which has as its meaning the other word *agni* having the same form, the name of the other word *agni* conveyed by it having the same form.²

[1. P. 1.1.68.

2. The construction of the last sentence in the *vṛtti* is rather awkward and contains repetitions. The sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* etc. teaches the relation of *saṃjñā* and *saṃjñin* between a word mentioned in a sūtra of Pāṇini and the same word, having the same form, coming in actual usage. Though the *saṃjñā* and the *saṃjñin* have the same form, they are mentioned as different from each other. The sūtra in question refers to a word which may come in any sūtra of Pāṇini as the *saṃjñā* and the same word, as it may come in actual usage, as the *saṃjñin*. These two are called *pratipādaka* in the *Vṛtti*. The word which actually comes in a sūtra (as *agni* in *agner dhak*) and the same word when it comes in actual usage, are called *pratīyamāna*. The sūtra in question tells us that the word which actually comes in a sūtra is the name (*saṃjñā*) of the same word actually occurring in usage.]

61. Whatever word is uttered does not necessarily become the object of grammatical operation. Its power to bring another similar word to the mind is not taken away.

The reason for the statement which has been made will be given in the next verse. The word which conveys (*pratyāyaka*) is uttered for the sake of another and it connects that other word for which it is uttered with grammatical operations, causes them to be performed on it. When the word which is conveyed (*pratyāyya*) and exists in the mind (of the hearer) is uttered for the sake of illustration, its power to convey another similar word is not hampered. This is the nature of all words that are uttered¹

[1. The point in this verse is that all words, when uttered, have the power to bring another similar word to the mind and the grammatical operation in question is done to the one that comes to the mind. That which is uttered is *pratyāyaka*, something which conveys another and that which is conveyed is *pratyāyya*. The latter can also be uttered in its turn and it would then convey another similar word.]

62. When a word is uttered to convey a meaning, it is secondary to the latter and, so, is not connected with action. It is, with the meanings conveyed by the words that actions are connected,

Just as words like 'bring the cow' or 'eat the curds' are secondary to the conveying of the meaning and do not become auxiliaries of the action in question, so are words secondary to other words, as there is no difference as far as dependence is concerned. From this one understands that all things which are conveyed by words, whether they are perceived by the eyes or the ears, become auxiliaries to the action.

63. When, whatever is considered as the common property between the standard and the object of comparison, itself figures in acts of comparison, some other common property, different from it, is adopted.

The standard of comparison, the object of comparison and the common property, this triad is well-established. In the sentence "the kṣatṭriya studies like the brāhmaṇa", the common property is mentioned in regard to the standard of comparison also. When the statement is 'the study of the kṣatṭriya is similar to that of the brāhmaṇa, the two students are mentioned as connected with the standard and objects of comparison and then, excellence etc., are understood as common properties of the two ways of studying, different from each other, because they exist in different substrata. Completion (*pariniṣpatti*) etc. would be understood as common properties of excellence etc. connected with study. In this way, there is no limit to the process of difference (by abstraction) ¹.

[1. There are different grades in the process of comparison, we can say: (1) *Brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣatṭriyaḥ* (2) *Brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyaṁ kṣatṭriyādhyayanam* (3) *Brāhmaṇādhyayanasaṁsthavena tulyaṁ kṣatṭriyādhyayanasaṁsthavam*.

In No. 1, the common point is that both the brāhmaṇa and the kṣatṭriya study; in No. 2, the common point is that their studies have excellence; in No. 3, the common point is that their studies lead to completion. What was a common point in the previous comparison becomes the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one. Study, excellence and completion are really one, but are looked upon as different by abstraction.]

64. When an attribute which is the cause of degree is presented as an independent thing, degree in it can be known only through another attribute present in it.

Whatever is presented as the main thing in the form 'this' or 'that' is substance. There cannot be a greater or lesser degree of it; therefore, when degree is sought to be expressed in an object, it is done through attributes (*nimitta*) which exist in it, differentiate it, are dependent upon it, are physically attached to it and are active in bringing about degree. In the sentence: 'this is an excellent white thing (*prakṛṣṭaḥ śuklaḥ*) even though the colour white distinguishes the thing, it is also active in bringing about degree and, therefore, that thing which has that quality and would otherwise have no degree, now attains degree. In the sentence: 'the colour of this is white' where colour is presented as a substance, degree is brought about by an attribute (*nimitta*) present in the colour. The universal 'whiteness' which inheres in white is one and cannot be a cause of differentiation and so differentiation in the one having shades of difference within (*avāntarasya*) is brought about by an attribute present in the colour. Or it can be put in this way: As there is no word expressive of such attributes (in *śuklataram rūpam asya*) and as they cannot be conveyed by the abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*) they are understood from the word, like whiteness itself, and are understood as the cause of degree. As long as it is sought to bring about degree in anything which is presented as the main thing, in the form 'this' or 'that', so long would there be no end to this process of abstracting some attribute or other.¹

[1. Verse 61 makes the statement that a grammatical operation is not done on a word which is actually mentioned in a sūtra but on a similar word occurring in worldly usage. The two words are different but are looked upon as the same because of resemblance. Verse 62 gives the reason for the statement made in 61: what is mentioned is subordinate to something else and so is not subject to grammatical operations. Verses 63 and 64 give illustrations. The former tells us that what was the common point in the previous comparison becomes

the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one by a process of abstraction while the latter tells us that by the same process, what is presented as a *guṇa* in one statement can be presented as a *dravya* in another.

When a quality which is the cause of degree in a substance is presented independently, i.e., as a substance, it is only by another quality present in it that degree can be understood. In 'śuklataṛaḥ paṭaḥ', *paṭa* is the substance and degree in it is expressed by *śuklataṛa*, which denotes the quality of being whiter. But in *śuklataṛaṃ rūpam aśya*, colour itself is presented as a substance and not as a quality of cloth. But it is presented as having degree and this degree comes through some other quality like *bhāsvaratva*, brightness present in the white. For grammarians, whatever a word presents as the main thing to be qualified is substance (*dravya*). They do not follow the Vaiśeṣika definition of *dravya* (Vai. Sū. 1.1.15.). Even what is called quality can be so presented by words in which case it will have to be qualified by some other quality. In order that a quality may bring about degree in a substance it must be: (1) *bhedahetu*, (2) *āśrita*, (3) *saṃśṛṣṭa*, (4) *prakarṣe savyāpāra*. Due to the absence of one or more of these conditions in the sentence *puruṣasya svāmī*, *puruṣa* cannot bring about degree in *svāmī*. For the same reason, *jāti* or the universal, cannot bring about degree.]

That being so, in an utterance.

65. When the word considered to be the meaning is itself uttered, it assumes a form quite different from the one (which it had as a meaning).

After having given a reason (verse 62) and examples (verses 63, 64). For establishing difference, the consideration of the topic under discussion, i.e., the form of the word, is now being concluded. Whenever the word which is the meaning is uttered for the sake of illustration, on every such occasion, another form of it, the cause or the basis of it, would be distinguished, for such is the nature of anything that is uttered. According to some, it is the same word which is repeated as the conveyor—form (*abhidhāna*) without its losing its character as the form-conveyed (*abhidheyatva*). It has been said in the *Saṅgraha*—

"The form of the word (as the conveyed) never comes under the organs of articulation (*karāṇa*) anymore than

objects like a cow (which are also conveyed by words); it is always the conveyed; when the conveyor-form comes under the organs of articulation, the conveyed which has the same form appears to be uttered, even though it does not come under the organs of articulation.¹

[1. The point which is emphasised from verse 61 onwards is that the same word can be looked upon both as *pratyāyaka* and *pratyāyya*. The difference would then be due to an abstraction made by the mind. Ordinarily, it is outside objects which are conveyed (*pratyāyya*) by a word. Sometimes, as in Grammar, the word itself is the *pratyāyya*. The word which is *pratyāyaka* is uttered, but not the one which is *pratyāyya*. As soon as the latter is uttered for the sake of illustration, it becomes *pratyāyaka* in relation to another similar word which would then become the *pratyāyya*.]

66. Before the name becomes connected with the named, the name is connected with its own form as the meaning (the named). That is how it becomes the occasion for the use of the genitive and the nominative cases.

Even though a word may not have any other thing to be conveyed, it is not without its own form (as the conveyed). On the basis of its own form (*svarūpādhiṣṭhānam*) and after making it secondary, the word conveys some other meaning. As long as the name is not connected with the named, the latter is not its meaning and if it has no other meaning, it would not get the name of stem (*prātipadika*) and so no case-affix could be added to it. As words are expressive (*vācaka*) because of their difference (in regard to the expressed), in the present case, the meaning of the stem would not be different from the stem itself.¹

[1. In the sūtra *Vṛddhir ād aic* (P. 1.1.1.) the word *Vṛddhi* is the name and the vowels *āt* and *aic* are the named. Even before *ādaic* was written, the word *Vṛddhi* had already got the first case-affix. It must, therefore, have been a stem (*prātipadika*). But nothing can be a stem if it has no meaning and *Vṛddhi* gets its meaning only after it is connected with *ādaic*. How then did it become *prātipadika*? The

answer is that its own form was already there as the meaning. So it became *prātīpadika* and the first case-affix was added to it.]

✓ 67. Because it has its own form as the meaning, the nominative case comes after the name. When it has an outside object as the meaning, difference comes in and is conveyed by the genitive case in the form 'asya'.

When the form of the word is sought to be imposed on external objects, then they are meaningful with their own form which is their basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the first case-affix is taught after them. When one says: "This is so and so", the relation (of the name) with the named is specified, its expressive power is determined. As when one says: "This *Vāhika* is a cow" or "This lad is a lion". The cause of the addition of the sixth case-affix to the named, namely, the absence of the meaning of the stem, is brought about by the connection of the name which stands for its form with the words which are the named. It has been said—

"Since, whether in the form 'that is so and so' or in the form 'this is the name of so and so', it is with a meaningful name and not with a meaningless one that connection takes place; therefore, the relation between word and meaning is eternal."

68-69. According to some, in the sūtra—"svam-rūpam" etc., the particular form of the word (*vyakti*) is taught as the name (*saṃjñā*) of the form in general (*jāti*). The general form as existing in a particular one undergoes grammatical operations.

Others, on the other hand, look, upon the particular form to be understood as the named in this sūtra; in particular places, the particular form conveyed by

the general form, comes up (for grammatical operations).

(While explaining the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* etc., P. 1.1.68.) some commentators say:—"the own form of a word is the expressor, the illuminator, the conveyor of the word," while others say—"the own form of a word is the expressed, the illuminated, the conveyed." These two views have been set forth by these two verses. In regard to the universal, there are two views current among thinkers.¹ Some maintain that the individuals have their special forms. The form of the individuals is not something unknowable, unnameable and non-existent. It is the individual cow which is the cow and not cowness. It is the individual blue which is the blue and not the universal blue. The universal is the cause of the uniformity of cognition. It is the same thing in regard to the different individuals in which there is no inherence (of the universals). It is this (uniform cognition) which is the cause of the inference of the existence of the universal.

Others, however, are of the opinion: words attain their form in regard to the universal as identical with the otherwise inexpressible individual. Everywhere, from a thing in which the cause (*nimitta*) exists, a cognition corresponding to that cause arises. In such cases, those causes which have their own expressive words and those which have not,² bring about the same cognition and the application of the same word, on the basis of a partial or complete resemblance. That being so, in the sūtra in question, the words 'own form' (*svaṃ rūpaṃ*) stand, according to some, for the universal (*jāti*) and in the expression 'of the word' (*śabdasya*) 'word' stands for the individual. According to others, it is just the opposite. Either the individual is the name of the universal or the universal is the name of the individual. This universal, (of the word) uttered in the different contexts, conveys the individual as connected with the relevant action (i.e. grammatical operation). The universal is never uttered as unconnected with the individual. Nor is the individual ever

brought into use unconnected with the universal. The speakers' intention differs according to his purpose. One of the two is the main thing and the other comes inevitably with it. That it is the universal on which the action is to be done according to the Science of Grammar or that it is the individual that is so is only a difference in the statement (in particular cases).

In regard to the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* (P. 1.1.68.) the tradition of the circles of Grammarians is very varied. It may be stated as follows—The mere form which is a part of that meaningful combination of form and meaning, possessed of the powers of the universal, particular etc. and referred to as the word (*śabdasya*) is the name. Or the meaningful combination including the form, characterised by the powers inherent in it, is the name. The fact is that what is called the word is a combination of parts. Form etc. are its parts. One does speak of a whole and its parts as different from each other as when we say 'the branch of a tree'.

Another declares: Even though an object remains the same, the meaning of the word (which refers to it) varies. A word makes a choice between the different powers relating to the same object.³ For example, in the expression 'this stick' the pronoun presents the object as something existing before one's eyes, not as something having the universal 'stickness' even though that is also perceived. The pronoun cannot express the connection with the universal stickness. The power of the word 'stick' which expresses a particular universal is debarred, even though it is visible, from presenting it as present before the eyes. In the same way, in the expression 'the own form' (*svaṃ rūpaṃ*), the words 'agni' etc., even though they have the universal in them, are presented as the words *agni* etc, not as universals of the words. By word in 'of the word', what is conveyed is the connection with the universal (of the word *agni*) and not its aspect as being the word *agni*. All this is just an illustration of the principle that a word, in one of its aspects, considered as a name, can convey the same word in another of its aspects as the named:⁴ All the different views relating to the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ* etc,

have not been set forth in order to avoid prolixity resulting from one thing leading to another.

[1. So far, the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ* was explained on the basis of the view that the own form of a word that may occur in a sūtra is the name and the external object which it denotes is the named. The present two verses set forth two other views in regard to the name and the named. They are—(1) that the individual aspect of a word is the name (*saṃjñā*) and its universal aspect, the named (*saṃjñin*), (2) that it is vice-versa. As this involves the concept of the universals, the author refers to two views in regard to universals current among thinkers of his day. The first view is that the existence of the universal is inferred from our uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals. The individuals themselves can be perceived and spoken about without the universal existing in them being directly perceived. There are other distinguishing features in the individuals which enable us to perceive them without the help of the universal. That there is uniformity in our cognition of the individuals does not mean that we cognise directly the universal existing in them. We only infer its existence on the basis of the uniformity of cognition. The second view is that words primarily convey the universal. They convey the individual also as identical with the universal and, therefore, nameable. The universal existing in the individual is what enables us to cognise the individual as such: it is the 'nimitta' and our cognition of the individual takes the form of this nimitta according to the principle: *sarvatraiva hi nimittānnimittavatyarthē nimitta—svarūpaḥ pratyaya utpadyate*. It is this *nimitta* which causes uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals and the application of the same word to them.

2. *Drṣṭābhidhānāni adṛṣṭābhidhānāni ca nimittāni*. *Nimitta* is of two kinds: *kāraka* and *jñāpaka*. It is the latter which is subdivided into *drṣṭābhidhāna* and *adṛṣṭābhidhāna*. *Gōtva* is a *jñāpakanimitta* which exists in the cow. It is *drṣṭābhidhāna*, because it has a recognised word to express it. When we see different individuals having *gotva* in them, we see the same *gotva* (*jāti*) in all of them, our cognition (*pratyaya*) of all of them is uniform and we apply the same word to all of them. As Vṛ. puts it, three things persist. *Drṣṭābhidhāneṣu trayam anuvartate jātiḥ śabdaḥ pratyaya iti*. *utpalagandha* is given as an example of *adṛṣṭābhidhāna*, because the word does not denote any universal, but only two things connected by a relation. In this case, therefore, only two things persist: the word and the cognition. As though not satisfied with this example, Vṛ. gives that of *rājapuruṣa*.

3. *Śabdo hyekavastuviṣayāñāmapī śaktinām avacchedenopagrahe vartate*. Any given thing has many aspects. Words have the power

to convey them. But a given word, on a given occasion, conveys one of them to the exclusion of others. In *ayam daṇḍaḥ* = this stick, *ayam* conveys the aspect of the stick being present before the eyes to the exclusion of the universal which is also present in the stick.

4. *Tatra śabdāntarārthaḥ śabdāntarārthasya prasiddhabhedasya saṃjñātvenopādiyamānasya saṃjñābhāvaṃ pratipadyate.* What is meant is that *śabdavyakti* is *saṃjñā* and *śabdajāti* is *saṃjñā*. To refer to both of them as *śabdāntarārthaḥ* is using rather peculiar language, a general characteristic of the Vṛtti. It seems to be a bahuvrīhi compound the analysis of which would be: *śabdāntaram (vyaktirūpaṃ) jātirūpaṃ vā artho yasya sa śabdaḥ śabdāntarārthaḥ.*]

70. Some consider the word to be one whether it is accepted as transitory or eternal; others consider it as many, whether it is accepted as transitory or eternal.

According to those who believe that the word is one, there cannot be this distinction between the universal and the individuals (because that presupposes difference between the individuals); that is why this new point (the unity or the plurality of the word) has been taken up after expounding the point about the universal. According to the view that the word is eternal, its unity is the main doctrine. According to the view that the word is an effect (and so not eternal), the invariable cognition of sameness which arises when a phoneme or a word, once uttered, is uttered again, leads to the postulation that it is one. It is on the basis of the view that it is one that it has been said in the Vārttika—

“That is already settled, because the phoneme ‘a’ is one”.¹ It is between the cognitions of the same phoneme that there is an interval of time or of other phonemes and not that the phoneme itself is different. That one hears the same word at different places is like the cognition of Being (*sattā*) or the universal at different places or the form (of moon etc.) in water etc. Even according to the view that the word is different and that it is an effect, one must necessarily accept a kind of secondary one-ness when a word is uttered again and again. Whether the word be eternal or an effect, those

who are for plurality believe that a word having many meanings and phonemes found in different words is not at all the same unit.²

[1. Vā 5 on the sūtra 'a-i-un' (M. Bhā. I, p. 16).

2. In regard to the word, there are the three following pairs of alternative views held by different thinkers: (1) that it stands for the universal or for the individual, (2) that it remains the same even when it has another meaning or that it is a different word for every new meaning (3) that it is eternal or that it is an effect. These pairs of views are related to one another. The concept of the word as a universal presupposes the existence of individual words in each of which the universal inheres. So, according to the view that the word is one under all circumstances, the concept of universal and particular cannot arise. There is a very close connection between the view that the word is eternal and that it is one. This is the primary concept of unity. But some kind of unity has to be postulated even according to the view that there are as many words as there are circumstances of its use because, in all these circumstances, we do recognise the word to be the same. This is the secondary kind of unity. Grammarians accept eternality, unity and both the concepts of the universal and the individual.

71. Even when the words where they occur are different, the identity of the phonemes is not affected. Similarly, a word occurring in different sentences is one and the same.

In the different words *aśva*, *arka*, *artha*, it is the same phoneme *a* that is used in the word; it is perceived after an interval of time or after the intervention of other phonemes¹ or not perceived at all when the causes of manifestation (*nimitta*) are absent; it appears to be different when the different speakers are at different places and, hence, the manifesting agents (*nimitta*) are different, just as the reflection of the same thing in a shadow or mirror or water. Similarly, a word abstracted from sentences and having different meanings like the word *go* or *akṣi* is really the same word as long as the form is the same.² Even though as expressive of two different meanings, a word may be a noun or a verb, still it is looked upon as the same word.

[1. Vā 11 and 12 on the sūtra 'a-i-un' (M. Bhā., p. 18.)

2. Vr. points out that the word *akṣi*, when taken as a verb can be derived from the root *akṣ* or *as* or *ad*. He derives *aśva* as a verb from the root *śvi*. Of course, ordinarily, these words are nouns.]

72. There is no word over and above the phonemes nor is there any sentence over and above the phonemes and words.

The phonemes which are produced in a sequence, which perish as soon as they are uttered, which do not exist at the sametime and have themselves parts, cannot produce the word as distinct (from themselves); therefore, the word is nothing more than the phonemes. As the phonemes have parts and as that process of division can be continued to the point of impracticability (*ā vyavahāravicchedāt*) there results something which is the fourth of the fourth, unnameable and beyond practicability (*vyavahārātīta*) but no phoneme or word. And if there is no phoneme or word, there cannot be a sentence as distinct from them. That is why it has been said;

"All this would result in non-eternality,"¹

As there cannot be a collection (of phonemes or of words) there would be no unit associated with a definite meaning (*upagr̥hītārthaḥ*) nor any form fully delimited. (*upagr̥hītāḥ*).²

[1. Cf. M. Bhā. on Vā. 12 on the sūtra *a-i-un* (M. Bhā. I., p. 18.)

2. It was said in the previous verse that a phoneme occurring in different words is the same phoneme and that a word occurring in different sentences is the same word. This means that there is no sentence over and above the phonemes and words. The phonemes cannot produce the word because they do not co-exist. Secondly, they themselves can be thought of as having parts and if one goes on dividing these parts, one comes to something which is infinitesimal and unnameable, the fourth of a fourth (*turiyaturīya*) as it has been called to show that it is something very minute. Such minute parts cannot produce the phoneme and so the phonemes cannot produce the word. If the phonemes and the words cannot be produced, the sen-

tence, as something over and above them, does not exist, nor can it be produced by them. It would be something eternal and indivisible. It would also be impossible to conceive of words having fully delimited forms or well-defined meanings.]

Another has said—

73. There are no phonemes in the word nor are there parts in the phoneme. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence.

As the effort relating to the whole as a collection of phonemes is different and, therefore, the sounds uttered to suggest the word are also different, there takes place, from the different cognitions having the appearance of the cognitions of the real phonemes, a perception of the word caused by means of the perception of parts in the form of phonemes. But it is really without sequence, without before and after, one, eternal, indivisible and it appears as a unit produced by smaller elements, the phonemes. But the further divisions of the phonemes like *a*, indescribable, beyond usage, considered different, are really fictitious. Therefore, their clearly intelligible unity is well-known in the usage of the Science of Grammar. As it is the sentence, whether consisting of one word or of many words, which is used to express the meaning, there arises a perception of the word as means to the perception of the sentence. In regard to the sentence, there arise cognitions having sequence and having the form of phonemes and words, but they are not identified with the sentence. Therefore, phonemes and words have no separate existence from the sentence so defined, unbreakable, indivisible.

74. The practice (of the Grammarians) has been based on these different views. What the main view is to some is, to others, the reverse.

In regard to the supreme, sequenceless, inner principle of the word, scholars, on the basis of different traditions re-

garding every topic (*pratyadhikaraṇam*) have resorted to different doctrines in following the usage of the Science of Grammar. It is as follows—If the audible form is the same, it is the same word, even when the meaning varies; if the meaning varies, even when the audible form is the same, it is a different word. For some, the difference is secondary and one-ness is primary. For others, difference is primary and one-ness is a matter of usage. It has been said—

“The same word has many meanings—For example, *akṣāḥ*, *pādāḥ*, *māṣāḥ*.”¹

Similarly, after having said—

“The word ‘village’ (*grāma*) has many meanings.”² he (the Bhāṣyakāra) concludes specifically by saying—
“That word ‘village’ is taken which stands for the whole, including forests, boundaries and pasture-land.”³

[1. M. Bhā on Vā. 9 on P. 1.2.45. (M. Bhā. I, p. 220).
.. *Akṣa* means, among other things, (1) an axle, axis (2) a gambling die (3) an organ of sense; *pāda* means (1) foot, (2) a quarter, (3) a weight; *māṣa* means (1) black gram, (2) a weight, (3) a spot on the skin.

2. M. Bhā. I, p. 59, l. 20.

3. M. Bhā. I, p. 59, l. 23.]

75. Of the *sphoṭa* which has no temporal distinction and which appears to follow the duration of the sounds, distinctions in duration (*vṛtti*) have been declared on the basis of distinctions in the manifesting sounds.

As the principle word-self is eternal, the function of the measure called ‘time’ does not affect in the slightest degree the duration of *sphoṭa*. Inasmuch as the form of the *sphoṭa* is perceived as mixed up with the sounds, therefore, the duration of the sounds appears to be that of the perception of *sphoṭa*. Through the limiting factor of such a perception of *sphoṭa*, involving difference in time, divisions in the form of quick, medium and slow speeds, each faster than the fol-

lowing one by one third,¹ are associated with the *sphoṭa* (though they belong to the sounds).

[1. *Tribhāgotkarṣeṇa*. It is not clear whether this means 'greater by one third' or 'multiplied by three'.]

If that is so, in the case of the short, long and protracted vowels also, it is the sound which would be the cause of the difference in time. Therefore, just as the long and the protracted vowels would be called by the same name, the sūtra—"A vowel followed by the symbolic letter *t* stands for one of that duration only"¹ would be applicable to them. Similarly, in the case of the different speeds also, it would apply and there would also be the objection contained in the following—

"If the symbolic letter *t* is added after the quick one, it should be added after the medium and the slow ones also, because of difference in time."² To this, the following answer is given—

76. According to the view that the word is eternal, the short, the long and the protracted being different in nature, distinctions in time belonging to the primary sound are attributed to the *sphoṭa*.

The sound is of two kinds: primary and secondary. The primary one is that without which the form of the *sphoṭa*, being unmanifested, would remain unperceived. And the secondary one is that by means of which the form of the *sphoṭa* is perceived again and again without interruption. The author of the *Saṅgraha* says, indeed, as follows—

"The primary sound is the cause of the perception of the word (*sphoṭa*); the secondary one becomes the cause of the difference in the continuity of perception (*sthitibheda*),"

In the same way, out of the sentences uttered by Garga and others, of equal length because of equal number of parts some, on account of their special arrangement (*sunniṣeṣaviśeṣa*) are perceived after a large number of repetitions while others are grasped after a lesser number of repetitions. Similarly,

the short vowel, by its special nature, is perceived by a sound of lesser duration. With so much of manifesting cause, a knowledge which grasps its form is engendered. The long vowel, on the other hand, is manifested by a sound of longer duration. The protracted vowel is perceived by a sound of still longer duration. Because of the non-perception of difference, the duration of the primary sound is attributed to the *sphoṭa* and is looked upon, by courtesy, as the duration of the *sphoṭa* in the Science of Grammar.

[1. P. 1.1.70.

2. Vā 4 on P. 1.1.70.]

77. After the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, the secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance, but the essence of the *sphoṭa* is not affected by them.

Just as light, as soon as it appears, becomes the cause of the perception of a jar etc. and if it continues, becomes the cause of the continued perception of it, in the same way, the sound which continues after the manifestation of the word, causes the continuance of the cognition of the word by adding strength to the manifestation. Therefore, though associated with the secondary sound, the difference of which is clearly perceived,¹ no identity is superimposed on the *sphoṭa* which, therefore, does not cause any usage of difference of time in the Science of Grammar as in the case of short etc.

[1. *upalakṣitavyatirekeṇa vaikṛtena dhvaninā*. Vṛ points out that the primary sound causes the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* and so it has to be produced before the manifestation whereas the secondary sound is produced after the manifestation and so its difference from the *sphoṭa* is clearly perceived by the hearer. There does not, therefore, take place the false attribution of its properties to the *sphoṭa*. The two are clearly distinguished. As the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* itself depends upon the primary sound which has to be produced before, its properties are falsely attributed to it.]

How does the sound become a factor in the cognition of the word?

78. Those who hold that the word is manifested by the sounds conceive of it in three ways—that a certain fitness is brought about in the sense of hearing, that a fitness is produced in the word itself or that a fitness results in both.

In this verse, only the process of the manifestation of the word is stated. Giving illustrations is the topic of the next two verses.

In this matter, some think that the sound, when produced, perfects the sense of hearing and the sense of hearing, thus perfected, becomes the means of the perception of the word.¹ Other upholders of manifestation are of the view that the word, perfected by contact with the sound, becomes the object of the sense of hearing. According to others, the sound brings benefit both to the word and to the sense of hearing. The sense and the object, favoured by a helping factor, cause the perception of the word. Like the benefit conferred by the light of the lamp in regard to things perceived by the sense of vision, (here also) the powers of the causal factors, merely because they require a helping factor, do not go beyond the totality of the causal factors.²

[1. Vṛṣabha understands the perfection of the sense of hearing itself in three ways: (1) the sounds impart to the sense of hearing the power of grasping the word which was not there before. (2) the sounds only awaken the power which was already there (3) what is called perfection of the sense means the presence of the sounds in the sense of hearing, favourable to its grasping the word.

2. What is meant here is that the function of the sounds, whether it be the perfection of the sense of hearing or of the word, does not go beyond the totality of the causal factors, but is part of them, just as the light of the lamp is part of the causal factors in the perception of visual objects.

The Vṛtti here may be compared with the following passage:—

Sa ca nādaḥ śrotasyānugrahe varṭtate. Tadanugrhitam śrotram śābdopalabdham samartham bhavati, yathā akṣṇo rañjanam ityeke. Apare śābdasyaiva, yathā prokṣaṇam pṛthivyā eva, na ghrāṇasya. Ubhayaṃ ityapare, yathā vaśyendriyasya prathamataścaḥśūraśmīn ghaṭam cānugrhnāti.

(Bhartrhari's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.I, XLIII).

79. By concentration and by the application of ointment, it is only the visual sense which is perfected. The perfection of the object is for the perception of the smell in it.

Concentration, whether natural or extraordinary, does not bring about any special feature in the essence of the object to be seen. Similarly, substances like ointment perfect the sense of vision and not the external object. Even extraordinary concentration confers benefit on the sense of vision only in the perception of things subtle, hidden and distant. If it conferred a benefit on the object, others also would perceive it, as there would be no difference. Perfection of the object, ie. of oil etc.¹ by sunshine and of the earth etc. by the sprinkling of water, can be seen at the time of the cognition of their smell, but not perception of the sense of smell. If it is the sense of smell which is perfected, there would be no difference as far as the cognition of the smell is concerned, whether the objects be perfected or not, because there would be no difference (in the objects).

[1. *Tailādīnām*, Vṛ explains: *Gandhatailādīnām* = of medicated oil etc.]

80. According to the view that the visual sense reaches out to the object, it is held that both the object and the sense are perfected by light. Such is the process in the case of the (manifesting) sounds.

One who is situated in the dark perceives an object like the jar, illuminated by light. According to those who believe that the sense of vision does not reach out to the object, it is the object which is mostly perfected. If the sense of vision reaches out, the rays of the eye are aided by light which is of the same kind.¹

[1. There were several views about the sense of vision. Some held that it is nothing more than the physical eye-ball and, therefore, not of the nature of light. Others held that it consists of the eye-ball which, however, is of the nature of light. The Naiyāyikas held that it consists of visual light rays and, therefore, it is *aijasa*. Even here, there were two views: Some held that it does not reach out to the object before perceiving it, that it is *aprāpyakāri*. Others, however, held that it reaches out to the object (*prāpyakāri*) Vṛ describes the process as follows:—The sense of vision which consists of light rays goes out of the eye to the object and, on the way, mixes with the all-pervasive light atoms and engenders a beam of light very wide at the further end (*prthvagram*). This beam, on reaching the lighted spot where the object is, mixes with the external light, both being of the same kind. This is what is meant by the perfection of the sense of vision. The fact that the object is illuminated by the external light is its perfection. Thus there takes place perfection of both, according to this view.]

81. According to some, the sound is cognised as identical with the word (*sphoṭa*); others think that the sound is not perceived at all, which others still think that it is perceived as a separate entity.

Those who believe that the word is manifested hold three different views on the subject. The sound which is closely bound up with the word is perceived as one with it, as the colour of the associated object is perceived as one with the crystal. According to others, just as the senses, and their qualities, being themselves unperceived,¹ become the cause of the cognition of the object, in the same way, the sound, its own form remaining unperceived, becomes the cause of the cognition of the word. Others still say: from a distance, even if the form of the word is not perceived, the bare sound is perceived. Others explain that it (the perception of the sound) is similar to that of the word. It is like this: it is seen that in deserts, small things appear to be big. Moon and other objects are perceived as small, trees etc. are vaguely perceived but not that they have bark and holes on them or that they belong to particular species like *Dhava* or *Khaḍira*.

[1. The Sāṅkhyas consider the senses to be products of *Ahaṅkāra*, but the illustration here is based on the view that the senses are products of the elements. Even if they are products of the combined elements (*pañcīkṛta*), one of the elements is predominant in the combination. The predominant element with its special quality, is itself not perceived when it becomes the cause of the perception of the same quality in the external products. The sense of smell has smell as its quality but that is not perceived when it helps us to perceive the smell of other objects.]

82. Just as a Vedic passage (*anuvāka*) or a verse is well-fixed in the mind¹ after the (last) repetition and is not fully grasped in each repetition,

The sounds relating to the phonemes, words and sentence, produced by special efforts, manifest the *sphoṭa* of the phonemes, words and sentence and superimpose them on the cognitions. If the ultimate parts of the phonemes² are perceived gradually, could be no collection of them and the final cognition would be devoid of an object. This point has been discussed in many ways in the commentary³ on the Bhāṣya on the sūtra which defines connected text (*saṃhitā*). Even when the form of the whole word is manifested, as long as it has no definite form and special features, it is as good as unperceived and no usage can be made of it.

[1. *Soḍhatvam*. This is an unusual word. Vṛ. explains it as becoming the objects of one act of remembrance: *smṛtibuddher ekasyā viśayabhāvam*. It amounts to becoming well fixed in the mind.

2. *Krameṇa tu varṇaturīyagrahaṇe*. What is pointed out here is that if it is held that the parts of a *sphoṭa* are gradually manifested, it cannot be manifested at all. Each sound manifests the whole of the *sphoṭa*. Thus it is manifested again and again.

3. *Samhitāsūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇe*. The sūtra is P. 1.4.109. The *Vivarāṇa* is obviously a commentary on the Bhāṣya on this sūtra, written probably by Bhartṛhari himself. See p. 9 of Pt. Charu Deva Shastri's Sanskrit Introduction to his edition of Vākyapadiya, Kaṇḍa I.]

83. In the same way, through the previous cognitions, unnameable, but favourable to the final clear

cognition, the form of the word, manifested by the last sound, is perceived.

The many cognitions, produced by the sounds in the course of the manifestation of the word, being conducive to the clear perception of the form of the word, inexpressible and in the nature of means, become the cause of the perception of the word.

The following is the process by which the form of the word is clearly perceived:

84. The word is grasped in the (final) cognition the seeds of which have been sown by the sounds including the final one and which has gradually attained maturity.¹

The sounds, while they manifest the word, leave impression-seeds² progressively clearer and conducive to the clear perception (of the word). Then, the final sound brings to the mind which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word as coloured by itself.³

[1. Verses 82, 83 and 84 are quoted in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* (p. 132), (Madras University Sanskrit Series 6).

2. *Vyaktapariśchedānugūṇasaṃskārabhāvanābījāni*. *Samskāra*, *bhāvanā* and *bīja* denote the same thing. They stand, according to Vṛ., for three aspects of the same thing. The previous somewhat vague cognitions of the *sphoṭa* leave their impressions in the mind. Vṛ. says that they are called *saṃskāras* because, they, in a way, perfect the mind; they are called *bhāvanā* because they give them the form of consciousness (*bhāvayanti*) and, finally, they are called seeds (*bījāni*) because they are the causes of the later clear cognition.

3. *Upagraheṇa*. Vṛ. explains this by '*svikāreṇa*'. This is probably a reference to the fact that the sound colours the *sphoṭa* with its own form.]

85. When one perceives those non-existing elements in the middle as existing, it is due to the incapacity of the perceiver, they are only a means to the cognition of the real word.

When the indivisible, sequenceless and unbreakable phoneme, word or sentence is manifested by the sounds, cognitions appearing to perceive parts of the phoneme and relating to its parts occur in regard to the phoneme; cognitions appearing to perceive phonemes as parts of the word occur in regard to the word and cognitions appearing to perceive words as parts of sentences occur in regard to the sentence. Due to these cognitions, hearers think that these non-existing parts actually exist. It is only the incapacity of the hearers who can only perceive the word as shown by others.¹ Indeed their perception of the word can take place only through such means, such sequence and such phonemes (which appear as parts of something which is partless. (Others, on the other hand) perceive and cause others to perceive the sequenceless word, even a *dāśatvāya*,² through other means.³

[1. *Parapradarśitā*. What is emphasised here is that ordinary persons can perceive the word (*sphoṭā*) only through the sounds and as possessing the attributes of sounds. The next sentence makes this point clear.

2. *Dāśatvāyā*. The word occurs also in the *Vṛtti* on I. 51. There, as here, Vṛṣabha explains it as *catuḥṣaṣṭiḥ* = sixty-four.

3. *Upāyāntareṇa* Vṛṣabha explains it is *ārṣeṇa jñānena*.]

86. The appearance of diversity in knowledge and the Word is surely an illusion. The word is coloured by sequence and knowledge is coloured by the known.

Even though knowledge is undifferentiated and formless, it appears to be differentiated because it takes on the form of all the things which are to be known, as when one says five trees, twenty cows. The inner word in which all the

seeds are merged, appears, at the time of its manifestation, to follow the differentiation and sequence of the manifesting sounds. Therefore, the indivisible word-principle, called Word-Mind, being affected by the appearance of difference belonging to something else, is understood differently from what it is. It has been said:—

“Knowledge, without the thing to be known, does not enter into usage. And nothing can be expressed through the word which has not assumed sequence.”

87. Just as the cognition of the earlier (lower) numbers is the means for the understanding of the number in question, though they are different from one another, in the same way, the understanding of the other verbal elements is the means for the understanding of the sentence.

Just as one who wants to cognise the number hundred or thousand which differentiate their substrata, understands as means thereof the numbers one etc. having different effects as parts of the numbers hundred etc.¹ in the same way, the cognitions of the different words *Devadatta* etc. is the means for the perception of the form of the sentence. Hence their acceptance is inevitable.

[1. The illustration of the cognition of numbers is based on the Vaiśeṣika conception. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that from duality onwards up to the highest number *parārdha*, all numbers are produced by *apekṣābuddhi*, ie. the notion that relates to many unities before the next number is produced. When two things are brought before us, we cognise each one separately as ‘this is one and that is one’. This is *apekṣābuddhi*. Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all the subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the means for the production and cognition of the later numbers.]

88. Even though the sounds manifesting the phonemes, words and sentences are entirely different from one another, their powers appear confused.

Separate efforts are made in regard to the phoneme, word and the sentence and the air set in motion by them strikes against the places of articulation. Even though the sounds thus perfected by contact with the different places of articulation are different from one another, the difference between these manifesting agents is difficult to grasp as in the case of the manifesting substratum of the universals of the cow and the gayal or as in the case of the substratum of the actions of turning and pouring. Even though the manifesting powers have separate effects, their essence, possessing some common features, is confused due to some special effect. Hence there is the comprehension of parts in the partless phonemes, of divisions in the form of phonemes in the word and of divisions in the form of words in the sentence!

[1. The Vṛtti explains why the partless phoneme, word and sentence appears to have parts. The sounds which manifest the phoneme 'g' are different from those which manifest the word 'gauḥ' and the latter are different from those which manifest the sentence 'gāmahyāja.' But they are identified with one another because of their apparent resemblance. They differ from one another in their cause as well as in their effect. So their powers are different. They suggest such different things as phoneme, word and sentence. This is difference in the effect. They are produced by different efforts, such as the effort to manifest the phoneme, the effort to manifest the word and the effort to manifest the sentence. This is difference in the cause. Difference in the effort causes difference in the air which strikes at the different places of articulation. Though these manifesting sounds are different from one another, the difference is not noticed, because, on the basis of imagined resemblance, they are identified with one another. The sounds manifesting 'g' are identified with those manifesting 'g' in *gauḥ* and these latter with those manifesting 'g' in the sentence 'gāmahyāja'. So the word which is indivisible appears to have parts 'g' etc. and the sentence which is partless appears to have parts 'gām' etc. This is what is meant by 'saṅkīrṇa īva śaktayaḥ', the powers seem to be confused. The appearance of parts in the partless is the result of this confusion. If, for the manifestation of two indivisible words, one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the phonemes produced by these movements, appear to be parts of both of these indivisible words.]

89. Just as, from a distance or in the dark, after having mistaken an object in the previous cognitions, one sees it correctly,

It is in accordance with the properties of objects and the senses that people of ordinary vision, perceiving from a distance, only the general shape, mistake trees etc. for elephants etc. Staying in the same place, by steady concentration, gradually, they perceive their special features. Entering suddenly dimly lighted rooms from a well-lighted place and after having mistaken rope etc. for snake etc. they, once their eyesight has become normal, through steady concentration, perceive them as they are.¹

[1. Cf. *Sphoṭāsiddhi*, verse 19 and the commentary thereon. It is an echo of this verse and the *Vṛtti* thereon. This and the following verse are actually quoted there (p. 143.)]

90. In the same way, when the sentence is being manifested by the sounds which are the causes of its manifestation, there is at first a cognition in which parts figure.

Even though the sentence is indivisible, the sounds produced by the efforts intended to manifest it, cause a knowledge consisting of the cognition of parts appearing as phonemes and words, because of resemblance in their powers which, in reality, are different.

91. Just as there is a definite sequence in the transformation of milk or of the seed in the same way, there is a definite sequence in which the cognitions of perceivers take place in regard to the word (sentence).

Just as, according to the creation theory or the manifestation theory, milk, prompted by its transformation clarified butter etc., passes through definite stages like curds, having or not having their special names, preserves, as far as possible, the presence of the properties of the original material and, without violating the fixed sequence of the stages, shows the transformation which prompted it; or rice-seed, prompted by its transformation, the rice-grains, passes through the inevitable stages like stalk, sprout etc. and appears as its main

transformation which prompted it, in the same way, the cognitions of ordinary hearers, prompted by the main result, the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, preceded by the grasping of the form of the sentence, show, when the effect having its fixed means has to be brought about, appearances of parts having fixed sequence and proceed to perceive the *sphoṭas* (the words)¹.

[1. The use of the expressions *prayuktam*, *prayojikām*, *prayojakena* and *prayuktānām* is based on the idea, a figurative one, that the effect prompts its own cause to act in such a manner that the effect is produced. Vṛ. puts it in this way: *Pradhānaṃ Kāryasyātmalābhāya Kāraṇāni prayuñkte* = Primordial matter sets in motion the causes in order that the effect may come to be. The activity of Primordial Matter is attributed to the effect itself. This verse is quoted in *Sphoṭa-siddhi*, p. 159.]

92. Even if the words are accepted as having parts, the difference in parts is due to the sequence of sounds. And if they are partless, the appearance of parts (due to the sequence of sounds) is the means for their cognition.

According to those upholders of division who are of the opinion that the word '*gauḥ*' is nothing more than the phonemes *g-au-h*, that there is no indivisible word-essence beyond them to be cognised through the cognition of the phonemes and who accept the eternality of the words, when the unnameable minute parts in the form of phonemes are gradually manifested, the form of the word would not be cognised and the final clear cognition of the form would have no object to be cognised. If it is held that all the parts are manifested at the same time, there would be no difference between *vega* and *gave* or *tena* and *nate* as far as the audible side is concerned. If they are looked upon as two divisible words with two different meanings, this difficulty would not arise. According to that view also, their perception as two different words would be due to the difference of sequence of

the manifesting sounds. It is seen that ropes etc., illuminated by a lamp fed with the fat of frogs etc., appear like snakes etc.

How, according to the view that the words are indivisible, the cognitions embracing different powers resulting from the postulation of divisions become the means (of cognising the word) has been explained in the immediately preceding verses.¹

[1. Three views in regard to the word are referred to in this verse. From 'Ye'pi to 'nate iti ca', the view discussed is that the phonemes themselves constitute the word and that there is no word beyond them. From 'tatra śabdāntāre' to 'sarpādipratipattibhedah', the view mentioned is that the word is eternal and so are its parts. From 'nirbhāgeṣu' till the end, the view is that the word is indivisible.]

93. Some have declared the universal manifested by the individuals to be the *sphoṭa* and what are called sounds (*dhvani*) to be the individuals.

Some, proclaiming the eternity of the word because of the eternity of the universals, declare that in statements such as the following

"On both sides, it is only the *sphoṭa* which is shown: in place of the phoneme 'r' comes the phoneme 'l'."¹

It is the universal of the word which is called the *sphoṭa*, it is different from the universal called 'word-ness' and its fitness to be perceived is brought about gradually by its substrata which are produced in a sequence and do not co-exist. The individual sounds which are produced and which make the unnameable *sphoṭa* nameable get the name of sound (*dhvani*).²

[1. M. Bhā I. p. 26, l. 1.

2. Before, in verse 69, it was declared that the universal is the name and that the individual is the named. Here, the view that the universal is the *sphoṭa* is set forth.]

94. The sound, modified by its causes, becomes the cause of the cognition of the changeless word, just as the light from a lamp (becomes the cause of the perception of an object).

Others, on the other hand, on account of difference from the process which results in the use of the terms universal and particular, assert that there is only one word which is external, not subject to any change through the sounds modified by their own causes and not residing in the sounds. It is manifested as is done by the light of a lamp when there is no vagueness in the object, with the colouring of the changes in the manifesting sound, as though it has received a new form.¹

[1. Another view of *sphoṭa* is referred to here. It is not clear who held this view. Vṛ. gives the following quotation expressing this view: *Tasmin nityān śabdaśaktim pratijānate* = they assert that there is one eternal word-power in it (the ether). The main idea here is that the sounds, which differ from one another because of difference in the articulatory movements, cause the cognition of the one changeless word without effecting any change in it, just as the light from a lamp reveals the object without effecting any change in it. This process is said to be different from the one relating to the universal and the individual in wholes like a jar: *ākṛtivyaktivyavahāravaidharmyāt*. The parts of a jar are the substrata of the whole, namely, the jar. The jar itself, which is the individual, is the cause of the cognition of the universal in it and of the application of the word 'jar' to it. This is not the relation between the sounds and the word, because the sounds cannot co-exist. As Vṛ. puts it: *Yaugapadyābhāvāc chabdabhlāgūnām*.]

95. Manifestation is not necessarily confined to that which is transitory. The manifestation of the eternal universals by their substrata is admitted.¹

Some put forward the fact of manifestation itself as a reason for concluding that it is non-eternal, as follows—The word is non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar. It is seen that non-eternal objects like a jar are manifested by

a lamp etc. The word is manifested by sounds; therefore, it is non-eternal. If it is held that it is not manifested, that would mean that it is produced. That also makes it non-eternal. Now, to those who hold that universals exist and that they are eternal, it is answered; the reason given (in the above syllogism) is not a real reason, because it is seen both ways. Against those who hold nothing to be eternal and, therefore, maintain that the invalidity of the reason is not proved, those who consider the word to be eternal declare even before them that the invalidity is not established. How? Against the opponent (one who does believe in eternity) the reason "because it is manifested" is not a good reason because it is doubtful and would lead to option and as the other incidental properties also would be attributed, the discussion would lead to regressus ad infinitum.²

[1. Verses 95 to 101 answer objections to the manifestation theory. The objections are made clear in the Vṛtti.

2. *Prasaṅgo vānuṣaṅgiṇām ityanavasthā syāttarkasya*. If the word is said to be non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar by the light of a lamp, why not attribute the other properties of the jar, like visibility also to the word? There would then be no end to the process (*anavasthā*)].

96. It is only material objects which are associated with particular places. Even when difference of place between sound and word is imagined, there is, in fact, no real difference.

Another opposite view is now put forward: The word is not manifested, because of difference in location between the manifestor and the manifested). Jars and other objects are manifested by lamp etc. because they exist in the same locality. The word is found in a place other than where its manifestors, the contacts and separations of the vocal organs take place.¹ This objection does not really hold good in the case of the sounds. Still, it is argued as follows—How is the word which is in one place manifested by the sounds

which are in different places and very far from one another? This is answered as follows—To be in one place or to be in many places is a property of corporeal things. Even material objects like the sun, while being actually restricted to one place, are perceived as being in many places. Sound and word, both, incorporeal, are beyond the range of such expressions as location and located and, therefore, even though the misconception of difference of location takes place, really speaking, there is no difference between them in this respect.

[1. The opponent's idea is that the manifesting sounds exist in the vocal organs whose contacts and separations produce them, whereas the word exists in ether (ākāśa).]

97. Just as there is an eternal fitness between the senses and the objects, in the same way, there is the relation of manifestor and manifested between particular sounds and the word (*sphoṭa*).

Another opposite view is now put forward: The word is not manifested because the (so-called) manifestators are fixed. In this world, what is to be manifested does not require a fixed manifestor, since all objects like jars are manifested by any one of the following, a precious stone or a lamp or a luminous plant or a planet or a star. In the case of words, on the other hand, it is held that fixed sounds manifest them; the sounds which are the causes of the manifestation of particular phonemes cannot manifest other phonemes. Therefore, words are not manifested. To this, the verse which begins with the words: "between the senses and the objects (*grahana-grāhyayoḥ*) is the answer. Just as the colour which inheres in the sense of vision is the cause of the manifestation of external colour, not other qualities nor other senses, nor the qualities of other senses, in the same way, they (the sounds) become the causes of the manifestation of external objects.¹

[1. The answer to the present objection consists in pointing out that even in regard to other manifestors, like the senses, there is a certain

fixity and restriction. While the sense of vision, which is of the nature of fire according to the Vaiśeṣikas, can reveal the colour of external objects, it cannot reveal their smell or taste.]

Against the argument that such fixity does not exist where a thing is manifested by a sense having the same attribute as itself, the following answer is given—

98. In the case of smells etc., which are manifested by their similars, it is seen in the world that there is a particular factor in each case which is responsible for it.

Even when things are perceived by senses having the same attributes as themselves, this fixity can be observed. For example, among substances like nail, bitumen etc., only some particular substance in contact can manifest the smell of some particular substance.¹

[1. When the colour in the sense of vision manifests the jar, it is a case of difference between the manifestor and the manifested, because the jar is a substance and the colour in the sense of vision is a quality. Where there is such difference, the opponent points out, there is no requirement of a fixed manifestor. But where there is similarity between the two, there should be fixity. But in the case of the word being manifested by the sounds, there is similarity, because both are cognised by the sense of hearing and yet there is a fixed manifestor. Against this, it is pointed out that, in other cases also where there is similarity, a fixed manifestor is required. The smell of an object is perceived only by the sense of smell. Thus the manifestor and the manifested are similar to each other. And yet smells are manifested only in contact with a particular substance. The smell of *Kuṅkuma* is manifested only in contact with clarified butter. The only when it comes in contact with boiling barley broth.]

99. The thing that is revealed follows the differences of the revealors. This is evident in the case of reflections in such different reflectors as oil, water etc.

Another opposite view is now put forward—The word is not manifested because (in its case) increase, decrease

and difference in number of the manifestors are seen in the manifested (the word). When there is increase and decrease of the manifestors, increase and decrease of the manifested are not found. Increase and decrease of (the light of) lamps (the manifestors) do not cause increase and decrease of jars etc. Nor does any variation in the number of lamps cause any change in the original number of jars etc. In the case of the word, on the other hand, one sees variation in number and magnitude following variation in the striking of the vocal organs. Therefore, the word is not manifested.

This argument is answered as follows—one does see that the manifested follow the variations of the manifestors. It is as follows—When the surface of the mirror is sunk, the reflection of the face is raised, when the surface of the mirror is raised, the reflection of the face is sunk. In a dagger, the reflection of the face is long, in mustard oil, it is dark, in a Chinese dagger, Greek crystal etc. it follows the dimensions of the reflector. Thus possibilities of variation are infinite. Difference of number is also seen in the case of the reflections of the sun etc. when there are many mirrors and many waves of water.²

[1. It is not clear what specific objects are meant by *cīnaśāstra* and *yavanakāca*. Obviously, they could reflect objects.

2. The *Vṛtti* may be compared with the following passage from the *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* of Bhartṛhari—

“Yasyāpi śabdavyaktiḥ tasyāpi nityaḥ śabdaḥ. Sa tu nādābhivyaṅgyaḥ. padanīyato nādaḥ. Yathā cakṣurādayo niyatā abhivyaṅjakā abhivyaṅgyeṣu rūpādiṣu. rūpavṛddhīrāsānuvidhāyinaśca. Yathādarśamaṇḍalādiṣu pratibimbāni dīrghāni parimaṇḍalāni mahānti anyāni ca drśyante evaṃ śabdā api nādaḥbhedenā bhidyante. Yathā salile taraṅgabhedenaikaś candro’ neka upalaghyate, pradīpabhedācca chāyā bhidyate, ādarśabhedācca pratibimbabhedah. Tasmānnīyatānādābhivyaṅgyā hrāda-vṛddhīrāsānuvidhāyino vyaktiśabdā api nityāḥ.

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.I, XLIII).

It might be said that the reflection which has entered a mirror etc. is different from its originals like the moon etc. Against this, the answer is—

100. Original objects like mountains cannot possibly enter into reflectors like a diamond and the surface of a mirror which have totally different dimensions.

It is not possible that objects like mountains having different dimensions should enter and be produced inside substrata like a diamond.

101. Therefore, due to the difference in time of the manifesting sounds, their own time and that of the duration of their cognition are attributed to the phoneme (*varṇa*) word (*pada*) and sentence (*vākya*) which have no difference in time.

In the continued existence of eternal things, the power of time as an auxiliary cause does not play a part. All the *sphoṭas*, the phonemes, words and sentences, having a greater or lesser magnitude and whose continued existence, during the, according to worldly usage, earlier and later periods, is understood from their cognitions (at the time of their manifestation) do not differ as far as their duration is concerned. When they become objects of cognition, though they have no difference in time, they seem to have the duration of their cognition. What is meant by speed and their own duration is this—the primary sound whose duration is superimposed on the essence of the word, in order that their difference may not be grasped, becomes the cause of the use of the expression short, long and protracted. The secondary sound brings about the external difference of speed, quick etc.

102. Others have declared that whatever is produced by the organs of articulation, through contacts and separations, is the *sphoṭa*; the sounds produced by this initial sound are the *dhvanis*,

According to the view that the word is transitory, the first sound which is produced by the contacts and separations between the points and organs of articulation is the *sphoṭa*. Those which are produced by that first sound and spread in all directions carrying its reflection, are the *dhvanis*. All things are in themselves without parts, but the parts of their main associates are attributed to them. Similarly, ether (which is one) has no parts but division into parts due to relation with objects in contact with it, is attributed to it. That being so, because of proximity in the form of succession of parts and on account of uninterrupted succession of cause and effect, those elements which have progressively diminishing power of reflecting the previous sounds are similar to the forms illuminated by dim light, gradually disappear and cause division in the phoneme, are called sounds. According to the view of eternality, the *sphoṭa* is manifested by sounds produced by contacts and separations. According to some, it is manifested by the resonance¹ produced by the sounds caused by contacts and separations. Sounds, on the other hand, are those which favour the cognition of the *sphoṭa*, have progressively diminishing power of manifestation, cause the distinction of the speeds quick etc. and gradually disappear.

[1. *Dhvani* and *nāda*. Here also, as in the *Vṛtti* on verse 47, a distinction is made between *dhvani* and *nāda*. The latter is produced by the former. This distinction is mentioned in the course of the exposition of the views of those who held the *sphoṭa* to be the one indivisible word (*śabdavyakti*) as distinct from those who held it to be the Universal. According to *Vṛṣabha*, the sounds produced by contacts and separations produce a resonance (*nāda*) which manifests the *sphoṭa*. The sounds produced by the first sound are the cause of the continued cognition of the *sphoṭa* or of the speed of utterance which is only another way of looking at the same thing. See note 1 on verse 47.]

103. Whether the sound in question is short or long, the time of the *sphoṭa* is invariable. The series of sounds which follows is susceptible of greater or lesser duration.¹

Smallness and bigness are attributed to the word² on the basis of the common feature consisting of covering a certain amount of space. Or it is due to worldly usage. Everywhere usage is the basis for determining the nature of objects. Determining the nature of objects on the basis of reason and tradition would be unreliable because it would result in different views. As both the sounds which are effects and those which are causes are produced and perish without distinction, there is not the slightest difference between a big and a small sound, as there is none between the cognitions of an elephant and a mosquito. Due to difference in circumstances, however, the power of a sound to produce effects differs. The succession of effects of a sound like the one produced by the impact of the drum and the stick reaches far. Another sound like the one produced by striking on iron or bronze causes a succession of sounds which can be heard only from near, but reverberates without a break.

[1. This verse is meant to describe in greater detail the process of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* according to the view that the first sound produced by contacts and separations is the *sphoṭa* and the later sounds produced by the first one are the *dhvanis*.

2. If one looks upon sound as a quality, one can object to its being described as 'small' or 'big' because smallness or bigness are qualities and they can reside only in substances and not in the sound which is itself a quality. If one looks upon sound as a substance, even then one can object that only material substances can be big or small and not immaterial substances like sound. To meet this objection, it is pointed out that these two expressions are used for sound by courtesy (*upacaryate*).]

104. From a distance only the sound is perceived like the light from a lamp. The difference is clearly visible in the sounds which are produced by bells, etc.

Here some thinkers consider that the *sphoṭa* manifested by the sound which comes into being at the same time and spreads far in all directions like the light of a lamp is associated with the sound from the very moment of its manifesta-

tion just as a substance is endowed with its smell from the very moment it is produced. Just as, in a lamp, there is the burning substance which is the material cause of its closely packed parts (*ghanasanniviṣṭāvayavaṃ pratyupādānam*) and its light is based on it and follows its transformations, in the same way, the *sphoṭa* and the sound, very distinct when a bell is struck, constitute the characteristic of the manifestation of the phonemes. The difference between primary and secondary sounds has been explained in the two preceding verses.¹

[1. This verse puts forward another view of those who held the *sphoṭa* to be transitory. It is an answer to a possible objection that the sound, apart from the *sphoṭa*, does not exist at all. It is here pointed out that it does exist separately. We can see the difference when we hear from a distance the sounds which a crowd makes but cannot distinguish the words (the *sphoṭas*). Or, it is like seeing the light of a lamp without seeing the lamp itself. The sound produced by the first impact of a bell is the *sphoṭa*. In this verse, it is stated that the sound (*dhvani*) is also produced at the same time whereas in the previous verse it was stated that the sound produced by the impact is the *sphoṭa* and the subsequent sounds produced by the first one are the *dhvanis*. In both the views, the *sphoṭa* is transitory.

In the text of the Vṛtti, *ghaṭasanniviṣṭāvayavam* is a mistake for *ghanasanniviṣṭāvayavam*.]

105. On account of the relative intensity in the contact between the organs and the places of articulation, the long and the protracted also become different. The sounds produced after the cessation of the vibrations bring about variation in the speed of utterance.

Even according to the view that the word is transitory,¹ it is not because of any increase in the manifesting sounds that there is any increase in the long and protracted vowels. How then? Because of the greater intensity in the contact between the places and the organs of articulation. All that contact can only bring about the form of the long and pro-

tracted vowels. Therefore, till they acquire their form, the vibration, causing mutual contact of the parts of the places and organs of articulation because of their striking against one another and following closely the special movements of the air, continues. When the vibration ceases, the sounds which are produced by the original ones, become the cause of the regulation of speed like quick etc.

[1. I have adopted the reading 'anityapakṣe' as Vṛṣabha has it.]

106. Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds are produced from the *sphoṭa* as one flame from another.

Even when the vibrations continue uninterruptedly, whatever sound is produced by the contact (between the places and organs of articulation) never disappears without producing its effect. The sounds which are produced by the vibration and are simultaneous (with the *sphoṭa*) manifest the *sphoṭa*. The sounds which come in between, resemble them, and shine like them, are called secondary sounds (*anuśaṅga*). It has also been said that each secondary sound among them has its series of effects lasting as long as the vibration lasts and helps in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. This production of sounds has been described on the analogy of the continuity of the flames proceeding from burning fuel. Just as from the flames of burning fuel proceed continuously other flames produced by them and manifest objects by their light, so is the continuity of the sounds.

107. Air, atoms, or knowledge is said to be transformed into the word according to some. Thus, in the different doctrines, there is no fixed view on the subject.

Some declare that it is air which becomes the word.

108. The air set in motion by the effort corresponding to the desire of the speaker, strikes at the different places of articulation and is transformed into sounds.

109. By the impact caused by the force of the original cause (the effort) even the solid forms of air which has speed and solidity are diversified.¹

This and similar views must be understood.

[1. Vṛṣabha understands that the air brings about the contacts and separations of the places and organs of articulation which are solid (*sāravatyah*). The translation connects 'sāravatyō 'pi mūrttayah' with 'tasya' = of the air.]

Others have accepted that it is the atoms which become the word. They have declared as follows—

110. Because the different kinds of atoms have all powers, they, in combination or otherwise, transform themselves into shadow, sunlight, darkness and sounds.

111. The atoms called words, when their power is manifested by effort, are set in motion by the same effort and they gather like clouds.

All such views have to be understood. Others expound the transformation of knowledge into the word.

112. This inner knower, at first identical with the subtle word, transforms himself into the gross word, in order to manifest his own form.

113. He, the inner knower, becomes mind after attaining maturity through heat. Then he enters the air called breath which is then emitted.¹

[1. This verse describes the steps by which the self becomes the gross word. First, the self becomes the mind, capable of cognising objects. Then this capacity attains maturity through the bodily heat. When set in motion by the desire to speak, the mind identifies itself with the breath which is then emitted.]

114. Air becomes the substratum of the mind and becomes coloured by the qualities of the latter and is transformed by the inner heat.¹

[1. The Self becomes the mind of which the air becomes the substratum. The air becomes impregnated with the attributes of the mind and becomes the word.]

115. The inner air (*prāṇa*), after splitting into parts in the form of sounds and after suggesting the phonemes, is merged into them.

All this and similar views have to be considered. What has been given is only an illustration. There is much diversity in the views of the authors of the Śikṣās and the Bhāṣyas.¹ For example—

“Vital air, prompted upwards by the innēr effort, aided by the inner heat, accumulates, through the sound-carrying interstices,² fine particles of sound like masses of smoke. When thus accumulated in the places of articulation, it assumes the identical form of the inner word, because of its illuminating aspect”. All such views have to be considered. It is as follows³—

“The air, prompted by effort from the region of the navel, going upwards, strikes against one of the places like the chest and then sound is produced”.

Such diversity of views of the authors of the Śikṣās must be considered. It has been said by the teacher (Pāṇini).

"The Self sees things through the intellect and joins the mind with the desire to speak. The mind strikes at the heat of the body which, in its turn, prompts the vital air."⁴

And so on. Another teacher says—

"The vital air reaches the stomach where the resonance takes place. Reaching the throat, it becomes either breath or sonority".

And so on. Another teacher says—

"The heat of the body, struck by the mind, prompts the vital air. It rises from the navel and strikes against the head and when it comes into contact with another rising wave of air, becomes sounds such as 'k' or 'kh'."

Such different views are found in the treatises called Śikṣā attached to each branch of the Veda and they must be understood in detail.

[1. Vṛṣabha says that by Bhāṣyakāra, the commentators of the Śikṣās are meant.

2. Vṛ. says that the veins (nāḍīs) are filled with fine parts of the word and when they are set in motion along the veins by the inner air, they accumulate in the places of articulation, like masses of smoke.

3. Vṛ. says—*Tathetyāpiśaliyaśikṣādarśanam.*

4. Pāṇinīyaśikṣā, 6.]

116. The eternal word which, being fine, is not perceived by the ear, becomes perceptible through its own cause, as the air by fanning.

Now another tradition¹ is being recorded. There is subtle sound within and without all embodied objects like masses of fine air. According to some, it is understood as ether. Just as, even though atoms of air exist everywhere, it is only when, due to the impact of the fan,² they are dislodged from their place, that they become endowed with action, in the same way, sound, when given a gross modified form by

its manifesting causes, reaches the region of the ear and perfects it.

[1. According to Vṛṣabha, this tradition is also current among the authors of the Śikṣās.

2. Both in the Kārikā and in the Vṛtti, Pt. Charu Deva Shastri's edition has Vyañjana. But the context requires Vyajana and it is actually found in the manuscript 'S', used for our edition of Vākyapadiya Kāṇḍa I. So that reading has been adopted.]

117. The power of it which is in the breath and in the understanding strikes at the different places of articulation and becomes differentiated.

All these are different views. The sound mentioned in the previous verse having the attribute of accumulation is not referred to here. The word, already under discussion, is being explained according to different views. The word rests on the breath as well as on the mind.¹ Being manifested by the powers of the two substrata, the breath and the mind, the word conveys the meaning. The breath is penetrated by the mind. Surging upwards like a flame, following the effort which set it in motion, it strikes against the points of articulation of the phonemes and assumes a form favourable to the comprehension of the eternal word. Having thus attained the state of the effect of the two powers which are within it, the breath assumes different forms, as the earth or the foetus or the banyan seed does² and gives to the one essence of the word the mere colouring of difference.

[1. The word has two substrata, the mind and the breath. While explaining this idea, Vṛṣabha adds a third one: the vocal organs. As he puts it—*Sa cāyaṃ trītyaśabdaḥ Karaṇādhiṣṭhānaḥ*.

2. The earth, the foetus and the banyan seed go through certain stages before they attain their final form. Unfortunately, the text of the Paddhati here is corrupt, so that one does not get a clear idea of what Vṛṣabha considered to be the stages.]

118. The power which creates and regulates this universe rests on words. It is through that eye that

all this diversity of understanding (*bhedarūpaḥ prati-bhātmā*) is perceived.

According to some, the universals (of words and meanings) rest on the substratum of the subtle word. They become manifested when the substratum evolves and appear as the expressed meanings and the expressive words. It is like what some others say—"All objects merge into the senses (as potentialities) and all the senses merge into the intellect as potentialities and the intellect merges into the sequenceless word as a potentiality. All this activity which goes on during dreams and the wakeful state and involves distinction into different individuals always exists in the subtle word, the supreme cause (in a potential state). Others have also said as follows—

"It is the word which sees the object, it is the word which speaks, it is the word which reveals the object which was lying hidden, it is on the word that this multiple world rests and it is this very word which enjoys after the differentiation."

✓ 119. The difference between '*śaḍja*' and others is grasped when conveyed through words; therefore, all kinds of meanings depend upon the powers of words.

Everything depends upon the word which causes its cognition and enters into usage when grasped through remembrance of it as intertwined with its word (*smṛtinirūpaṇā*), as identified with its word through memory (*abhijalpanirūpaṇā*) and as connected with some particular action (*ākāranirūpaṇā*). The distinction between *śaḍja*, *ṛṣabha*, *gāndhāra*, *dhaivata*, *niṣāda*, *pañcama* and *madhyama*, the words expressive of which are not well-defined nor well-known, cannot be understood without knowing the words on which depend their understanding. Cowherds, shepherds and others invent special words and accomplish their special purposes in regard to cows and other animals. Therefore, a thing with its distinctive feature, closely linked with general

or special words the meanings of which are clearly grasped or otherwise respectively, is illuminated, embraced and identified with a cognition which is united with the power of the word, intertwined with the word and has the form of the word.¹

[The purpose of this verse is to show that distinction between things can be known only through words. The distinctive features of some things in this world are easy to see and they have their words to express them. But the distinctive features of some things are not easy to grasp. By merely listening to the musical notes *ṣaḍja* etc., one cannot understand their special characteristics. One can do so only with the help of the technical explanation of the Science of Music. What we cognise can enter into worldly usage only if we can express it in words. The process of cognition has three stages which, as explained by Vṛṣabha, are: (1) to see a thing and to remember it as intertwined with its word (*Smṛtinirūpanā*), (2) to cognise the identity between word and meaning (*abhijalpanirūpanā*), (3) to see it as connected with some action (*ākāranirūpanā*).

The intimate relation in which the word and the meaning figure in the cognition is emphasised in the Vṛtti by the use of several expressions covering different aspects of it: *bhedavānarthah, śabdaśakti-saṃsrṣṭayā śabdānuviddhayā śabdātmikayā buddhyā prakāśyate upa-grhyate svikriyate*. The meaning is illuminated and embraced by the cognition, it becomes one with it. The word, on the other hand, is also intertwined with the cognition which has the form of the word. The cognition has the form of the word which has the form of the meaning. (*upagṛhītārthākāraśabdarāpā sā buddhiḥ—Vṛ.*)]

120. Knowers of tradition (the *Vedas*) have declared that all this is the transformation of the word. It is from the *chandas* that this universe has evolved.

Just as other thinkers,¹ while explaining causality, saw that the properties of the cause continue in the effects and have declared as the source of everything, either the mass of atoms, free from mutual distinctions, subtle, imperceptible, having the potentialities of all effects, with the tendency to produce them kept in abeyance or Primordial Matter or the collection of Powers rooted in Nescience or something which has no birth nor change (but is merely the substratum) of appearances, in the same way, in the Scripture also, the word

in which the powers of Enjoyer and Enjoyed are submerged has been declared to be the cause of the world in many ways. For example, it has been said: "The Lord Vairāja, is indeed made up of *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*. The Lord is the world, the Lord is the sacrifice. In it, three oblations are offered, pleasing to the three worlds. These oblations offered in a three-fold manner, are the three worlds."² Similarly—"He who created the world is indeed the Lord of the world, made up of hymns, existing at the very beginning, indestructible (or a very bull). From him were born cattle, from cattle all vegetation and from vegetation, fire. That is why it has been said that one should not milk in a wooden vessel. A wooden vessel is, indeed, fire. That is why milking is never done in a wooden vessel."²

There is a *Ṛk* also on this very subject—

"From the Lord first came knowledge, the food; from it were separated name and form; the name came from life (breath) and the form from knowledge. The one knowledge appears as many."³

Again, it has been said—"It is the word which became the worlds; the word became all that is immortal and mortal. It is the word which enjoys, which speaks in many ways. There is nothing beyond the word."³

There are also some ancient sayings on the subject—

"The Creator, mentioned in the Scripture, after dividing Himself in many ways, into manifestations of Himself, entered into Himself with all the manifestations."⁴

"Those persons in whom the pure speech is established in a great measure, in them the holy light of the Creator exists eminently."

"The great Light of the Creator which is in the learned as though covered with a lid, becomes merged with its source, when their body dissolves."

"When one is in possession of right knowledge, one is identified with the shining mass of that wonderful light and is merged in it."

[1. The problem here is to decide what *ānye* means. According to Vṛṣabha, it means the Vaiśeṣikas and others. If he is right, then the Vṛtti "*yathaiivānye... vyavasthāpayanti*" mentions different things beginning with the mass of atoms (*aṇugrāma*) as the original cause of the world, according to others. For Vaiśeṣikas, it is the mass of atoms, for Sāṅkhyas, it is Primordial Matter (*Pradhāna*), for others, it is the bundle of Powers, rooted in Nescience and for others still, it is something devoid of birth and change and is the substratum of appearances (*vivarta*). The other way of interpreting the passage is to take it as describing only the mass of atoms, linking all the adjectives in the passage with '*aṇugrāmam*'. The former way is more in accordance with our text.

2. The source of these two prose texts is unknown. In the second text, the word '*akṣan*' may be '*ukṣan*'.

3. These two verses are given as R̥K, but they are not found in the R̥g-Veda.

4. The idea in this verse is that all differentiation merges into the ultimate at the time of pralaya. That is, it exists in a latent stage, only to become patent at the time of creation. As Vṛ. puts it. *vyakti-rūpeṇa bhūtvā śaktirāpeṇāvatīṣṭhate*.]

121. All knowledge of what is to be done in this world depends upon the word. Even the child, with its residual traces from the previous birth, has such knowledge. 1113

Even that which exists is as good as non-existent as long as it does not come within the range of verbal usage. Even a totally non-existent thing like a hare's horn or something which appears and disappears in the sky like a celestial town¹ (*gandharvanagara*), when brought to the mind by words, figures, like something endowed with primary reality,² in various usages. In children in whom the germs of the word exist according to their kind, because of the existence in them of the residual traces of their use of words in their former births, there arises cognition based on vague words (*anākhyeyaśabda*) in the course of their various purposeful activities.

[1. Vṛṣabha points out that a celestial city may suddenly appear to us in the sky and it may disappear equally suddenly. But when the word brings the idea of it to our mind, it stays.

2. *Mukhyasattāyuktam iva. Mukhyasattā* (primary reality), the fact of something existing outside our mind is contrasted with *Upacārasattā* which consists in the fact of something figuring in our mind through the agency of words. Words move chiefly in the realm of *Upacārasattā*, as explained in Vāk. III, *Sambandhasanuddēśa*.]

122. The first movement of the vocal organs,¹ the emitting of the air upwards and the striking of the places of articulation are not possible without the residual traces of the speech (in the previous birth).

This residual trace of speech has no beginning and it exists in every one as a seed in the mind. It is not possible that it should be the result of the effort of any person. Movements of the articulatory organs by children are not due to instruction by others but are known through intuition. Who, indeed, can make or make known these human properties as other than residual traces of the word?

[1. Vṛ takes the word 'Karaṇa' as denoting the vocal organs as well as the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Thus, it is due to *śabdabhāvanā* that the child makes, untaught, not only the first movements of the vocal organs, but the very effort to say something. The first movement of the vocal organs may not be necessarily to speak, but to eat or to drink.

2. *Pratibhāgamyāḥ. Pratibhā* seems to be another name for *śabdabhāvanā*. It stands (1) for the residual traces of the exercise of the faculty of speech in the previous birth; (2) for the faculty of speech with which the child is born; (3) for the child's instinct to do something in response to a situation.]

123. There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word.

When, in the word-seed, everything is merged, then no verbal usage can be accomplished with the indeterminate knowledge which takes place in regard to objects. For instance, when one walks quickly and treads on grass and clods of earth, even though knowledge of them takes place (no usage is accomplished thereby). That stage of knowledge is only sometimes reached in which, when the word-seed is awakened and the powers, confined to particular meanings, of expressive, explainable and unexplainable words are manifested, the object is given a shape and accepted by knowledge which is intertwined with the word and follows the power of the word and it comes within the range of clear cognition and can be designated as such and such and is said to be known. Where, due to circumstances, the manifesting causes of the word appear, it becomes a cause of memory. Similarly, according to some, even one who is asleep has a stream of cognitions like one who is awake. The only difference is that the seeds of the word function in a very subtle manner in that condition. That is why that condition has been called one of darkness. Thus consciousness, mixed up with the word, appears and disappears constantly as the cause and effect of the manifested word.

124. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.

Just as illumination is the nature of fire or consciousness the nature of the Inner Controller, in the same way, all knowledge is intertwined with the word. Even in the state of unconsciousness (sleep), there is the persistence of the association with the subtle word. Also, that first cognition of external objects which does not grasp their special features (*nimittānām*) illuminates them in a vague manner (*avyapadeśyayā vṛttyā*) as mere things, by referring to them as this or that. At the time of remembrance also, when the seeds of such indeterminate cognition are awakened, a mere

outline, consisting of the previous vague cognition, figures in the mind in the form: 'this is some hymn or verse which I have heard before'. If knowledge were not mixed up with the word, the (vague) cognition which arises, not being intertwined with the form of another (the word) does not become an auxiliary in the act of illumination. After the cognition of the bare meaning of the words (in a sentence) which are different from one another, mutually unhelpful and independent of one another (*ātmāntarānātmanām*) has taken place, what takes place afterwards, namely, the mutual determination of their meanings, the definite identification of their meanings as such and such, their cooperation to fulfil one purpose, the connection of the individual sentence-meaning with the expressive power of the words, all this is closely linked with the fact of knowledge being closely intertwined with the word. It is this (*vāgrūpatā*) which brings about the identification and the mutual determination of the word-meanings, a cognition (of the sentence) which is qualified by all the qualifications and causes purposeful activity and yet it does not abandon the appearance of difference within it by a process of abstraction of powers.²

[1. *Ātmāntarātmanām*. Vṛṣabha's text seems to have been: '*ātmāntarānātmanām*' because he explains as follows— *ātmāntaram eṣām ātmā na bhavati. Itaretarasya iti. Itarasyetara ātmā na bhavati. Itarasyāpītāro devadattārtho gavārthasyātmetyādī*.

2. From '*bhinnarūpāṇām* to *na vijahāti*, it is explained that the understanding of the sentence-meaning from the word-meaning presupposes that knowledge is of the nature of the word. The stages in the process, as understood by Vṛṣabha, are: (1) the understanding of the word-meanings from the words; (2) the identification of the meanings in a cognition intertwined with the word; (3) the unification of these meanings by their mutual delimitation.]

125. It is this which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to this can be analysed (and communicated).

Human transactions in regard to worldly things and in regard to things taught in the Vedas takes place through the

sciences, crafts and arts. The activity of the rest of the animate and inanimate creation depends upon man. All science is closely bound up with the intellect (thought) which is of the nature of the word. It is on the basis of this fact of knowledge being of the nature of the word that in cases such as the making of a jar, all instruction and effort of the prompter and the prompted respectively, proceed.

126. The consciousness of all beings going through transmigration is in the nature of the word; it exists within and without. The consciousness of all types of beings does not go beyond this essence.

It is because consciousness is of the nature of the word that the distinction between sentient and insentient is made in the world.¹ It has been said—

“It is the word which urges all beings towards purposeful activity. If that were absent, everything would be insentient like a piece of wood or a wall.”

The experience of pleasure and pain in the case of those whose consciousness is turned inward is possible only as long as consciousness is of the nature of the word. As for those whose consciousness is external, their transactions in the world are dependent upon that and would, in the absence of that, cease to be. There is no kind of being endowed with consciousness who knows or causes others to know without the association of the word.² Therefore, there is no activity of consciousness which is not closely linked with the powers of the word. Others go to the extent of saying that the activity of consciousness is the principle of the word itself. For it has been said—

“The word which has been taught in all the Sciences as the ultimate source assumes form through the appearance of differences.”

“The divisions of this word, cows and the like, made known through the words,³ having their source in the word, are not beyond the unity of the ultimate even though they appear to be different.”

"They conquer death who know the word which has six doors, six bases, six forms of knowledge and six eternal⁴."

[1. *Samjñā*, *sasaṃjñā*, *visaṃjñā*, *antaḥsaṃjñā*, *bahiḥsaṃjñā*, these five allied expressions are found in this verse and the Vṛtti thereon. *Visaṃjñā* is also found in the verse quoted in the Vṛtti. *Sasaṃjñā* and *Visaṃjñā* mean sentient and insentient respectively. A piece of wood is given as an example of what is *Visaṃjñā*. *Antaḥsaṃjñā* and *Bahiḥsaṃjñā* seem to stand for different states of beings: when consciousness is withdrawn from external objects it is *antaḥsaṃjñā*, when it is turned outwards, it is *bahiḥsaṃjñā*.

2. *Svaparasambodhaḥ*. Whatever has consciousness is capable of *svasaṃbodha* or both *svasaṃbodha* and *parasambodha*—whatever is *sthāvara*, stationary, like a tree has only *svasaṃbodha*. Men and other animals have both, according to Vṛṣabha: *svasaṃbodhānugama eva sthāvareṣu, ubhayānugamo jaṅgameṣu manuṣyādiṣviti*. 'Parasambodha' can mean both knowledge of others and making others know.

3. *Vāṇnetrāḥ vāṇibandhanāḥ*. Things consisting of objects and words, are brought to the mind through words (*vacanān nīyante*—Vṛ.). So they are called *vāṇnetrāḥ*. In other words, we see everything through the word.

4. The word is said to have four sets of six things. What they stand for is not clear. Vṛṣabha explains them on the basis of the six kinds of *Pratibhā* mentioned in Vāk. II, 154. due to (1) *svabhāva*; (2) *caraṇa*; (3) *abhyāsa*; (4) *yoga*; (5) *adrṣṭā*; (6) *viśiṣṭopanatā*. They are the means (*dvāra*) of attaining the ultimate word, the six meanings which figure in them are its basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the six kinds of cognitions which result from them lead to it and the six relations with the six meanings are eternal (*avyaya*).]

127. Just as in the wakeful state (*pravibhāge*) it is through the word that the agent acts on the objects of all actions, in the same way, in dream (*avibhāge*), it is the word itself which becomes the object of all actions.

The appearances of the Word-Brahman (in the wakeful state) consist of things to be accomplished and the means of accomplishing them. In the wakeful state, the seeds of the divisions of the word, being of the nature of the word,

attain modifications like birth etc. through production, modification and reaching and act as objects of action. In the undivided states like sleep, on the other hand, the same word, being deprived of (external) objects but being similar to them, becomes the object of the actions of production, modification and reaching.¹ It has been said—

“The Lord of All, the All-Embracing, the Enjoyer, after dividing Himself and after having created many different things, proceeds to sleep.”

[1. See Vāk. III, Sā 45.]

128. Whether everything is of the nature of the Self or of the Supreme, as the word presents it, so it is understood; it is through the word that the object is established.

¹According to some, all transformation is a product of the Self. It exists within in every individual, but appears to be external. That something is internal and something else is external is mere usage, based on rooted previous practice. But this is impossible considering that the source of both is one and incorporeal. According to others, all forms of knowledge and all differentiation is a transformation of the inner consciousness and so on. Such are the views of those who hold that everything is a product of the Self. Others, however, think that the Supreme Self is the source of creation which emerges out of it as oil does from the sesame seed. Others still think that the process is like the production of sparks from fire, of masses of cloud from subtle air, of streams of flowing water from the moon-stone, of sāla trees and the like from the earth, of banyan trees with their downward growth from banyan seeds and so on. Such are the views of those who hold that everything is a product of the Supreme Self. The views of those who are for the Self and these who are for the Supreme have to be understood from the Philosophical commentaries. What is meant by ‘as the word presents it’ is this — the word which is within is presented as pleasure

or pain in many ways in different beings. Even in such cases as the throwing and falling of stones,² it is so presented according to worldly usage and established practice. What is meant by 'it is through the word that the object is established is — It is the word which creates the object and preserves it.

[1. The views expressed in this verse and the Vṛtti are not those of Grammarians. It is intended to show here that many views are just creations of words and do not correspond to reality. There are some who hold that everything is a creation of the individual Self while others hold that everything proceeds from the Supreme Self. They are respectively called *svamātrāvādinah.* and *pāramātrāvādinah.* Among those who hold that the universe is a product of the individual Self, there are those who do not specify whether, by individual Self, they mean the Intellect (*Buddhi*) or the individual consciousness. As Vṛ puts it:—*caitanyam ekam kāraṇam, pūrvatra tvanirūpitō 'ntaḥ-sanniveśī puruṣa iti viśeṣaḥ.* Among those who declare the Supreme to be the source of everything, those who give the emergence of oil from sesame-seed as example seem to think of gradual creation and those who give the other four examples, of simultaneous creation.

2. *Loṣṭakṣepapātādiṣu.* Vṛṣabha gives reference to the following passage from M. Bhā. I, p. 123, l. 11.

"*Acetaneṣvapi. Tadyathā. Loṣṭiḥ kṣipto bāhuvegaṃ gatvā naiva tiryag gacchati, norddhvam ārohati, pṛthivīvikāraḥ pṛthivīmeva gacchat-yāntaryataḥ.*"

In the course of the discussion on P. 1.1.50, where we are told that of many possible substitutes, the nearest to the original must be chosen, somebody argues that the word '*antarātama*', in P. 1.1.50 is unnecessary as the nearest would be adopted in any case, that being the practice in the world, not only among living things, but also among insentient things. To illustrate how even insentient things associate with what is nearest to them, the example of a stone thrown upwards is given. After going up to a certain height according to the strength of the thrower, it does not proceed horizontally, nor does it go further upwards, but being a product of the earth, falls and joins the earth below. Here, however, the throwing upwards of a stone seems to be mentioned in another context. The context is the idea that everything is understood by us and affects us as words present it. As Vṛ. puts it:—"*Prāṇidharmesvūkhyāya bāhyeṣvapi śabdasya vyāpāram āha loṣṭakṣepa iti.*" It is, however, a pity that the text of the Paddhati here has not come down to us faithfully, so that the connection between the Bhāṣya context and the present context, as understood by Vṛṣabha does not become clear.]

129. In the case of a thing like 'a circle of fire' (*alātacakra*) where the circumstance is totally different, merely by the force of the word, its form clearly figures in the mind.

It is the audible word which shows all meaning as residing in its own form, the word. It seems to create that meaning as it were. It always exists in it as something to be conveyed by it. The word is not concerned as to whether the object in question has real existence outside or not, nor whether there has been a mistake or not. Even in the case of a circle of fire, the presence of a word which bears resemblance to the one which denotes an action consisting of spreading in all directions, creates a meaning for practical words like *alātacakra* (circle of fire). The form of the object so fictitiously created, becomes conventionalised, even in the face of strong inference to the contrary. In the case of objects like a hare's horn, definitely known not to exist, it is the audible word which creates or rather brings the idea thereof to the mind and binds it to its own form. So also in the case of objects which are accessible to the senses (*pratykṣān*). A meaning, whether it has an external basis or not, is always present in the word, as the thing to be expressed by it. (Whether the object exists outside or not) in every individual, following the impressions of his previous experience and according to his knowledge, meanings of different kinds are understood from words.

130. It has been said that the Self, which is within the speaker is the word, the great Bull with whom one desires union.

Here (in the Science of Grammar) the word is of two kinds: it is eternal or it is a product. The product is that which is found in worldly usage and it bears the reflection of the Self¹ which is essentially the word. The eternal one is the source of all usage,² it has all sequence suppressed, it

resides within everybody, the source of all transformations, the substratum of all actions, the basis of pleasure and pain, unimpeded anywhere in regard to the production of effects (but) with its field of enjoyment restricted like a lamp covered with a jar, the limitless source of all corporeal objects, manifesting itself as all forms of knowledge and as all differentiations, imitating the states of sleep and wakefulness through cessation of activity and resumption of it respectively, endowed like rain and forest-fire with the powers of production and destruction respectively, the Lord of All, endowed with all powers, the great word—Bull; those who know the process of union with the word break the ego-sense and are united with it, in complete absence of differentiation. It has been said³—

“He has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands. He, the great Bull, is tied in three places and roars. The great God has entered into human beings.”

[1. *Puruṣasya prabimbopagrāhī. Vṛṣabha* comments— ‘Yo’yaṃ rathyāpuruṣaḥ sa vāktattvavikāratvāt kāryaśabdasvabhāvaḥ, vikārāṇām prakṛtirūpānvayāt = The man in the street is of the nature of the transitory word, because he is a transformation of the word-principle and the source persists in the products.

2. *Sarvavyavahārayoniḥ. According to Vṛṣabha*, this means that it is the source of the distinction between the end and the means and of all the distinctions accepted in the different śāstras.

3. RV IV, 58.3.]

131. Therefore the purification of the word is (the means to the) attainment of the Supreme Self. One who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal Brahman.

Once the essence of the word is purified by the form the correctness of which is established and particular merit is manifested by the disappearance of obstacles in the shape of incorrect forms, well-being (*abhyudaya*) is certain. Through repeated practice of it and after attaining union (with the word-principle) through the correct word and after fully un-

derstanding the Intuition which derives from the word-principle and which is the same as being, which is the source of its modifications and possesses the powers of being the means of accomplishment and the thing to be accomplished, attainment of the Supreme Good (*kṣema*) is certain.

"After taking his stand on the word which lies beyond the activity of breath, after having taken rest in oneself by the union resulting in the suppression of sequence,

"After having purified speech and after having rested it on the mind, after having broken its bonds and made it bond-free."

"After having reached the inner light, he, with his knots cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light."

132. Nobody admits that there is any written tradition not associated with a particular author. When all such written traditions disappear, the three Vedas continue as the seed.

In all systems, somebody is thought of as the author of the written tradition and so its human origin is accepted. Vedic sentences, on the other hand, are like consciousness itself, not created by any person. When the authors of the written traditions will have perished, they will serve as the seed for the formation of other traditions.¹

[1. The word *āgama* is used in a wide sense. In many places, both the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* refer to the *Mahābhāṣya* as *āgama*. In the *Vṛtti* on verse 11, the word '*āgamena*' occurs and it refers to the *Mahābhāṣya*. *Vṛṣabha* calls the twelve verses quoted in the *Vṛtti* on verse 1 at the end, the quotation *sūkṣmām* etc. and *nāmaivedam* etc. occurring in the *Vṛtti* on verses 5 and 11 respectively, *āgamas*. Similarly, he calls quotations from the *M. Bhā* and the *Saṅgraha*, found in the *Vṛtti*, by the name *āgama*. (See the *Vṛtti* on verses 23 and 26 and the *Paddhati* thereon.)

Here the word occurs both in the verse and the *Vṛtti*. It stands for ancient tradition, especially for written Tradition.]

133. Even if the doctrines perish and there are no more authors to compose others, cultured people follow the right path mentioned in the *śrutis* (Scripture) and the *Smṛtis* (written tradition).

In all discussions, it is admitted that, like the authors, the written traditions themselves can disappear. When they come to an end and before other authors arise and other written traditions are elaborated, there may be an interval during which cultured people do not violate the rites taught in the Scripture nor the regulations relating to what to eat and what not to eat embodied in the written traditions.

134. If knowledge were spontaneous, there would be no purpose in the composition of the *śāstras*. If spiritual merit is the cause of knowledge, the Veda is the cause of the former.

If it is accepted that a particular person can acquire knowledge without instruction, then written traditions prohibiting what is harmful and enjoining what is beneficial would become useless. If only a particular individual, due to special merit, acquires knowledge without instruction, while some others have to be instructed by a treatise, then the merit which has brought about that particular individual must have a definite basis. All other bases disappear. Therefore, writers who follow the right path which is based on Scripture, compose different doctrines and attain different modes of realization.

135. Reasoning which does not go against the Vedas and the *śāstra* is authority for those who cannot see. The meaning of a sentence does not become clear from its mere form.

Reasoning makes divisions within the words and meanings of the sentences of the Scripture. And that is done for the benefit of those who see superficially. That is why such

reasoning has been adopted by the ancients in the investigating sciences (*nyāyavidyāsu*). Only that much of reasoning is to be adopted as will not go against one's Scripture. In all the sacred works, there is much that is beyond reasoning and has to be accepted through faith. What purpose does he seek to serve who does not follow reasoning, but accepts Scripture alone as authority? Correct understanding of the sentences of the Scripture would be his purpose. The power of the sentences of Scripture to convey their meaning varies, even when their form is the same, due to the presence of some other factor. He who understands the meaning from the mere form, without relying on context, connection etc. ends in confusion as to what is meant and what is not meant.

136. Sometimes what the words say is not meant, sometimes it is included in something wider, sometimes it is specified by other indications, many such conclusions are arrived at by reasoning.

In the sūtras

"What the agent wishes most to reach is the object."
(P. 1.4.49)

and

"The suffix has the meaning of 'child of' so and so."
(P. 4.1.92.)

and in the sentence

"He cleans the vessel" (Cf. Tai. Sam. 3.2.2.3 and Jai. Mī. Sū. 3.1.13-14.)

and in the sūtra

"The person for whom the object is meant is the recipient." (P. 1.4.32.)

and in

"Those who live on a woman have attained the characteristic of a dead person"

gender, number and tense are not meant; sometimes they are meant; such specification in regard to definitions depend upon reasoning. Similarly, in the sentence

“He should release his speech after seeing the star.”
(Kā. Śaṃ. 23.5.)

the seeing of the star is meant to convey a particular time (when the stars are ordinarily visible). Thus, it, the releasing (of speech), is done when the main thing (the time) is otherwise ascertained or as (seeing the star) stands for something else, the particular time is ascertained when the stars are visible. In the sentence ‘let the curds be protected from crows,’ as it is meant to ward off all damage, even if there are no crows, the curds are protected from dogs etc. As the sentence ‘let the vessels be cleaned’ is meant to denote the completion of all the preliminaries to the act of eating, even if there are no vessels, the other preliminaries are completed. Clarifications can be done by other indications also (*liṅga*). In the sentence “he puts the sugar mixed with fat,” all kinds of fat come to the mind, but through the indication contained in the sentence—

“Clarified butter is indeed lustre itself”

a particular fat is understood. Such conclusions are reached by reasoning and definitions are specified.

137. Reasoning based on human intelligence (as distinct from written tradition) is also ultimately the power of words. Argument not based on words among those who have no written tradition, is really without any basis.

It is the word which is the instructor. Speakers follow the power of words and act when urged by a desire to speak based on the availability of the right word. When the hearer follows the fixed power of words to convey a meaning, through reasoning based on meaning, context, indication, interconnection etc., people look upon the capacity of the words as the reasoning of the hearer.¹ As for the reasoning

which does not proceed from the power of words, but follows the similarities and dissimilarities of objects, it is destructive of all tradition, without any basis and it is called 'dry reasoning.' As in the following—

"If the drinking of wine contained in a big circle of rose-coloured jars cannot take one to heaven, what can the little that is drunk in a sacrifice do?"²

Or in the following—

"To say that one should express oneself in words means that one should do so in the Drāmilaka language."

[1. The relevant considerations for determining the meaning of words are given in Vāk. a. II, p. 214 ff.

2. M. Bhā, I, p. 3, 1. 3.]

138. Just as colour and other qualities are seen to have powers in regard to particular effects, so are words seen to have such powers to remove poison etc.

For those who have understood from the sacred books that divine happiness results from the knowledge and use of correct words, accompanied by a knowledge of the science of Grammar, this verse provides an argument strengthening the tradition recorded in the sacred books. It is seen in this world that colour, taste, smell and touch, whether singly or in combination, have powers to produce particular visible or invisible results.¹ Power to produce visible result is seen in poisonous plants, magnet and trees. Power to produce invisible result is seen in wine and in the waters of holy places. In the case of some words also, visible result such as the curing of snake poison is seen. Similarly, it is accepted that an invisible result is obtained by the repetition of mantras.

[1. Vṛṣabha gives the following examples. Blue and bright are both colours, but one is soothing to the eyes and the other is irritating; sweet and bitter are both tastes, but one causes phlegm and the other bile.

These are visible results. Only a white goat can be sacrificed to Vāyu, otherwise the invisible result expected will not be produced. The

touch of wine leads to a bad invisible result while that of the waters of holy places leads to a good one. That the mantras of the Atharvaveda have the effect of curing snake-poison is an example of visible effect from the word.]

139. Let it be understood that just as they (the words) have such powers, similarly they also have the power to produce merit. Therefore, good people who desire well-being should use only correct words.

It is learnt from the sacred books that there are powers leading to visible results associated with every word. As there is such a tradition, let it be understood that correct words are the means of acquiring merit and, therefore, those who wish to attain divine happiness must follow the trustworthy tradition uninterruptedly practised by the cultured and use only correct words in worldly transactions.

140. Everybody understands things having invisible effects from the sacred texts. In regard to everything mentioned in it, it would be possible to postulate the opposite.

Some argue as follows:— Just as words have the capacity to cure poison, in the same way, why not understand that they have the capacity to cause demerit. From this very illustration, let one conclude the existence of an opposite power. Against this objection, it is maintained that, in regard to all conclusions relating to visible or invisible results of sacred texts, it would be possible to postulate an opposite effect. Therefore, if after taking some sacred text as authority, its meaning is settled, then any reasoning that is put forward would strengthen the understanding of it.

141. Knowledge of the correctness of words is the subject of this tradition called Grammar. It is here that the uninterrupted tradition of cultured people is recorded.

Just as traditions relating to what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which woman one cannot marry, what can be said and what cannot be said are well established and cultured people do not go against the code of conduct based on them, in the same way, this tradition called Grammar relates to what particular words can be used and what not. What is remembered from generation to generation, in an uninterrupted manner is again and again embodied in words. A tradition which has no written basis but the observance of which is well-known is preserved by the continuity of the practice of the cultured.

142. This Science of Grammar is the supreme and wonderful source of the knowledge of the three-fold word, comprising many paths, of the *Vaikharī* (the Elaborated), the *Madhyamā* (the Middle One) and the *Paśyantī* (the Seeing One).

That is called the Elaborated (*Vaikharī*) the form of which is cognised by others inasmuch as it comes within the range of the sense of hearing, and is well defined. It is mixed up or uttered in distinct phonemes; it has well-established correctness or is devoid of correctness. It is what comes out of the axle of a cart, a drum, a flute and a lute (*vīṇā*); thus, it has infinite varieties.¹ The Middle One (*Madhyamā*), on the other hand, is what exists within, it looks as if it has sequence and mind is its only substratum. According to some, it is accompanied by the subtle functioning of breath (*prāṇa*) and even though sequence is suppressed in it, yet it has distinct functioning of breath in it.² The Seeing one (*Paśyantī*) is that in which sequence is merged and though it is One, the power to produce sequence has entered into it. It is restless (*calācalā*) and also still in concentration,³ hidden and pure;⁴ the forms of the objects of knowledge have entered into it or merged into it or it has no form at all; it has the appearance of limited objects or of connected objects or the appearance of all objects has come to an end in it; thus it has infinite variety. According to some, in all the states of the

word which come within the range of usage, the distinction between what is correct and what is not is well-established and brings about the perfection of the individual. But the supreme form of the Seeing One is devoid of all correct forms, it is not mixed up and it is beyond worldly usage. According to the tradition of some, it is the form of this (state of the Word) which can be attained either by a knowledge of Grammar or through Union preceded by the word, obtained by the knowledge of the correct form of the words.⁵ On this point, illustrations are found in the *Itihāsa*.⁶

"One of them, the word—Cow, having a radiant smile and an excellent nature, in her divine and non-divine form, yields milk as the Cow does."

"See the difference between the two, both subtle and throbbing; the other one is present in the interval between *prāṇa* and *apāna*."⁷

"Another one, not being prompted at all, exists without the breath. From that is breath born, which, in its turn, strengthens the word."

"Strengthened by the breath, it becomes the basis of usage; by reaching the breath of everybody, the word does not speak in any case."

"That which has always resonance, that which has acquired resonance, and that which has no resonance at all, exist. To the two which have resonance, that which has none at all is superior."⁸

Again, it has been said—

"The Elaborated (*Vaikharī*) assumes the form of phone-mes when the air strikes against the places of articulation and is based on the functioning of the breath of the speakers."

"The Middle One proceeds by going beyond the functioning of breath, has sequence and has the mind alone as its substratum."

"The Seeing One is indivisible and is entirely without sequence. It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperishable."

"Though always attacked by adventitious impurities, it, like the last digit of the moon, is never overwhelmed."

"When its form is perceived, all obligations cease.⁹ Of man having sixteen parts, that is the immortal part."

"The Elaborated One (*Vaikharī*) coloured by adventitious impurities, is not really affected by them, any more than the pure Being is affected by qualities."

This three-fold word, has, like the appearances of the knots of Consciousness, indefinable dimensions, and a fourth of it exists in man. Even of this, only a little comes within the range of usage, the rest is beyond the usage of ordinary man. It has been said—

"There are four states in regard to the word. The wise among the Brāhmaṇas know them. Three of them are kept in a cave and do not move. Men speak the fourth part of the word."¹⁰

The pure form of that word is embodied in this descriptive Science called Grammar, consisting of general and special rules. The powers of those of lower visions, generally admit of degree, are liable to meet obstruction and to commit mistakes. Hence this method of acquiring the words, free from error and consisting of definitions and elaborations and containing many paths, has been developed.

[1. *Śliṣṭā vyaktavarṇasamuccāraṇā prasiddhasādhubhāvā bhraṣṭa-saṃskārā ca ... aparimāṇabhedā.*

It is stated that *Vaikharī* has infinite varieties. To an objection that what comes out of the axle of a cart is just noise and not *vāk*, Vṛṣabha replies that the inclusion of it is based on a śruti which he proceeds to quote.

By explaining *śliṣṭā* as *avyaktākṣarā*, he makes it the opposite of *vyaktavarṇasamuccāraṇā*. It is not clear whether the noise coming out of the axle of a cart or a drum is meant to be an example of *śliṣṭā*. If even such noises can be examples, it is only natural that incorrect forms of words also should be considered as varieties of it. They are, after all, *Vāk*.

2. *Kramasaṃhārabhāve*’ *pi vyaktaprāṇaparigrahaiva*. Vṛṣabha gives as a proof of the presence of subtle *prāṇa* in the *Mahyamā* stage that sequence can be observed when one silently recites something to one-self. As he puts it—*Śvayamapyasyopāṃśutaram paṭhataḥ tat spaṣṭam*.

3. *Calācalā pratilabhasamādhānā ca*. Vṛṣabha explains these two expressions in terms of Yogic terminology. He says: *calācalāiti rūpādiṣu viṣayeṣv arvāgdarśanānam vikṣiptotpadhyate buddhir, vāgeva hi sū. Pratilabdhasamādhānā ca iti avikṣiptā Yoginām śabdapūrvavayogena samāhitatvāt*.

4. Vṛṣabha explains *viśuddhā* in two ways: (1) free from all differentiation, as Yogis see it, (2) free from all corrupt forms, as Grammarians know it.

5. According to some, the supreme form of the *Paśyantī* can be attained in either of two ways: either through a knowledge of Grammar or through union with the word, induced by a knowledge of the correct form of the word. Vṛṣabha also understands it in this way. The use of the expression ‘*ekeṣāṃ*’ suggests that this is not the orthodox view. In fact, elsewhere *śabdapūrvavayoga* alone is mentioned as the means of attaining it. See the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk. I. 14, 131*.

6. The following verses are found in a very different form in the *Mahābhārata*, *Āśvamedhikaparvan*, 22.

7. *Prāṇāpānāntare*. Vṛṣabha explains ‘*antara*’ as absence. So the absence of *prāṇa* and *apāṇa* would mean something beyond the range of *prāṇa*, ie, *buddhi*, the seat of the *Madhyamā*.

8. In these verses which are supposed to be quotations from *Itihāsa*, ie, the *Mahābhārata*, the names *Vaikharī*, *Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī* are not used (unlike the later quotations where they do occur), but the descriptions are sought to be interpreted by Vṛṣabha as relating to them. Thus *prāṇāpānāntare tiṣṭhati* is equated with *Madhyamā*; *āpūryamāṇeva vinā prāṇena tiṣṭhati* is also understood as referring to *Madhyamā*, *vyavahāranibandhanā* means *vaikharī*. *Ghoṣiṇī* and *jātinirghoṣā* are interpreted as standing for *Vaikharī* and *aghoṣā* for *Paśyantī* and *Madhyamā* together.

9. *Adhikāro nivartate* = all obligations cease. *Adhikāra* is explained by Vṛṣabha as *niyogo bandhākhyah*. The bond of obligation which is the cause of *saṃsāra* ceases to be and one attains *Mokṣa*.

10. R. V. I, 164, 45.]

143. As the powers of words are seen by those who know the true nature of things, the Science of

Grammar is composed on the basis of analysis or without analysis.

What is called analysis is the postulation of divisions like stem and suffix for teaching others. For example, the statement that the suffix *tavyat* etc. are added to the root. So it has been said—

“Whatever he can teach in a general manner, he does accordingly.”¹

There is absence of analysis where a word is given as it is. For example, the words *dādharti*, *darddharti*, etc.² and the words *dāśvān*, *sāhvān*.³ In some Grammars, there is a great deal of absence of analysis and they teach many words directly (*pratyakṣapakṣeṇa*). Others, on the other hand, resort to analysis and by adopting the indirect method of inference, teach whole groups of words. This Grammatical tradition is established in different ways, according to the times and keeping in view the mental capacities of people. There are cultured people and that they are so can be inferred only from their use of correct words. They, whose inner vision is unobstructed in regard to all things to be known, see, without error, the power of words, differing at different periods of time and consisting in their being the means of merit or demerit, according to the times.

[1. M. Bhā on P. 1.1.46.

2. P. 7.4.65.

3. P. 6.1.2.]

144. Scripture (*Śruti*) has been declared to be beginningless, continuous and without an author. Written tradition (*Smṛti*) is composed by cultured Ancients and has continuity.

There are those who accept the authority of Scripture only and consider only the sacred books as trustworthy in regard to matters having invisible fruit and the views of men as doubtful and, therefore, not authority. According to them, even though there is no difference between Scripture and

written Tradition as far as continuity of what is taught is concerned, yet Scripture has no deviations in the rules relating to accent, phoneme, sequence, place and time of study nor has it been established differently by any other person and it has always been established in all the countries in divisions according to branches. Written Tradition, on the other hand, has continuity of meaning, but is composed by the cultured differently at different times in prose, verses, sentences etc.

Some teachers think as follows: No act has, in itself, a visible or invisible fruit. It is only by acting according to Scripture that merit is manifested and by going against Scripture that one is tainted with sin. Scripture itself ordains that an act like the killing of a Brāhmaṇa which is a sin in some contexts becomes the cause of divine happiness if done in another context.¹

Others, on the other hand, think that Scripture only makes known the specific power of objects. What would be the interest of Scripture to be a playful cause (of merit and demerit) and favour or harass men? It is seen to be better to assume that it (the causing of merit or demerit) is the nature of substances rather than that it is the nature of Scripture. In such written traditions as that of the Science of treatment, it is things like poison or herbs which have the capacity to fulfil a purpose and not the traditional texts. Therefore, it is nature of substances which is followed by Scripture, as it is the nature of Scripture in the other view. Just as, in the world, causes of benefit or harm are clearly distinguished, in the same way, there is uninterrupted establishment of the means of knowing them.²

[1. Vṣṛabha points out that in *Puruṣamedha* and *Sautrāmaṇī*, *brāhmaṇavadha* leads to heaven. As he puts it— *Puruṣamedhe sautrāmaṇyāṃ ca svargāṅgatvam*.

2. What is meant is that the power to produce their effects, good or bad, belongs naturally to substances, but, by uninterrupted tradition, it is Scripture that makes it known. Similarly, the power of correct words to produce merit and that of incorrect words to produce demerit are inherent in them. Grammar only makes them known].

145. In those who evolved out of the undifferentiated, there is knowledge of the *Śruti* (revealed Scripture) as in a dream. The written Tradition, on the other hand, is composed by the sages, after understanding the nature of things and following the indication (found in the Vedas).

It has been stated in the immediately preceding verse what the *dharma* is that is taught in the Scripture and in the written Tradition according to those who believe that the present differentiated condition of the world is eternal, that distinctions such as *Yuga*, *Manvantara*, etc. do not exist nor such an extraordinary division called the day of *Brahmā*. According to those who hold that the ultimate cause works in the manner of sleep and wakefulness and the differentiated individuals, some sages manifest themselves as identical with Intuition; they see it, the great Self in the form of Being, the source of Nescience and endowed with all knowledge and they become one with it. Some sages manifest themselves together with (the means of) knowledge. They identify themselves with their Self in the form of mind-knot, free from the elements ether etc., either severally or collectively, ie., devoid of any sense of 'I' in regard to them. All the activity of those sages is the product of Nescience and, therefore, adventitious and secondary. Their being essentially knowledge is eternal, non-adventitious and primary. They see the whole Scripture, endowed with all power of differentiation and all power of unity, as one hears sound in a dream, inaudible to the ear.

Some other sages, after perceiving the nature of objects, conducive either to the welfare or to the harm of man and after seeing in the Scripture indications thereof, compose the tradition, (the observance of which) leads to visible and invisible results. At first, they hand down the Scripture in an undivided manner, without any deviation in the words, as they saw it and later, they hand it down, divided into branches. Such is the tradition.

146. The impurities which belong to the body, the speech and the mind are removed by the sciences of Medicine, Grammar and Philosophy.

Just as, after seeing forces leading to illness in the body and the capacity of precious stones, herbs etc. to remove it, the Science of Treatment has been initiated; just as, after seeing that passions etc. cause disturbance of the mind, systems of philosophy have been composed which are the means of acquiring knowledge which leads to their cure, in the same way, the Science of Grammar has been initiated in order to make known the features of correctness in words and to enable us to discard the corrupt forms which are obstacles.

Of what nature are the corrupt forms?

147. When one wants to utter the word *gauḥ* and actually utters one which is devoid of correctness to convey that particular meaning, it is called a corrupt form (*apabhraṃśa*).

The author of the Saṅgraha has said:

"The correct word is the original of the corrupt form."

There is no corrupt form which is independent, without an original. Of every corrupt form, a correct form is the original. But some corrupt forms acquire independence by being constantly used and becoming conventional. Instead of saying *gauḥ*, one uses, either through lack of capacity or through mistake and other causes, the corrupt forms *gāvī* etc. having the correct form as the original. Such forms lose their correctness when used to denote an object having dew-lap, etc. When used in another meaning (which is its own) it is looked upon as correct. Their incorrectness is not linked with their form only.

148. Words like 'asva' and 'goṇī' are correct in regard to other meanings. Everywhere correctness is determined by the particular meaning which the word is to convey.

The two words *goṇī* and *asva* are correct, the former in the sense of a receptacle and the latter in the sense of one who owns nothing. These two words which have acquired their correct form in regard to some other meanings are considered to be correct if, due to some special reason,¹ they are used to denote an object having dew-lap etc. and one which neighs etc. respectively. When a cow carries much milk and is, therefore, like a receptacle, one says: this cow is a receptacle because she is like a receptacle. In the same way, a horse (*aśva*) is called '*asva*' when it is a priceless one.¹ Therefore, till some feature is isolated on the basis of which correctness or incorrectness can be established, no object is definite.

[1. *Tathā sāsṇādimati hreṣītādilinge ca tathāvidyamānaṃ svam asya so'yamasva iti.* What is stated here that, in certain circumstances, the words '*goṇī*' and '*asva*', applied to a cow and to a horse respectively, would be correct. Figurative use of words is meant here. This passage of the *Vṛtti* should be compared with the commentary of Bhartṛhari on the *M. Bhā* (*Paspasāhnikā*), p. 13 (the edition now being printed in Benares) or p. 11 (of the edition of K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye) *A.B.O.R.I.*, Vol. XLIII:

Sa eva śabdo'rthaviśeṣe Kasminścidasādhurīyetadākhyāyate. Yathā goṇīśabdaḥ sāsṇādimatyasādhustathā aśvaśabdaḥ kesarādimati sādhur na niḥśva iti. asva iti nirdhane sādhuḥ, naikaśaphādīlakṣaṇe. Yadi tu goṇīśabdo'pi nimittāntarāt sāsṇādimati prayujyeta goṇīva goṇīti sādhur eva syāt. Aśve vā asvaśabdaṃ dhanābhāvadvārakam prayuñjīta sa sādhur eva.]

149. They (the incorrect words) are the cause of the correct words (figuring in the mind) by inference. By identifying themselves, as it were, with them, they convey the meaning of the correct words.

When corrupt forms are used to denote objects which are the sphere of the correct forms, they convey the meaning through the correct words, just as winking etc. are, through familiarity, well known to appear as having taken on the form (of the words which express the same idea).

The purpose of another verse¹ on the subject is to say that corrupt forms do not convey the meaning directly.

[1. That corrupt forms do convey a meaning was already stated in Vāk. I. 147. *Viśiṣṭārthaniveśinam.*]

Why is it that *gonī* etc. are not considered to be synonyms of *gauḥ*? In regard to such matters which are embodied in the written Tradition, no other cause other than being well-known in the practice of the cultured can be adduced. If *gāvī* etc. were synonyms, they would also have been included in their rules and actually used. That word is correct which is used, like perception, to convey the thing which cause its use. The correct words convey that meaning which directly prompt their use. Therefore, it is being said—

150. Since they are not explained like correct synonyms by cultured people in the written Tradition (*smṛtiśāstra*), therefore, they are not directly expressive.

The meaning of the verse has already been explained.

151. Just as the child who is learning the words *ambā*, *ambā*, pronounces them indistinctly and those who know his speech understand their distinct forms,

When the baby makes the necessary effort, but due to deficiency in the vocal organs, utters indistinct sounds when it wants to use the correct word, those who hear it understand the distinct word which is the original thereof. And they look upon the correct word as connected with the meaning and not the corrupt form used by the baby.

152. In the same way, when an incorrect word is uttered in place of the correct one, the understanding of the meaning is preceded by the correct word coming to the mind.

When words are mixed up, corrupt forms are used instead of correct ones. But the cultured people who know Grammar understand the correct ones. They also look upon the meaning as having been expressed by the correct words. The corrupt form is the cause of the inference of the correct one as smoke is of fire.

153. In the case, however, of those ignorant speakers among whom incorrect words have become established through habit, the correct words do not (first come to the mind and then) convey the meaning.

Corrupt forms are used habitually by women, *śūdras* and *cāṇḍālas* and by speakers who make mistakes and thus they enter into convention and usage is more based on them (than on the others). When a doubt arises after the use of the correct form, now it is resolved with the help of its corrupt form. They look upon the corrupt form as being on the side of perception and place the correct form on the side of inference.

154. This Divine Speech has been mixed up (with the corrupt forms) by incapable speakers. Those who consider words to be transitory are mistaken in this matter.

It is heard that, in the old days, the word of those whose body itself was light was free from all corrupt forms as it was free from falsehood. But it became contaminated and through the persistence of the tendency towards contamination by the repetition of the first corruptions, it became, for those speakers, the original and the convention. Upholders of non-eternality, on the other hand, do not believe that correct words lead to merit and look upon the rules relating to correctness as similar to the rules among wrestlers and consider the whole collection of correct words as *prākṛta*, i.e. derived from *prakṛti* (the original, i.e. the corrupt forms). The form which is settled by some narrow-

mindful persons by regulating accent, correctness and so on is a modification and established later.

155. Both (the correct and the corrupt forms) have been handed down to us uninterruptedly. Still, when, intending to use one (the correct form) the speaker uses the other (the corrupt form) it is not the latter which must be deemed to be expressive of the meaning.

Even according to those who do not believe in old times nor in an unmixed Divine Word which existed sometime ago, this distinction between correct and corrupt words, as the distinction between which woman one can marry and which not, has always been transmitted, without a break, by the cultured. The word, which, like the talk of children, is actually used to convey a meaning when some other word was meant to be used and has entered into usage and the one (which is similarly used) but which has not entered into usage, neither is expressive of the meaning. In such cases, either the meaning is understood preceded by the remembrance of the correct word or, as with the ignorant, something is understood from those words as from winking and the like.

Thus has ended the chapter relating to Brahman, entitled "Collection of Traditions" in the 'Treatise on the Sentence and the Word' composed by Harivṛṣabha, the Great Grammarian.

CHAPTER II

In the previous chapter, the nature and purpose of the Word were briefly stated. It was stated, in a general way, that the Word is expressive of the meaning. There is difference of opinion as to whether it is the individual Word or the Sentence which is expressive. The purpose of this chapter is to expound in detail the nature of the expressive sentence.

1-2. In regard to the Sentence, opinion is widely divided among thinkers inasmuch as they declare it to be (1) the Verb, (2) the collection of words, (3) the Universal inhering in the collection of words, (4) the One indivisible Word, (5) the Sequence (of the words), (6) the Unification in the mind, (7) the first Word, (8) each Word requiring the others.

[These are the eight alternative ways of looking at the Sentence current among thinkers :—The Universal inhering in the collection of words, the One indivisible Word, the Unification in the mind, these three definitions of the Sentence come within the view that the Sentence is indivisible (*akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*). The Verb, the Sequence of the words, the collection of words, the first Word and each Word requiring the others—these five definitions come under the view that the Sentence has divisions (*sakhaṇḍa-pakṣa*). That the sentence is the collection of words or that it is their Sequence, these two views are held by those who accept *abhihitānvaya-vāda*=the view that the sentence-meaning is the inter-connection of the meanings conveyed by the individual words. That it is the Verb or the first Word or each Word requiring the others, these three views are held by those who follow *anvitābhidhāna*=the view that the word conveys a meaning already potentially connected with those of the others. These two theories result from interpreting the statement *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* (*Ṛk-prātiśākhya* II,1.) as a *tatpuruṣa* or as a *bahuvrīhi*. That the Verb is the Sentence is explained much later, in verse 326. The eight verses from

41 onwards explain that the collection of individual words constitutes the Sentence. Verses 7-14 and 19-27 explain that the indivisible Sentence is the *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is of two kinds: External and Internal. The former is either the Universal or the Particular. Five verses from 49 onwards expound the view that the Sequence of the words is the Sentence. Verses 47 and 48 elucidate the view that the first Word or each Word requiring the others is the Sentence. The Mīmāṃsaka definition of the Sentence would come under the *saṅghāta* (collection) view. Definition of the sentence naturally leads to statements on the nature of the sentence-meaning. If the verb constitutes the Sentence, then the sentence-meaning is in the nature of Action. If the collection of words or their Sequence constitutes the Sentence, then its meaning is the interconnection of the meanings of the individual words. If the first Word or each Word requiring the others is the Sentence, then the connected meanings make up the sentence-meaning. According to some, the sentence-meaning is in the nature of purpose (*prayojanam*). *Vidhi*, *niyoga* and *bhāvanā*, mentioned by others, are not different from Action (*Kriyā*) and so they are not given separately here. The Buddhist view of the Sentence is very near to Unification in the mind (*buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*) and their view of the Sentence-meaning is very near to that accepted in this work, namely, that it is in the nature of Intuition (*prati-bhā*). The *Nyāya* view of the Sentence and Sentence-meaning would amount to *saṅghāta* and *samsarga* respectively.]

The author now discusses whether the definition given by the author of the *Vārttikas* and by the *Mīmāṃsakas* would agree with the above definitions or whether they have a different scope altogether.

3. With the definition of a sentence given in this *śāstra* for regulating loss of acute accent etc. the (*Mīmāṃsaka*) definition does not fully tally.

[Kātyāyana gives the following two definitions of a sentence: *ākhyātam sāvayakārakaviśeṣaṇam vākyam* and *ekatīṇ vākyam* (vā 9, 10. M.Bhā.I, p. 367, l. 10, 16). The Mīmāṃsaka definition is contained in *Mi.Sū. II.1.42*:—*arthaikatvād ekaṃ vākyam sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt*. It is referred to in verse 40. In *ayaṃ daṇḍo harānena*, there is syntactical connection (*sāmarthya*).

Therefore there should be loss of acute accent (*nighāta*) in *hara* by P. 8.2.28 but that is not desired because, according to the definition of Kātyāyana given above, there are here two sentences and *nighāta* takes place only if both the words, the *nimitta* and the *nimittī* are in the same sentence. In *nadyās tiṣṭhati kūle, sālīnāṃ ta odanaṃ dāsyāmi*, there is no syntactical connection between the first two words and yet *nighāta* in the first case and substitution of *te* for *tava* in the second case take place, because the two words are in the same sentence. To decide whether the two words are in the same sentence, one should know what a sentence is and Kātyāyana tells us what it is in the *vārttika* quoted above. If we follow the *Mī.* definition of a sentence, there would be *nighāta* in *hara* in the sentence quoted above and that is not desired. So here the two definitions do not tally. In *nadyās tiṣṭhati kule*, they do.]

The *Mīmāṃsaka* definition is now referred to.

4. A sentence is a collection of words which in isolation require one another for particularisation, which, as a whole, do not require an outside word, in which the verb is the predominant word, which has qualifying words and which serve one purpose.

[In this definition, the verb is said to be the most important word, but not the only word. That is why the sentence is said to be *guṇavat*. The verb is also essential. Otherwise, *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* would also be a sentence. Unless the words require one another, they would not form a sentence. All this is an elaboration of the idea contained in *Mī.Sū.II.1.42*.]

5. The word in the vocative case in the sentence *vrajāni devadatta!* (=let me go, Devadatta!) is a qualifying word. That being so, loss of acute accent results.

[In Kātyāyana's definition of the Sentence there is the word *viśeṣaṇa* which includes *kriyāviśeṣaṇa* also. So in *vrajāni devadatta!*, the word *devadatta!* which is in the vocative case is a kind of *viśeṣaṇa* of the verb *vrajāni*. So it is in the same sentence and the suppression of the accent takes place according to the rules.]

6. Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can qualify (that is, can be subordinate) to a verb, in the same way, they declare, a verb can qualify another verb.

[In Kātyāyana's definition of the sentence, the word *ākhyātam* is in the singular number. That means that there can be only one verb in a sentence. There can be more than one verb if one of them is the main one and the others subordinate to it. Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can be subordinate to one verb and be in the same sentence, in the same way, more than one verb can be subordinate to the main verb which follows them in the same sentence. That being so, there would be *nighāta* in the verb *vrajati* in the sentence: *pūrvam snāti pacatitato vrajati tataḥ*, because that is the main verb. The *sūtra* : *tiṇatīnaḥ* (P. 8.2.23.) also implies that there can be more than one verb in the same sentence. More than one verb can result in more than one sentence if they are independent of one another. Thus Kātyāyana's definition is not too narrow.]

7. Just as the one entity, comprising the cognition of all objects is differentiated on the basis of distinction in what is cognised, so is the cognition of the sentence-meaning.

[Bhartṛhari really wants to set forth the following view: The sentence is the *sphoṭa*, either external or internal. It is external when it is clearly uttered. Till then, it is internal. In any case, it is indivisible. It has two aspects : the sound aspect and the meaning aspect which are identified with one another. It is essentially in the nature of knowledge or consciousness because it illuminates an object. Because of articulation, it assumes the form of sound. Though indivisible, it appears to have divisions just as our complex cognition, though one, appears to have inner differentiation because of the objects in it. The picture is one but we seem to see different colours within it. That is what happens with the sentence and the sentence-meaning. Both are indivisible like the flavour of a cold drink, or the juice in a pea-hen's egg, or the form of a picture, the *narasiṃha*, the *gavaya* and our perception

of a picture. The indivisible sentence is the *sphoṭa* and the indivisible sentence-meaning is *pratibhā*. But both appear to have divisions.]

8. Just as the One picture is explained through its different colours like blue which belong to its parts,

9. in the same way, the One sentence, entirely self-sufficient and complete, is explained through individual words which require one another.

[A colour-pattern is one but it is explained in terms of the different colours which figure in it. In the same way, the sentence is one and self-sufficient but it is explained in terms of individual words which appear to figure in other sentences and which require one another.]

10. Just as a word is analysed into stem, suffix etc. in the same way, the analysis of a sentence into individual words is also described.

[In the *vārttika* : *na vā padasyārthe prayogāt* (Vā.19 on P. 1.2.64.) it is stated that it is the word as a whole which conveys the meaning and that its division into stem, suffix etc. is artificial. In the same way, the division of a sentence into individual words is artificial. The words have no real existence.]

11. Just as one sees in phonemes parts resembling other phonemes, in the same way, one sees (in a sentence) parts which resemble other words.

[Just as the abstracted parts of diphthongs like *ai*, *au* seem to resemble independent phonemes like *a*, *ā*, *i*, *u* etc., in the same way, the abstracted parts of a sentence seem to resemble independent words. But that is not true because these parts have no real existence.]

12. The words *Vṛṣabha*, *Udaka* and *Yāvaka* have meaningless parts. Analysis through the method of agreement and difference is the basis of worldly usage.

[Everywhere the parts which we artificially make in a word are meaningless. If we make these parts and attribute meanings to them, it is only in an artificial sense. Words like *Vṛṣabha*, *Udaka*, *Yāvaka* contain meaningless parts in the form of *Ṛṣabha*, *Uda* and *Yāva* respectively. Similarly, words like *pacati*, *pācaka* have meaningless parts in the form of stem, suffix etc. But the splitting of a word into stem and suffix and attributing meanings to them atleast serve the purpose of teaching the formation of words to the ignorant. But the artificial parts *Ṛṣabha*, *Uda* and *Yāva* in *Vṛṣabha*, *Udaka* and *Yāvaka* do not serve any such purpose.]

13. The word has no division, how can the meaning have any? But the ignorant person sees division through artificial splitting.

[The available *Vṛtti* on the IInd *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* begins from this verse and goes on till the end, with many gaps big and small, in the middle. On this verse, what it says can be summarised as follows—The sentence, the *Vākyasphoṭa*, is indivisible. Its meaning, namely, *pratibhā*, is equally indivisible. This has been stated also later on in verse 145. This artificial division of the sentence and the sentence-meaning is a means to the understanding of the indivisible sentence and the sentence-meaning. To understand the indivisible straight-way is as difficult as learning each word of a language separately. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*guruprakramā tatra saṃśṛṣṭa-rūpasya pratipattir avibhāgena, pratipadam pāṭhavat* = “The understanding of the unified word without dividing it is a difficult process. It would be like learning each word of a language as a whole.” A good student, however, knows that division is only a means to an end and that indivisibility is the truth. In any case, doubts sometimes arise as to how the division should be effected. For instance, in the case of words *haridru* and *dustara*. Even when it is effected, it is only a means to an end. The word is really indivisible.]

14. Just as, in the compound, *brāhmaṇakambala*, the term *brāhmaṇa* has no meaning, in the same way, in a sentence, words like *Devadatta* are without a meaning.

[In the compound word *brāhmaṇakambala*, the element *brāhmaṇa* has no meaning. Similarly, in the sentence : *Devadatta gām abhyāja daṇḍena*, the words Devadatta etc. have no separate meaning. Individual words are, therefore, meaningless. The truth is that the sentence is an indivisible self-sufficient unit, quite different from the individual words. Similarly, the sentence-meaning is an indivisible, self-sufficient unit. When the compound *brāhmaṇakambala* is uttered in isolation or after some words or sentences, even though the word *brāhmaṇa* is heard and some meaning understood from it, it is known to have no meaning. Similarly, even when the word is not uttered in isolation or after other words and sentences, parts of sentences which resemble individual words do not really exist and have, therefore, no meaning.]

15. The general meaning, having disappeared, cannot lead to the particular. How can what has already been conveyed be abandoned and where can what is already gone rest ?

[The *Mīmāṃsaka* view is that it is the individual words themselves which constitute the sentence and not anything beyond them. This is not sound. Words are uttered in a sequence. When the second word is uttered, the first one has already vanished. So its meaning which is of a general nature cannot become particularised in association with the meanings of the later words because it is not there at all. Even if it has an existence in memory, how can the general meaning which was first conveyed be abandoned ? To do that would go against the eternal relationship between the word and the meaning, which the *Mīmāṃsaka* would not accept. In any case, if the word gives it up, where would it rest ?

The *Vṛtti* points out that a word which, at the time of its utterance, conveys the general cannot denote the particular after its disappearance. Nor can the speaker mean to convey the general and the particular at the same time : *na ca sāmānya-viśeṣayor vivakṣā yugapat sambhavati.*]

16. If the sentence-meaning is not derived from the words (but from their interconnection), the meaning of the word would also be in the same

position. Thus the relation between the word and the meaning would be destroyed.

[The criticism contained in the above verse is answered as follows— After all, a particularised meaning is understood from the sentence. How to account for that? The *Mīmāṃsaka* view does not explain it either. If the particularised meaning does not come from the words which cease to exist after conveying the general meaning, it means that it does not come from words. It is *aśabda*. The same thing can be said about the meaning of the individual word. Because, the phonemes are uttered in a sequence and they disappear. So they do not co-exist and cannot constitute a word. So there cannot be a word-meaning. Thus, the relation of expression and expressed between word and meaning, accepted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, would cease to be.

The *Vṛtti* argues differently to reach the same conclusion.

17. According to some, words expressive of the particular (*viśeṣa*), resembling those which are expressive of the general, become clear to listeners when they are (later) connected with the other words in the sentence.

[When a sentence is uttered, it is done in order to express a particularised meaning. So the very first word, even when it seems to be the same as in some other sentence, expresses, not a general meaning, but a particularised one. This becomes clearer when each succeeding word is heard. So the meaning of the sentence is the meaning of each word as connected with the meanings of the other words. No word conveys an unconnected meaning. It conveys an idea with its connection with other words implied. This is an explanation of the two views regarding a sentence, referred to as *padam ādyam* and *prthak sarvapadam sākāṅkṣam*.

The *Vṛtti* explains this verse in one long and rather obscure sentence. It seems to say this : The very first word of a sentence denotes its meaning as qualified and delimited by the meanings of the other words of the sentence which are yet to come and when they do come, they do not say anything new,

they only make clear and patent what is already latent in the meaning of the first word. The very first word is as good as the sentence.]

18. According to them, the whole of the sentence-meaning is concentrated in each word. Hearers understand the meaning all the better when all the expressions are uttered.

[Nor can one object that if the very first word conveys the meaning of the whole sentence, the other words would be useless. The first word conveys the sentence-meaning only vaguely. The others make it clearer. But this view is not accepted because the utterance of the other words would be either for the sake of restriction or restatement. Neither is necessary if the very first word or any word in the sentence can convey the meaning of the whole sentence. As a matter of fact, neither the first word (*padam ādyam*) nor any word separately (*pr̥thak sarvapadam*) can convey the meaning of the whole sentence. If the other words are uttered at all, no matter for what purpose, the *anvitābhīdhāna* view falls.

What the *Vṛtti* says on this verse amounts to this: According to those who accept the use of many words to express one meaning, all the particulars, the whole of the indivisible sentence-meaning is concentrated on each word and on each phoneme. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*teṣāṃ evamupagrhītasarvaviśeṣa ekasminnarthe bahusabdānabhyupagacchatām avikalpaḥ kṛtsno vākyārthaḥ pratipadam prativarnam vā samāpyate*. Thus, when all the expressions are actually uttered, the sentence-meaning becomes clear to the hearer and not by its mere existence before all the words are uttered.]

19. The indistinct word which is uttered in silence appears to have sequence. The intelligence perceives it as having extension (that is, sequence) though it is really without any.

[The sentence is really indivisible. But it is manifested by the sounds and it seems to have divisions like the phonemes and individual words. This indivisible Word has an inner and outer aspect. As something existing within the speaker,

it is inner. As it is externalised by utterance, it is outer also. It is indivisible and eternal. It is this which is expressive of meaning. All distinctions such as spoken to oneself, spoken slowly, spoken quietly etc., are based on the sounds which manifest it and not its own. When one utters something well within, to be heard by oneself only, it is called *upāṃśu*. When no utterance takes place, that is, when the *prāṇa* plays no part but the word is thought of in one's mind and has assumed divisions and sequence, it is called *paramopāṃśu*. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tatra prāṇavṛtṭyanugrahe satyeva yatra śabdarūpam parair asamvedyaṃ bhavati tadupāṃśu. Antareṇa tu prāṇavṛtṭyanugrahaṃ yatra kevalam eva buddhau samāviṣṭarūpo buddhyupādāna eva śabdātmā tat paramopāṃśu*. When the activity of the mind is suspended and the divisions and sequence are not there but due to their impressions they are superimposed, it is *pratisamhṛtakramam*.]

The next two verses are meant to elucidate the view that the sentence is *jātiḥ saṃghātavartinī*.

20. Even though it is particular movement which is made the specific action is not cognised but when it is repeated, the universal of actions like turning is manifested.

21. In the same way in the case of (the *śphoṭa* of phonemes, words and sentences which may be different from another, the manifesting sounds appear to be the same.

[A movement like turning consists of a series of momentary movements. Each movement consists in coming into contact with a point of space and then disappearing. It is then replaced by the next movement which does the same. As these point-movements are momentary, they cannot co-exist and cannot form a whole of which they would be parts and in which the universal of the movement called turning can inhere. Such a universal, different from the wider universal called 'action' is accepted and if it does exist, it would inhere in the momentary movements relating to turning. Even though this universal exists in each point-movement, the latter is not

capable of producing the cognition of the universal because of too much resemblance between the movements of turning and the movements of another movement like, say, lifting. The movements of each movement are the result of a special effort to produce that movement and so they are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be cognised until a series of point-movements has been cognised. It is not enough to cognise one or two such point-movements. The universal really inheres in each movement and it is also cognised. But the cognition is too vague and unfit for verbal usage. After a series of movements is cognised, the direction of the movement becomes clear and so the cognition of the universal, inherent in each movement also becomes clear. In other words, it becomes quite clear that the movement is turning and not, say, lifting. The process is similar in the perception of the Word (Sentence.)]

22. How can there be really priority or posteriority in eternal things? It is the power of the One that it so appears.

[The Sentence is One and indivisible without any sequence involving priority and posteriority. But it has within it the power to appear as many, as having sequence. It is really the sounds which manifest it that have sequence but the *vākya-sphoṭa* itself appears to have it.]

23. Just as the cognitions 'slow' and 'quick' appear to have temporal difference even though they have none, in the same way do long and short vowels appear to have temporal difference.

[The cognitions 'slow' and 'quick' have, as cognitions, no difference in time, but appear to have it because of the difference in their object. In the same way, the *sphoṭa* has no distinction such as slow and quick but appears to have it because of the difference in the manifesting sounds.]

24. Time, which is eternal, cannot be differentiated through divisions belonging to something else. (According to the view that there is no eternal

entity called Time) the phenomena, being of a transient nature, cannot exist at the same time. How then can there be sequence?

[The latter half of the stanza is an answer to an objector who might say that he does not believe in Time as an entity separate from the phenomena. Time is nothing more than the phenomena themselves following one another, in succession. It is on the basis of these phenomena that we speak about sequence and simultaneity and not on the basis of a separate entity called Time.

The main idea in the *Vṛtti* on this verse may be expressed as follows—If Time is eternal, One and indivisible, it cannot have divisions on the basis of something external like action. Secondly, Time conditioned by some action, is a measure. Therefore, there cannot be something else to measure and divide it. If everything is eternal, it cannot bring about division in Time. If everything is momentary, there cannot be any sequence between any two non-simultaneous moments and, therefore, sequence cannot be attributed to time on the basis of the sequence of the momentary objects. As there is no sequence in the things or in Time, to see temporal difference in long, short and prolated which are temporally identical is not right.

The words of the *Vṛtti* say something like what I have said above but I do not claim that the idea is very clear to me.]

The idea that the notion which arises on the basis of these phenomena would explain Time is now answered.

25. The cognition which is produced by them is One and indivisible but through its own power, it seems to be differentiated and assumes sequence.

[Though *bhāgavartini* is found in some editions and manuscripts, *bhāgavarjitā* is a better reading and is confirmed by Puṇyarāja's *nirvibhāgā* and the *Vṛtti*'s *bhāgavarjitā*. The gist of the *Vṛtti* seems to be this:—Cognition is One because it is essentially in the nature of illumination. (*sā tvekā bhāgavarjitā buddhiḥ prakāśasvarūpatvāt...*). Therefore its homogeneous and heterogeneous divisions are one with it. Being of the nature of illumination, cognition is partless and sequenceless, but it

displays the sequence of the objects now mixed up with it within itself. Strictly, it (the sequence) should not be so displayed but the cognition displays it without dissociating it from the objects. Such indeed is the way in which cognition displays sequence.]

According to Puṇyarāja, the next verse is meant to refute the following view:—Even though cognition is one and indivisible, it appears to have parts and sequence because of the sequence of the objects which figure in it. The cognition appears to have the sequence of the objects. This is due to an immemorial and eternal predisposition of cognitions. This appearance of sequence in the cognition is not contradicted. It is of the nature of cognition itself. A cognition displaying sequence leaves a similar impression (*samskāra*) so that the next cognition also displays sequence. That is why in our cognition of short, long and protracted vowels or of words and sentences, temporal distinctions figure though these are eternal and have, therefore, no temporal distinctions.

26. It is not possible to explain as identical with the intellect or as different from it the seed which is sown in it by the display of sequence (in the cognition).

[The impression of sequence which is supposed to be left by the cognition in the intellect is either identical with it or different from it. If it is different from it, it cannot do any service to it. It cannot bring about temporal distinction in short, long etc. If it is identical with it, then intellect or cognition would remain one and indivisible and there would be no sequence at all. Therefore, it is futile to try to explain sequence in cognition through the impressions of the sequence of objects which figure in the cognition.]

Indivisibility is now set forth in a different manner.

27. This indivisible (Sentence) is understood as having the capacity for sequence (or division) at the time of the artificial separation (*bhāvanā-samaye*). Hence its meaning, though devoid of all division is perceived as having division.

[In the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, the nature of *sphoṭa* has been determined. It is the sentence as *sphoṭa* which is expressive. At the time of analysis, the sentence-meaning is understood as having sequence and division, but it really has none.

The *Vṛtti* gives the analogy of Dik to explain how the One appears as many. *Dik* (Direction, Space) is one but when we use expressions like *ūrdhvam*, *adhaḥ*, *tiryak*, we are speaking about it as though it had divisions, knowing that it has none: *ūrdhvam adhas tiryag ityekatve'pi diśām yathāyatham viniviṣṭabhāvanāviśeṣāḥ sarvaprāṇināḥ* = All beings have an inner disposition to divide Dik (Direction, Space) which, though one, is regarded by them as being above, below, across and so on.]

The view that the sentence is nothing more than a collection of words and not an entity over and above them and that the word is nothing more than a collection of phonemes and not an entity over and above them is now criticized.

28-29. If the words in the sentence are those very ones (which are found singly outside the sentence) and if the phonemes in a word are those very ones (which are found singly outside the word) then there would be divisions like atoms in the phonemes also.

As the parts cannot combine (because of their non-existence) there would be neither phoneme nor word. As they cannot be determined what other thing could be determined as the expressive element?

The *Vṛtti* argues as follows—

[If it is held that the words in a sentence are the very ones which are found separately and if the phonemes which are found separately are the very ones found collected in a word and if it is held that there is no essence of the sentence or of the word apart from the phonemes, then there would be atom-like divisions within the phonemes also by going to the extreme limit of division. These divisions would have sequence and would never be simultaneous and would, therefore, never come into mutual contact. Thus there would ensue nothing called phoneme or the word. The final divisions being indefinable,

they would not enter into usage. Therefore what would be the verbal unit which would be clearly defined as 'this'? There cannot be any usage with a verbal entity the divisions of which are indefinable and which are not collected together in something different from knowledge. The idea is that the sentence is a collection of words and if the word is only a collection of phonemes, one can divide the phonemes also. Ultimately, there would be no unit at all which would be looked upon as the expressive element. Therefore, the sentence is an entity over and above the phonemes and words. This entity is described as something outside the mind. But the *śāstra* is of the view that the sentence is *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*.]

The view that the sentence is *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*, mentioned in the very first verse of this *Kāṇḍa* is now explained.

30. Others declare the Word (that is, the Sentence) to be the word-Principle which is within and One and is manifested by the sounds. It is that unity which appears in the manifested sentence.

[Others emphasize the inner aspect of the word. Its external aspect as *jāti* or *vyakti* has already been considered before. The chief characteristic of this inner aspect is that it is one and indivisible and without any inner sequence. It is an inner entity, consisting essentially of cognition or consciousness and an amalgam of word and meaning. When manifested by the sounds, wrongly thought of as its parts, it becomes the external sentence. The *Vṛtti* points out that this external sentence is like the written symbols (*akṣaracihnavat*) which are mistaken to be the word. The external sentence is only a symbol of the real sentence which is within and is an indivisible unity.]

It is now stated that not only the sentence but the sentence meaning also is indivisible and manifested by the word meanings.

31. According to them, the inner meaning, (that is, the Sentence-Meaning) is manifested by parts of it. Word and Meaning (that is, Sentence and Sentence-meaning) are inseparable (*apṛthak-sthitau*) divisions of one Inner Principle.

[Just as the Sentence is an inner entity, so is the Sentence-meaning. They are identical with each other and with the One Inner Principle but, externally, they appear to be different from each other. Puṇyarāja does not say anything more.

The *Vṛtti* interprets this verse in a deeper manner. From its terse and rather obscure language, one understands something like this:—

It is well-known that the Word-Principle is mainly the indivisible inner entity and that it is grasped through its indefinable and unreal parts. Similarly, the meanings reflected in the intellect are experienced as identical with the external objects. This is according to the view that the external object is transient. According to the view that it is eternal, it manifests itself according to the power of sequence of the intellect (*Kramaśaktirūpanirbhāsamātrayā*). An external object is not fit for practical purposive usage without the intellect with which it is wrongly identified. All worldly usage is done with objects which have been grasped by the intellect. Thus both the word and the object are in the intellect. Others, on the other hand, declare that as the intellect in which the object is reflected inheres in the Self, the latter which is essentially consciousness, assumes the form of the intellect which inheres in it and this explains the experience of the individual (*puruṣārthasya prasiddhim*). When the intellect which is transparent assumes the character of consciousness and of the object through their reflections, the powers of the enjoyed and of the enjoyer (*bhogaśakti* and *bhokṛśakti*) quite distinct from each other and not at all mixed up with each other, seem to attain the state of non-distinction in the intellect, which has apparently assumed the nature of consciousness and of the object and then distinctive worldly usage becomes possible. The power to experience is unchangeable and is not reflected anywhere but it appears to be reflected in the intellect. It is through the imitative transformation of the intellect in which the consciousness is reflected that one speaks of the operation of specific knowledge. The transformation of the intellect is said to be imitative (*anukāramātrā*) because, on the one hand, it imitates the object whose form it takes and, on the other, consciousness is reflected in it. In the background of all statements, there are three views :—

(1) The external word is transitory and is an unreal manifestation of the eternal inner word. (2) According to *satkārya-vāda*, all objects are eternal and they are experienced when manifested. (3) When the object is reflected in the transparent intellect (*Buddhi*), it is experienced. According to all the views, the inner word is One, with all multiplicity resolved. From it, meanings which are also inner and undivided, with all multiplicity resolved, are understood without their original division being abandoned. What then remains is the single entity Intellect in which multiplicity has been resolved, in which the distinct powers of being the conveyor and the conveyed are not separated (*pratipādakapratipattavyaśaktyor avibhāgena*) even though their distinction is not abandoned. In the view that both the word and the meaning are eternal, neither is adventitious, subject to increase and decrease and to change.]

If the word and the meaning are identical, how are they said to stand in the relation of expression and expressed to each other ?

32. Of that Word-Principle which is within, there is always this character of being the Illuminator as well as the Illuminated, the Cause as well as the Effect.

[The idea is that the Inner Word-Principle has got both powers : that of being *prakāśaka* and that of being *prakāśya*, that of being the Cause and that of being the Effect. The One inner Reality contains the seeds of all manifestations, as already stated in Vāk.I.4.

In explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* emphasizes the nature of the *Śabdatattva* within. The inner word is endowed with two powers : the power of being the Illuminator and that of being the Illuminated. Though the latter is not separate from the former, it appears to be so. As they are mutually dependent, there is the relation of causality between them. As the Illuminator, it is the cause and as the Illuminated, it is the effect. The former power is constant and the latter occasional (*anapāyini* and *apāyini*). The Word-Principle is not associated with any particular place, but, because of its association with the intellect, it is spoken of as the inner word. Nor is it associated with

time, divisible into past, present and future. That is why the word *sarvadā* is used in the verse. The Word-Principle, being identical with Consciousness, is beyond existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāvavibhāgābhāvāt*). The expressions past, present and future can be used only in regard to *bhāva* or *abhāva*.]

What other power the Word-Principle has is now stated.

33. It is that (the Word-Principle) which has the two powers of existence and non-existence which have no sequence but appear to have it and are the basis of all worldly usage.

[The inner Word-Principle has the two powers of existence and non-existence. These two powers cannot have any sequence because of the eternality of their substratum, but they appear to have it. The indivisible sentence appears to have the sequence of the phonemes and individual words. Their existence and non-existence seem to have sequence. All manifestation involving multiplicity and sequence is due to the powers of the Word-Principle and not merely its manifestation as the Illuminator and the Illuminated].

The view that the individual word has a reality is again criticised.

34. If the mere understanding of the word-meaning is taken as proof of the reality of the word and its meaning, as it is abandoned when it is mixed up with the meaning (of the following words) it would become useless.

[If the mere fact that the individual word and its meaning are cognised, are taken as proof that they have reality, there would be a difficulty. Each subsequent word of a sentence conveys its meaning as mixed up with that of the preceding word or words and so the meanings conveyed by the preceding word or words are abandoned as such. Thus the utterance of the preceding words becomes useless. Therefore, when the sentence-meaning is ultimately understood, it would not be due to the useless preceding words. The understanding of the

individual word and its meaning were only temporary and, therefore, unreal phases.]

It is now stated that, as the individual word is something indefinite, its reality should not be accepted.

35. (ab). The word *rājan* conveys the idea of 'king' through its different forms.

[The word *rājan* does not occur in speech in a particular form but in its different inflexional forms like *rājā*, *rājānam*, *rājñā*, *rājñe*, *rājñah*, *rājñi* (or *rājani*). If the word had a reality, its form would not thus change.]

35. (cd). In a complex formation, a word (a noun) resembling a verb could mean something different (from what it ought to mean).

[The compound word *rājapuruṣa* could be understood to mean : Shine ! O Man ! and yet that is not its meaning. Which shows that what looks like an individual word has no reality.]

It is not only independent individual words which have no definite fixed form but as parts of compound words also they have no fixed form.

36. Just as the compound word *aśvakarṇa* conveys a special meaning without the part *aśva* conveying any meaning of its own, so do other compound words.

[We understand from the word *aśvakarṇa* a particular class of objects, having a particular universal inhering in it. The meaning of the part *aśva* does not contribute to it. The meaning comes from the word as a whole. It is better to believe that the same thing happens in all compound words. If the meaning of *aśva* plays no part in the meaning of the whole, it is wrong to think that there is a part called *aśva* in the compound at all. Similarly, there is no part called *karṇa* in it.

Here the *Vṛtti* points out that, for the purpose of grammatical derivation, one may explain the meaning of the compound *aśvakarṇa* as *aśvasya Karṇāviva paṇau yaśya* = a tree of which the leaves are like the ears of a horse. But this is only *artha-*

pradarśikā = 'showing of an alleged meaning' and should not be taken seriously. It does not prove the reality of parts.]

If all compound words are in the same position, what would be the basis of the distinction between *rūḍhi* = 'conventional' words and *arūḍhi* = 'non-conventional' words?

37. While resemblance is postulated (between the meaning of the compound word and the analytical sentence which explains it) in the case of some compounds where the analysis conveys a totally different meaning, the Science of Grammar itself looks upon them as conventional words.

[A difference is pointed out between compound words like *rājapurūṣa* and *tailapāyikā*. The meaning conveyed by the former and the meaning obtained from its analysis are very similar. So it is not looked upon as a mere *rūḍhi* word. The meaning conveyed by the second compound is that of cockroach, a kind of insect. The meaning obtained by analysis is : "that which drinks oil" which is quite different from what the whole compound means. That is why it is a *rūḍhi* word. In regard to such words, grammar teaches some special operations as in P. 6.2.76, 77, 146 ; P. 6.3.53 etc. This is pointed out by the *Vṛtti*.]

38. Means (*upāyāḥ*) are so called because they are first accepted (*upādāya*) and then abandoned (*heyāḥ*). And no fixity necessarily exists in regard to the means.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that when correct forms are being taught in the Science of Grammar, as in the case of compounds, secondary derivatives, denominative verbs and *ekaśeṣa*, individual words are brought in for making analytical explanatory sentences. When the purpose of teaching their correct form is achieved, these individual words are abandoned. Similarly, some rules relating to accent (such as P. 8.2.4, 5, 6 ; P. 6.2.2, 65) teach correct forms of words on the assumption that there are individual words in compounds or sentences, that they have their own meaning and that they come in a certain order.

All this has to be understood in order to grasp the correctness of the forms in question. Once that is done, the rest is forgotten.]

39. One understands the facts in some way or another. Whether united or separated, the divisions are based on the sentence.

[One can understand the facts of the Sanskrit language either through Pāṇini's grammar or through some other. All of them have to analyse the sentence and sentence-meaning to do their work. The latter are, therefore, the real entities and not what is obtained by analysis.

The *Vṛtti* gives examples of the different ways in which the same word is derived, by different grammarians. The word *śrotriya* is one of them. According to some, it is a word expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence *chando'dhite* = 'he studies the Vedas'. Others say that the word *chandas* becomes *śrotra* to which the suffix *ghan* is added in the sense of *tad adhite* (P. 4.2.59.) or in the sense of action done by the ears. Similarly grammarians differ in their derivation of words like *uśtragoyugae* and *aśvaśadgavae*. The *Vṛtti* also gives two explanations of the second half of the verse. The difference is chiefly in regard to the meaning of the words *saṁsṛṣṭāḥ* and *vibhaktāḥ*. In the first explanation, the former means 'united', that is, one word and its meaning united with another to form a compound. The second word means 'separated', that is, each word standing separately in the sentence. Whether a word combines with another to form a *samāsa* or not, its meaning is determined by the sentence as a whole. In the second explanation, the two words mean 'included' and 'excluded' respectively.]

It is now stated that the sentence-meaning can sometimes be understood even from a single phoneme.

40. Sometimes, when the relation of identity in the form 'it is this' is understood, then even a single phoneme can be expressive of the meaning of the whole sentence.

[When the identity of the sentence and the sentence-meaning is already in the mind of the speaker, then it is not necessary

that the sentence-meaning should be understood after the word-meanings have been understood in the sequence in which the words have been uttered. A mere phoneme without any inner sequence may sometimes be able to convey it. Puṇyarāja does not give any example. The *Vṛtti* does and ends by referring to the way in which the sages, those who are experts in *Vāgyoga*, grasp the integrated Word-Principle within.]

Now the view of the sentence referred to by the word *saṅghāta* in the very first verse is being explained.

41. It has been declared that a word, as part of a sentence, expresses the same extent of meaning as it does when it is in isolation.

[Puṇyarāja points out that this *saṅghāta* view is held by the *Abhihitānvayavādin*. The *Vṛtti* illustrates by saying that the isolated word *Vṛkṣa* conveys a particular universal, namely tree-ness. It does the same in the following sentences: *Vṛkṣo'sti*, *Vṛkṣo nāsti* *Vṛkṣaścchinnaḥ*. Because of its connection in these sentences with existence, non-existence and cutting, it does not become associated with another universal. In any case, these actions are not connected with a universal, but with the individual in which the universal inheres.]

42. Whatever extra meaning is understood when the words (in a sentence) are connected together is the meaning of the sentence and it rests on many words.

[According to this view, the sentence meaning is the inter-connection (*saṃsarga*) of the meanings of the individual words.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the extra meaning which comes when the words are joined together does not play any part in determining the form of the individual words. They get their form on the basis of the meaning or meanings which they themselves express.

The words of somebody, referred to as *tatrabhavān*, are quoted in the *Vṛtti*. In the writings of Abhinavagupta, *tatrabhavān* always stands for Bhartṛhari. If that is the case here, it means that the *Vṛtti* is not by Bhartṛhari. But the title can very well stand for somebody else. Who is the question?]

Another view on the subject is now given.

43. Even though it rests on many words, it is found in full in each like the universal, or, like number, it is said to rest, by others, on the whole collection of words also.

[The universal is supposed to exist in every individual in full. Number is supposed to exist in all the units together. Similarly, the view that the sentence-meaning rests on many words is understood by some to mean that it exists in each part of it in full like the universal and by others to mean that it exists in the totality of words also. Those who hold the latter view go by the principle that what does not exist in the part cannot exist in the totality. As the Ambākartrī puts it: *na hyavayavāparyāptasya samudāye paryāptir asti*. Both Puṇyārāja and the *Vṛtti* speak about these two views.

The *saṃghāta* view is now explained from the *anvitābhidhāna* point of view:

44-45. Others declare the meaning of the word to be so general as is adaptable to all the particulars. When connected with the meaning of the other words, it assumes the form of the particular.

Contact (with the meaning of the other words) removes the vagueness which arises when it requires particularisation by fixing it to one particular.

[It was stated in verses 41 and 42 that a word in a sentence gives the same meaning as in isolation. When the meanings of the words are connected together, a qualified meaning emerges and that is the meaning of the sentence as a whole. In verse 43, it was stated that the meaning of the whole is contained in a single word according to some and in the totality of words also according to others. In 44 and 45, it is stated that the individual word conveys a general meaning which is potentially capable of being connected with the meanings of other words and when it is actually connected with the other words, it conveys a meaning actually connected with particular meanings of other words. The general meaning and the parti-

cular meaning are those of the individual word and not of the sentence and is not conveyed by *ākāṅkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*.]

46. The connection is to be inferred from its effect; it has no particular form. That is why some declare it to be absolutely non-existent (as distinct from the meanings of the individual words.)

[The effect referred to is the fact of the meaning of the individual word referring to the particular and not merely to the general. The connection inferred has no concrete shape or form. That is why it is said to be *asattvabhūta*.]

The same view is further explained.

47. An accessory (*sādhana*) necessarily presupposes an action to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and an action is necessarily connected with accessories. This necessity which is present becomes evident in the presence (of the meaning of other words).

[Action and accessory presuppose each other. It is only when the words expressive of them enter into the sentence that what is presupposed becomes manifest. So the sentence is nothing more than the individual words presupposing one another and the sentence-meaning is nothing more than the word-meanings presupposing one another.

The *Vṛtti* points out that this mutual requirement of action and accessory is one and indivisible. It is not felt in the absence of the other. It becomes manifest in the mere presence of the word expressive of the other and not because of the help of any other factor. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :

nityaniyatatvācca niyamo'pyatra vidheyaḥ, sanstu niyamaḥ prayoge sannidhimātreṇa padāntarāṇāṃ puruṣaṃ prati prakāśate, nānugrhyate.]

If the mutual requirement of the meanings of the words of a sentence is equal, how to decide which is primary and which is secondary.

48. In it, (that is, the sentence), the noun, being secondary (to action) requires the verb. The

verb, being expressive of something to be accomplished, requires (the words expressive of) the means.

The meanings of the individual words of a sentence require one another. Some looked upon this mutual requirement as a property of the meanings while others looked upon it as property of the listener. The *Vṛtti* refers to this difference of view. It says that the listener understands mutual requirement (*vyapekṣā*) according to what the words convey, whether it actually exists or not in the meanings : *artheṣu satīm asatīm vā śabdavṛttīyanukāreṇa puruṣo vyapekṣām samīhate.*]

The view that the sentence is nothing more than the sequence of the words is now explained.

49. The particularisations which already exist in the word-meanings are understood from their sequence and there is no expressive sentence beyond that.

[If the sentence is nothing more than the sequence, it is not anything verbal, it is not something which can be heard. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *nāparaṃ vākyaṃ nāma kiñcicchabdarūpam abhidhāyakaṃ vidyate.*]

The same view is further explained.

50. The mere sequence of the words being thus expressive, there is no other verbal element which is so. And sequence is a property of time. There is no separate entity called sentence.

[What is denied here is the existence of some verbal element characterised by sequence, which could be called the sentence. The sentence is nothing more than the sequence itself. Sequence which is a property of time is superimposed on the words. What is called sentence is a mere name without any reality behind it. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*tena vākyaṃ ityavastukamevadamabhilāpamātram, padamevārthavaditi.*]

It is now stated that the same is not true of the sequence of phonemes.

51. The particularisations which already exist in the meanings of individual words but are not

evident become manifested in the presence of the other words. But such a (meaningful) sequence does not exist in the phonemes.

This point is now concluded.

52. The names Word and Sentence may be applied to the sequences of the phonemes and the words respectively but they are not the expressive element (*śabdatva*).

[The phoneme and the word are audible but mere audibility does not entitle them to be called *śabda*. For that, they must convey the meaning, they must be *vācaka*. They are not. Only sequence is so.]

53. Even though the fact of being word (*śabda*, something audible) is common (to both the phoneme and the word), the meaning is understood from the word (conceived as the sequence of phonemes) but not from each phoneme. Hence the meaning belongs to the word.

[As audible entities, the phoneme and the word are both *śabda* but the sentence-meaning is understood from the sequence of the words and not from the phonemes. So sequence is the sentence and interconnection of word-meanings is the sentence-meaning.]

The *saṅghāṭa* view is now restated.

54. Just as phonemes, parts of a word are devoid of any meaning, so is the case with the sentence.

[All the phonemes put together may have a meaning, but each one, taken separately, has no meaning. Each individual word, by itself, cannot express the sentence-meaning which is in the nature of a connection between the meanings of individual words. Only a collection of such words can do it and so that is the sentence.]

Now the sequence theory is restated.

55. Individual words, meaningless being only a means to an end or having their own meaning only when uttered in a sequence, convey the sentence-meaning which is different from the meanings of individual words.

[The meaning of a sentence is the meaning of the individual words in it as syntactically connected with one another. No single word can express this mutually connected meaning. There is not only temporal sequence between the words, but also syntactic connection.]

The *sphoṭa* view is now stated.

56. The sentences, looked upon as collections of words, being eternal or when the sentence-universal is postulated, it is the one sentence which expresses an inalienable meaning.

[The sentence may be looked upon as one unit. As uttered by different persons, it is something different and yet it is recognised to be the same. The different sounds uttered by the different speakers ultimately manifest the same sentence. Or the sentence may be looked upon as a universal which inheres in the different utterances of it by different persons. In whatever way it is looked at, it is one and it expresses a meaning in the nature of intuition (*pratibhā*) and is indivisible.]

57. According to the upholders of the (indivisible) sentence, unity precedes division which is fictitious. The upholders of the individual word, on the other hand, hold that the unities of the sentence are preceded by their divisions.

The statement *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā* (*Rk-prāṭisākhya*.2.1.) is now considered.

58. The fact of the *saṃhitā* (the connected text) being the source of the individual words is explained by resorting to a different complex for-

mation (*Vṛtti*). *padaprakṛtiḥ* can be explained either thus : 'the *saṃhitā* is the source of the individual words' or thus : the *saṃhitā* has the individual words as its source.

[The compound word *padaprakṛtiḥ* is taken as a *śaṣṭhī-tatpuruṣa* according to those who follow the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*. The others take it as a *bahuvrihi*. If the Vedic sentences are indivisible and not composed by humans (*apauruṣeya*), then the individual words obtained by analysis are of human origin (*pauruṣeya*). On the basis of this very statement, the other view, namely, that the individual words are real and that the sentence is a fiction can be justified. It is like this: The individual words are eternal and not formed by men. Their connection is man-made. Each word conveys its own meaning, plus its connection in general with the meanings of the other words. In the presence of the other words, this connection becomes specific and is realised. Thus, the sentence-meaning is conveyed by the words themselves and not by the sentence.

The *Vṛtti* also refers to the statement of the *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* and says that some held the *padapāṭha* of the Vedas to be eternal and the connected text (*saṃhitāpāṭha*) to be of human origin while others held just the opposite view.]

A statement of Patañjali is now explained.

59. If the other tradition, namely, that of the separated words (*padapāṭha*) shows the way to the connected text and is eternal, how is the separated text to be constituted according to the rules ?

The very fact that Patañjali says that the authors of the *padapāṭha* have to follow the rules in doing their work shows that, according to him, that text is man-made. His words are : *na lakṣaṇena padakārāṇāṃ anuvartyāḥ ; padakārair nāma lakṣaṇam anuvartya* = "Rules are not to be framed according to the text made by the authors of the *padapāṭha* ; it is the latter who have to follow the rules." In other words, Patañjali is in favour of the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*. See M.Bhā. II. p. 85, l. 4.5.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the word used in the world is eternal. It is for the rules to conform to the eternal word and not for the latter to conform to the rules: *ataḥ śāstreṇa nityasya lakṣyaśyānuvidhānaṃ kartavya , na tu nityena lakṣyeṇa śāstram anuvidheyam.*]

60. Just as the meaning of the word is not understood from each phoneme, in the same way, the meaning of the sentence is not understood from each word.

[Here the *Vṛtti* makes an interesting observation. It says that the cognition of the sentence meaning is self-luminous, besides illuminating the external object. Being self-luminous, the cognition of the sentence-meaning is authority in itself. The sentence-meaning which its cognition grasps is one and indivisible and being authority, it confirms the unity and indivisibility of the sentence-meaning.]

To meet this, the upholder of the individual word says—

61. Just as the meaning of the sentence is understood when all the words are together, in the same way, the meaning of the word is understood when all the phonemes are together.

[The idea here is that each phoneme does denote the meaning of the word and so does each word denote the meaning of the sentence, but only when the other phonemes and the other words are also uttered in the same context. So the analogy brought forward by the upholder of the sentence is not valid.]

The point is now further elucidated.

62. Just as a minute perceptible object, when associated with something else, is perceived with it, in the same way, a phoneme becomes expressive (of a meaning) when it is associated with other phonemes.

[What is meant here is that a phoneme really has a meaning but that is understood only when the other phonemes of the word are uttered. All of them express the meaning together,

but each one has the potentiality to do so. The hearer cannot understand it unless the other phonemes are also uttered.

63. Just as some meaning is understood when a word is uttered, in the same way, when the phonemes are near one another, the same meaning is understood.

[The point sought to be made here is this :—Just as, when, the phonemes are together, they become expressive by pooling their powers (*parasparaśaktyāveśavaśāt*), so do individual words together convey the sentence-meaning. So there is no need to postulate a sentence apart from the phonemes and the words. The *Vṛtti* points out that the upholder of the meaningfulness of the phoneme can argue exactly in the same way as the upholder of the individual word.]

It is further pointed out that if the reality of the individual word is denied, it would not be possible to have substitutes if what is prescribed is not available.

64. The purpose of the text (the word *vṛīhibhiḥ*) is restriction to one possibility which occurs to one (in any case) due to the power of the verb. Therefore, if the accessory in general is set aside by a particular accessory,

65. If mere substance which occurs to the mind through the power of the verb *yajeta* is set aside by the mention of the particular substance, there would be no substitute if rice (*Vṛīhi*) is not available.

[If the verb *yajeta* in *vṛīhibhir yajeta* brings to the mind substance in general and not the universal of any particular substance, then, if rice, denoted by the word *vṛīhibhiḥ*, is not available, a similar substance like barley can be used. But if it is held that the mention of a particular substance sets aside substance in general also, then there can be no substitute at all, because the substitute barley would come under substance in general which has been set aside.]

Therefore, another view is adopted as follows—

66. Therefore, the word rice, bringing the additional idea of rice, has a positive meaning (*prāptyarthaḥ*) and does not set aside substance in general as there is no opposition between the two.

[According to this view, *vrīhibhir yajeta* is a positive injunction and not a restriction. It specifies and does not exclude other things. From *yajeta*, substance in general is understood because without some substance, *yāga* cannot be performed. From *vrīhibhiḥ*, we further learn that the particular substance is rice. If rice is not available, another similar substance is not excluded.]

67. When substance in general (*dravyatva*) is taken away by it (from other substances) with which it co-exists, other substitutes are not seen there (that is, in the sacrifice) because of impossibility.

68. The verb does not bring to the mind all particular substances as it does substance in general. A word indeed does not express all the meanings which it has.

[Here the *Vṛtti* explains as follows—

If the verb *yajeta* brings substance in general to the mind and not a particular substance and so the word *vrīhibhiḥ* is a positive prescription of rice and not an exclusion of other substances, it means that a substance like barley has not been excluded. That being so, why does it not come optionally? The answer is that prescriptive words are of two kinds : (1) Some have a restrictive effect. They prescribe something and in effect, exclude others (2) Others do not emphasize the restrictive side. Some scholars of *Mīmāṃsā* say that, in some matters this becomes a kind of restriction through impossibility (*asambhavanīyamaḥ*) when, through the mention of the word rice, the universal of rice (*vrīhitva*) becomes an extra accessory of sacrifice, it is not possible for other universals like *yavatva* to become accessories though they have

not been openly set aside, because they cannot coexist with *Vrihitva* in the same thing. If they could become accessories at all, it would be because they come to the mind due to lack of contradiction. They would then be combined with other things and not adopted optionally. Only, that which is openly stated by the words can become an option. The verb does not convey a particular accessory but only substance in general. A word does not express all that actually exists.)

Now an illustration is given.

69. Just as qualities like white, though present (in the rice) are not meant to be conveyed (by the word *vr̥hi*=rice) in the same way, the universals of being particular substances which co-exist with substance in general (*dravyatva*) are not meant to be conveyed.

[A word does not express as its meaning everything that exists in an object. An object, to be expressed by a word, depends upon the desire of the speaker to speak about it. Even existing objects do not exist as meanings of words. The speaker's desire to speak about a thing depends upon the capacity of the form of the word to express it: *rūpasāmarthyānjbandhanā* as the *Vṛtti* puts it. Due to the natural power of words, the verb cannot denote the colour which exists in the substance in general which it brings to the mind. Similarly, the verb cannot denote all the particular substances in which *dravyatva* co-exists with their particular universal.]

The purpose of substitution is now stated.

70. A substitute is taught in the absence (of what is prescribed) in order that there may be no omission of a compulsory (*nitya*) ritual or of an optional one which has already been begun.

[What is pointed out here is that even in the case of an optional ritual, if what is prescribed is not available, it should be performed with a substitute. This is all the more so in the case of a compulsory ceremony, because its omission would result in sin. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *Nityaṃ yat karma tasyākaraṇe pratyavāyaḥ*]

Thus it has been shown how a substitute becomes possible by taking the view that the verb brings only the substance in general to the mind and that the word *vr̥hibhiḥ* is a positive injunction and not meant to exclude other substances. It is now stated that if the sentence is indivisible, a substitute would not be possible.

71. For him who looks upon a sentence as expressive of a particularised action, when a substitute is used for a substance which is not available, there would result a different action altogether.

[It is accepted by all that, while another substance may be substituted if the prescribed one is not available, the prescribed ritual, an act, should not be substituted by another. But if the sentence is looked upon as expressive of an indivisible meaning, what looks like substitution of material would really be substitution of ritual which is not allowed. The sentence being indivisible, it does not teach two things. It does not say: (1) One should perform the ritual, (2) One should do it with rice. That would imply that the sentence has two parts which the doctrine of unity and indivisibility does not accept. So the sentence teaches only one thing, a ritual to be done with a particular material. When that is not available and the ritual is done with some other material, it would not be a mere substitution of material, but of the ritual itself. But that is not allowed. When the Veda enjoins one ritual, it would be wrong to perform another.]

It is now stated that, if the individual word does not exist, one cannot explain why people sometimes enquire about the meaning of a particular word.

72. When the meaning of the known words (in a sentence) has been understood, why does one enquire about the meaning of an unknown word like *pika*?

Puṇyarāja and the *Vṛtti* explain this *kārikā* in the same way, except that the latter gives two examples instead of one. It is well-known that listeners sometimes fail to understand the meaning of just one word in a sentence and enquire about it.

In *vanāt pika ānīyatām*, the word *pika* may be obscure to somebody, who would therefore enquire about its meaning. In the sentence *vārāṅgī jarjarā vṛṣalāya dīyatām*=let the torn *vārāṅgī*=‘turmeric-coloured dress’ be given to the *śūdra*, somebody may not understand the meaning of *Vārāṅgī* and may just enquire about that. This shows that the enquirer has the consciousness that the individual word has a meaning. Nobody makes a similar enquiry about the meanings of *v* or *Kin* the words *Vṛṣabha* and *kāṇḍīra* after having understood the meaning of the remaining portions of the two words, *ṛṣabha* and *āṇḍīra*, showing that people have no consciousness that phonemes have a meaning.]

73-74. When what is implied is mentioned for the sake of clarity, it is a case of direct statement (*śruti*) and it sets aside indication (*liṅga*) and juxtaposition (*vākya*).

A quality like white, when not implied, is understood through proximity and is therefore conveyed by a special effort and is different from direct statement.

[If the individual word has no reality, the principle that when there is opposition between direct statement and juxtaposition, the former prevails would not work. Six principles are laid down by Jaimini in order to determine the meanings of doubtful sentences. Of them, each preceding one is stronger than the following one. In the sentence : *śvetam chāgam ālabheta*=‘one should sacrifice a white goat’ the connection of the act of sacrificing with the goat is conveyed by direct statement (*śruti*), namely, the second-case-affix. The quality white becomes connected with the act because the word expressive of it is in apposition to the word expressive of the goat. In other words, through juxtaposition. If both the words—*chāgam* and *śvetam*—are connected with the verb at the same time because of the second case-affix, then the connection in both cases would be through *śruti*, with the result that if either is not available, there can be a substitute.]

75. If the sentence is indivisible and its meaning also is indivisible, then everything would be

direct statement (*śruti*) and there would be no such thing as contradiction with direct statement.

[If the sentence and its meaning are indivisible, then one cannot, within the sentence-meaning, distinguish between what is conveyed by direct statement and what is conveyed by juxtaposition. Everything would be conveyed by direct statement. There could arise no conflict and what is more, there would be no substitute if what is prescribed is not available.]

It is now shown that if a sentence is indivisible, intermediary sentences would become meaningless.

76. There would be no sentence-meaning (in the case of a big sentence) consisting of a collection of minor sentences requiring one another and used for conveying one single meaning.

(If individual words do not exist and are meaningless, intermediary sentences would be in the same position. Also, a meaningful sentence can become a part of a bigger sentence and so become meaningless which is a contradiction.

The *Vṛtti* explains the same idea with an example : *gaur duhyatām, upādhyāyaḥ payasā bhuktvā māmadyāpayiṣyati* = 'let the cow be milked, the teacher will eat (his rice) with milk and then teach me. Here a big sentence, having an intermediary sentence as its part, is expressive of an action which is qualified by another action having its own accessory. If the parts (in the form of intermediary sentences) requiring one another are not connected with the one main meaning, then the main sentence would also be meaningless. Besides there is no fixity in limits of intermediary sentences. Sometimes, *gām abhyāja* = 'drive the cow on' is the sentence, sometimes it is : *Devadatta! gām abhyāja* = O ! Devadatta ! drive the cow on. Sometimes it is : *Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām* = O ! Devadatta, drive the white cow on ! That being so, one would have to accept the contradictory position that the same thing is sometimes meaningful and sometimes not. The first sentence is meaningful, while the same words are meaningless in the next, being only a part thereof.]

It is now pointed out that, if the individual word and its meaning are denied any existence, certain principles followed

in the world and in the *śāstra* would become inexplicable. These principles form the subject matter of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini.

77. That this action is *prasaṅga*, this is obtained through *tantra* (extension), this through *āvṛtti* (repetition) or *bheda* (difference), there is *bādhā* (suspension) here and combination there (*samuccaya*).

[The principle of *prasaṅga* is established in the twelfth *adhyāya* of the *Mi. Sū.* Mādhava, in his *Jaiminiya-nyāyamālā-vistara* XII.1. defines it thus:—*anyoddeśena anyadīyasyāpi sahā-nuṣṭhānaṃ prasaṅgaḥ* = ‘the single performance of a subsidiary action, accepted as helping a primary action other than the one to which it belongs.’ For instance, *prayāja* and *anuyāja* offerings, taught as subsidiary to the *agnīṣomiya* animal sacrifice, serve as subsidiary to the cake-offering also. See *Mi. Sū.* XII.1, 1-6. This principle is sometimes followed in the world also. When a teacher is teaching one student and other students arrive and profit by the same teaching instead of asking the teacher to instruct them separately, it is a worldly example of the principle. It is sometimes followed in the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* also. For example, P.1.1.27 not only gives the name *sarvanāma* to some words but tells us incidentally that in the word *sarvanāma*, *n* is not changed to *ṇ*, as it normally should. If individual words have no meaning, this principle cannot be applied.

The principle of *tantra* is established in chapter XI of the *Mi. Sū.* It is similar to the principle of *prasaṅga*. The difference is that in *tantra*, the single performance of a subsidiary rite is prescribed and it is intended by the sacrificer to help more than one primary rite, whereas in *prasaṅga* no such prescription or intention is discernible. The *prayājeṣṭi*, performed once before or after, serves all the six sacrifices. An every-day instance of the application of such a principle is that of many students using one lamp for their study. Pāṇini’s use of the word *tapara* in P.1.1.70 in two meanings is an instance of *tantra* in grammar. The two meanings are : (1) *taḥ paro yasmāt so’yaṃ taparaḥ*, (2) *tāt paraḥ taparaḥ*. For a Vedic application of this principle, see *Mi. Sū.* 1, 14.

Each of these principles has its opposite which also goes

to prove the existence of the individual word. *Āvṛtti* or repetition is the opposite of *tantra*=extension. A Vedic instance of *āvṛtti* is the statement that there are seventeen *mantras* for kindling the sacrificial fire (*saptadaśa sāmīdhenyo bhavanti*). This number is reached by repeating the first and the last of eleven three times. *Bheda* or difference is also an extension of *tantra*. A Vedic instance of it is *graham sammārṣi*=he cleans the vessels. As there are many vessels, each one has to be cleaned separately (*bheda*). The cleaning of one would not do for all.

Bādhā or suspension is the subject matter of *adhyāya* X of *Mi. Sū.* An instance of it would be the prohibition of the 'eating of the domesticated fowl (*abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ*) which would otherwise be possible, considering that it can also satisfy hunger. An instance from the world would be : After the statement: "Give curds to Brāhmaṇas," it is said 'and butter-milk to Kauṇḍinya'. The latter statement suspends the operation of the previous one as far as Kauṇḍinya is concerned. The opposite of this principle is *samuccaya*. Instead of one operation cancelling another, both become applicable to the same case. An instance of it would be the statement : Feed Devadatta with salt, ghee and vegetables. All are given to the same person.

These principles would not be sound if the individual word and its meaning did not exist.]

78. That *ūha* (modification) in this matter is justifiable, the relation here is not barred, that this is an instance of general transference and this of particular transference.

[*Ūha* is dealt with in chap. IX of *Mi. Sū.* In the Veda, this principle consists in the modification of the *mantras* prescribed for a *prakṛti-yāga* in order to suit the circumstances of the *Vikṛtiyāga*. In the *āgneya* sacrifice which is a *prakṛti*, one has to say : *agnaye tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi*, when one offers *vrihi* to Agni. In the *Sūrya* sacrifice which is a *vikṛti* of it, one has to substitute: *Sūryāya tvā* while offering *nīvāra* (wild rice) instead of *vrihi* (cultivated rice). Thus, we modify the mantra to suit different circumstances. The opposite of this principle would be not to make any modification. For instance, in the Vedic sentence *yajamānaṃ daṇḍena dīkṣayati, mekhalayā dīkṣayati*, the word

yajamānam is joined on to each one of the verbs without its case-affix being changed. It is clear that to pick out one word of a mantra and substitute another for it is an admission that the individual word has a meaning of its own.

Transference or *atideśa* is the subject matter of *adhyāya* VII and VIII of the *Mī. Sū.* It means the transference of the details of the *prakṛti yāga* to a *vikṛti-yāga*, as, for instance, those of the *Darśapūrṇamāsa iṣṭi* to other *iṣṭis*. In everyday life also, such transference often takes place, as, for instance, when one says: Behave towards this *kṣattriya* as towards a *brāhmaṇa*. In the Science of grammar also, there are many cases of such transference. For instance, the *sūtra*: *Sthānivad ādeśo'nalvidhau* (P.1.1.53.) actually teaches such transference. As such, transference involves the removal of a word or its meaning from its original context and placing it in a new place. It goes to prove the existence of the individual word and its meaning.]

79. That here candidature (for the fruits of the sacrifice) means the fact of being entitled to perform it, whereas no differentiation exists there in regard to the fruit, that one who gets his right to perform an action through the *śāstra* is prohibited from performing another.

[Only the *śāstra* can tell us who is entitled to perform a ceremony and who is not. This subject is discussed in the sixth chapter of *Mī. Sū.* The three factors which confer the right are : (1) Desire for the fruit, (2) Capacity, (3) absence of prohibition by the *śāstra*. Only the *śāstra* can determine capacity or the absence of it in regard to invisible matters.]

80. That here the sequence is understood through direct injunction, there through utterance etc., that the sequence is important here, insignificant there.

[How to determine the order in which the different minor rituals belonging to a major sacrifice are to be performed is discussed in *Adhyāya* V of the *Mī. Sū.* Many guides are given there. In the sentence: *hṛdayasyāgre'vadyati, atha jihvāyāḥ*, the two words *agre*= first and *atha*= 'afterwards' indicate the order. In the *sūtra* : *parasmaipadānām ṇalatus..* (P. 3.4.82), the order of enumeration indicates the order of application.

This order is sometimes very important, as, for instance in the Vedic sentence : *prathamam bhojayitavyaḥ tato' bhyañ-janam* = he should be fed first and then anointed. Sometimes, it is quite significant. Thus, though a *naimittika* sacrifice may be mentioned after a *kāmya* one, the two need not be performed in their order, because the two are not connected together by one purpose. Therefore, if the occasion (*nimitta*) arises earlier than the desire, the *naimittika* sacrifice may be performed earlier. See *Mi.Sū.* V. 3. 32-36. All this is possible only if the individual word and its meaning have a separate existence, because, the determination of the order involves picking a word out of a sentence.]

81. That this is connected with the subsidiary actions of another and, therefore, brings into existence the subsidiaries of the ritual in question, that this does bring into existence (the subsidiaries), that here, this is inevitable.

[The motive of actions is discussed in *adhyāya* IV of *Mi. Sū.* For the principles referred to in the present stanza, examples can be found (1) in the world, (2) in the Vedas, (3) in *Vyākaraṇa*. Puṇyarāja gives only one example. The king who sits on the elephant causes the umbrella to be held over him and thus brings into existence its shade. It is not for the elephant that the umbrella is held and so it does not bring it into existence, (*aprayojaka*), but as it also benefits by the shade, it also may be said to bring it into existence. Both the king and the elephant enjoy the same result, namely, the shade. This is an example from the world. An example from *Vyākaraṇa* is this : P. 4.1.92 and P. 4.1.95 produce the same result, namely, the form *dākṣi* = son of *dakṣa*. In these two examples, two things become *prayojaka*, because they lead to the same result or benefit by the same result.]

82. That this is primary and this is secondary, that this is the mode of procedure, that this is directly useful and this is indirectly useful.

[Much space is given in *Mīmāṃsā* to the question of what is primary and what is subsidiary. In the process of threshing

the corn, for instance, the threshing is subsidiary to the corn to unhusk which it is performed. Among the different actions constituting a Vedic sacrifice, some are directly useful while others are only indirectly so. For instance, the threshing of corn is directly useful for the performance of the *Darśa pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice while *prayāja* is so only indirectly. In *Vyākaraṇa* also, this distinction can be found. For instance, the stem is directly useful to the suffix; that which qualifies the stem as a preposition is only indirectly so. An example from the world is : the ornaments which a man himself wears are directly useful to him, while those worn by his wife and children are only indirectly so. This distinction between primary and secondary, directly useful and indirectly useful, presupposes the existence of parts of sentence and sentence-meaning.]

83. That here there is difference of power as well as of function, while there, there is a difference in the result, that here the distinction has arisen out of the (particular) relation while there the difference is insignificant.

[*Bheda* or difference among actions is dealt with in *adhyāya* II of the *Mī.Sū*. As in the other cases, difference can be illustrated also by examples taken from the world and the *vyākaraṇa-sāstra*. Lightning can be described as follows : *valāhakād vidyotate* = 'it flashes from the cloud', *valāhake vidyotate* = 'there is a flash in the cloud' *valāhako vidyotate* = 'the cloud flashes'. In these three sentences, the cloud is described as the starting point (*apādāna*), the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) and the agent (*kartā*) of the act of flashing. There is difference in power and, according to that, grammar prescribes different endings. This is the difference in function. Sometimes, there is only difference in power. For example, in *dhanuṣā vidhyati* = 'he hits with the bow'. Here there is only one case ending, the third one but there are two powers. The bow is thought of as an instrument of the act of hitting but it cannot be so unless it is the starting-point for the departure of the arrow. The bow is both *apādāna* and *karaṇa*, two distinct powers, but the former is not expressed. The making of a gift with a view to attain long life, health and prosperity is an instance of difference in result. When different

suffixes expressing different agents are connected with the same root, the action expressed by this root also appears to be different. For example, *pacati*, *pacanti*. In the sentence *paktvaudanam bhuñkte*—‘he cooks the rice and then eats it’, there really ought to be a difference in the actions performed by the agent and the object, but this difference is not emphasised. Hence, there is only one agent for both actions.]

In addition to the foregoing arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka wants to put forward some others based chiefly on *vyākaraṇa*, in order to prove the existence of the individual word.

84. That here the negative particle is connected with the verb while there it is connected with the noun, that this is secondary while that is primary, that this is pervasive while that is long or short.

[*Prasajyapraṭiṣedha* means a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the verb. *Paryudāsa* is a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the noun. *Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ* is an example of the former and the *sūtra*: *āto'nupasarge kaḥ* (P. 3.2.3.) is an example of the latter. In the *sūtra*: *tatpuruṣaḥ samānādhikaraṇaḥ karmadhārayaḥ* (P. 1.2.42.) the word *samānādhikaraṇa* qualifies *tatpuruṣaḥ*. This is a secondary use of the word, because, primarily, it is not the *tatpuruṣa* but the component words which are *samānādhikaraṇa*. In *ekaśrutī dūrat saṃbuddhau* (P. 1.2.38.), the word *saṃbuddhi* should be taken in its pervasive (*vyāpi*) worldly meaning. All this is possible only if words are taken out of the sentences and that means that they have a separate existence.]

85. That this is secondary to many severally while there the options are numerous, that this is restricted while that becomes entitled to such a thing under these circumstances.

[When one verb is connected with many nouns in a sentence, we have an instance of one thing being secondary to many severally. The options sometimes allowed in the application of the rules of Pāṇini are explained by commentators in their remarks on the *sūtra*: *na veti vibhāṣā* (P. 1.1.44.) An example of restriction in Grammar is that contained in the *sūtra*:

patiḥ samāsa eva (P. 1.4.8.) which means that the word *pati* gets the name of *ghi* only when it becomes one of the members of a compound. When one syllable in a word gets the *udātta* accent, the others become entitled to *nighāta* = suppression of the acute accent, by the *sūtra*: *anudāttaṃ padam ekavarjam* (P. 6.1.158.)

86. That the distinction here is understood from indications found in another sentence while the meaning of the word there is obtained by analysis.

[When one reads of *aktāḥ śarkarāḥ* = 'sugar mixed with fat' in the Veda, one wants to know mixed with what fat. From the sentence : *tejo vai ghṛtam* = ghee is indeed splendour, one understands that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter (*ghṛta*). This is an instance of a distinction being understood from an indication found in another sentence. When one says : *rājapuruṣaḥ*, to ask 'of which king' and to get the answer 'of king Śūdraka' is an instance of analysing the meaning of a sentence.]

87. Such properties of sentences which depend upon the meaning of individual words would be incompatible if the individual words were considered to be inexpressive (*avācaka*).

The above arguments of the *Mīmāṃsaka* are now answered.

88. What has been pointed out above is not inexplicable if one analyses a big sentence into minor sentences, even though its meaning is really indivisible.

[The idea is that just as a big sentence is divided into small sentences on the ground that these latter express minor ideas, in the same way, though the meaning of a sentence is really indivisible, we can recognise within it the meanings of individual words also. Once this is done, all the objections raised by the *Mīmāṃsaka* are answered.]

The upholder of the individual sentence may argue in one of the two following ways :—

Even if meanings of individual words and of subordinate sentences exist, one does understand a sentence-meaning in addition to them. It does exist as a cognition, if not in reality.

Such a sentence-meaning can be analysed on the basis of difference in power (*śakti*) and the meanings of individual words and of subordinate sentences obtained. The Buddhists believe in the *svalakṣaṇa* only, something which is absolutely unique, having nothing in common with anything else in the world. And yet, they talk about *jāti* on the basis of *apoha*, that is, difference from everything else. In the same way, the upholder of the sentence believes in its indivisibility. And yet, on the basis of analysis through difference of power, individual words and subordinate sentences and their meanings are recognised as taking place in cognition, though not having reality.]

An analogy is now given for seeing differentiation where there is really unity.

89. Just as the same scent appears to be different when it is found (in different objects like) flowers, in the same way, differentiation of meaning can be made within the sentence also.

[One speaks of the smell of a flower or of sandal-wood as though they were totally different from each other, not realising that they are really the same. The idea here seems to be that scent is one and all-pervasive, even though it may seem to be different according to the substance where it is found.]

Another analogy is now given.

90. It is like the perception in a *gavaya* or in a man-lion, grasped by a single cognition of a part that is similar to a universal external to it.

[In a *gavaya*, there is no universal called *gotva*, in a man-lion (*narasiṃha*), there is no universal called *naratva* or *siṃhatva*. Whatever universal there is in these two objects is totally different from these two universals. But the average man thinks that the universals *gotva*, *naratva* and *siṃhatva*, similar to those existing in a cow, a man and a lion, exist in a *gavaya* and *narasiṃha*. They do not, but mind creates the fiction. In the same way, the mind creates the fiction of word-meaning within the indivisible sentence-meaning.]

91. When one sees the unseen and unfamiliar portion (in them), it is the whole thing which has

become unintelligible to the man of feeble intelligence.

[When one sees in a *gavaya* a part that resembles the cow and another part that resembles some other animal, the fact is that one does not see correctly the object at all.]

92. In the same way, in sentences that become totally different by the addition of the word *pika* (cuckoo) and other elements, what appears to be similar is really non-existent.

[Though apparently the only difference between *vanād vṛkṣa ānīyatām* and *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is that, in the latter sentence, there is the word *pika* instead of the word *vṛkṣa*, still it is held that the latter sentence is totally different from the former. The portion that appears to be common, namely, *vanād ānīyatām* is really non-existent as a sentence is indivisible. When there appears to be a doubt about the meaning of one word, it is really the meaning of the whole sentence which is in doubt.]

93. Just as one indivisible knowledge appears to resemble another indivisible knowledge in one part and to differ in another.

94. In the same way, even though the sentences are indivisible and differ from one another completely one perceives difference (between them in parts).

[The knowledge of blue resembles the knowledge of green in that both are knowledge but differs from it inasmuch as the contents of the two are different. Or the point might be illustrated by taking two pictures, the colour of one of which is green and blue while that of the other is green and yellow. The two pictures would resemble each other in parts and differ in parts but in reality they are two different partless wholes. Similarly, two sentences which appear to resemble each other in having a common word and word-meaning are really two different indivisible wholes.]

95. How is one to determine the limits of an individual word considering that its form changes. If its limits are not determined, how can its meaning be fixed ?

[In the sentence *dadhy ānaya*, the word *dadhi* has changed its form into *dadhy* because of what follows.]

If a sentence is indivisible, how can the sentence *śveto dhāvati* be the answer to two different questions at the same time? This is answered as follows—

96. In the other view (*anyatra*=that of indivisibility) there is a kind of coalescence of forms in such words as *śvetaḥ*; by the law of extension (*tantra*), it is to be taken as different for these two different forms.

[By *tantra*, the same word stands for both the forms. For the meaning of *tantra*, see the notes on Kā.77.)

97. In one and the same word (*śveta*) there is a coalescence of different forms. Though not really different from each other, they are separated (because they convey different meanings.)

(In Kā.96, it is said that *śvetaḥ* brings two separate expressions to the mind : *svāitaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*, each of which conveys its own meaning. Here we are told that *śvetaḥ* directly conveys the two meanings.)

It is now shown that, in grammar also, one verbal form sometimes conveys two things.

98. In this Science, sometimes there is an equality of number between the conveyor and the conveyed and sometimes there is difference.

99. In the *sūtra*: *ūkālo'jjhrasvadīrghaplutaḥ* (P. 1.2.27) it is on the basis of equality of number that mutual correspondence is established; but in the

sūtra : *syatāsī lṛluṭoḥ* (P. 3.1.33.) a difference in the number as between the conveyor and the conveyed is present.

[The *sūtra* P. 1.2.27 means : vowels having the duration of u, ū and ū are called short, long and protracted respectively. Thus, this *sūtra* teaches three names to be applied to three different things. There is equality of number between the names and the named. P.3.1.33 means : let *syā* and *tāsi* be added to roots when followed by *lṛ* and *luṭ* *lṛ* stands for *lṛt* and *lṛñ*. Thus there are two conveyors and three conveyed.]

100. *Ya* in the *sūtra* : *yasyeti ca* (P. 6.4.148.) denotes the two vowels (*i* and *a*) and stands for all the named (*saṃjñinah*) through identity (*abheda*). Because the bare thing which is understood cannot convey all of them.

[*Yasyeti ca* (P. 6.4.148) means : *i* or *a*, belonging to a stem called *bha* is dropped when followed by *i* or *a* of a *taddhita* suffix or by long *i*. *Ya* in the *sūtra* stands for *i* and *a*. In the same way, the word *śvetaḥ* stands for *śvā+itaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*.]

101. The form *ū* (in P. 1.2.27) though indivisible, is the cause of the understanding of three separate 'u's through separate sentences. This separate application is just like the latter element (*pararūpa*) standing for itself and the preceding element (*pūrvarūpa*) when it becomes the substitute for both.

[Pāṇini often teaches that when two vowels meet, the latter should remain and take the place of both. For example in P. 6.1.94—*eñi pararūpam*=when a preposition ending in *a* is followed by a root beginning with *e* or *o*, the latter vowel takes the place of both. This is an exception to P. 6.1.88 which requires *vrddhi* in such cases. The sound which comes in the place of both is called *pararūpa*. It stands for both. Similarly, *śvetaḥ* stands for both : *śvā itaḥ* and *śvetaḥ*.]

All this has been said on the basis of *abheda*. It is now stated that Kātyāyana believes in *bheda* and not in *abheda*.

102. By rejecting the prolongation of a particular portion (of a diphthong) in connection with protraction (*pluti*) and by rejecting the combination of two vowels, he (the *vārttikakāra*) has adopted difference.

[The *sūtra* : *plutāv eca idutau* (P. 8.2.106.)=when *e*, *ai*, *o* or *au* is to be protracted, it is their first element, namely, *i* or *u* that is protracted. Puṇyarāja apparently quotes the following : *aṅgavivṛddhir nopapadyate, na hy aico'vayava akāra, ikāra, ukāro vā*= This protraction of a part of the diphthongs in question, that is, *e*, *ai*, *o*, *au*, is not right because *a*, *i*, or *u* is not a part of *e*, *ai*, *o*, or *au*. This passage is not found in the *vārttikas* or the *Mahābhāṣya*.

While considering the *sūtra* : *samāhāraḥ svaritaḥ* (P. 1.2.31.) Kātyāyana says :—*samāhāro'coścet, nābhāvāt*=if it is said that it is the vowels which are combined, it is not right, for there is no such thing. Thus Kātyāyana rejects the idea that here there is a combination of vowels.]

Tantra is the accepted view. That is now explained.

103. Just as there are different forms for *ardharca* and other such words on the basis of the sequence (of their elements) in the same way, according to the view that they are one, different forms can be understood otherwise (that is, as one).

[The compound word is *ardharca* (P. 2.4.31.) but its analysis is : *ṛco'rddham*. Thus, the same thing has two forms on the basis of the sequence of its elements. Similarly, two different things can be combined into one on the basis of *tantra* as in *śvetah*]

104. The phonemes, in themselves unchanging, become different by taking on new powers when there is connected speech (*saṃhitā*).

[The one word *śvetah* appears to have the power to convey more than one meaning. When it is looked upon as the result of the unification of artificially analysed elements (that is,

svā and *itaḥ*) it acquires the power to convey another meaning. Really speaking, there is no unification of separate elements.]

105. Objects, without giving up their real form are perceived differently as a result of some defect in our senses. The same is the case with words.

[A defect in our eyes makes us see the same thing in different forms. In the same way, on account of artificial analysis, the same word can take on many forms.]

106. As a result of the mode of pronouncing it, the same word appears to be different though no change has taken place in it.

[The word *svetaḥ*, while remaining the same, appears to consist of *svā* and *itaḥ* on account of a particular mode of pronunciation.]

107. What is called *sāman* is either the *ṛk* sung in a particular manner or it is the song itself. It is not a separate entity. These very transformed hymns (*ṛks*) differ from one another according to the particular method in which they are sung.

[It is well-known that the hymns included in the *Sāma-veda* are found in the *Rg-Veda* also. They are collected together separately only for the purpose of singing them in a particular manner. This is what is meant by the *sūtra* : *gītiṣu sāmākhyā* (*Mi. Sū. II. 1.3.6.*)]

The principle of *tantra* is again explained.

108. Many forms, different from one another, resembling those of which only one will be retained, are, in this way (*upāyāt*) coalesced into one. Being uttered in a compressed form, it is considered to be correct in the *śāstra*.

[*Tantra* means compressing several forms into one. The compressed form stands for all of them. In the verse, the word *ekaśeṣiṇām* is used because of the resemblance of the process adopted in *svetaḥ* to what happens in an *ekaśeṣa* like *devau* which

stands for *devaśca devaśca*. A real *ekaśeṣa* is the retention of one out of many identical forms. In *śvetaḥ*, there are no identical forms, but there are many forms which are coalesced into one. There is only resemblance and not identity.]

109. By accepting it (the word *śvetaḥ*) to be a form common to different phrases, it should be used for conveying more than one meaning. Otherwise, such forms would not be correct.

[*Śvetaḥ* is an indivisible word having the meaning of 'white' or it is a combination of *śvā* and *itaḥ* and, therefore, divisible. It is really two words but because of the identity of the phoneme sequence, it is looked upon as one. That is why it can be used to convey two meanings. Ordinarily one word conveys one meaning only.]

110. By means of compressed utterance, one correct form is obtained for sentences that are similar to one another.

[Just as Pāṇini has taught the retention of one of many identical individual words, he has not taught the retention, in the same manner, of one among many identical sentences. But *padatantra*, *vākyatantra* and *vākyaikaśeṣa* do play a part in grammar. *śvetaḥ* is an example of *padatantra*: the use of adjectives and verbs in a sentence in such a manner that they can be taken in the singular or dual number. What is called *tantra* by the grammarians is *śabdaśleṣa* and *arthaśleṣa* is *ekaśeṣa*. There is *vākyaikaśeṣa* when a general statement sums up several special statements. For example : *Taśo vidhātuḥ kathayanti khaṇḍitam* = 'they declare the glory of the Creator as marred'. This general statement sums up the previous special statements found in the same verse. See *Ambākarī* on Vāk. II. 110.]

An example is now given.

111. Just as one and the same sound appears to be different according as it is produced by a flute or some other musical instrument, in the same way, different forms are reduced to one.

[What is pointed out here is that just as one can become

many through some conditioning factor, in the same way, through compression (*tantra*) many can become one as in *svetaḥ*.]

The author now refutes the view that if the doctrine of indivisibility were true, intermediary sentences would become meaningless:

112. Just as the intermediary sentences (forming part of a big sentence or passage) and resembling words (forming parts of a sentence) are recognised as separate, in the same way, these sentences may be recognised as separate (even when they do not form part of a sentence.)

[The idea here seems to be that by resorting to analysis (*apoddhāra*) we ascribe meanings to intermediary sentences which form part of a big sentence. When these intermediary sentences are independent, they would have a meaning all the more. So the objection raised in verse 76 does not hold good.]

The author now points out a defect in the view that purpose (*prayojana*) is the meaning of a sentence.

113. He who holds that the expressed sense belongs to the word and that the sentence denotes purpose cannot establish any connection between one sentence and another.

[Puṇyarāja, in his commentary on verses 1-2 enumerates six views on the nature of the meaning of a sentence. That is, purpose (*prayojana*) is one of them. This is supposed to be common to all the views on the nature of the sentence-meaning. According to this, what is understood on hearing a sentence, that is, its *abhidheya* is not the sentence-meaning but the purpose to fulfil which the speaker utters it. But if the sentence has no *abhidheya*, an expressed meaning, there would be no connection between sentences because such connection is always through the expressed meaning.]

But the defect can be removed according to the *anvitābhidhāna*.

114. It is only verbs which have mutual re-

quirement and a relation based on such verbs is understood between sentences (even if purpose is taken to be the meaning of a sentence).

[According to *anvitābhidhāna*, the verb which expresses action brings the means (*sādhana*) to the mind. Words expressive of the means do not bring action to the mind in the same manner. As between action and the means, the former is primary and the latter secondary. In this view, the verb brings the means to the mind and the relation between the two is the expressed meaning of the sentence (*abhidheya*). Thus sentences are not devoid of *abhidheya* and so there can be connection between them.]

It might be said against the *anvitābhidhāna* that, if the very first word expresses the particularised meaning, the remaining words would be useless. This is answered as follows—

115. Repetition or restatement tends to make the meaning of the word clearer. All the words belonging to a sentence being present the meaning of (the whole) sentence is present in each of them.

[The defect mentioned is removed by pointing out that the other words would serve the purpose of restricting and specifying the other words with whose meaning the meaning of the first word is connected. It is also pointed out that even when the other words are not yet uttered, they are already present in the mind of the speaker and so they serve to determine the meaning of the first word, to give it a certain completeness. See verse 18.]

It is now stated how the indivisible sentence is divided by some.

116. Even though the meaning of a sentence is without differentiation, divisions are brought about by the difference in the background of their authors. On this subject, there have been many views among ancient thinkers.

[What is pointed out here is that thinkers are influenced, by the systems of thought to which they belong, in their view about the nature of the meaning of a sentence. They try to make it conform to their other doctrines.]

117. Others have declared that all words are the cause of a flash of understanding through practice (*abhyāsa*), even in the case of children and animals in their understanding of things as they are.

[All words, of whatever kind, are the cause of a flash of understanding according to some. This is as true of those who know the language as of those who do not, like children and animals. That is why fixed words are used by men in their dealings with animals, so that they may have this understanding through practice. After they get this flash of understanding, they act in particular ways. What is meant by practice or long usage is the repeated use of the same word for the same purpose or in the same situation. It is a kind of predisposition. When the horse hears the sound of the whip, it understands something and acts in a particular way. The relation between that sound and the action of the horse is natural and spontaneous.]

118. That practice is not the result of *āgama* (transmission of tradition in this life). Some look upon it as convention. It is in the form of : this should be done after that.

[The *abhyāsa* mentioned in the previous verse is not the result of the transmission of tradition to the child in this life. It is something which the child has inherited from its previous life. The word *āgama* in that verse may not mean anything more than cause. As we cannot see its cause in this life, the practice is called *anāgama*. As it comes from previous lives, it is as good as eternal. Others look upon it as a result of convention, established by man or god.]

Thus, it has been concluded that the sentence is indivisible and that its meaning is Intuition which is also indi-

visible. But, for practical purposes, we analyse a sentence into words and word-meanings. The nature of these meanings is now set forth. There are twelve views. The first view:—

119. All words have a meaning amounting to : ‘something exists’. This meaning is the characteristic of the thing denoted by each word. In the case of words like *go*, they say, it is similar to what is denoted by such words as *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga*.

[The meaning of a word is in the nature of a generality, having no particular form. When we hear the words *apūrva*, *devatā* and *svarga*, we visualise no definite shape or form. This is what Puṇyārāja says. Kamalaśīla also says the same thing in his *Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṅgraha* 886. It is true that we visualise a form when we hear such words as *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ* etc., but that is due to the concurrence of the senses. From these three words, we just understand a meaning, without any shape or form.]

Why not include shape and form in the meaning of a word wherever they are understood ?

120. The perception of a particular form which takes place as a result of our seeing a word used constantly for a particular object does not come within the range of a word. That is the result of a special effort.

[The special effort is the experience of the repeated use of a word for a particular object. It must be distinguished from the normal power of a word.]

The second view

121. Certain distinctive features are revealed by the words expressive of them while others understood subsequently are also considered to be this meaning.

[What is expressed directly by the word is the universal. Whatever else is understood with it is not the expressed meaning of the word. But some consider what is subsequently understood also as the meaning of the word.]

This is now refuted

122. The word expressive of the universal does not express the varieties of the particular which is necessarily understood when the word expresses the universal (primarily).

[A universal must have a substratum. The particular is the substratum of it and so it is necessarily understood, but not its varieties and peculiarities. What is necessarily understood cannot be considered to be its meaning.]

123. An expressive word (like *ghaṭa* = a jar) does not denote the shapes and forms of a jar as it rests only on the general idea (that is common to all the jars). One, however, inevitably understands them.

[When we hear the word *ghaṭa*, we understand only what is common to all jars and not all the possible forms and shapes of a jar.]

An illustration of this inevitability is now given.

124. An action expressed by a word is never seen except with (the means necessary for) its accomplishment. The understanding of the means (*prayoga*) happens subsequently. The same is true of the meaning of words.

[The word *prayoga* which means execution or accomplishment is understood by Puṇyarāja in the sense of association with the means of an action. The idea is that when one thinks of an action, one necessarily thinks of the means of its accomplishment.]

The third view

125. Others accept as the expressed meaning of a word both the fixed actions as well as the means necessary for their accomplishment.

[In this verse, the word *prayoga* seems to be used in a different meaning. It cannot mean *sādhana* as in the previous verse, because it is mentioned separately. Puṇyarāja does not discuss it. It appears to mean action or application. What is emphasised here is that all that is understood from the word, action as well as means of action, the universal as well as the particular, is its expressed meaning. There is no ground for distinguishing between what is expressed and what is implied. The different elements may stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other.]

The fourth view

126 (ab). According to others, the particular forms taken as a whole but without choice or combination are the expressed meaning of a word.

[If a word denotes all the forms and shapes taken on by the individuals coming under it, it would always have to be put in the plural number. If, on the other hand, it denotes an indefinite number of such forms and shapes, there would be indefiniteness in regard to number. That is why the author says : *avikalpasamuccayaḥ*. What it appears to mean is that the exact number of forms and shapes is not present to the mind. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 887, with *Pañjikā*. Puṇyarāja says that this matter will be discussed in detail in the *upamāsamuddeśa*. There is no such *samuddeśa* among the fourteen which make up the third *kāṇḍa*. Can it be a lost *samuddeśa* ?]

The fifth view

126 (cd). Still others think that it is the unreal connection (of things with their universal).

[The view is that a word like *ghaṭa* denotes the relation between the object and the universal etc. which inhere in it. As this relation cannot be perceived apart from the things which it unites, it is said to be unreal. See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 887 with the *Pañjikā*.]

The sixth view

127 (ab). The real, conditioned by the unreal, is the meaning of the word.

[See Vāk. III. *Dravyasamuddeśa* where it is declared that all words denote the ultimate Substance as conditioned or limited by some unreal thing, just as all gold ornaments stand for gold, conditioned by the particular shape of that ornament. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 888 with *Pañjikā*.]

The seventh view

127 (cd). Or the word itself, when it becomes the *abhijalpa*, is its meaning.

[What *abhijalpa* is becomes clear from the next verse. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 888, with the *Pañjikā*.]

128. When the form of the word is identified with the object, in the form : 'that is this', the word is called *abhijalpa*.

[The word is superimposed on the object. The object is, as it were, hidden by the word. The two are identified. This identification itself is called *abhijalpa* and the word which is superimposed on the object is also called *abhijalpa*. See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, 889, with the *Pañjikā*. It is the word which is superimposed on the object and not vice versa. That is why the object is said to be hidden.]

129. Word and meaning, being thus invariably identified with each other through long usage, one

of them assumes predominance over the other on occasions.

130. In the world, a word is known chiefly as identical with the meaning (object): in the Science of Grammar, on the other hand, there can be importance of both, according to the speaker's intention.

[Word and meaning are so intimately united that to separate them and to consider one of them to be more important than the other is difficult. In the world, the meaning (object) is more important than the form of the word. In Grammar, sometimes the word as in P. 4.2.33. and sometimes the object as in P. 4.1.92. assumes importance.]

The eighth view

131. Either because it (the object) has no power or because it has all powers, it is through words that it is presented in a fixed form such as action.

[An object is as the word presents it. A word can present it emphasising its action aspect or its universal aspect or its qualities. The object has no power of its own. It is as the word presents it.]

The ninth view

Another way of looking at it is that a thing has all powers, but the word emphasises one of them according to circumstances.]

The tenth view

132. Others declare that the meaning is something mental but resting on an external object and is looked upon as the meaning of the word when it is externalised.

[See *Tattvasaṅgraha* 890 with the *Pañjikā*. There it is pointed out that as long as the meaning or the object is purely mental, it does not become connected with action. A word must convey something capable of being connected with action. So what is mentally grasped must be externalised. It is only then that it becomes the meaning of a word.]

The eleventh view

133. The external forms conveyed by some words are based upon distinct reminiscences. The meaning of others is in the nature of bare understanding.

[Words like *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, *go*, convey a meaning having a shape which is the residual trace of the actual experience of the corresponding external object having a shape. Words like *apūrva*, *devatā*, and *dharma* convey a meaning which is not characterised by any shape or form. A bare understanding takes place.]

The twelfth view

134. Just as our senses perceive the same object in different ways, in the same way, an object is understood from words in different ways.

[Puṇyarāja attributes the difference in our way of perceiving the same thing to defects in our senses. It may be due to other causes such as distance and the absence of sufficient light.]

135. The meaning of words, intended by the speaker to be one thing, is understood by different listeners differently, according to their own background.

[Puṇyarāja points out that everybody, in using and understanding a word, is influenced by his own background. A *Vaiśeṣika* may use the word *ghaṭa* to convey a whole but the

Sāṅkhya will understand from it a mere combination of qualities and the *Jaina* and the *Bauddha* a collection of atoms.]

136. With regard to the same thing, one's views undergo change. The same person sees the same thing differently at different times.

[Punyarāja attributes the difference to the study, by the same person, of different *śāstras* at different times.]

137. To one and the same word are attributed many meanings by one and the same person or by many persons according to undefined circumstances.

[The same person understands different meanings from the same word at different times according to the different disciplines under whose influence he comes. On the other hand, many persons, trained under the influence of different systems of thought, understand different meanings from the same word at one and the same time.]

138. Therefore, cognitions and words of people who have not seen the truth, being full of mistakes and deceptions, are unreliable.

139. Nor can the vision of the sages, based on truth, be brought into human transactions, for it is not the basis of the use of words.

[In the empirical stage, the sages are on the same level as ordinary men. They perceive things with their senses and the mind and use words according to what figures in their mind. See Vāk III. Saṃ 53.]

140. The sky is perceived as a surface and the firefly as fire. There is no surface in the sky nor is the firefly fire.

[*Tala* is explained in the *Bhāmatī* and in the *Ratnaprabhā* as a big frying pan made of sapphire. *Naiva cāsti talaṃ vyomni* = there is no *tala* in the sky leads us to take the *vat* in *talavat* as a *matup* suffix and not as the suffix *vati*. If this is correct, *tala* may mean nothing more than a part or division. See *Ambākarī* on this stanza. See *Mahābhārata*, *Śāntiparvan*, adh. 112 for this verse and Nilakaṇṭha's commentary thereon.]

141. Therefore, the wise man should examine by reasoning even an object apprehended by direct perception. He should not form his idea of the object on the authority of the perception itself.

[An object is not necessarily as we see it. A little reflection may convince us that it is otherwise.]

142. In regard to objects which are difficult to define, the wise man should not deviate from the definitions of them adopted by men of the world in their usage.

[According to Puṇyarāja, what is emphasised here is that the indefinability of worldly objects being understood, it is better to follow in practical life the worldly conception of them. To try to have another worldly conception of them would be useless repetition (*piṣṭapeṣaṇa*) of work already done.]

The author now continues his statement on *pratibhā*.

143. When the meanings (of the individual words) have been understood separately, a flash of understanding takes place which they call the meaning of the sentence, brought about by the meanings of the individual words.

[Even though the meanings of the individual words are not real or rather have only a practical reality, they serve the purpose of bringing the sentence-meaning to the mind. They are the manifesters of the sentence-meaning.]

144. It cannot be explained to others as such and such. It is experienced by everyone within himself and even the subject (of the experience) is not able to render an account of it to himself.

[The difficulty of defining the special taste of a drink made up of many ingredients is usually given as an example of the difficulty of defining the meaning of a sentence.]

145. It is something indefinable (*avicāritā*) and it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of individual words, covering the whole sentence as it were, it becomes its object.

[Even though this flash of understanding called sentence-meaning is indefinable, its affect can be indicated : it brings about a kind of amalgamation of the meanings of the individual words. One can also say that it is the meanings of the individual words which manifest it. Otherwise, the understanding of the meanings of the individual words before the final understanding of the sentence-meaning would be useless.]

146. None can avoid in one's activities that (flash of understanding) produced either through words or through the working of one's predispositions.

[All activity of living beings is preceded by this *pratibhā*, which is either produced here and now or is inherited from previous births. It is words which we hear from others that produce it here and now (in addition to other factors). In the case of children and animals, they are born with a predisposition. *Pratibhā* and *itikartavyatā* are not the same. The latter is the result of the former.]

147. The whole world considers that to be the authority (in daily life). Even the activities of animals develop because of that.

[Puṇyarāja compares this intuition to the conscience of good people which is able to decide what is right and what is wrong quite instinctively. He quotes Kālidāsa's famous verse : *satām hi sandehapadeṣu vastuṣu pramāṇam antaḥkaraṇa-pravṛttayaḥ*=in matters of doubt, one's own conscience is the guide of good people.]

148. Just as some substances acquire the power to intoxicate and the like by mere maturity, without the help of any special effort, in the same way are intuitions produced in those that possess them.

[The Intuitions are caused, says *Puṇyarāja* by predispositions, peculiar to every living being of every species. Instead of *mada*, another reading is *manda*. Puṇyarāja obviously had *mada* which seems to me to be a better reading.]

149. Who transforms the voice of the male cuckoo in spring ? Who teaches living beings to build nests etc. ?

[It follows from the way in which the subject is treated that in the case of human beings also, the Intuition produced at the moment when we hear words is not only caused by the words but also by something inherited from previous lives.]

150. Who goads beasts and birds on to actions like eating, loving, hating, swimming etc. associated with particular species and pedigrees ?

[*Plavana* can mean floating, swimming, jumping etc. which animals and birds do well instinctively.]

151. This Intuition is the result of Tradition (*āgama*) accompanied by *bhāvanā*. The Tradition is differentiated inasmuch as it is proximate or remote.

[The words *āgama*, *bhāvanā*, *āsatti* and *viprakarṣa* are not clear. They can mean many things. The difficulty is to decide what Bhartṛhari meant. Puṇyarāja understands by *āgama* the word. Did he have the words of the Veda in mind ?

The word, proximate or remote is the cause of Intuition. As such, it is assisted by *bhāvanā*, that is, the tendency to act according to the nature of the different classes of beings. This tendency is either inherited from previous births or it arises in this very life. From the *kārikā*, it appears that the relation of causality is *bhāvanā* > *āgama* > *pratibhā*. By *bhāvanā*, does Bhartṛhari mean what he calls *śabdabhāvanā* in Vāk. I. 114 (122)?]

152. This Intuition is of six kinds according as it results from nature, adherence to one's own *Veda*, Practice, *Yoga*, Invisible factor, intervention of specially qualified persons.

[The *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja differ widely in their examples of *svabhāva*. Puṇyarāja cites the behaviour of a monkey as an example of Intuition caused by Nature (*svabhāva*). The *Vṛtti*, on the other hand, mentions the natural tendency of *Prakṛti* to evolve into *mahat* etc., our natural tendency to awake after sleep. The knowledge of Vasiṣṭha and others is given as an example of *pratibhā* resulting from adherence to one's Veda. Intuition resulting from practice is exemplified by the knowledge of well-diggers as to the exact location of water in the ground. Yogis have Intuition of what is going on in other people's minds. The power of Rākṣasas etc. to enter into other people's bodies and to disappear suddenly is attributed to *adṛṣṭa* (Invisible factor). Lastly, the knowledge which Saṅjaya and others got of the progress of the widely scattered fighting in the *Mahābhārata* war was due to the intervention of specially qualified persons like Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana.]

The author now begins the consideration of the question of what is primary and important and what is secondary and implied in the meaning of a word.

153-154. Just as the word *go* (cow), though it

might be applied to an animal adorned with articles which cling to it, cannot be said to be expressive of these articles.

In the same way, a word, though applied to objects which are characterised by shape, colour and parts, cannot include these characteristics (in its denotation).

[A word denotes either the universal as Vājapyāyana thinks or it denotes the particular as Vyāḍi thinks, though both are understood. Even the shape, colour etc. of an object are not included in the expressed meaning of a word, what to say of external objects like ornaments, temporarily associated with an object.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing slightly differently. Both for one who considers the individual to be the meaning of the word and for one who considers the universal to be it, the other things which are different from the real meaning of the word are just understood, that is, they are not part of the denotation of the word—*nābhidheyatvena śrutibhiḥ prakāśyante.*]

Something is now said about words whose primary meaning is form, shape or colour.

155. A word which is applied to an object as qualified by a shape, colour and parts, cannot be considered to denote only a portion thereof.

[Words like *sthūla*, *hrasva*, *karbura*, *śabala* do express particular shapes and colours directly. They are not merely implied. Some shape or colour is the very basis of their application. They do not denote a part of these shapes or colours. Hundred may include fifty as its part but the word *śatam* does not denote fifty.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing but gives its own illustrations. Words like *parimaṇḍala*, *dīrgha*, *caturaśra* denote things having these shapes and not parts of these shapes. Similarly, words like *muṣṭi*, *granthi*, *sandhi*, *kuṇḍala* denote things having that shape and not parts of that shape. Words expressive of colour such as *citra*, *kalmāṣa*, *sāraṅga* do not denote parts of these colours. Words like *śatam*, *sahasram*, *prastha*, *droṇa*, *māṣa*,

saṃvatsara are expressive of wholes and do not denote their parts.]

Apart from such words, ordinarily a word denotes the universal.

156. A word denoting water applies equally to a drop and to a large collection of it, irrespective of number, size and shape.

[The *M. Bhā* says that the word *ghṛta* = clarified butter, can be applied to a drop or to a whole gallon of it. (See *M. Bhā*. I. p. 184, line 19. and on P. 5.1.115.)].

157. A word (like *taila* or *ghṛta* applied to oil etc, particularised through improvement etc. really denotes a part of it, identified with the whole. It is, therefore, really a word expressive of a part.

(Both improvement and pollution of substances like oil mean their particularisation. Still, we use the general word to denote the improved or polluted substance. Thus used, it denotes a part of it only, but a part identified with the whole. This is a reference to *M. Bhā*. I. p.12, l.18-20. The context is the explanation of the *vārttika* which says that *Vyākaraṇa* stands for both the forms to be explained (*lakṣya*) and the rules which explain them (*lakṣaṇa*). And yet, sometimes, we apply the word to the rules only. In the world also, a word which means the whole is sometimes applied to the part. *Pañcāla* is the name of the whole country but when we say: *pūrve pañcālāḥ*, it is applied only to its eastern region. When we say *tailaṃ bhuktam*, though the word *taila* stands for all the oil that has been medicated, here it means only the dose which has been taken. In other words, the word for the whole has been used for a part.]

158. A word, the use of which is connected with a particular meaning, ceases to be used if that meaning is absent.

[This *kārikā* gives the fixed definition of the cause of the application of the word (*prayojana*) of what is conveyed by the word (*abhidheya*).

It is given as verse 160 by Dr. R. Pillai but the *Vṛtti* gives it here.]

159. A word which is used after including in its denotation attributes which happen to be present does not invariably depend upon the presence of these attributes before it is used.

[There may be certain things which are not the cause of the application of a word to something, but accompany the cause, are connected with it and are understood at the time of the use of the word, as though they are part of the meaning of the word. But their presence or absence does not affect the application of the word. As the *Vṛtti* says : *teṣāṃ sānnidhyam asānnidhyam vā śabdapravṛttāvakāraṇam.*]

160. Even though the word 'cow' may be used even in the absence of hair, hoof etc., it cannot be used when 'cow-ness' itself is absent.

[Here also, a distinction is made between that which is the real meaning of a word and causes its application to an object and that which may ordinarily accompany it. The latter is not included in the meaning of the word. A part is included in the whole but the word which denotes the whole does not necessarily express its parts. Similarly, a particular shape or colour may accompany the universal but it is not the meaning of the word as the universal is.

The *Vṛtti* points out that it is the presence or absence of the universal which determines whether a word can be used to denote an object. When the universal is understood from the word, its substratum is also understood. One does see the use of a word expressive of the original material for its modification (*vikāra*) also. Similarly, a word expressive of the whole is used for a part also. In the words of the *Vṛtti*—

Dr̥ṣṭā ca vikāre ca prakṛtau ca prakṛtiśabdapraṇvṛtīḥ. Avayave ca samudāye ca samudāyaśabdapraṇvṛttidarśanam.]

161. It is difficult for anybody to see all the parts of an object. From the few parts which are perceived, the whole object is inferred.

[Here a kind of analogy is made between perceptive knowledge and knowledge obtained through words. It is well-known that the word expresses what is understood through the senses. It was said before that it expresses the universal and not the things which may accompany it. In other words, it does not denote the whole object. Similarly, perception also does not cover the whole object.

The *Vṛtti* points out that sometimes, after seeing a part of an object, one cannot infer the whole. A doubt may linger : *kvacittu sandeho naiva nivartate. tadyathā dadhimātradarśane.* The example, however, is not clear. The text may be wrong. Or it may mean that when we see curds only, we cannot decide from which milk (cow's or buffalo's, for instance), it has been made.]

162. In the same way, it is seen that one understands (from the words *jātigandha*, *utpalagandha* etc.) those qualities which accompany and are always associated with the smell (of these two flowers).

[The idea here is that though the qualities which accompany the smell are understood, they cannot be looked upon as the meaning of these two words. The *Sāṅkhyas* who look upon an object (substance) as nothing more than a combination of some qualities and not as an entity over and above them may hold that the words express the qualities. The *Vṛtti* is probably referring to them in its last sentence on this verse.]

163. Therefore, even though qualities which happen to be present are understood from a word,

it is that which is invariably present which is intimately connected with the word.

[A possible accompanying quality is not recognised as the expressed meaning of a word. A natural relation of such a meaning with the word is not acceptable:—*Na hi tathābhūtenārthātmanā śabdasya sambanddho 'pi yujyate*, as the *Vṛtti* puts it.]

Now begins the consideration of the meaning of parts or nouns.

164. Case-endings are either expressive or suggestive of numbers like two. Or it might be considered that the whole (consisting of stem and suffix combined) denotes an object qualified by number etc.

165. Or it might be considered that words like 'cow' denote objects possessing number according to their nature, without (actually) expressing this number.

[Three views are expressed in the above two verses : (1) the case-endings express or suggest (illuminate, manifest) number, means etc., (2) the stem and the case-ending together denote number etc., either by itself being meaningless, (3) words ending in case-endings denote objects qualified by number, etc. without being actually expressive of them. Such discussions are the early forms of the discussions in later grammatical literature as to whether the stem (*prātipadika*) denotes one, two, three, four or five things. See *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.2.64.

As usual, the *Vṛtti* is written in rather obscure language and here and there the text is also doubtful. Its contents may be summarised somewhat as follows—Just as worldly usage is done by dividing the sentence into words and word-meanings, in the same way, *śāstraic* usage is carried out by abstracting stems and suffixes from individual words. In this matter, some think as follows—If the method of agreement and difference is adopted there is, in a word, only as much

meaning as can be obtained by this method and nothing beyond that for the whole. Whatever additional meaning is understood from the whole does not come from the word itself. The *Mīmāṃsakas* argue as follows—Stems and suffixes have been mostly put forward on the basis of analysis by the cultured and their meanings, the basis of the *śāstraic* work of the *Ācāryas*, are analysed by the practical method of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). This analysis is for the purpose of showing that these two meanings are only a means of conveying the whole. In the world, for the cognition of the meaning of the whole, there is no division into stem-meaning and suffix meaning. Therefore, according to some, the stem conveys its own meaning (*svārtha*) the individual (*dravya*), gender, number and case. The case-endings only illuminate the cases like the object (*karma*). According to others, the stem expresses only its own meaning, the individual, and gender and the case-endings denote number and case. The expression of number and case by the stem is only optional, according to possibility. According to some, gender is an expressed meaning while according to others, it is only illuminated. Illumination is of two kinds : (1) conveying something which has no verbal element of its own (*anāvīrbhūtāvīrbhāvanam*), (2) eliminating one and retaining the other. For example, in *pratiṣṭhate*, *utpucchayate* and *abhīmanāyate*. Retaining one takes place in the case of words the usage of which is well-known or not well-known. For example, *upāste prapacati*, *adhīte*, *adhyeti*. Or the stem and the suffix together convey a single idea as in *pācaka*, *gopāyitā*, *brāhmaṇādadhīna* and *jugupsate*. In these words, the suffixes *aka*, *āya*, *kha* and *san* do not convey any separate meaning.

Alternatively, the whole, undivided into parts, endowed with many powers, closely linked with one another, expresses a meaning having a number. Without directly expressing a number at the time of the use of the word, meanings determined by different numbers which are transitory, are conveyed by words having different forms.

The *Vṛtti* says that the different numbers are transitory like carpets round the neck of a crow :—*saṃkhyāviśeṣaiḥ kākākaṇṭhe guṇakambalavadanīyaiḥ*. The analogy is not clear.]

166. The meaning of those words whose relation with meaning is eternal and whose power to denote their meaning has been understood by analysis, can also be understood by agreement and difference.

[Words and their meanings are analysed by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. That is, recurrent parts of the meaning are ascribed to recurrent parts of the word.]

167. The meaning of a particular part of a word (stem or suffix) is to be taken as settled only if these (agreement and difference) can be applied without fail. That is not the case (for instance) in *nuṭ* and *śap*.

[The last point in this verse can be illustrated as follows —In *bhavatām* (genitive plural of *bhavat*) there is no *nuṭ*, still it expresses the sense of the genitive plural just as well as *devānām* where *nuṭ* is present. Can we say, therefore, that *nuṭ* has a meaning? In the same way, in *atti*, third person singular form of the root *ad*, there is no *śap*. But in *pacati*, there is *śap*. Can we say that *śap* has any meaning of its own? All that we can say is that it just helps the other elements to express their meaning.]

168. Where there is a possibility (of the stem and the suffix) having each its own meaning, it is not right to include the meaning of one in that of the other. The powers of words, when in contact with one another, are fixed and dependent upon one another.

[One does see that stem and suffixes can express a meaning when the other is absent. The word *kim* has no suffix and yet it denotes a meaning. In *iyān*, *iyat*, there is no stem and still they are expressive. In *aleṭ*, there is no suffix to see and yet it is expressive. Though ordinarily, stem and suffix

come together in usage it is possible, by using the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, to isolate the meaning of each and ascribe it to it. It would be wrong to include the meaning of each into that of the other.

The *Vṛtti* says something like this :—If the stem and the suffix have their own meaning, anybody would accept that the latter is expressed by the former. To consider it as included in something else would not be right because that would affect the natural power of words. That would lead to all meaning being considered as included in something else according to one's fancy. Therefore whatever meaning is understood from a word in usage should be ascribed to that word. Even though when words are used, stems and suffixes are not used in isolation and so their meanings are found to be mixed up, still it is accepted that stems and suffixes are expressive of their meanings separately. Because the powers of words have been handed down in the *śāstra* as distinct on the basis of regulation arrived at by the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*pratīnyamena kṛtapravibhāgā vyavasthitāḥ śabdānāṃ śaktayaḥ pratijñāyante*].

Where analysis would not result in a distinct meaning for the different elements, it should not be resorted to.

169. In the words *kūpa*, *yūpa* and *sūpa*, one does not see any recurring meaning (for the recurrent word element). Therefore, it is the whole word which expresses a different meaning.

[*Kūpa*, *yūpa* and *sūpa* have *ūpa* in common. The remaining element is peculiar to each word, but the meaning of the word is not due to its peculiar element. It belongs to the whole word. (See. *M. Bhā.* I. p. 32, lines 2-7.)]

170. In the derivations of words, one resorts to many ways of explaining them. Where many meanings are possible, a particular one is taken as the basis of derivation.

[The *Vṛtti* argues as follows—When experts put forward

derivations of words, either by giving them readymade (*nipātana*) or by giving rules of word-formation, one sees various kinds of explanations of correct words on the basis of some characteristic which is either fundamental (*śavyāpāra*) or secondary, the worldly meaning of the word being invariable. Among the many powers of an object, any one may be resorted to as the basic characteristic and used as help in derivation : *anekaśaktiyukte'rthe yā kācinnimitabhāvenāśrīyamāṇā śaktiḥ sād hutvānvākhyāne 'ṅatvaṃ pratipadyate*. For example, the derivation of the word *tanḍula* is given in the *Uṇādisūtra*—*Ṛṇluṭitanitādibhya ulac tanḍaśca* (U.S.5.8). It is possible to derive the word *tanḍula* by adding the suffix *ulac* to other roots and substituting *tanḍa* for those roots.].

171. Words like *vaira*, *Vāsiṣṭha*, *girīśa* and *ekāgārika* have been explained by some on the basis of a variety of meanings.

[*Vaira* can be explained as *vīrasya idam* or as *vīrāyā idam*, *Vasiṣṭhasya idam* or *Vasiṣṭhena kṛtam proktaṃ vā* can result in *Vāsiṣṭha*. *Girīśa* can stand for *girav sete* or *giriṃ śyati*.

In addition to the words mentioned in the *kārikā* itself, the *Vṛtti* points out that the *Vārttika* : *taḥ parvamarudbhīyām* on P. 5.2.121 is used to explain *parvata* and *marutta*. Similarly the idea of giving or what has happened (*Vṛtta*) is used to explain various forms. Thus various meanings and various limits of stems and suffixes are used by grammarians in order to explain forms without any restriction.]

172. Just as there is no contradiction in showing the same path in relation to a tree, an anthill or a mountain, in the same way, words like *go* can be derived through different accompanying attributes.

[The word *go* really denotes the universal *gotva* but it can be derived on the basis of any one of the many attributes which co-exist in the cow with its universal. These attributes may be actions or qualities.]

173. People who observe the different conditions of the object (denoted by the word in question) explain a word like, say, *kiṃśuka* by taking hold of one particular condition.

[Puṇyarāja points out that somebody might explain the word *kiṃśuka* which means the *palāśa* tree by reference to its state when it is devoid of all fruit and, therefore, of parrots. The tree is called *kiṃśuka* = what ! parrot ! meaning something where there is no parrot because there is no fruit. Objects have many powers or states according to time and place. Man observes them and applies a word to it according to any one of these powers or states. The two become closely associated.]

The *Vṛtti* points out that there is no contradiction in fixing the form of a word on the basis of one particular power as in the case of the word *kiṃśuka* for *palāśa*, arrived at on the basis of the absence of any parrot (*śuka*) on it when there is no fruit : *kiṃśukānām iva kālabhede śaktau kasyāñcicchabdasya vyavasthāyām na virudhyate.*]

174. Some have derived the word *go* from *girati* (to utter) or *garjati* (to roar) or *gami* (to go) or *gavati* (to sound or) *gadati* (to articulate).

[The purpose of the verse is to show the extraordinary variety that there can be in the derivation of the same word by different scholars. Here the word *go* is taken as the example. Though usually it is derived from *gacchati*, it is possible to derive it from any one of the other roots mentioned in the verse. Both the sound of the verb and its meaning have something to do with the derivation.]

175. Others have declared that the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow because of its form (and not because of any meaning). All words are devoid of any derivation. Others take both (the form as well as the meaning) as the basis.

[If the meaning of the root is the basis of the derivation of a word, one can think of several alternative roots as the basis of derivation. But there was another view on the subject, namely, that the form of the word itself is the basis of the derivation. This view is attributed to the *Aukthikyas*. Words are devoid of any derivation based on meaning. This is the *avyutpattipakṣa* = the view that words are not made up of smaller meaningful elements. The opposite view is that both form and meaning are the basis of the application of a word to an object. This is the *Vyutpattipakṣa*.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is not clear in some places. It also connects the *avyutpattipakṣa* with the *Aukthikyas* : *Apāre cācāryā aukthikyādayo gauḥ kasmād gaur ityeva gaur iti nirvacanam āhuḥ*].

The next question is : The same word or sound is found in different contexts in the language. Is it the same everywhere ?

176. For the sake of simplicity, instruction in grammar is based on what is generic. The particular forms are expressive of this common element as in the case of the other universals.

[The *Vṛtti* says something like this : In the Science of Grammar, whatever can be taught on the basis of what is generic, of what recurs in the form or the meaning in the midst of changes is so taught. But the particular relating to the form or the meaning conveys another universal, as it were. The root *gam*, expressive of its conventional meaning, does not express the real meaning of the word *gauḥ*. The verbs *sraṇati*, *syandate*, *plavate*, *patati* are taught in the sense of motion in general (*gatisāmānye*) also, but they denote naturally particular movements coming under motion in general. In the same way, the word *gauḥ*, also denotes a particular motion. In the word *gauḥ* the root *gam* does not stand for mere shifting of the legs. Roots being polysemic, there is nothing to prevent the root *gam* from denoting all movements coming under motion in general. It is actually seen that the root *gam* stands for other activities as in *gurutaḥpaga*. Thus

from conventional words, not only is the generic meaning understood, but also the particular meaning.]

177. The same stem used in another meaning is considered to be a different one. Though it has the same form in usage, it is not reckoned the same in the other case.

[This verse further explains the idea contained in the previous one. A separate word is applied to every separate object (*pratyarthaṁ śabdaniveśaḥ*). The root *gam* in the word *go*, standing for a particular kind of movement, is different from *gam* standing for motion in general. The root *pac* in *taṇḍulaṁ pacati* is different from the root *pac* in *pacyate taṇḍulaḥ svayam eva*, because there is a difference in meaning. The two roots look alike, but they are not the same.

The *Vṛtti* also points out that a root must be considered to be different when it is used in a *karmakartṛ* formation. Even though there may be resemblance in form and meaning, there is difference also and so there is no trace of the conventional roots in the non-conventional ones and vice versa : *Karmakartṛviśayavat satyapi tulyaviśayarūpatve 'tyantabhedānna rūdhiviśayāṇāmarūdhīṣvarūdhiviśayāṇām vā rūdhīṣu kaścīd anu- saṅgo vidyate.*].

178. *Iji* and *Yaji*, two different roots, each restricted to its own scope, are explained differently by different people. There is indeed much variety in the process of derivation.

[Puṇyarāja points out that some grammarians teach the root *yaj* and its *samprasāraṇa* (change of *y* into *i*) when followed by a *kit* suffix. We would then get *iṣṭah*, *iṣṭvā* etc. When followed by *tṛc* or *tumun*, no such thing takes place and we get *yaṣṭā*, *yaṣṭum* etc. Others say that the root is *ij* and when followed by *tṛc*, the *i* is changed into *y*.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing but gives different examples. It says that in *staḥ* and *santi* the root is different from what it is in *asti* and it consists of *s* only and has its own

special scope, that is, when followed by a *ñit* suffix. All these views about words are of a practical character and only resemble reality. In fact, there is no such thing as a root. It is only a practical postulate resorted to by scholars : *na hi dhāturūpam paramārthena kiñcid vidyate, vyavahārastu-kaścīt kriyate*. Some declare that the root in *asti* consists of *s* only and that, when followed by a *pit* suffix, it takes the augment *a*. Some teach the root *āhi* = 'to speak', 'to explain' the five forms *āha* etc.]

179. Thus one should do as in the case of *bālavāya* and *jitvarī*. There is no contradiction in taking identity or difference as the basis.

[*Vaidūrya* is explained as something coming from *vidūra*. In reality, it comes from *bālavāya* and is only polished at *vidūra*. It is, therefore, assumed that *bālavāya* and *vidūra* are the same. Or, it may be that among grammarians *bālavāya* is known as *vidūra*, just as *Vārāṇasī* is known as *Jitvarī* among merchants. Likewise, *Viśravaṇa* and *Ravaṇa* are the same. The *Vṛtti* adds that grammarians consider *vidūra* to be a substitute for the stem *bālavāya* when the suffix *ṣyañ* follows. What the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja say is based upon the following *śloka*vārttika on P. 4.3.84:—

*Bālavāyo vidūraṃ ca prakṛtyantaram eva vā |
na vai tatreti ced brūyāj jitvarīvad upācaret||*

180. It is for such purposes as the fixing of the position of the augment *aṭ* that roots and prepositions are regarded separately in the discipline. In reality, the root itself is like that (that is, joined to an *upasarga*).

[The whole or unity is real and not differentiation. But grammar has to adopt differentiation in order to do its work. *upasargas* and roots together constitute a unity and convey one idea. But the *śāstra* treats them as different in order to regulate the position of the augment *aṭ* and reduplication and so on.]

181. The word *saṃgrāmayati* is an instance where (the augment *a* and the reduplication) are taught (not before the pure root) but before the root and the preposition combined. Particular actions are conveyed by particular combinations (of root and preposition).

[The forms *asaṃgrāmayat* and *sisaṃgrāmayiṣati* can be explained only if the augment *a* and the reduplication are taught before the root preceded by a preposition. See *M. Bhā.* II. P. 23, lines 7-8.

The *Vṛtti* remarks—Roots are taught as separate elements, expressive of particular actions. In the verbs *nivāsayati*, *āspṛṣṭayati*, *juguṣate*, *mūtrayati*, the suffix *lyap* and reduplication would get their proper place when the preposition and the root are regarded as separate elements. It is the combination of *saṃ* and *grām* which is taught as expressive of the particular action called 'fighting'. It has been made clear again that derivation must take place from the root *saṃgrāma* with the preposition included in it.]

182. The grammatical operation relating to the combined root and preposition is of an inner nature (*antaraṅga*). It is such an action (conveyed by root and preposition together) which becomes associated with the means of its accomplishment.

[Puṇyarāja quotes the following passage from the *M. Bhā* on *Vā* 11. on P.1.3.1 and *Vā*. 5. 6. on P. 6.1.135.

kāraṇāṇāṃ pravṛttir viśiṣṭakriyāyām, anyathākṛtvā māmsaudane pravarttante, anyathā ca śuṣṭkaudane.

It is only after the action is fully determined that the means are employed for its accomplishment. In other words, the root is first united with the preposition. Thus united, it expresses a fully determined action and such an action is united with the means. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *tasmād viśiṣṭaprakṛtirūpavācya viśiṣṭakriyā tathābhūtaiva sādhyā satī sādhanasambandham pratipadyate.*]

Now the opposite view is explained.

183. It is only when the meaning of roots, fit to be used, is fully determined that it is qualified. Before being connected with the means of its accomplishment, an action does not attain its form at all.

[The view expressed here is that it is only when the action denoted by a root is connected with the accessories denoted by other words in the sentence that it attains its full form and becomes fit to be qualified by prepositions.

The *Vṛtti* puts it as follows—When an idea has attained its full form and is to be qualified and there are several possible ways of doing so, the qualification is actually done by words actually used and then the relation of qualifier and qualified is attained. As an action is to be brought about, its relation with the accessories takes place first. Therefore, before that, action is formless (*nirātmikā*) and cannot enter into the relation of qualifier and qualified with the prepositions which only manifest what is already there. According to some scholars, a root first enters into relation with the words expressive of the accessories : *pūrvam dhātuḥ sādhanena yujyate ityakeśāṃ matam.*]

The other view is now further explained—

184. Just as the quality of being a root and the object of an action are assumed on the basis of a future connection with the means of its accomplishment, in the same way, a similar process can be seen elsewhere also.

[The reference here is to P. 3.1.7. which teaches the formation of the desiderative verbs. The suffix *san* is added optionally, to a root when it becomes the object (of 'to desire') and when it has the same subject as the action of desiring. We are here asked to add *san* to a root which is a *karma*, but it becomes a *karma* only when *san* is added. What is going to happen is assumed here to have taken place. The same

thing can be done in regard to association of a root with prepositions.]

185. Just as lac and other dyes applied to the seed at the time of sowing prove useful to the fruit by changing its colour,

186. in the same way, a distinction introduced on account of the connection in our minds between a root and a preposition appears at the time that words develop.

[These two verses are meant to explain the view that a root first enters into relation with preposition and then only with words expressive of the accessories. The analogy of dyeing the seed with lac in order to bring about some difference of colour in the fruit is used here. Root and preposition together express a particular action. That particularity cannot be expressed by the root alone, no matter with how many accessories it is connected. The particularity which exists in the action, expressed by the root and the preposition together, may be made cleaner by association with the accessories. In all this discussion, a distinction is made between mental connection and actual connection in speech. The former naturally always takes place first. The *Vṛtti* also refers to this previous connection in the mind.]

The author now proceeds to speak about the other parts of speech, now that something has been said about the noun and the verb (*nāma* and *ākhyāta*).

187. Distinctions already existing in some (roots) but not expressed (by them) are brought out when they come into contact with preposition like *pra* and *parā*.

[The view about prepositions mentioned here is that they only reveal (*dyotaka*) a meaning and are not expressive of it.

The *Vṛtti* refers to the author of the *Saṅgraha* in support of this view, namely, that the preposition reveals a meaning

already present in it and is, therefore, not expressive of it. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*Śabdāntaropagraham antareṇa sambhavī sannalabdhanīyamo yo'rthas taṃ dyotako niyamayan vācakatām atikrāmatīti Saṃgrahkāra āha*. According to the author of the *Saṅgraha*, the function of the preposition is to specify one of the peculiarities or modifications which are all potentially present in the action denoted by the root. Because it specifies (*niyamayan*) it is called *dyotaka*, revealer, manifestor and so it is far from being expressive (*vācakatām atikrāmati*.)]

Are prepositions only *dyotaka* or are they *vācaka* also ?

188. A preposition is expressive of some distinction in the action. It is also possible for it to be a manifestor of it. Or it is used as a help to give strength to the root (to express its meaning).

[Thus, this verse mentions three views about prepositions—(1) that they are expressive (2) that they are manifestors of something which exists elsewhere (*dyotaka*) (3) that they are helps, that is, they and the roots together express a meaning.

The *Vṛtti* clearly says that three views regarding the upasargas are held by the Ācāryas : *Vācakatvaṃ dyotakatvaṃ sahābhīdhāyitvaṃ ityupasargeṣu trividhā pratīpattir ācāryāṇām*. If, due to association with a preposition, a meaning which a root cannot have is understood, then it is said to be expressive of it (*vācaka*). If it manifests a meaning which the root can have but does not convey, it is said to be a manifestor (*dyotaka*). If the root and the preposition together convey a particularised action, then it is like a *svārthika* suffix.]

The reasoning which establishes that prepositions manifest and do not express is now given.

189. The ideas of going etc. which are not expressed by the bare roots *sthā* etc. are manifested by the prepositions *pra* etc. as can be established by the two kinds of reasoning.

[The root *sthā* conventionally means : to stay, to stand. When the preposition *pra* is placed before it, it means 'to go', 'to start'. So it is the preposition which expresses the idea of going. This is refuted by the present verse and the double reasoning referred to is as follows—

- | | |
|---|--|
| <p>(1) <i>Praśabda ādikarmadyotakaḥ</i>
 <i>praśabdatvāt</i>
 <i>pūrvoditapacyādīdṛṣṭapra-</i>
 <i>śabdavat</i></p> | <p>= The word <i>pra</i> reveals the beginning of an action. Because it is the word <i>pra</i>. Like the word <i>pra</i> seen elsewhere.</p> |
| <p>(2) <i>Tiṣṭhatir anekārthaḥ dhātutvād</i>
 <i>ubhayavādisammatānekārtha-</i>
 <i>yajatyādidhātuvāt</i></p> | <p>The root <i>sthā</i> is polysemic. Because it is a root. Like the root <i>yaj</i> etc. admitted to be polysemic by both sides.</p> |

These two kinds of reasoning called *sāmānyato dṛṣṭenānumānam* and *viśeṣato dṛṣṭenānumānam* are referred to by the *Vṛtti* also.

It is now stated that the root and the preposition together convey the meaning. Neither by itself can do it.

190. When *adhi* and *pari* are not used some other action is expressed by the root. The root, by itself meaningless, expresses the meaning together with them.

[In *adhyāgacchāti* and *paryāgacchati*, *adhi* and *pari* are meaningless because what these two words mean is conveyed by *āgacchati* by itself. Whatever additional meaning we attribute to *adhi* and *pari* can be understood from the context without the help of these two prepositions. They are used only for the sake of clarity. The root by itself is also meaningless. So the meaning is conveyed by the two together. See *M. Bhā* on P. 1.4.93.

The *Vṛtti* points out, following the *M. Bhā* that when P. 1.4.93 says that *adhi* and *pari* are meaningless, what is meant is that they do not convey a meaning different from that of the root. Whether they are used or not, the same

meaning is understood. As a result of grammatical tradition, the root and the preposition are looked upon as separate.]

As *upasargas* are joined to roots, so are *svārthika* suffixes to stems. The latter are now considered.

191. In the same way, some *svārthika* suffixes, finding themselves in other combinations (and, therefore) connected with a meaningless element express, with the help of the latter, a meaning belonging to this element considered separately.

[*Yāva* means a certain food prepared from *yava*=barley. *Yāvaka* also means the same thing. Here the suffix *ka* is found in a combination (*yāvaka*) which is different from *yāva*, a separate word altogether. It is, therefore, natural to ask : What is the use of *ka* in *yāvaka* ? The answer is that in *yāvaka*, the *yāva* portion is really meaningless, though the word *yāva* has a meaning. This very meaning is expressed in *yāvaka* by the *yāva* portion plus the *ka* portion. *Prakṛtyarthānuvādiṇaḥ*=the *prakṛti* in *yāvaka* is *yāva* which has no meaning. As it looks like the meaningful word *yāva*, the suffix is said to express the meaning of the *prakṛti*. This is a mere grammatical tradition : *arthavadbhiḥ saṃsṛṣṭā iti śāstravyavahāre vyopadiśyamānāḥ*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

Now something is said about *nipātas*, the fourth part of speech recognised by Yāska.

192. Some *nipātas* (particles) manifest a meaning, some are expressive of a separate meaning, some, like augments (*āgamāḥ*), express a meaning together with other elements.

[It is stated in this verse that *nipātas* can be *dyotaka*=manifestors of meaning existing elsewhere, or *vācaka*, directly expressive of meaning or lastly, they can express a meaning in cooperation with other elements. Puṇyarāja does not give separate examples of each kind. The *Vṛtti* quotes some Vedic passage in the course of the explanation but the text is not clear. Those *nipātas* are *dyotaka* which are not used except

in association with other words. Such are *ca*, *vā* and so on. Those are called expressive which can convey a meaning by themselves like *śaśvat*, *yugapat*. There is no restriction as to the position of the former in the sentence.]

193. It makes no difference to the manifesting nature of particles whether they are used before or after the associated words from which they differ in meaning.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that even though, logically, the general precedes the particular in speech, one may sometimes put the particular before the general as in *Gārgyo brāhmaṇa ānīyatām* = let *Gārgya*, the *brāhmaṇa* be brought or *Śiṃśapā vṛkṣaś chidyatām* = let the *Śiṃśapā* tree be cut.]

It is now stated why some *nīpātas* are said to be *dyotaka* while others are said to be *Vācaka*.

194. A suffix, though expressive, is not used by itself. Particles *ca* etc. though they are separate words, are not used by themselves.

[What is *dyotaka* is sometimes not used by itself; what is *vācaka* is also not used by itself sometimes. The difference is that if a particle, even though a *pada*, is not used by itself, it is *dyotaka*. If it is a *pada* and expresses a meaning by itself, it is *vācaka*, like *śaśvat*, *yugapat* etc.]

195. Even if they denote the things collected (and not the collection), there is no diversity (which is the basis for the use of the sixth case-ending). It is a thing which is not an entity (that is expressed by the particles). Action is expressed by other kinds of words.

[It might be said that if *ca* denotes *samuccaya*, then the noun used with it would take the sixth case-ending as it does when used with the word *samuccaya*. One says *Vṛkṣasya samuccayaḥ*, *plakṣasya samuccayaḥ*. So it must be deemed to denote

not *samuccaya* = collection but the *samuccita* = things collected, which, when expressed by *ca* is *asattva*, something which is not an entity. This is due to the nature of words (*śabdaśakti*). The main idea in this verse is that words denote meanings according to their nature. It is the nature of particles like *ca* to denote the *asattva*, the non-entity. *Pacati* and *pāka* both mean cooking, but the former conveys cooking as *asattva*, not a concrete entity but a process, whereas the latter conveys cooking as a thing, an entity, not as a process. This difference in the power of words is natural and not the result of teaching.

The *Vṛtti* had the reading : *tiṇṇapadair abhidhīyate*, instead of *kriyānyenābhidhīyate* adopted by Puṇyarāja. The translation follows the latter.]

196. Only such words as denote qualified objects are connected with attributes. *Ca* and other such particles are always dependent on others even if they denote the collected.

[Words which denote objects in which the universal and other properties inhere have a certain independence and they can be qualified by adjectives with some qualifying property. As far as particles like *ca* are concerned, they denote by their very nature, non-concrete things and are always dependent upon the use of other words. They have no independence and so they cannot be qualified by adjectives like independent words. Therefore, though particles denote non-concrete collected things, they are not used independently and are not connected with adjectives. This is their nature.

The *Vṛtti* also emphasises what has been said above and adds that in the different types of *dvandva* compounds, it is the collection to which the collected are subordinate which is expressed : *karmasādhane'pi samuccīyata iti samuccitopasarjanaḥ samuccaya evābhidhīyate.*]

The author now says something about *karmaṣṭhāna*.

197. Sometimes an action creates a relation and disappears (that is, it is not mentioned). Some-

times, a relation is produced while the verb is actually heard.

[*Rājapuruṣa* is an example of an action producing a relation and not being mentioned. In *mātuḥ smarati*, an action is mentioned and it brings the relation of mother and child to the mind. In *vrkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes towards the tree', *prati* is a *karmapravacanīya*. It specifies that the relation between the tree and the flash of lightning is that of aim and what aims (*lakṣyalaṣaṇabhāva*). It does not manifest the action because the verb *vidyotate* does it. Nor does it denote a relation in general because the second case-ending in *vrkṣaṃ* which comes in place of the sixth, does it. Nor does it bring some other action to the mind, because it is not understood. What it does is to specify the general relation. All relation is brought about by a previous action. It always subsists between two things which were *kāraṇas* in relation to some action. In *rājā puruṣaṃ bibharti* = 'the king supports the man' the king is the agent and the man the object in relation to the act of supporting.

The *Vṛtti* also speaks about two kinds of relation and claims that it is based on the *Saṅgraha*. The two kinds are : (1) that which is understood when no verb is used and (2) that which is understood when a verb is used : *tirobhūtakriyāpadaḥ* and *sannihitakriyāpadaḥ*. While explaining these two terms, it seems to quote a passage from the *Saṅgraha*. As this passage is in prose while some other quotations from the same work are in verse, it appears that this famous work was partly in prose and partly in verse. Here the two kinds of relation are illustrated by *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* and *mātuḥ smarati*.]

198. It is for the sake of preventing compounds that the sixth case-ending has been taught in some cases. The third case-ending comes after *guṇa* in order to show that it is the instrument (and not the object).

[There are eight *sūtras* which teach the sixth case-ending in special cases (P. 2.3.52ff). No compound can be made of

the two words connected by the sixth case-ending in the examples of these rules. For example, P. 2.3.52 teaches the sixth case-ending in *mātuḥ smaraṇam*. One cannot make the compound *māṭṛsmaraṇam*, because the *karmakāraka* is here thought of as a general relation : *karmaṇi śeṣatvena vivakṣite*. If the compound is made, the sixth case-ending would have to be elided. No other *kāraka* is thought of as a general relation according to this rule. So the case-ending would be used according to the *kāraka*, as in *mātur guṇaiḥ smarati*. P. 2.3.52 teaches a restriction which is understood in two ways. The *Kā śikā* understands it thus : —*karmṇyeva śeṣatvena vivakṣite śaṣṭhī, na tu kārakāntare*. Bhartṛhari understands it thus : *karmaṇi śaṣṭhyeva, na tu samāsalugādi*. Thus one can have a *mātur guṇānām smaraṇam* and *mātur guṇasmaraṇam*.

The *Vṛtti* also discusses why the eight *sūtras* prescribing the sixth case-ending with particular roots have been given and why the same purpose could not have been served by the general rule *Śaṣṭhī śeṣe* (P. 2.3.50). Its view is that it has been done to prevent compounding : *pratipadam punar ārabhyate, samāsapraṭiśedhaḥ katham syād iti*.]

199. When the verb is not mentioned, a relation created by it is specified in some places by the post-position.

[In *vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes at the tree', there is, first of all, the action of flashing. Secondly, there is the action of aiming. The lightning aims the flashing at the tree. The tree is the aim. Between the aim and the action of aiming, there is the relation of *lakṣya-lakṣaṇabhāva*. This relation is created by the action of aiming which is not mentioned in the sentence. The second case-ending after *Vṛkṣa* tells us that there is a relation. What it is and by what action it is brought about is specified by *prati*, the post-position (*karmapravacanīya*). Its function, therefore, is to specify the particular relation brought about by the action which is not mentioned. It does not manifest the action of aiming because this action creates this particular relation between the tree and the action of flashing and is not mentioned. Nor

does it manifest the action of flashing, because the verb is mentioned. It only specifies the relation already expressed in a general way by the second case-ending.

The *Vṛtti* contains a quotation defining the function of the *karmapravacanīya*. Can it be from the *Saṃgraha* ?]

Why not say that the post-position brings to the mind the action which is not mentioned ?

200. That which brings the action to the mind would be connected with *kāraka* case-endings, just like *vi* (in *viparilikhati*) . *vi* is not a preposition of the root *likh*.

[In *prādeśaṃ viparilikhati*, the *vi* brings to the mind the action of measuring (*vimāna*) and when it is connected with *prādeśaṃ*, it is connected with a *kāraka* case-ending, *prādeśaṃ* being a *karmakāraka*. Thus, it is not *parilikhati* which would be connected with *prādeśaṃ*. *Vi* would become the *upasarga* of *mā* and not of *likh*. Similarly, if the post-position brings the action to the mind, it would be connected with a *kāraka* case-ending and there would be no need for the *sūtra* P. 2.3.8. But if the view is that it does not bring an action to the mind, then the relation between *vrkṣa* and *dyotana* would be a general one and the sixth case-ending would result. To prevent it, P. 2.3.8. teaches the second case-ending.]

201. In the word *apratyajayan*, it is seen that the preposition *prati* brings to the mind the action denoted by *tiṣṭhati*. *Abhi* by itself is used in the sense of direction in connection with the verb *sunvati* (that is, in *abhiṣunvanti*).

[In the word *apratyajayan*, the preposition *prati* suggests the action denoted by the verb *tiṣṭhati*. The sentence in which it occurs is, according to Puṇyarāja : *Devā asurān aprati-tiṣṭhataḥ pratiṣṭhām alabhamānān ajayan*=the gods defeated the asuras who were not firmly established. *Aprati* is understood as *apratitiṣṭhataḥ*, that is, *prati* brings to the mind the action of *pratiṣṭhā*. It is not connected with the root *ji* in *ajayan*. In

abhiṣuṇvanti, *abhi* by itself denotes direction. It is not that the root denotes its action qualified by direction and that *abhi* merely manifests it (*dyotaka*).

The *Vṛtti*, while explaining *apratyajayan*, quotes *Taittirīya Samhitā*. V, 4.6.3.4. to which probably the verse refers.]

202. When they are connected with an action, the name *karmapravacanīya* is given to *su*, *ati* etc. which are really of a different nature in order to prevent the change of *s* into *ṣ*.

[*Su* becomes *karmapravacanīya* by P.1.4.94 and *ati* by P.1.4.95. But for P.1.4.54. *su* would be *upasarga* and that would have the effect of causing the change of a following *s* into *ṣ* by P.8.3.65. as in *su śiktaṃ bhavatā*. In this sentence *su* has not the characteristic of a *karmapravacanīya*, because it does not specify a relation, but modifies an action. And yet the name is given to it in order to explain why a following *s* does not change into *ṣ*. So we get *su siktam* and not *su śiktam*.

The *Vṛtti* points out that *su* and *ati* do not have the characteristic (*pravṛttinimitta*) which would justify the name *karmapravacanīya* being applied to them. And yet, it has been applied to them in P.1.4.94, 95. on the basis of their form (*svarūpa*) only in order to prevent the names *upasarga* and *gati* being given to them. The name *upasarga* would result in loss of *udātta* accent and the change of *s* into *ṣ* : *tena gatyupāsargasamjñāśrayanighātādikāryaṃ na pravartate*, concludes the *Vṛtti*.]

203. Once the relation of cause and effect has been specified by *anu*, the third case-ending would result but that is prevented by special teaching.

[The special teaching referred to is P.1.4. 84. *Hetu* (cause) is of two kinds : it is either that which brings about something or that which makes known something. By P.1.4.90, *anu* gets the name *karmapravacanīya* when the idea of *lakṣaṇa* is to be expressed. *Lakṣaṇa* stands for both kinds of cause. In *vrkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, the second kind of cause is ex-

pressed. The tree is what makes the lightning known. In such a case, *anu* gets the name *karmappravacanīya* by P. 1.4.90 and takes the second case-ending by P. 2.3.8. But *lakṣaṇa* can mean the first kind of cause also and that takes the third case-ending by P. 2.3.23. But as there is a separate *sūtra* (that is, P.1.4.84.) giving the name *karmappravacanīya* to *anu* when the first kind of cause is to be expressed, the third case-ending is set aside and the second case-ending comes according to P. 2.3.8.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing as follows—The word *anu* has been seen elsewhere to suggest the action of hearing (*niśāmayatikriyā*) and so here it brings to the mind the action of hearing as the cause of the relation produced by it. The sixth case-ending expressive of cause should therefore be used. But the third has been taught as expressive of cause (P.2.3.23.) That would then come in place of the sixth. But then *anu* has been given the name of *karmappravacanīya* which takes the second case ending which, therefore, sets aside the third case-ending.]

204. It does not manifest an action, nor does it directly express a relation nor does it supply a verb but it specifies a relation.

[This stanza states the position in regard to the *karmappravacanīya*. In *vrkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, the *karmappravacanīya anu* does not manifest an action, in this case, the action of aiming. Such an action does not come to the mind from the sentence. Nor does it directly express relation because the second case-ending does it. Nor does it bring some other action to the mind as *vi* does in *prādeṣaṃ viparilikhati*. All that it does is to specify the relation, namely, *lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāva*.

The *Vṛtti* explains this verse on the basis of the sentence : *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat*. Here the word *anu* does not bring the action of 'hearing' to the mind. Nor does it imply an action as *vi* does in *viparilikhati*. Nor does it express an action because the case-ending in *saṃhitām* would become a *Kāravibhakti* which it is not. Nor does it express a relation created by the action of hearing. So it specifies the relation created by the action of hearing. It specifies that the relation is that of cause and effect. As it performs this special function,

it is regarded as a separate part of speech by some. The concluding words of the *Vṛtti* are worth quoting—*Tasmād anyaprakārāsambhavād ayaṃ niśamayati kriyopajanitaṃ sambandham avacchinatti. Hetuhetumatsambandho' yam, nedaṃ sambandhāntaram iti. Etasmācca vṛttibhedāt pañcamaṃ padajātaṃ karmapravacanīyāḥ kaiścid ācāryaiḥ pratijñāyante.*]

The author again speaks about the indivisibility of the sentence and of the sentence-meaning.

205. A collection of meaningless phonemes is either with meaning or without meaning. It is the individual word which is endowed with meaning. There are no parts in a word.

[The doctrine of indivisibility is challenged as follows—If the individual word is a collection of phonemes, if the phonemes have a meaning, if the word has a meaning, if the sentence is a collection of words and if the collection has a meaning, how can indivisibility be maintained? The *vārttika*—*Samghātārthavattvāt* (Vā. 12, *M.Bhā.*I.p. 30, l. 24.) seems to imply this objection.

It is answered thus—The phonemes are never felt to be meaningful. Nobody has the feeling that the meaning of the word is made up of the meanings of phonemes, just as one seems to recognise in the meaning of the sentence the meanings of individual words. If phonemes have no meaning, they cannot be parts of words because division of the sound part of a word must correspond to the division of the meaning part.

The *Vṛtti* which is none too clear contains a reference to the *Samgraha* which is said to speak about ten kinds of meaningfulness: *tad ubhayaṃ parigrhya daśadhārthavattā svabhāvabheditā iti Samgrāhe. . . .*]

206. A collection of meaningful words, on the other hand, is different, being expressive of a meaning different from that of the component words (when there is connection between them)

and because of the absence of a connection (between these words.)

[The *Vṛtti* points out that a collection of meaningful words may be of two kinds: (1) one in which the meanings of the words are interconnected, so that the collection, as a whole, has a meaning different from that of the words and (2) one in which the meanings of the words have no connection at all with one another.]

207. Some say that when a word is analysed (*bhede*) its two elements, one meaningful and the other meaningless, do not enter into any relation with each other while others declare that they do, as there is the example of the word *kuṭīra*.

[The word *kuṭīra* is analysed into two parts: *kuṭī* and *ra*. The former has a meaning while the latter has not. So they cannot be connected, according to some, while others think that *ra* suggests the idea of smallness and so the two can be joined.]

208. Taking compounds and words ending in *svārthika* suffixes respectively as their basis, some say that from elements having a meaning, a collection having a meaning is produced while others hold that such a collection is not produced.

[The word *rājapuruṣa* is an instance of a compound having a meaning and made up of elements having a meaning. From a word made up of a meaningful stem and a *svārthika* suffix, no collection having a different meaning is produced.

In the *Vṛtti* on this verse, there is a quotation from the *Saṅgraha* in which words as collection of smaller units are said to be of three kinds: (1) *śabdānvayinaḥ* = those in which the sounds of the smaller units can be traced but not their meanings, like *gaurakhara* and *aśvakarṇa*, (2) *arthānvayinaḥ* = those in which the meanings of the smaller units can be traced, but

not their sounds, like *śrotṛiya* and *vaidūrya* and (3) *śabdārthānvayinaḥ* = those in which both the sounds and the meanings of the smaller units can be traced, like *rājapuruṣa* and *nīlotpala*. The verse gives the views of different thinkers. One of them is called Dhyānakāra, the author of the *Dhyāna*(graha). See Bhartṛhari, p.29.]

209. Some collections are made up of separately meaningful parts. When divided, each element is separately recognisable and meaningful. Some (on the other hand) have to have their denotative power inferred by means of agreement and difference.

[*Samīṣṛkṣa* and *Dādimīṣṛkṣa* are examples of the first kind. *Samjñu* and *Prajñu* are examples of the second kind. *Samjñu* is explained as *saṁgate jñunī asya* = one whose knees are joined together. The word *jñunī*, though seen in the analysis, is not easily recognisable in the compound word.]

210. It is only a meaning current in the Science of Grammar which is shown to prove that phonemes are meaningful. Pure roots, stems etc. have no recognised meaning in the world.

[The *vārttika*: *Arthavanto varṇā dhātuprātipadikapratyayani-pātānām ekavarṇānām arthadarśanāḥ* (*Vā.* 9. *M.Bhā.* I. p.30,1.2.) is considered here. The question whether single phonemes have a meaning or not is considered in the *M.Bhā* on the *pratyāhāra sūtra*: *ha-ya-va-raḥ*. The conclusion reached there is that they have a meaning only when they happen to be roots, stems, suffixes or particles. Even this meaning is obtained by the analysis practised in the *Śāstra*. It is not seen in the world.]

211. The meaning of the bare *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes is likewise not known in the world. Similarly,

before the inflexional suffixes are added, a word ending in a *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffix has no meaning.

[The *Vṛtti* quotes *vā. 7* on P.1.2.45. to show that bare suffixes have no meaning as against the alleged opposite view implied in the *sūtra* P. 1.1.19—*īdūdau ca sapṭamyarthe.*]

212. The meaning which is observed as being expressed by words ending in such suffixes is really of the same nature (that is, just assumed in grammar) because the context is that of meaningful elements.

[This has been said in answer to the objection that if words ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes have no meaning, how is it that such words are called *prātipadika*, considering that to be a *prātipadika*, something must be meaningful. The answer amounts to saying that the meaning ascribed to words ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* is only the result of analysis in grammar and not something seen in the world, because such words, without a case-ending, are not used in the world.]

213. If the word and the sentence are not different from the phonemes, the latter would ultimately become expressive by virtue of the power of mutual requirement.

[The view which is criticized here is that there is no such thing as the word or the sentence apart from the phonemes. If the phonemes are expressive and if the word and the sentence do not exist as distinct from the phonemes, the latter cannot be said to be expressive and that would go against the accepted view that it is they which are expressive.]

214. If a collection of phonemes, with some missing phoneme but still expressive of the meaning (of the whole collection) is not considered to be a different word, then it is the complete word which is brought to the mind by it.

[If *iṣkartāram* and *niṣkartāram* mean the same thing and if the former is not taken as entirely different from the latter, then it is the complete word which is first brought to the mind by the incomplete word and from the complete word so conveyed, the meaning is understood.

The above note is based on Puṇyarāja. The *Vṛtti* is not clear, but it also speaks about remembering the complete word through the incomplete word in connection with the Vedas :— *Chāndaseṣvapi lopeṣu prasiddhivikalāni yāni śabdāntarāṇi tair anyūnā avaikalyayuktāḥ prasiddhāḥ samudāyāḥ smaryante*. It also quotes words from the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* I, 8.10.1. and IV. 1.10.2.]

215. Such an incomplete word, due to a particular reason (here the grammatical tradition) reminds one of the really expressive word (that is, the complete word) and conveys, as though directly, the meaning which is a step removed from it by the real word.

[It is one step removed from the meaning because it first reminds one of the complete word and then expresses its meaning.

Whether the incomplete word is looked upon as the same or as different from the complete word, it is clear that the parts have no meaning. Even if the incomplete word is looked upon as a different word, as long as it can convey the meaning only after bringing the complete word to the mind, the conclusion is that the incomplete word which is a part has no meaning.

The *Vṛtti* points out that through habit and practice listeners think that they understand the meaning from the complete word :— *tatra paricayāt pratipattāraḥ sākṣādivāvikalāvayavaśabda-janitam abhimanyante*. It also compares the understanding of the meaning from the incomplete word to the understanding of the meaning from gestures and signs like winking (*akṣīnikoca*) which are also supposed first to bring the corresponding word to the mind.]

That the parts cannot convey the meaning of the whole is now further explained by means of examples.

216. Just as in compound words like *gaurakhara* no separate meaning exists for each term and even if any be understood, it is not understood from the whole,

217. in the same way, it is of no use to detect meanings for individual words in the apparently connected meaning that is conveyed by the different words comprising a sentence.

[From compound words like *gaurakhara* one understands an animal having a particular universal. No meaning is understood from each term and even if it is held to be understood, it is not taken note of at the time of the understanding of the meaning of the whole. Similarly, when the meaning of the sentence is understood, the meaning of the individual words does not figure in it. The sentence-meaning is like the flavour of a cool drink. It is something different from the flavour of the ingredients.

The *Vṛtti* also says the same thing and discusses the same words : *gaurakhara* and *aśvakarṇa*.]

218. If the parts and the whole have different meanings, then, in compounds such opposite attributes as differentiation and unity would result.

[This verse points out the difficulty that would arise if the meaning of each term in a compound word is considered to be real. From *gaurakhara* as a whole, an object having a particular universal is understood. From each one of its terms, another universal would be understood and these two would be different from each other. It would mean that from one word both difference and unity would be understood which is unsound.]

219. Who would think of *adhi* etc. as expressive of the means (to the accomplishment of the action)? In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, how could a

meaning belonging to no word actually used (that is, *anyapadārtha*) be expressed ?

[If the divisions are looked upon as real and not fictitious, they could become expressive instead of the whole. In *adhibhuvi* or *adhistri* the *adhi* would express location instead of the compound as a whole as it is generally believed. Secondly, if the parts are expressive, what would express the *anyapadārtha* in a *bahuvrihi*? The parts cannot do it and yet that is the real meaning of a *bahuvrihi* according to P. 2.2.24.

The *Vṛtti* mentions the compounds *antastīram* and *adhistri* for discussion. One can infer that in *adhistri*, *adhi* merely conveys the power of location (*ādhāraśakti*) which is favourable to the action in question. In a *bahuvrihi* compound, the whole conveys the meaning of a word the form of which is different from that of its parts :—*bahuvrihau ca rūpānvayayuktam avayava-padam antareṇa padāntaram tadabhidheye vartamānaḥ samudāyo dṛśyate*.

220. In the words *prajñu* and *saṃjñu*, one does not understand a meaning from the different parts. Therefore, it is the whole which conveys a definite meaning.

[Thus, four arguments have been given against the expressivity of the parts : (1) Both differentiation and unity cannot be understood as real from the same word, (2) *adhi* etc. by themselves cannot express the means (*sādhana*), (3) in a *bahuvrihi*, the *anyapadārtha* cannot be understood from the parts (4) in *prajñu* and *saṃjñu*, *jñu* has no meaning when it is by itself.

The *Vṛtti* also discusses *prajñu* and *saṃjñu* which convey a meaning only as wholes. It is only in the *śāstra* that these words are analysed and a meaning ascribed to the parts. But that is fictitious, not known in the world. It concludes as follows—*tasmād anarthakā avayavāḥ sarvatra saṅghāta evārthavān*.]

Some objections against indivisibility are anticipated and answered. The first objection is that if individual words and their meanings have no reality, then a *dvandva* compound would

only denote an integrated object and cannot, therefore, take the plural number. It is answered as follows—

221. Just as the word *gargāḥ* is used for many belonging to the family of *garga* even though only one word *garga* is used there, in the same way, the whole called *dvandva* is expressive of many.

[From the mere fact that a *dvandva* compound denotes many things and takes the plural number, one cannot conclude that the individual words of a compound and their meanings are real.

The *Vṛtti* says that the word *gargāḥ* conveys a meaning which is grasped by a single cognition and in which parts thought of as one figure. Similarly, a *dvandva* compound seems to have parts similar to other independent words and conveys many objects grasped by one cognition.]

The second objection is that an action would have to be performed at the same time to all the objects denoted by a *dvandva* compound and that is impossible. The answer is—

222. Just as the action of feeding is applied to each part, in the same way, an action is applied separately to the things expressed by a *dvandva* compound.

[In the sentence : *brāhmaṇā bhojyantām* = 'let the brahmins be fed', the action of feeding is understood in regard to the brahmins as a whole. But when the action is implemented each brāhmin is mentally separated from the whole and fed separately. That is exactly what happens to an action enjoined in regard to the objects denoted by a *dvandva* compound.]

The reference by a pronoun, a part of a compound, to the meaning of the other part of the same compound is now explained.

223. When the meaning of one of the words in a *dvandva* compound is referred to by the word *tad*, there also, the word only resembles the pronoun.

[In the *sūtra* : *janapadatadavadhyośca* (P.4.2.124.) the word *tad* refers to the word *janapada*. The whole *sūtra* is in the form of a *dvandva* compound. If *janapada* has no separate meaning, how can the pronoun *tad* refer to it? The answer is that the word *tad* only resembles the pronoun *tad*. Really speaking, there is no pronoun here at all. The word is a unity and so is its meaning. There is no division in it. What looks like the pronoun *tad* does not really exist at all: *tasmād vyāvṛttabheda evāyam viśiṣṭe'rthe sarvanāma viśeṣitāvayavasārūpaḥ śabdo vartate*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

From the sentence : *dhavakhadīrapalāśās chidyantām*, one understands just one meaning which cannot be divided and in which one cannot trace any sequence. If that is so, the cutting of all the trees would have to take place at the same time, which is impossible. This objection is now answered.

224. Just as, in regard to the cutting of a *khadira* tree, the action can proceed only gradually, part by part, in the same way, there is an order in the different parts of the meaning of a *dvandva* compound.

[The idea is that order or sequence is necessary for worldly purposes but the words convey the indivisible sequenceless idea.]

According to the *Vṛtti*, this verse is meant to answer the objection that if the individual word and its meaning did not exist one cannot explain how we do understand the meanings of the different terms of a *dvandva* compound in a certain sequence. The answer consists in comparing the process to that of carrying out an order to cut just one tree, say, a *khadira*. The cutting can be done only in a certain order, first the bark, then the inner trunk and so on. In the same way, the action enjoined in regard to the objects conveyed by a *dvandva* compound is carried out in a certain order though the compound does not mention any order.]

If only one among the above-mentioned trees is cut, we still consider that the order has been carried out. How to

explain this if the meaning understood from a word has no parts in it ? The answer is:—

225. Just as actions (described by a sentence) relating to the whole are applied part by part, such is the case with the elements comprising a *dvandva* compound.

[Even though the action mentioned in a sentence may relate to all the elements in a *dvandva* compound together, yet it is applied part by part as is done in the case of the different elements forming part of an *ekaśeṣa* word.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing and concludes:—*tasmād ekadeśasambandhinyo'pi kriyāḥ samudāyam evānupatanti. Avayava-dvārikaiva hi samudāyānām kriyāpratipattiḥ.*]

226. While explaining the compound to the ignorant with the help of the analytic sentence (*vigrahavākya*) the teacher (that is, Pāṇini) has spoken about the relative importance of the meanings of the different terms (obtained by analysis).

[This verse is an answer to the question: if the meaning of the individual words has no reality, how does one speak about the relative importance of the first or second term in a compound. First and second terms of a compound are obtained by artificial analysis, done for the sake of teaching derivation to the ignorant. They really do not exist.

In explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* quotes *M.Bhā.* I, p. 404, l. 3-4.]

227. Even though the meaning is a unified one, many views regarding the importance (of the different terms of a negative compound) are set forth in the *Bhāṣya*. Their limitations are due to the exigencies of grammatical derivation (*prakriyā*).

[*A-brāhmaṇa* is an example of a negative compound.

The meaning of such compounds is discussed in the *M.Bhā*, I, pp. 410-411.

The *Vṛtti* points out that in the *M.Bhā*, a preference is shown for the *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* as far as the negative compound is concerned: *tathā hi nañsamāsa etasminneva sarva-parikalpanāsamभवāt sarvapakṣopanyāsam kṛtvā kaścīd eva pakṣaḥ parigrhītaḥ. Tathā hyuktam—idaṃ khalvapi bhūya uttarapadārthaprādhānye sati saṃgrhītam bhavati. kim ? anekam iti. M.Bhā. I, p. 412. lines 1-2.]*

228. By declaring that, according to the *jahatsvārthā* view, words entering into a compound give up all their meaning, the Bhāṣyakāra has shown that in a *bahuvrīhi* compound all the terms give up their meaning.

[This verse is an answer to the objection that if individual words have no meaning, how can one speak about the idea of the different terms giving up or not giving up their meaning when they enter into a compound word (*jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*). In the *M.Bhā* on P.2.1.1., Patañjali goes into the question whether a compound word has a meaning different from that of the words entering into it. The two main views on this question are represented by the two expressions given above. If, in a *bahuvrīhi*, the whole denotes a meaning totally different from that of the parts, it is a further proof that the meaning of the parts has no reality.]

229. In Grammar, sometimes, the meaning of a stem is expressed by a suffix when the former is absent while the meaning of a suffix is expressed by the root when the former is absent.

[The author wants to show that individual words and their meanings are a fiction and exist only for the sake of grammatical derivation. *Iyān* is a word where the suffix alone is seen and it expresses the meaning of the stem. The word means 'so much'. As taught by Pāṇini, only the suffix is left here, as the stem has been elided. *Ahan* = 'he killed' is an

instance where the suffix has disappeared, its meaning being expressed by the root.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing with the help of other examples, some of which are taken from the *Veda*.]

230. The meaning expressed by two suffixes as in *pac-a-nti* (*śap* and *jhi*) is sometimes expressed by only one as in *ad-ti*. Sometimes, when both are absent, the root expresses it.

[According to Pāṇini, in conjugation, something may come between the root and the suffix but not always. He has divided all the roots of language into ten classes on this basis. Whether something comes between or not, the meaning is the same which shows that its meaning is unreal.]

231. Those very meanings of suffixes which are taught as their basis in some school of grammar are taken as belonging to the stem (or root) in some other school.

[The *Vṛtti* says that some grammarians looked upon all suffixes as *svārthika*, that is, they do no more than manifest the meaning of the *prakṛti*, root or stem:—*tathā hi keśām cit smarṭṛ-ṇām sarva eva pratyayāḥ svārthikāḥ prakṛtyarthānuvādina ityākhyāyante*.]

232. Being well-known, only shortened forms like *udvami* and *kari* are used in the *śāstra*. All grammatical derivations are meant to serve practical purposes.

[Grammar has its own conventions which do not conform to worldly usage. In grammar, one would sometimes say *udvami* for *udvamati* and *kari* for *karoti* or *karomi*, because that would serve some practical purpose. Such forms are not used in the world.]

233. It is only Nescience which is described

in the Science of Grammar through the different modes of derivation. But knowledge arises spontaneously, free from the alternatives of tradition.

[The *Vṛtti* here is not at all clear and that is a great pity because one would very much like to know what, according to the *Vṛtti*, Bhartṛhari means by *Avidyā* and *Vidyā* here. According to Puṇyarāja, what is stated here is that *avidyā* is the means of attaining *Vidyā*. *Śāstra* is all *avidyā*, but through it, one ultimately attains *Vidyā*.]

But how can *vidyā* come through *avidyā* ?

234. Just as the effect is not related to the cause in a definite manner and, is therefore, indescribable, in the same way, knowledge, even though unconnected with any special means (*anākhyeyā*) is still thought of as coming from the *śāstra*.

[The fact is that knowledge does not really come from *avidyā*, that is, from the *śāstra*. Looking upon *vidyā* as an effect, it is like all other effects. No effect is related to its cause in a definite form. But it comes out of it in a definite manner and so seems to be wonderful. *Adbhutena rūpeṇa upajāyate*, says Puṇyarāja. In the same way, the understanding of the word and the sentence as unity is *vidyā* and their division into stem and suffix is *avidyā*. Their understanding as a unity takes place when *avidyā* in the form of division disappears. It disappears really because of the rise of awakening, but as awakening takes place after the study of *śāstra* which stands for *avidyā*, one thinks that *vidyā* comes from the study of *śāstra*.

The *Vṛtti* also describes this rise of *vidyā* from *avidyā* as something wonderful: *Tathā vidyā . . . kuto' pyadbhutayā vṛttyā prādur bhavati*. Puṇyarāja's *adbhutena rūpeṇa* is an echo of the *Vṛttis*—*adbhutayā vṛttyā*. In fact, the expression *adbhutā Vṛttiḥ* occurs already in the *kārikas*. Once in III. Sambandha—81 and again in III. Kā. 17. In all these occurrences, there is a similarity of context. The expression is used in connection with the appearance of the effect from the cause, with the

appearance of many from the one and with the realisation of unity from plurality. Here, emphasising the wonderful character of this process of *vidyā* arising out of *avidyā*, the *Vṛtti* concludes as follows—*tasmād anyatrābhyāsaḥ kriyate, nāntarīyakatayānyad eva prādur bhavatīti*=one studies one thing, namely, the *Śāstra*, that is, *avidyā* and what results from it is the opposite of it, namely, *vidyā*. That is why it is a wonderful process.]

235. The word conveys a meaning according to long grammatical usage. This long wrong usage appears to be natural.

[The *Vṛtti* here points out that the wrong usage of words only reflects our wrong understanding of the world around us which is unreal, the only reality being the ultimate one.]

236. The ignorant person sees parts in the primordial atom. Likewise, he sees its parts also as wholes endowed with parts.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that, due to our experience of all objects as having parts, some think of the atom also as having parts and indulge in discussions as to whether an atom is connected with objects through one of its parts or through all its parts : *paramāṇur ekadeśena vā sambadhyete, sarvātmanā veti*.]

237. By our seeing jar and other objects, the universe also seems circumscribed. Due to the fact that objects are created, even the eternal Brahman appears to have had a beginning.

238. These *śāstras* which are a means (of attaining knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant people. But by following the unreal path, one attains truth in the end.

[The *Vṛtti* reminds one that the unreal is the means of attaining the real. Similarly the meaning obtained by analysis

(*apoddhāra*) is the means of understanding the integrated meaning :—*Vināpoddhāreṇa nāsti sthitalakṣaṇasyārthasya pratipattir iti.*]

The author again denies the reality of the individual word and its meaning.

239. As the words are (gradually) grasped, one understands the meaning in one particular way but when the whole sentence is grasped the same meaning appears to be quite different.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that this verse only states a general idea and that its illustrations are given in the following verses. The general idea is that one sets aside at the sentence stage a meaning understood at the stage of the individual word. If the latter were real, that could not happen, the relation between the word and the meaning being eternal : *nityatvācca śabdārthasambandhasya yadupāttaṃ śabdena tasya punaraśakyaḥ parit-yāgaḥ kartum iti.*]

240. Those sentences in which, after many meanings (are conveyed by the individual words) a negation follows, (in these sentences) these meanings are discarded and should not be taken as real.

[In the sentence *dhava-khadira-palāsās chedanīyā na*, the meaning understood until the last word is heard is that the trees *dhava*, *khadira* and *palāśa* should be cut. But as soon as the last word is heard just the opposite meaning is understood which shows that the meaning of the individual word is unreal. It is better not to take it seriously even before the last word is heard.]

241. The sentence : 'tree, there is not' is the cause of our understanding a particular kind of absence. There is no connection in our mind between the negative particle and the object.

[If each word has its own meaning, the first word 'tree' (in the sentence 'tree, there is not' = *vrkṣo nāsti*) conveys the tree as something which exists and the negation which follows denies its existence. If the tree exists, its existence cannot be denied. If it does not exist, its negation is unnecessary. In either case, the word expressing negation is useless. If the sentence is taken as a whole, this difficulty does not arise.]

242. If it is maintained that the idea of the existence (of the tree) takes place in isolated understanding (*vicchedapratipattau*) how can an idea not conveyed by a word disappear (simply because of its connection with negation) ?

[The idea which is refuted here seems to be this :— The idea of the existence of the tree arises when the sentence is split up, that is, apart from any word and that is set aside by the negative particle. It is said in answer that the negative particle can set aside only an idea conveyed by a word. An idea which arises apart from any word is not conveyed by the word and such an idea cannot be set aside by the negative particle.]

243. If it be held that the idea (of the existence of the tree) is declared false (by the negative particle and does not disappear) then the negative particle performs a new function and how can one understand the non-existence of the tree (from the sentence *Vrkṣo nāsti*)?

[The new function of the negative particle *na* is to declare a certain idea false and not to set it aside. The non-existence of the tree cannot be understood if this new function is accepted. Puṇyarāja points out that the new function attributed to the negative particle would be possible only if its function is *paryudāsa* and not *prasajyapratishedha*. If *vrkṣo nāsti* is *paryudāsa*, the negative particle would be connected with *Vrkṣaḥ* and the sentence would mean : not a tree, but some-

thing similar. If the sentence is *prasajyapratishedha*, the negative particle would be connected with the verb *asti* and the meaning would be : 'the tree does not exist'. It is clear that the function ascribed to the negative particle here is possible only if the sentence is *paryudāsa*.]

244. If it be said that the negative particle is used without reference to any substratum, then it could be used even before. If it be said that what is negated is the substratum, then the purpose of the mention (of the substratum) would be merely restriction.

[If the negative particle by itself could denote negation as well as what is negated, the separate mention of what is negated would be for the sake of restriction or elimination and not for its own sake. This is an unsatisfactory way of construing words.]

245. Or (the particles) would only suggest a restriction or they would restate (meanings expressed by other words). Only one word (in a sentence) would possess a meaning and the rest would be meaningless.

[If the view that the particles (*nipāta*) are only manifestors (of the meanings of other words) and not expressive of their own meaning is adopted, then in the present case, in *vykṣo na* the word itself would denote the object and its negation and the negative particle would only manifest that negation. What merely manifests the meaning of another word is useless. It would do no more than restrict the object to be negated to the tree. To interpret a word as merely restrictive is not satisfactory. Nor would it do to say that one of the two words denotes both the object and its negation and the other word only restates it (*anuvāda*), because restatement is a kind of repetition. All this is the result of looking upon

the sentence and its meaning as divisible. Therefore, it is better to look upon it as indivisible.]

246. In the sentence *udahāri* etc. one understands a contradictory relation between the words. But once the whole sentence is finished, a quite different meaning is understood.

[The sentence : *udahāri ! bhagini ! yā tvaṃ śirasānaḍvāhaṃ vahasi sā tvaṃ prācīnaṃ kumbhaṃ abhidhāvantam adrākṣiḥ*, referred to in the verse, quoted by Puṇyarāja and the *Vṛtti* is probably older. Here, once the sentence is finished, a quite different meaning is understood : As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*vākyasamāptau arthāntaropādānam arthāntaraparityāgaśca dṛśyate.*]

247. From sentences the chief meanings of which are praise, blame etc. a different meaning is understood than the one obtained from the individual words.

[Sometimes, when the meanings of individual words are considered, it consists in condemnation, but the sentence as a whole denotes praise. Sometimes, it is vice versa. Puṇyarāja quotes illustrations. In the first one, the verse as a whole is meant to praise some king by saying that his glory has whitened the whole world whereas the parts of the verse enumerate four things which continue to remain dark even after the king's glory has spread everywhere. The four things are : (1) The spots on the moon, (2) the neck of *Śiva*, (3) *Murāri*, (4) the temples of the elephants of the regions, soiled by the flow of their dark liquor. How can one accept the existence of these parts of the sentence if they denote the opposite of what the whole sentence denotes ? The second verse, as a whole, is meant to blame the ocean. But each part of it seems to praise it. Another proof that the parts, namely, the meanings of the individual words, are unreal.]

The author now expresses the view of the defender of the individual word.

248. From each word (in a sentence) a meaning not connected (with the meanings of other words) is understood which ultimately becomes the means of our understanding one single meaning from the whole sentence.

[After understanding the unconnected meanings of the individual words, we connect them together and get the sentence-meaning which is thus in the nature of connection (*samsarga*).]

This view is now refuted.

249. The meaning which is first unconnected and later joined on to others and thus accumulates becomes something quite different, because it is like putting together broken pieces.

[The translation is according to Puṇyarāja's commentary. His text does not seem to have had *na* in it. There is no *na* in M. either. It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* on this verse is not clear because there are two gaps in the text of it. Though ॠ (R) has *na* in the verse, the commentary *Ambākarī* explains it as though it was not there.]

The author now begins the topic of the distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of words.

250. Some thinkers have declared that the word which has many meanings is the same word. Its power to convey all meanings is differentiated according to circumstances.

[Once the sentence is analysed and we get the individual words, consideration of the meaning of the latter begins. Twelve views are mentioned :—(1) That the word is the same in all its meanings, (2) that it is different with each meaning, (3) that the individual word and its meaning are

unreal, (4) that they are real. Each one of these four views can be differentiated according to *śabdopacāra* and the two kinds of *arthopacāra*. *Śabdopacāra* means : the application of a word to an object primarily, as the application of the word *go* to a cow or figuratively, as the application of the same word to a *vāhika*, because of his resemblance to a cow in dullness. In both these cases, the word *go* is applied to an object which has *gotva*, really or figuratively. *Arthopacāra* is of two kinds :—When the form of the word, whether applied primarily or figuratively, is considered to be its meaning, it is one kind. When an outside object is its meaning, whether applied primarily or figuratively, it is the second kind. When each of the first four views is combined with each of the next three views, one gets twelve views in all. But speaking broadly, there are two main views, designated as *ekaśabdadarśanam* and *anekaśabdadarśanam*. The present verse begins the consideration of the former. See, on this topic, my paper on “Bhartṛhari on the primary and the secondary use of words.” Indian Linguistics, Vol. 29, 1968, pp. 97-112.]

251. Therefore, due to purpose or context or contact with another word, a word gives up its power of denoting many meanings at the same time and conveys them one by one.

[If it is the same word which has many meanings, how is it that it does not convey all of them at the same time ? The answer is that purpose, context and contact with another word determine which meaning is conveyed by the word on a particular occasion. In verses 315-316, other factors for determining the meaning of a word will be mentioned. Here only those three factors are mentioned which help one to decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary one. The other factors mentioned later help one to decide what is expressed and what is implied.

The *Vṛtti* says the same thing with examples and adds that sometimes words convey more than one meaning at the same time: Examples : *śveto dhāvati, alambusānām yātā*. See *M. Bhā.* I. p. 14, line 14.]

252. Just as the word 'cow' denotes an object endowed with dewlap etc. so does it denote a *vāhika* also.

[All this is being said according to *ekaśabdadarśana*, the view that when a word denotes different things, it is still the same word. The word cow denotes a particular class of animals through its power called *abhidhā*. When it is applied to a *vāhika* who has not the physical characteristics of a cow, it denotes that object through the same power and not some other.]

253. The primariness or secondariness of a word having many attributes, that is, the power to denote many things, depends upon frequency of usage.

[Therefore the word *gauḥ* primarily denotes the cow and secondarily an object like *vāhika* because of more frequent usage in the former case. It is the same word which denotes both. So this is *ekaśabdadarśana*.

Commenting on 252 and 253 together, the *Vṛtti* says : the same word *gauḥ* sometimes denotes the universal as in *gaur anubandhyaḥ*. Sometimes, it denotes the individual or substance in which the universal inheres, as in the sentence *gaur ānīyatām* or *gaur duhyatām*. Sometimes it denotes a particular individual as when one asks a cowherd seated in the midst of a herd of cattle: do you see a cow in this herd of cattle? (*astyatra kāñcid gām paśyasi*)? Sometimes it is applied to a totally different object like *vāhika* because of the presence in him of qualities like suffering everything, and eating a lot. Where it is used primarily and where secondarily depends upon whether it requires the help of other factors like context for conveying its meaning.]

Another effect of the *ekaśabdadarśana* is now being shown.

254. One and the same sacred hymn is accepted, without any confusion, as having many meanings and different powers according as it is consider-

ed from the point of view of the *ātman*, or of the gods, or of the ritual.

[A sacred hymn remains the same even if it is used for different purposes such as meditation, muttered prayer and sacrifice. On each occasion, it would have a different meaning but the mantra is looked upon as the same.]

So far, *śabdopacāra* according to *ekaśabdadarśana* has been shown. In *śabdopacāra*, the word now denotes one meaning and now another. That affects the eternality of the relation between the two. So he now considers the question from the point of view of *arthopacāra*.

255. Some hold that due to special circumstances (in this case the dullness and slowness of the *vāhika*) the quality of being a cow is traced in a *vāhika*. There has been a change in the external object but the word expresses its own meaning.

[In this context, two views have been put forward : *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana*. The first view means that when a word has many meanings, it is the same word. The second view means that it is not but that it becomes as many words as there are meanings. In the former view, there can be *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra*. When the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow primarily and to a *vāhika* secondarily, it is the same word. This is *śabdopacāra*. Within *ekaśabdadarśana*, there can be *arthopacāra* also and that has two aspects : the meaning of a word can be the form itself or an outside object. Whether the word *gauḥ* is applied to a cow or to a *vāhika*, its own form is understood first in any case. Whether applied primarily or secondarily, *gotva* is understood in both applications. Thus, the form and the meaning are the same in both cases. These are the two aspects of *arthopacāra*. As, in *śabdopacāra*, the word is applied now to one thing and now to another, the eternality of the relation between the word and its meaning is affected.

The *Vṛtti* points out that a word is really never used in a meaning other than its own. When the word *gauḥ* is applied to a *vāhika*, it is because some qualities associated with a cow are attributed to a *vāhika* : *ekeṣām ācāryāṇām mukhyāt svaviśayād anyatra śabdasya vṛttir nāsti.*]

256. The same form of a word is superimposed on all its meanings. It is the object that changes. The word is unchangeably fixed to its form.

[The point mentioned here is that a word never deserts its meaning consisting of its external form, namely, a particular pattern of phonemes.

The *Vṛtti* attributes to some *Ācāryas* the view that the form of a word, specifically its own and internal to it, invariably associated with it and normally never shared with other words, is its first meaning. It is superimposed on the object which it denotes. The two are identified : *Anye tvācāryā manyante svarūpe śabdo nityam vartate. Sa eva tasyāntaraṅgo savyabhicārī śabdāntareṇāsādhāraṇo'rthaḥ. Tatra cānupadeśapratipattiḥ sarveṣām. rūpaṃ tu śabdānām artheṣvadhyaōpyate.]*

The *anekaśabdadarśanā* is now explained.

257. Those who follow the path of difference maintain that though the primary and the secondary words are different from each other, they appear to be the same because of resemblance in their form.

[Here Puṇyārāja points out that those who follow the path of difference declare that a word used in a secondary meaning is different from the same word used in its primary meaning. This is the result of accepting identity as the relation between a word and its meaning. Once a word has been identified with its primary meaning, it cannot again be identified with another meaning. One wants a totally different word for it.

A similar question is discussed in the *M. Bhā* on *vā.* 4-10 and 11-12 in the second *āhnika*. The question discussed is

whether a phoneme occurring in different contexts is the same. Here the question relates to words having different meanings.]

258. It is thus that a Vedic hymn for kindling the fire becomes different by mere repetition. In the same way, a Vedic *mantra* that is the object of usage or guess also becomes different.

[It is prescribed in the Vedas that a certain number of *mantras* should be recited for kindling the sacrificial fire. The number is sometimes eleven, sometimes thirteen and sometimes seventeen. Repetition of a *mantra* is also taught in this connection. It follows that a *mantra* repeated becomes a different *mantra*. It is by repetition that the required number is obtained. In the same way, a word used in a secondary meaning should be considered to be different from the same one used in its primary meaning.]

What is interesting to note here is that the question of sameness or difference is thought of in connection with phonemes, words and whole *mantras*. The same phoneme comes in different contexts and becomes the object of grammatical operations; the same word denotes different meanings in different contexts; the same *mantra* is repeated in the same context and is counted as a different *mantra*. All this has been said to strengthen *anekasabdadarśana*.]

259. They (the hymns thus repeated) are also Veda. For, it is only some that have been handed down. Or rather what is actually handed down is meaningless whereas the rest is really subsidiary (to the ritual).

[The *mantras* which are actually handed down in the Vedas are only illustrative. They stand for others also which have not been handed down but which are also nonetheless Veda. As long as the sequence of the words is the same as that of the *mantra* actually handed down, it is also Veda. Not everything is actually handed down.]

Another way of looking at it is that what is actually handed down has no meaning other than its own form. So it is not *mantra*. Only that which has a meaning other than its form and brings to the mind what is connected with the actual ritual is *mantra*. It is only then that it is subsidiary (*śeṣa*) to the ritual.]

260. Some maintain that the outward form itself is the purpose of the transmission of the Vedas, so that everything possessing the form is different while those that are used in the ritual are different on account of their connection with what is actually handed down.

[If the outward form is the meaning of the Vedas, the *mantras* are different from one another because their outward form is different. Not only the *mantras* which have been handed down but the others also have an outward form and as that is always different, the *mantras* are also different. As far as the outward form is concerned, a word conveys it through *śakti* and not through *lakṣaṇā*.

261. The *sāvitrī mantra* is different according as it is used at the sacrament of initiation or at a Vedic ceremony or at low recitation. But it is taken to be the same.

[The *sāvitrī mantra* used on different occasions is a different *mantra*, but due to similarity in the sequence of the phonemes, it is looked upon as the same. Similarly, according to the *anekāśabdadarśana*, the word *gauḥ* is different according as it denotes the cow or the *vāhika* but identity is superimposed and so, in regard to the cow, it is said to be expressive (*vācaka*) on the basis of *prasiddhi* and in regard to the *vāhika*, it is said to be *lakṣaka* on the basis of *aprasiddhi*. If there is no superimposition, it is a different word and so each is expressive in regard to its meaning. Neither is *lakṣaka*. To look upon the two different words *gauḥ* as the same is *śabdopacāra*.

A *mantra*, used on different occasions, is a different *mantra*, says the *Vṛtti*. Used in the *upanayana* ceremony, the *sāvitṛī* is called *saṃskārasāvitṛī*. When one who has already had his *upanayana* uses it at some other ceremony, it is a different *sāvitṛī* altogether. When recited a definite number of times as part of an expiation ceremony, it is again different. In other words, a *mantra* differs according to application. It is looked upon as the same for practical purposes only. As the *Vṛtti* says : *vyāvahārikam ekatvam*].

262. It is on account of the particular form of words that they denote their object and so also a sentence denotes its meaning by virtue of its own form and not of anything else.

[The *Vṛtti* seems to say here that to look upon the form only as the basis for the application of a word to an object is *avyutpattipakṣa*. In the *vyutpattipakṣa*, on the other hand, there is some circumstance (*nimitta*) besides the form which is the basis of the application : *vyutpatti pakṣe tu nimittāny eva prayojakāni*.

263. According to those who hold that one and the same word has many meanings, the distinction between primary and secondary is based on established usage or lack of it.

[Really speaking, the question of primary and secondary in regard to meaning cannot arise if the word becomes different with every meaning. As there are as many words as there are meanings, each word has one meaning only and that is its primary meaning. It has no secondary meaning at all. But the question does arise in the *ekaśabdadarśana* and then long usage or the lack of it is the basis for the distinction between primary and secondary.

What the *Vṛtti* wants to say here is not clear as the text is doubtful here and there. The point raised is : When a word has many meanings, what is the criterion for regarding one as the primary one and the others as secondary ? The verse

says that the criterion is *siddhi* or *asiddhi*. The *Vṛtti* concludes thus :—*tathā paryāyeṇa yasmim vākye prasiddhārthaḥ śabdas tatra mukhyaḥ. Anyatra tu gaṇaḥ.*]

264. Others declare that word to be secondary which denotes a meaning with the help of the context or the presence of another word.

[The help of the context or of the presence of another word makes the meaning understood from a word secondary. This test is said to be common to both *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana*.]

The author now wants to express the same idea in the words of the author of the *Saṅgraha*.

265. A word which, when uttered by itself, denotes its well-known meaning is the primary one, being dependent on its own form only.

[Just before the Verse, the *Vṛtti* says *Saṅgrahakāraḥ paṭhati* and then follow 265, 266 and 267 on which there is a common *Vṛtti*. Does it mean that all these verses are quotations from the *Saṅgraha*? Puṇyarāja seems to regard 265 only as a quotation from the *Saṅgraha*.

266. A word which finds its application through the use of another word and by means of a special effort as it were is declared by others to be secondary, conveying as it does, the secondary meaning.

[By 'special effort', the context is meant here, according to Puṇyarāja.]

267. In a case where a word takes its chief meaning as the basis for application (to another object) the chief meaning is the cause and the secondary one the effect.

[That meaning is the primary one to which the word can be applied without any impediment or hitch. That meaning is secondary to which the word is applied after some incompatibility is felt. When the word *go* is applied to a *vāhika*, there is first incompatibility but it becomes alright when *gotva* is attributed to the *vāhika*. This is *arthopacāra*. This takes place when the word *go* is supposed to be the same in both cases. Though the same, it is looked upon as different on the basis of *śaktibheda* and so it is alright.

The *Vṛtti* here concludes by saying that when a word conveys a meaning on the basis of its form only, without depending on the context or some other word, it is said to be primary in regard to that meaning. If it does depend upon these other factors, it is said to be secondary.]

The author now points out the difficulty in trying to take purpose or context as the guide for determining what is primary and what is secondary.

268. The words *purā* and *ārāt*, are used in mutually conflicting meanings and it is by context that we determine what the meaning is on any particular occasion.

[The word *purā* denotes both the future and the past. Similarly *ārāt* means both near and far. Only the context can tell what the actual meaning is. If the meaning determined by the context is the secondary one, the meaning of these words would become secondary but that would be wrong. Both the meanings of these two words are primary. Therefore, context is not the correct basis for determining which meaning is the primary one and which the secondary one.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is doubtful in places but it says the same thing and gives other examples besides *purā* and *ārāt*. The point which it makes is that in the case of such words, the question of primary and secondary does not arise at all. Nor does it arise in the case of pairs like *vāyuh* *vāyuh*, *aśvaḥ* *aśvaḥ*, *tena tena* in which one is a noun and the other is a verb, though the two have the same form. Both the meanings

are primary here also as in the case of *purā* and *ārāt* :—
tathā vāyur vāyuh, aśvośvaḥ, tena tena iti nāmākhyātānām tulyarū-
patve viśayāntarasyāsamsparsān na gauṇamukhyavyavahāro'sti.]

How can the question of primary and secondary arise if the words and word-meanings are unreal and only the sentence and the sentence-meaning are real ? This question is never raised in regard to the sentence-meaning.

269. Once the analysis of the meanings of the individual words from that of the sentence is done, the meaning of one word so obtained can be connected with another, also so obtained.

[When the sentence and its meaning are considered indivisible, there are no individual words and their meanings and so the question of primary and secondary cannot arise. And yet for practical purposes the sentence is split up into words by a process of abstraction (*apoddhāra*). When this is done, the distinction of primary and secondary is based on long usage or lack of it.]

But then a word is sometimes used without being linked to another word. That means that the individual word is real.

270. When a word is sometimes used by itself with the verb *asti* (understood), it is really a sentence. That is why it is not connected with any other word.

[What is meant here is that the verb 'to be' is understood and added on mentally to a single word when it is used. Thus, it is really a sentence and so no other word is connected with it.]

271. When the word 'cow' or 'horse' is uttered as an answer to the question *ko' yam?* (what is this?) there is some action like seeing hidden in the question itself.

[The question *K'yam ?* = What is this ? really means : What is this that is seen ? = *Ko'ym drśyate ?* in which the action

of seeing is understood. Or it may be some other suitable action. In the same way, the answer 'cow' really means: 'it is the cow which is seen' or some other suitable action is implied in it. An action is implied both in the question and in the answer.

[The *Vṛtti* also points out that a single word is never used. Whether it is a question or an answer, it always implies an action :— . . . *iti kriyāviśeṣam abhyantarikṛtya praśna-prativacane bhavataḥ*. If the question implies an action though it is not openly mentioned, it is natural that the answer also should imply it :—*tatra ca praśnakāla evāntaritāyāṃ kriyāyāṃ prativacane'pi tadviśayaḥ caritakriyaḥ śabda upādīyate*.]

Some have taken the presence of the original properties in a greater or less degree as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

272. Nor can abundance or deficiency in the attributes be the basis of the distinction because some consider even abundance to be deficiency due to long usage.

[Dullness is associated with the cow. When the word cow is applied to the animal, it is a case of primary application because, in the cow, dullness is found in a greater degree. When the same word is applied to a *vāhika*, it is a case of secondary application because dullness is found there in a lesser degree. But this criterion is unreliable as abundance and deficiency are relative terms. The *vāhika* may be really duller but long usage considers that dullness exists in him in a lesser degree.

The *Vṛtti* discusses, besides the above example, *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* also :—*sampūrṇāśca śaktyādayaḥ siṃhe, nyūnā māṇavake. gavi ca sampūrṇā jāḍyādayo nyūnāstu vāhike*.

The author now speaks about similarity as the basis of the distinction between the primary and the secondary.

273. When a word expressive of the universal is applied to something in which the universal is absent

but a similar attribute is present, that word is said to be used in a secondary sense.

[According to this view, the word cow denotes the universal 'cowness' (*gotva*). It exists only in the cow. But when the word is applied to a *vāhika*, it is not because there is *gotva* in him, but because he resembles the cow in being dull. Resemblance in some attribute is, therefore, the cause of the secondary application of the word.

As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*tatra rūḍhasambandhasya prasiddhasā-hacaryasya dharmāntarasya darśanād atajjātiyeṣu jātiśabdaḥ prayujyamāno gaṇa ityucyate.*]

The author now speaks about *viparyāsa*, misapprehension on the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

274. When an object appears like another as though by misapprehension, then words like cow expressing the latter are said to be in a secondary sense.

[One can apply a word expressive of one thing to another, either through misapprehension or deliberate superimposition. To call mother-of-pearl (*śukti*) silver after misapprehension in the dark is an example of the first case. To apply the word cow to a *vāhika* on seeing some resemblance between the two and not because of misapprehension is an example of the second case. Here there is no wrong identification because one clearly sees the difference. That is why the word *iva* is used after *viparyāsa*.]

The author now speaks about shape and power as the basis of the distinction between primary and secondary.

275. Just as a plough or a sword or a pestle, being endowed with a particular shape and power, is understood as the fixed accessory (*sādhana*) of a particular action,

276. (Just as) these things have no power connecting them with other actions but are invariably under-

stood as meant for the performance of particular actions because of their shape,

277. In the same way, a word endowed with a form and power from the very beginning has its purpose fixed. Through some power, it can also be applied to other things.

[These instruments and tools perform their particular actions on account of the particular shape with which they are endowed. One cannot cut grass with a plough nor fight a battle with it. In the same way, the power of a word to denote its meaning is fixed from eternity. This is the view not only of the grammarians but also of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. See Jaimini, *Mi. Sū.* I. 1.5. Also *Vāk.* III. *Sambandha.* 29.]

278. The meaning which is understood to be the purpose (that is, the main one) of a word as soon as it is heard is considered to be the main meaning whereas the one to which it is applied by a special effort is the secondary one.

[If a word like *go* has many powers and it can be applied to a *vāhika* also, how is one to decide which is the primary meaning and which the secondary one? The answer is : that which is understood directly from the word without the help of the context, by merely hearing the word is the main one. That which is understood with the help of the context and other words in the sentence is the secondary meaning.

Commenting on 275-278 together, the *Vṛtti* points out that certain tools and instruments, by virtue of their shape and power, are associated in the world with particular actions. Not that they cannot be used for doing other actions, but normally, they are meant for particular actions. They are not associated with nor called by the other actions : *loke te tu karmāntareṣūpādīyamānāḥ sādhayanto'pi tamarthaṃ tadaṅgatvena vypadeśaṃ na labhante*. Similarly, words have normally the power to convey particular meanings, but they are sometimes used to convey other meanings secondarily but

they do not become known in the world as being expressive of these meanings : *pratyāyanasaktimātram tūpādāyānyatra prayujyamānāyāḥ pratyāyayanto'pi tānarthānstatsambandhitvena loke vyavasthayā prasiddhiṃ na labhante.*]

279. When the words *go*, *Yuṣmad* and *mahat* have the suffix *cvi* at the end and are used in a meaning other than their own, what was not so becomes so secondarily and sometimes also primarily.

[In the expressions : *agaur gauḥ sampadyate*, *go'bhavat*, *atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate*, *tvad bhavati*, the quality of being a cow and of being 'thou' is superimposed on what is not a cow and what is not thou. What is not a cow does not really become a cow. It is only a superimposition. In *amahān mahān bhūtāḥ*, *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, what was not big does actually become big. This case is therefore different from the two previous cases. The word *mahat* is used in its primary meaning in *mahadbhūtāḥ*, but in *go'bhavat*, *go* is used in a secondary sense, because it is applied to something which does not really become a cow. Being used in a secondary sense, the *o* in *go* is not considered to be *pragrhya*. For the same reason, there is no second person suffix in *tvadbhavati*. There is no real *yuṣmad* here. It only exists secondarily. In the words of the *Vṛtti*—*agaur gaur abhavat*, *go'bhavat iti pragrhyasamjñā na bhavati*. *Atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyate*, *tvad bhavati madhyamo na bhavati.*]

But, says the objector, this is alright in such expressions as *go'bhavat* and *tvadbhavati*. But in *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, the use cannot be called a secondary one as the moon does really become big (*mahat*) on full-moon day. That being so, the long ā, taught in P. 6.3.46, at the end of *mahat* should come in. To show that even in *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ*, the use is a secondary one, the author says—

280. The original state is changed into magnitude or whiteness. Considered as something different, it (the original state) is the cause of secondariness.

[In *mahadbhūtaś candramāḥ* = 'the moon has become big', and *suktibhavati paṭaḥ* = 'the cloth has become white' also, there is secondary usage. The moon remains the same, but it is thought of as having two different states. The former state is considered as the original one and the later state as the modified or secondary one. It is a question of the speakers' intention. When the former state is thought of as the original one, the later state appears as the superimposed one and then secondary usage results. On account of this secondary usage, the final of *mahat* does not become ā by P. 6.3.46. The presence of secondary usage here also is stated by the *Vṛtti* as follows—... *pūrvottarayor avasthayor āśritayoḥ savyāparatvāt pūrvasyā avasthāyā vivakṣāyām satyām vikāraśabdasya tadupagrāhi gaṇa-tvam vijñāyate.*]

281. The proper nouns Agni, Soma, etc., which are united with their names on the basis of their external forms are really used in a secondary meaning in phrases like *Agnisomau māṇavakau*) because these words (as applied to *māṇavakau*) are not well-known.

[Words like *agni*, and *soma* are names of deities which are their primary meaning. When they are applied to human beings on the basis of some resemblance such as brightness, it is a case of secondary usage based on superimposition. When they are given as names to new-born individuals, they are again used secondarily, but this secondary usage is not based on resemblance but on the mere fact that these words are not known as the names of new-born infants. In other words, *aprasiddhi* is the basis. That is why there is no *sattva* in *Agnisomau* according to P. 8.3.82.]

It is now stated that when there is superimposition, the usage is, of course, secondary.

282. When *Agnidatta* is called Agni, the word makes its primary meaning (of god Agni) subordinate and, therefore, the usage becomes secondary, as it also stands for *datta*.

[When Agnidatta is referred to by the word Agni, the primary meaning of the latter word, namely, the god Agni, is made subordinate and it now denotes a person called Agnidatta by superimposition (*adhyāropa*). This is also secondary usage.]

It is now explained how the augment *suṭ* in Hariścandra is justified even when the word is only the name of a student (*mānavaka*).

283. In the derivation of words which is based on different circumstances, the presence or absence of *suṭ* in such words as *Hariscandra* are regulated.

[There is the augment *suṭ* in the word Hariścandra and it is correct when it is the name of a *ṛṣi* (P. 6.1.153.) When we make a compound word in the sense of *Hariscandro yasya*, the resulting form would be *Haricandra*, that is, there will be no *suṭ*. The circumstance being different, the form is also different.

The *Vṛtti* points out that sometimes the form with *suṭ* can be correct when it is the name of the *Ṛṣi* :—*tathā sati Ṛṣer anyatrāpi sasutkasya sādhutvaṃ vijñāyate.*]

284. A word which attains its correct form as the name of a *Ṛṣi* and is then applied to denote something else does not lose its inner correctness of form when applied to a different object.

[A word gets its correct form before it enters into a sentence and it keeps that form even after entering into the sentence in a secondary sense. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*... tadā svaviśaye siddhaḥ saṃskāro bahiraṅgārthaprādurbhāve na nivartate.*]

Some deny the distinction between primary and secondary meanings. They are answered as follows—

285. Whenever a meaning, however contradictory it may be, is understood from a word, then according to that understanding, that is its primary meaning.

[Whatever meaning figures in the mind when a word or sentence is heard is its meaning, however unusual or contradictory it may be. This is based on the *Mīmāṃsaka* principle, expressed in the following *Mi. Sū* :—*śabdavattūpalabhyate tadāgame hi dṛśyate tasya jñānam yathā' nyeṣām.* (*Mi. Sū* IV 1.6.15)

The *Vṛtti* gives the example of the mirage. The mirage looks like water from a distance. So it is mistaken for water and the word water applied to it. This application should be looked upon as a primary one because it is based upon the well-established meaning for the application of the word water :—*jalanirbhāsāyāṃ hi mṛgaśṇikāyāṃ buddhāvutpannāyāṃ mukhya eva jalaśabdaḥ prayoktavya iti. Tulyaṃ hi pravṛttinimittaṃ sarvatra śabdasya prayojanam bhavitum arhati.*]

It is now shown that even if the meaning is what figures in the mind, there can be a distinction between what is primary and what is secondary. To show this, the author says something about what is real and what is not.

286. Even though the determination of an object depends upon our understanding of it, still all understanding of it does not go in vain (or, all understanding of it is not as in the case of the well-established object, if the correct text is *prasiddha iva*, instead of *asiddha iva*.)

[The *Vṛtti* seems to point out that even though the determination of an object depends upon our understanding of it, still our subsequent experience in regard to such objects brings out a distinction between the primary and the secondary :—'*pratya-yādhiṇe' pyarthasyā-vadhāraṇe kvacit tadviśayā-nāṃ pratya-yānāṃ avyabhi-cāreṇa yā pravṛttir loke (sā?) gaṇa-mukhya-bhāvaṃ vyavasthāpayati.*]

287. The perception of (real) water and of such things as a mirage is the same. In spite of the similarity of perception, mirage is not water.

[The point here is that mere cognition is not enough

for determining the existence of an object. We take a mirage to be water, but there is no water there.

The *Vṛtti* points out that our perception of real water and our perception of mirage as water resemble each other. But the difference becomes clear when we go to the place and try to touch the water in the mirage, drink it and have a bath in it. So the use of the word 'water' to the water which we see in a mirage is only secondary usage. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*tathāpi sparśana-snāna-pānādīnām abhāvāt taddeśaprāptaucādarśanān nedaṃ salilam iti . . . tāsu mṛgatṛṣṇikāsu nāsti mukhyasya śabdasya pravṛttiḥ.*]

288. Even though there is similarity in the perception of a serpent and that of a rope, still their difference is obvious from their well known special activities (that of biting in the case of a snake and that of binding in the case of a rope.

[We can conclude that the objection is non-existent if we do not see its special activity, even though it may figure in the cognition. The snake may figure in our cognition of the rope, but as the rope does not bite, we can conclude that it is not a snake. Further, that our perception of it was wrong.]

289. Whatever difference is perceived as a result of any circumstance causing a contrary perception, that they call a false perception.

[A defect in the senses or in the object itself may cause a false perception. What is seen because of such a defect is said to be false.

The *Vṛtti* mentions the following as possible causes of wrong perception :—*Santamasa timiropaghāta, madya, viṣapāna, anyadeśāvasthāna*. When, due to these causes, the wrong perception takes place, it can be corrected by comparison with perception under normal conditions and by verification through touch etc.—*tattu sparśanādibhir yathābhūtamavadhāryate. timiropaghātād darśanabhede dvitīyasya vastunaḥ sparśābhāvādaparicihinnacakṣuṣo yā pratipattiḥ saiva nyāyyetyavasīyate.*]

More examples follow to show that two cognitions may be similar if their objects are similar and refer to their special property but that they are really different.

290. Even though one sees ups and downs in a picture, similar to those of mountains (*nimnonnatam citre*) still it does not cause obstruction etc. (as a real mountain)

[R and RP have *nimnonnate citre* but *nimnonnatam* is a better reading. The *Vṛtti* and the *Kārikā* text of M. have it.]

291. Just as it is possible to have continuous contact of the hand with the wheel, that is not possible in the case of the torch-wheel which can be touched only with interruption.

292. While it is possible to have contact and protection in the case of cities by means of forts, walls and turrets, it is not possible to have these in the case of imaginary cities.

293. As much work as it is possible to get from real animals cannot be got from earthenware images of them. That is why the affix *Kan* has been taught by Pāṇini after (words expressive of imitations).

[It has been shown so far that the distinction between primary and secondary on which some grammatical operations are based depends upon the reality or unreality of the objects denoted by the words in question. One can tell whether the objects are real or not from the nature of their cognition which, though similar, may be different because of difference in their nature. Now the author speaks about difference between primary and secondary words, the basis for the use of the suffix *Kan*. P. 5.3.96. teaches the suffix *Kan* after words expressive of images of objects. One thus gets

forms like *aśvaka*, *uṣṭraka*, *gardabhaka*. As the objects are not real animals but only their images, the suffix *Kan* can be added. Mere resemblance is not enough. It must be an artificial image. There is, of course, secondary usage here also. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tasmāt. kasyacid eva sadṛśasya dharmasya bhāvād upamānopameyābhāva sambandhe sati 'ive pratikṛtau'* (P 5.3. 96). *ityetatprakaraṇavihitānām pratyayānām utpattau nimittam labhante.*]

294. Mountains and other well known objects cover a wide area but their reflection covers only a small area.

[The use of the word *Parvata* in the sense of the reflection of a mountain is secondary usage and so it takes the suffix *Kan* and we get the form *parvatāka*. To call an earthenware image of a horse *aśvaka* is secondary usage based on similarity of shape. To call a reflection of a mountain *parvatāka* is also secondary usage based on resemblance but resemblance due to the relation of original and reflection.].

295. 'While real poison and other such things are the cause of death, the same things seen in a dream are not capable of causing the same.

[The implication is that the suffix *Kan* can be added to words expressive of things seen in a dream, because they do not have the effect which the same things have in real life.

The *Vṛtti* says :—*Viśabhojanādayo hi yathā prasiddhā maraṇa-kṣutpipāsāpratighāta hetutvena vyavasthitā loke na tathā svapnānām mūrccādiṣu. tasmān na te mukhyaviśayatvaṃ labhante.*]

296. Things that seem to be otherwise as a result of changes relating to time, place or the senses are, however, understood rightly by following worldly tradition.

[Whether a thing is distant or near is due to difference in place. The rays of the sun shining in summer and thus causing

sing the illusion of water in a desert is due to time or reason. One who suffers from an eye-defect sees two moons instead of one. This is an instance of an object looking different due to a defect in the senses.

The *Vṛtti* gives other examples which unfortunately are not clear due to gaps in the text.]

297. The world does not regulate its verbal usage on the basis of knowledge arising from defective senses or which is of a supernatural character. Words are based on worldly tradition.

[Knowledge due to some defect in the senses is the opposite of truth and is illustrated by mirages and the seeing of two moons. Supernatural knowledge is that of *Ṛṣis*. Neither of them is fit for worldly transactions.

Though the *Vṛtti* has gaps here also, the following relevant sentences may be noted—... *yogināṃ sarvajñānāṃ ca jñānaṃ śabdavyavahāreṣu tair api nānugamyate. Prākṛtalokadrṣṭinibandhanatvācca śabdārthasambandhasya sarveṇārthābhīdhāne yatnaṃ kurvatā lokaḥ prathito nugantavyaḥ.*]

298. Just as a lamp reveals, in an object like a jar, through association (or proximity) other things than that for the illumination of which it was employed,

299. In the same way, a word conveys, from among the things which are connected together, those that are different from the one to convey which it was used.

[When a lamp is used to illuminate an object, it illuminates, not only that object but whatever else is invariably associated with it. If a lamp is lighted to see a jar, one sees not only the jar but also the properties which are inherent in the jar. This is inevitable. The jar itself is the main thing, its properties are the invariably associated things. In the same way, when a word is used to convey a particular property from among the many

which are connected with one another, it conveys not only that property but also others which are always associated with it. Puṇyarāja takes the word *bhāva* as an example. On the basis of its derivation, it can convey several connected notions such as the fact of being something finished (*siddhatva*), the masculine gender, singular number and so on. If it is used for conveying the idea of being something finished, it will not stop there. It will also convey the masculine gender, singular number etc.

The illustration of the lamp and of the word *bhāva* go back to the *Vṛtti*. The former, of course, is mentioned in the verse 298 itself. The *Vṛtti* contains several references to the *Mahābhāṣya* on the sūtra : *Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18.)

The lamp and the word *bhāva* were *jñāpaka* examples. The author now takes a *kāraka* example.

300. Though the churning of the ignition sticks (*araṇi*) is done for producing fire, it also produces the unintended smoke in the same process.

301. In the same way, a word also, when a particular meaning is meant to be conveyed, denotes by association, an unintended meaning also.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that neither the unintended smoke which is produced nor the unintended meaning which is conveyed plays any part in the action :—*aprayojakatvāttu pratīto'pyarthaḥ kriyāsāadhanabhāvena na parigrhyate. agniprayuktena hi nirmanthanenaikāsādhano'pi dhūmasannipātaḥ pākādiṣu ca dr̥ṣṭa-phaleṣvartheṣu agnivannopādīyate.*

That a lamp should illuminate not only the intended object but also what is next to it is natural. A word, on the other hand, is used to convey a particular object. Why should it convey something more than that?]

This objection is now answered.

302. Just as one cannot abandon (while taking a thing) something which is very closely connected with it, in the same way a word cannot but denote

what is intimately connected with its primary meaning.

[Punyarāja, following the *Vṛtti* explains that this is like one's not being able to avoid bones when one buys fish or meat. Similarly, a word not only conveys its primary meaning but also its gender and number—*tathaikavacanādir api śabdo vināpi tena prātipadikārthasyāpratyāyakatvādāśritasamsargaḥ tyaktum na śakyate.*]

303. Even when the unintended meanings are present and they are conveyed, it is still the meaning which led to the use of the word that is the accepted one, even though there is no difference in the form of the word (with which the others are also connected).

[The word which conveys the main meaning, that is, the one which led to its use is the very word without any difference in form which conveys the other meanings also.

The *Vṛtti* points out that even though it is the same word without any change in its form that conveys all the meanings, it is always possible to distinguish between the one which leads to the use of the word on a particular occasion and the others:—*...tulyaśrutir api śabdastenaiva rūpeṇa pravartamāna iha viśaye prayojakenārthenārthavān ihāprayojakeneti sāmārthyād avadhārayitum śakyate.*]

304. Sometimes the meanings are not meant to be primary or secondary, sometimes even proximity is not the cause of a meaning being conveyed.

305. Sometimes a meaning not belonging to the word actually used is conveyed and sometimes it is the chief meaning which conveys another.

[Even when the meaning which is the cause of the application of the word is the expressed meaning and not what is necessarily understood, there are four possibilities:—

(1) reversal of what is primary and what is secondary, (2) part of a meaning is not meant, (3) the whole of the meaning is not meant, (4) the conveying of another meaning without giving up the first meaning. These possibilities are now explained one by one.]

The following is an example of the reversal of what is important and what is secondary.

306. (In the *sūtras* setting forth the meanings of words ending in *taddhita* suffixes) the verb just says something about the meaning of the *taddhita* suffixes (and does not insist on action as it usually does) One sees a reversal of the relation of primary and secondary meanings.

[The following is an example. P. 4.4.2. teaches the meaning in which certain suffixes are added to stems. As the verb is the most important word in the sentence and as a verb like *dīvyati* primarily expresses action, the word ending in the suffix concerned should primarily express action. But, in fact, the usual relation of primary and secondary between action and accessory is not meant here. In *dīvyati*, the action is primary but in *ākṣika* the word formed according to that *sūtra* P. 4.4.2., (*akṣair dīvyati = ākṣikaḥ*), the agent is primary and not action. In the *sūtra Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18) the masculine gender and the singular number are not significant.

While Puṇyarāja explains this verse on the basis of P. 4.4.2, the *Vṛtti* does it on the basis of P.4.2.59 and P. 5.2.84 where also the meaning of the suffix is indicated by means of a verb. The word formed by the suffix concerned, however, expresses the agent primarily and action secondarily : *sarvadhātūpa-sarjanībhūtākriyāparicchinnaṁ ākhyātāpratyavamṛṣṭarūpaṁ prādhānyena sādhanam abhidhīyate.*]

Now follows an illustration of a part of the meaning being not meant:—

307. (ab) Proximity is not the cause of the gender and number being conveyed in the *sūtras* teaching meanings of suffixes.

[In the *sūtra Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18). the masculine gender and the singular number are not significant. Words formed by the suffixes concerned can be in other genders and numbers like *pakṭiḥ*, *gamanam*, *pākau*, *pākāḥ*, etc.]

307. (cd) From the word *hrasva* = short (in P.1.2.32.) it is the unmentioned measure which is understood.

[In P.1.2.32. the word *ardhahrasva* means half a *mātrā*.

The *Vṛtti* points out that in P. 3.3.18 the word *bhāva* cannot convey its meaning without some case-ending or other which brings about the correctness (*śabdasaṃskāra*) of the word which is its only purpose and not to convey the masculine gender and the singular number as significant items ; *bhāva ityevamādiṣu svārthasyānyathā vaktum aśakyatvāc chabdasamskāra-nimittatvācca sannihite pi liṅga-saṃkhye pratyayānte samudāye vācya-tvaṃ na pratipadyete*. Similarly in *ardhahrasva* in P. 1.2.32, the word *hrasva* has no significance. It means one *mātrā* and nothing more. *Ardhahrasva*, therefore, means half a *mātrā* and nothing more:—*na hyatra hrasvenāsannihitena vā prayojanam kiñcit. . . . hrasvasyārdhopalakṣaṇatvenopādānam.*]

308. Half of a short syllable is really what is meant even though the short syllable itself may not be mentioned because short is meant to include everything that has the duration of one *mātrā*.

309. The words 'long' and 'protracted' may qualify 'half' (so that it means half of the *mātrā* belonging to the long or the protracted) or *mātrā* may qualify 'half' so that the whole means half a *mātrā*. Or the word *ardhahrasva* may refer figuratively to the universal of half a *mātrā* just like *saptapaṇa*.

[The word *ardhahrasva* in P. 1.3.32 may be understood in three ways : (1) *hrasva* means *mātrā*, so *ardhahrasva* means half a *mātrā*. (2) *hrasva* stands for all the three ; *hrasva*, *dīrgha*,

and *pluta* and *ardha* means a part, equal or unequal. When added to *hrasva*, it would stand for equal part, because the total duration of *hrasva* is one *mātrā* and half a *mātrā* would be an equal division of one *mātrā*. As *hrasva* means half a *mātrā*, when added to *dirgha* or *pluta*, it would mean an unequal part, the other part in *dirgha* and *pluta* being $1\frac{1}{2}$ and $2\frac{1}{2}$ *mātrās* respectively, (3) the word *ardhahrasva* is indivisible and it stands for the universal (*jāti*) of half a *mātrā*.

The above interpretations are all found in the *Vṛtti* as the following relevant sentence shows—*sa hi tadavayavopalakṣaṇatvād dirghacaturbhāga iti vocyate, plutaṣaḍbhāga iti vā mātrārddham iti vā. Tat sarvathā tasya parimāṇāvasthā vyākhyātā bhavati.*]

It is now shown that, sometimes, it is the chief meaning that indicates another.

310. 'One has to go, look at the sun' though this sentence says something about the sun, it really indicates time, because it says, with a hint at the means (*upāya*) that time should be ascertained.

[The main meaning of the sentence relates to the sun but that is only a means to an end which is the ascertainment of time.]

311. In the sentence *vidhyaty adhanuṣā* 'he pierces with something else than a bow' the particular weapon stands for weapon in general or for anything that can be the substratum of the power of being a weapon.

[This is an example of the particular standing for the general taken from the *vyākaraṇaśāstra*. It is an example of *kvacit pradhānam evārtho bhavatyanyasya lakṣaṇam* (v. 305), because the word *dhanuḥ*, without giving up its main meaning 'bow' stands for any weapon.

The *Vṛtti* is not clear because of gaps in the text but it seems to say that in P. 4.4.83, the word *adhanuṣā* is a *pariyudāsa* kind of negation and means 'something else than a bow'. But

in this verse it is taken as standing for weapon in general. The idea is that by negating a particular weapon, weapon in general is conveyed.]

A similar example from the world is now given.

312. When a boy is told : 'save the butter from the crows', he does not refrain from protecting it from dogs etc. knowing that the order refers to destructive agents in general.

The *Vṛtti* says:—*Kākebhyaḥ kākād vā sarpiḥ saṃrakṣyatām ityukte upaghātahetusāmānyamātropalakṣaṇatvāt kākajāter yāvān upaghātahetuḥ sa pratiyate*. By saying that *kāka* in the verse stands for any destructive agent *yāvān upaghātahetuḥ*, the *Vṛtti* makes it clear that in worldly verbal usage also, the particular stands for the general.]

313. (When an order for feeding somebody is given) the washing of the dishes and plates, though not actually mentioned, is also understood because it is part of the action of feeding.

[The point made here, is that what is invariably concomitant with the chief meaning is also conveyed even though no word expressive of it is used.]

The factors which enable us to decide which meaning is primary, which secondary and which implied are now enumerated.

314 The meanings of words are determined according to the sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time and not according to mere external form.

[The following examples are given by Puṇyarāja. By sentence is meant the fact of 'construing' together several words occurring in the same sentence or taking together several sentences occurring in different contexts. For example: in the

sentence *kaṭam karoti bhīṣmam udāsaṃ darśanīyam*, the connection of the verb *karoti* is with the word *kaṭam* but as there cannot be a substance without qualities and as qualities must have a substratum in which to inhere, the other words like *bhīṣmam* ending in the second case-ending are taken as qualifying *kaṭam* and so a mat having those qualities is made and not any other on the basis of interconnection within the sentence, when someone is asked to fetch *saindhava* in the context (*prakaraṇa*) of battle, he would fetch a horse but when the same word is uttered in the context of eating, he would fetch salt. Thus context helps to determine the meaning of a word. When the same word is used in different sentences, its meaning is determined by the meaning (*artha*) of the other words in the sentence as in the following:—*añjalīnā juhoti, añjalīnā sūryam upatiṣṭhate, añjalīnā pūrṇapātram āharati*. In these three sentences *añjalīnā* means something different due to its association with the meanings of the other words. It is propriety (*aucitya*) that helps to determine, when *sīra*, *asī* and *musala* are mentioned without reference to any particular action, that *sīra* is for ploughing, *asī* for fighting and *musala* for unhusking again. When one says that he comes from a town to the east of Mathurā, from the word 'to the east', one would understand that he comes from Pāṭaliputra. When one only says 'the door' in winter 'the listener' would understand that it has to be closed and when the same thing is said in summer, he would understand that it has to be opened. Here it is time or season which helps to determine the meaning.

In the *Vṛtti*, some examples are the same while the others are different. But the text being corrupt, the meaning is not clear.]

The author now gives two verses giving a more complete list of the factors which help to determine the meaning of words. These may be quotations from some unknown work.

315. Connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning, context, indication, the presence of another word,

316. Suitability, propriety, place, time, gender and accent etc, these are the causes of our determining the meaning of a word when there is no definiteness in it.

[The *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja record that it is always *sāmarthya* = ability or capacity of the word which helps to determine its meaning when there is indefiniteness. The so called factors enumerated only reveal this capacity : *Tatra kecit sāmarthyamevaikaṃ bhedādvadhāraṇanimittam iti manyante. yasyārthaparakaraṇābhyāṃ svābhāviko bhedaḥ samadhigamyate so'pi sāmarthyād eva. sāmarthyam hi bahudhā pravibhajyate. (Vṛtti).*

As for the examples of the different facts, the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja give the same ones mostly. It is obvious that the latter has taken them from the former. Here and there the *Vṛtti* gives examples which are ignored by Puṇyarāja. It also raises some points for discussion which are ignored by Puṇyarāja. It is anxious to give an idea of the variety of views which existed in its day on some of the points raised. That is why the expressions : *anye, anye tu, anyetvāhuḥ, kecit, kecidāhuḥ, yeṣām, teṣām, keṣām-cit* occur in the *Vṛtti* in v. 315 and 316. The examples common to both are as follows—*Saṃsarga* = connection:— *sakiśorā dhenur ānīyatām*. Here on account of the connection between *dhenuḥ* and *kiśora*, a mare is understood from the former word and not a cow. *Viprayoga* = separation— *akiśorā dhenur ānīyatām* = 'let the *dhenu* without its *kiśora* be brought.' Here also, by *dhenu* a mare is understood because it is only a mare which can be without *kiśora*. *Sāhacarya* (association) — *Rāmalakṣmaṇau*. Because of association with *Lakṣmaṇa*, Rāma here means son of Daśaratha, *Virodha* (opposition) — *Rāmārjunau*. Here Rāma means Paraśurāma because of his well-known opposition to Arjuna. *Artha* = meaning and *prakaraṇa* = context have been illustrated under the previous verse. *Liṅga* = indication— *akṛtāḥ śarkarāḥ* = sugar mixed with grease. From indications found elsewhere it is understood that butter is used for mixing. *Rāmārjunau* can be taken as the example of the determination of meaning through the presence of another word. *Sāmarthya* = suitability, *abhirūpāya kanyā deya* = the girl must be given in marriage to a

good-looking person. Through suitability, one understands a good-looking bridegroom. *Auciti* = propriety, *deśa* = place, *kāla* = time have already been illustrated under v. 314. It is well known that in the Veda, the meaning of a word is often determined by its accent (*svara*).]

317. Even if it is held that a word having many meanings is different in each case (*bhedapakṣe*), the external form being similar, confusion arises and it is with the help of context etc. that definiteness in meaning is arrived at.

[Whether one holds the *nānātvapakṣa* or the *ekatvpakṣa*, one has to take the help of the context in determining the meanings of words having more than one meaning. If the word is different with each meaning, the form being the same, one cannot decide which meaning to take and the help of the context is necessary. If the view is that it is the same word, the help of the context is all the more necessary.]

Sometimes a word has more than one meaning, because from its form only, it can be a verb or a noun. Then also context alone can determine the meaning.

318. When words have the same form as nouns and as verbs and are to express a different meaning as each, then the meaning cannot be understood from the external form only.

[The word *aśva* as a noun means a horse but it can also be a verb. From the root *ṭu o ſvi gativṛddhyoḥ* one would get the form *aśva* in the aorist second person singular (*luṇmadhyama-puruṣaikavacana*). In the same way, *ajāpayāḥ* can mean goat's milk or the word can be the causative form of the root *ji* = to conquer. In such cases, only the context can be the guide.]

319. An enlightened hearer knows that praise and blame, meant to promote action and abstention from action respectively, are really unreal.

320. The praise of a prescribed action having a visible or invisible fruit only serves to prompt the agent thereof.

[These verses are meant to show that the individual word and its meaning do not really exist. Only the meaning of the sentence is real. The chief meaning of a sentence is action and though a part of it may consist of praise of this action, it has no real existence. In the same way, the condemnation of an action contained in a sentence meant to keep people away from it has no real existence, that sentence being meant only to keep people away from that action.]

The *Vṛtti* gives the following example of praise—*brahmacaryeṇaivehānantam āyur avāpnoti, ghṛtena pāpmānam apahantīti. tatra brahmavratam caritavyam, ghṛtam pānīyam ityetāvān upadeśaḥ.*]

321. Just as a crying child is put off when he is threatened that a tiger would eat him, in the same way, some bad consequence though unreal, is held up (before one who does some prohibited act).

322. Therefore, a learned man does not undertake an action prohibited by the *śāstra* after having arranged for averting its bad consequence.

323. One should not violate the injunction that 'one should not touch it (the sacrificial cake) with the teeth while eating it, for, if one does so, serpents would destroy him' after having first provided some antidote to serpent poison in the form of some *mantra* or medicine.

[The eating of the sacrificial cake by letting the teeth pierce it is prohibited as follows—*na dato gamayet, yad dato gamayet, sarpā eṇaṃ ghātukā bhavanti.*

324. Even if, sometimes, the truth is told in connection with praise or blame, the object is always to teach action or abstention from action.

Having thus shown that individual words and their meanings are unreal and that only the sentence and its meaning are real, the author wants to point out that the sentence is the source of the individual word.

325. The meaning of all individual words has its source or basis in the meaning of the sentence. If the meaning of any sentence is incomplete, it is on a level with the meanings of the individual words.

[The *Vṛtti*, echoing what is going to be said in v.419-420, compares the relation between the meanings of words and that of the sentence to the relation between the senses and the body as a whole: . . . *tathāpi indriyāṇāmiva śarīropanibandhanārthakriyā vākyaoparibandhanaiva sarvapaḍārthānām arthavyavasthā.*]

326. If a single word (a noun) is pregnant with the idea of action then, that also, they say, is a sentence, devoid of a verb, because (the understanding of action) is seen to take place from a sentence only.

[The translation is based on the *Vṛtti* text of the verse, the second half of which is : *antareṇa kriyāśabdaṃ vākyaḥ eva hi darśanāt.* This second half is missing in R and RP gives it in the footnotes with the remark that it is found in the manuscript *gha* and numbers the first half together with the first half of the next verse, though not for the purpose of translation. Though the *Vṛtti* on 326 is by no means clear because of several gaps in it, it certainly seems to take this half as the second half of 326. I have translated the verse accordingly.]

326(a) So is a mere verb said to be a sentence if a definite means for the accomplishment of the action denoted by it is understood and its meaning thus becomes complete.

[It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* has gaps here also. It seems to give examples of bare verbs which we mentally complete by supplying the necessary means for the accomplishment of the action denoted by them. *Parjanya* and *Mātariśvan* are mentioned as substrata of the *śakti* (*kāraśakti*, *kartṛśakti*)? This verse is also numbered as 326, (a) being added to distinguish it from the previous one, in order to maintain uniformity of numbering with R and RP.]

Here the Mīmāṃsaka objects as follows—

327. It is a certain completeness of idea, separated by and depending upon the words that are not used, which through inference, appears to be the cause of our understanding the meaning (of the words not used).

[When we hear the bare noun *vrkṣaḥ* tree we understand a complete meaning from it such as: 'the tree stands' or 'the tree is seen'. It means that we supply the word *tiṣṭhati* or *dṛśyate* mentally. This is *śrutārthāpatti*. The point of the Mīmāṃsaka is that a single word cannot convey a complete meaning. We supply some word or other mentally to complete the sentence and the sentence-meaning. In other words, the understanding of the complete meaning is separated from that of the incomplete meaning of the word actually used by the unused word coming to the mind..... *asminneva śabde viśiṣṭarūpe yā buddhir utpadyate tayā vyavahitaṃ buddhyantaram buddhau prāptasannidhānaṃ tadarthapratipattinimittaṃ bhavati.*]

The objection is answered as follows.

328. Whatever meaning is understood whenever a certain word is uttered, that meaning belongs to that word (and to that word only). There is no more correct definition of meaning than this.

[The point of the grammarian is that no part of the meaning should be attributed to any word supplied mentally. In other words, he does not admit *śrutārthāpatti*.]

[The *Vṛtti* begins its remarks on this verse with the words:—*anye tu manyante*. It obviously means somebody other than the *Mīmāṃsaka*. It can very well be the grammarian and the author himself is one. His remark *neha kaścīt śabdārtha-sambandhasyā kartā vidyate* also confirms that the grammarian is meant.]

That being so the *sūtra* :—*kriyārthopapadasya ca karmaṇi sthāninaḥ* (P. 2.3.14) is unnecessary, but it is based on *śrutārthāpatti*=supplying a word mentally.

329. That being so, in cases where a verb denoting an action meant for something else is the proximate word, the action denoted by the unused verb is understood and so does the mere preposition like *niḥ* express the meaning of *krānta* etc. in a complex formation.

[The purpose of this verse is to show that the supplying of non-existent word mentally is unnecessary. In the sentence *edhebhyo vrajati*, the verb expresses an action meant for some other action, the word for which is not mentioned but is understood from the word *edhebhyaḥ*=‘for fuel’, that is, for bringing fuel. The action of bringing is understood from the word for fuel itself. That is why P.2.3.14 has been declared to be unnecessary, as the fourth case ending in *edhebhyaḥ* can come by *tādarthye catuvarthī*. Similarly, in *nīṣkaśāmbiḥ*, *niḥ* by itself can express the idea of *krāntaḥ*.

The *Vṛtti* remarks as follows:—*edhebhyo vrajatityasmin vākye edhebhya ityevamādinā gatārthatvād āharaṇakriyārthaṃ pṛthak śabdo na prayujyate.*]

If half a sentence can express the meaning of the full sentence and both are sentences, what is the use of ever using the full sentence?

330. They are separate expressions and are like synonyms. The meaning of sentences consisting of single words is determined by purpose and the context.

[When the sentence consists of a single word only, noun or verb, how to complete it mentally would depend upon purpose and context.

The *Vṛtti* points out that *Vṛkṣaḥ* and *Vṛkṣas tiṣṭhati* are both complete sentences and not that the former is the latter devoid of the word *tiṣṭhati*. Both convey a meaning. They are like the pair *Vṛṣa* and *Vṛṣabha*, or *Yāva* and *Yāvaka* or *prapaṇa* and *prapatitapaṇa* in which each of the two is complete and not that the former is an incomplete form of the latter:—*tāni tvaprayujyamānapadaśasarūpāṇi samudāyāntarāṇi vṛsavṛṣabha—yāvayāvaka—prapaṇa prapatitapaṇavad*]. . .

If only the sentence is real, what is the use of analysing it into words ?

331. The means whereby the meaning is understood and which differ in the case of each person are not in any way connected with the thing to be known from the sentence.

[The idea is that the artificial divisions are the means of understanding the integrated sentence.

332. Even when no meaning is understood or when a wrong meaning is understood words are still eternally connected with their meaning.

[The relation between word and meaning is eternal. That is not affected by the fact that the listener may not understand the meaning due to absent-mindedness or due to ignorance.]

333. When the word *dvāram* (—the door) having the second case-ending is heard, then, according to the context one understands either ‘shut’ (*badhāna*) or ‘give way’ (*dehi*).

[This is said in support of *śrutārthāpatti*. According to the context, one is entitled to supply mentally some word or other

in order to complete the sentence. Otherwise, one would not understand meaning and the relation between the word and the meaning would be affected.]

The opponent points out a disadvantage in not accepting *śrutārthāpatti*.

334. A word expressive of a finished thing (*sattva*) and standing for the means (whereby an action is accomplished) cannot also express the main meaning of a sentence, namely, the action to be accomplished.

[The point sought to be made is that to avoid the disadvantage, the required word must be mentally supplied. In other words, *śrutārthāpatti* must be resorted to.]

335. Therefore, when a sentence consists of a single word (whether that word is a noun or a verb) it does no more than express its own meaning and retires incomplete. Its meaning suggests the proximity (of the other meaning required for completeness through the medium of the word to which the meaning belongs.)

[In this way, *śrutārthāpatti* is justified by the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

The upholder of indivisibility now criticizes the *Mīmāṃsaka*.

336. As there is no difference in the matter of being meant for something else, the word (actually uttered) cannot bring another word to the mind, nor can its meaning bring it nor can the uttered word bring the meaning (of the non-uttered word) to the mind.

[The word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered to the mind, because its function is to convey its own meaning.

Nor can its meaning bring the unuttered word to the mind, because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the uttered word bring the meaning of the non-uttered word to the mind because there is no relation between a word and the meaning of another word. A fourth possibility is that the meaning of the uttered word brings the meaning of the non-uttered word to the mind, but that would be a case of inference. The conclusion is that when a word, noun or verb, is uttered, it brings to the mind without the intervention of any other word but with the help of the context another meaning which is required to complete it. In this way, the Mīmāṃsaka view is rejected.

The *Mīmāṃsaka* replies:—

337. If the word expressive of the object (of an action, *dvāram* in the present case) makes the verb non-existent as it were (*naṣṭarūpam iva*) and (therefore) unnecessary, then both action (*bhāva*) and the finished thing (*sattva*) would acquire equal importance.

[The Grammarian himself believes that both action and the finished thing cannot be equally important in a sentence. If the actually uttered word *dvāram* conveys the meaning of the verb also which is not used, then both action and the finished object would be conveyed by it on an equal footing which is impossible.

Now the Grammarian says:—

338 (ab) They describe it (the word *dvāram*) as a verb similar in form to a noun.

If that is so, how to account for the second case-ending in the word ?

(cd) Usage is regulated by the positive and the negative reasoning (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*).

[The word *dvāram* is really a verb similar in form to a noun. Like other verbs, therefore, it also denotes action

primarily. If one sees the second case-ending in it, it is only by analogy. In sentences like *bhāṇḍaṃ pidhehi*, *dvāraṃ pidhehi* where both noun and verb are present, one sees that the verb denotes action primarily and the noun denotes substance and takes a case-ending. Where only the noun is used but both action and substance are understood, the word takes a case-ending because it denotes substance also.

Here the *Mīmāṃsaka* asks a question : If the word *dvāraṃ* denotes more than one thing, is not its expressive power thereby lost as there might be a doubt as to which meaning to take ?

The grammarian answers—

339. Even though doubt arises on account of (similarity) of form, still its expressive power does not disappear as in the case of the expression *ardhaṃ paśoḥ* (=half of the sacrificial animal) where competence decides what the meaning is.

[In *ardhaṃ paśor iva*, because of the word *iva*, a doubt arises as to whose half is meant, of the animal or of Devadatta, but the doubt is resolved with the help of context and appropriateness. Similarly, where only the word *dvāraṃ* is used, context and appropriateness would help one to decide whether it should be taken as a noun or as a verb.]

Mīmāṃsaka objection:—

340. If, when a word expressive of *sattva* (concrete object) stands by itself it is to be considered as being expressive of a process (*bhāva*), if, when they come together the word expressing *sattva* is considered to have a different meaning and if the verb does not have its own separate meaning,

341. Then, the statement (of old thinkers like Yāska) that a verb expresses chiefly a process whereas a noun denotes a concrete thing (*sattva*) and that there are four parts of speech would be contradicted.

[There is a reference here to Yāska's definition in his *Nirukta* of the verb and the noun : *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam, sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni*. It is also in the *Nirukta* that one finds the earliest mention of the four parts of speech : *nāmā-khyātopasarganipātāḥ*. See Yāska—*Nirukta* I. 1.]

The Grammarian answers—

342. Having seen the eternity of the sentence in the mind and its connection in the world with its meaning, Vārttākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa have declared that there are no four parts of speech.

[When the hearer grasps the indivisible sentence, he is not conscious of any parts in the form of individual words. Nor is he conscious of word-meanings when he grasps the sentence meaning consisting of *pratibhā*.

As the sentence is indivisible the individual word does not exist and so the question of the different kinds of words or parts of speech does not arise. Those who believe in *śrutārthā-patti* would naturally accept divisions within the sentence and their being brought under four classes.

What then is the function of the śāstra ?

343. Both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, the easy and very comprehensive treatment of sentences on the basis of individual words is resorted to by convention for the sake of convenience.

The Mīmāṃsaka objects—If the individual words and meanings are non-existent, how is it that action and abstention from action based on them take place in the world ? The Grammarian answers—

344. In the world, traditions of men are not always based on reality. Therefore, there is nothing beyond the sentence which is not a mere creation of the world.

[The point is that when we are trying to understand the truth, we cannot rely on the practice of the world. In the world, one sometimes reaches the real through the unreal. We can understand what kind of animal a cow is by looking at a picture of it. That does not mean that the picture of a cow is a real cow. Similarly, we sometimes act on the basis of word-meanings but that does not mean that they are real.]

345. Even when the meaning of a sentence is made clear by means of indications, found in other sentences, that meaning is its own. It was not clearly noticed on account of identity of forms.

[The *śruti* says : *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti*=he places sugar mixed with grease.

It is not clear from this sentence whether the sugar is to be mixed with oil or clarified butter. But another *śruti* says : *tejo vai ghṛtam*=‘clarified butter is indeed lustre’. That is a clue, an indication that the sugar is to be mixed with clarified butter. The first *śruti* thus means : ‘he places sugar mixed with clarified butter’ and this meaning belongs entirely to the first *śruti* in spite of the fact that the clue is found in the second one.]

Something is now being said about the relation of *bādhyā* and *bādhaka* (what is set aside and what sets aside) between the original rules and their exceptions.

346. Whatever is excluded implicitly, if not explicitly, from the operation of the general rules, is explicitly mentioned in the special rules of exception and that is really part of the meaning of the general rule.

[A general rule does not really cover special cases though there is nothing in the rule itself to tell us so. But when the author of the general rule framed it, he knew about it.

An example of the same from the world is now given—

347. The injunction regarding the serving of

curds to Brahmins operates by excluding Māṭhara. The word Māṭhara (in the subsequent sentence *takraṃ māṭharāya*) because of its connection with butter-milk, only confirms the correctness of the meaning of the previous sentence (*brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām*).

[What is pointed out here is that the sentence *takraṃ māṭharāya* does not set aside the giving of curds to Māṭhara because that was never envisaged by the first sentence *brāhmaṇebhyo dadhi dīyatām* which enjoins the giving of curds to Brahmins excluding Māṭhara. So there is no question of contradicting something which was enjoined before. Serving of curds to Māṭhara was never enjoined.

Thus what is called *bādha* of the first sentence by the second sentence is nothing more than the inferential understanding that curds were never meant to be served to Māṭhara *aprāptyanumāna*.

What was said in the previous verse was based on looking upon the two as two separate sentences. It is thus that *bādha* amounts to *aprāptyanumāna* : The second sentence becomes the cause of our inferring that the injunction in the first sentence was never meant to apply to Māṭhara.

If the two sentences are treated as one what would be the nature of *bādhyabādhakabhāva* ?

348. Even though there is more than one verb, some look upon the original injunction and the exception to constitute one sentence which appears to be divided.

[If they are looked upon as one sentence, the exclusion, of the sphere of the exception and the application of the original injunction to the rest would take place at the same time and so there would be no need for *aprāptyanumāna*.

Just as an exception is supplementary to the original injunction, in the same way, restrictions and prohibitions can be looked upon as supplementary to original injunctions.

349. That being so, restrictions and prohibitions are also supplementary to the original injunction. The *aluk* (which is taught in P. 6.3.1) has been declared to be supplementary to the *luk* (which is taught in P. 2.4.71).

[Exceptions, restrictions and prohibitions are looked upon as making one sentence with the original injunction on the basis of either *vākyaikavākyatā* or *padaikavākyatā*. The former is defined thus :—*upakāryopakārahābhāvāpannabodhajanakatvam*.

Without using these technical expressions, the *Vṛtti* explains the same ideas in its own words : *vidhikāla evotkr̥ṣṭasya punaḥśruter aprāptir anumīyate* = At the time of the original injunction itself, it is inferred that it would not apply to what would not come within its scope. Similarly when P. 2.4.71. teaches the elision of the case endings of words which are to enter into a *samāsa*, it is understood that this elision does not take place when particular words become the second term in a compound. In other words, the original injunction and the later exception or restriction or prohibition are understood as one sentence and so understood together : *yaśca supo dhātuprātipadikayor iti dvitīyena lug anvākhyāyate tasya tasminnevādhivākye uttarapada-viśeṣaṃ varjayitveti prathamameva vidhinā prakalpitaḥ śeṣo'numīyate.*]

Those who are against looking upon them as one sentence argue that the sentences in question are complete in their meaning and so there is no relation of primary and secondary between them.

350. The sentences in question are independent as they do not require one another when they convey their meaning. As they do not serve one another, how can they constitute one sentence ?

[The *Vṛtti* points out that two separate sentences can make up one sentence only if there is some kind of dependence or mutual requirement between them. If each is self-sufficient it is concerned with itself only. If they cannot render service

to each other, there is no question of their making up one sentence:—*Iha sākāṅkṣāṇāṃsaṃsargāt parasparam upakāre vartamānānāmekavākyatvam upapadyate. Pradhānāni tu pṛthagātmanirvṛttau vyāpṛtāni. Teṣāṃ nirākāṅkṣatvād asatyupakāre nāstyekevākyatvam.*]

The upholder of the single sentence argues as follows—

351. (As the original injunction) requires the special injunction, the latter is taken to be supplementary to it. The special injunction also requires the other in the matter of determining what is excluded by it. Therefore, mutual requirement is similar in each case.

[What is pointed out here is that the original and special injunctions (*niyama*, *apavāda* or *pratiśedha*) require each other in order to determine their own meaning. As their mutual requirement is equal, it is better to look upon them as constituting one sentence. Each requires the other in order to exclude the scope of the other from its own scope.

While explaining this verse the *Vṛtti* takes a different kind of example altogether. It takes the *sūtra* P. 3.1.96, that is, *tavyat-tavya-anīyarah* = 'After a root occur the suffixes *tavyat*, *tavya* and *anīyar*. It says that according to some, the verb 'to occur' is one though it has three different agents. The verb being one, there is only one sentence here :—*bhavater ekatvād ekavākyatvam*. According to others, the action denoted by the verb becomes different with each different agent. With each agent, the action is self-sufficient and so there are as many actions as there are agents and so as many sentences. Those who uphold the view that there is only one sentence say that each of the three suffixes is separately the agent of the verb *bhavati*, while mutual requirement does exist. The agent-power (*kartṛśakti*) is one, but it exists in three different suffixes : *ekavākyavādinastu manyante—satyām apekṣāyām tavyadādayaḥ pṛthag pṛthag bhavateḥ kartāro vijñāyante. Bhinnādhārā vā tavyadādīnāmekaiḥ kartṛśaktir iti.*]

The question whether individual words can also be analysed into parts is now discussed:—

352. There is no elision of the part of a name. A name with a particular sequence of phonemes has been given to something and that does not disappear.

[Devadatta is a name. Some people say only *Deva* or only *Datta*. That may happen in the world but the *śāstra* does not teach the elision of either *Deva* or *Datta*. As the *Vṛtti* puts it :—*katham ca viśiṣṭarūpāyām kṛtāyām saṃjñāyām nirjñāta-pravṛtti prasiddhaprayogaṃ rūḍharūpaṃ punar anyathā śakyam kartum.*]

353. From *Datta* etc, a different name altogether, another name (*Devadatta*) cannot be understood. Nor can *Datta* bring to the mind the named (individual) *Devadatta*, because it is the named of some other name.

[A part of a name can neither bring the full name to the mind nor bring the named of the full name to the mind. The *Vṛtti* says the same thing in its own way. *Iha yo'rthena kṛta-sambandhaḥ śabdaḥ śabdāntaraṃ tasya vācako na bhavati* = When there is a relation between an object and a word, another word cannot be expressive of that word, that is, another word cannot bring that word to the mind. All this has been said in answer to the suggestion, that *Datta* first brings *Devadatta* to the mind and, from the latter, the individual *Devadatta* is understood. The possibility of this process is denied here.]

Others believe that the 'named' is connected not only with the full name but also with parts or abridgements of it.

354. Others are of the view that there is a relation between the named and all the parts of the name as with the full name.

[In other words, a part of the name can bring the 'named' to the mind as well as the full name can. Or rather, the whole and the parts bring the 'named' to the mind at the same time.

As the *Vṛtti* says . . . *iti tatra saṃjñākāle sarva eva saṃjñīno yathaiva samudāyais tathāvayavair api sambadhyante* = at the time

that the name is given, the named individuals are connected with the full name and parts of that name at the same time.]

Two defects are pointed out in this view:—

355. In this way, even the phonemes which are parts of the name would become expressive of the named. Nor does one see the expressive power of the part once it is separated from the whole.

[The two defects are : (i) If a part of a name can denote the 'named', why not each phoneme of it? (2) Whatever expressive power a part has exists only as long as it is part of the whole, not when it is separated from the whole :—*sambaddheṣu vāvayaveṣu saṃjñātvaṃ pratipadyamāneṣu kevalā dattādaya uccāryamāṇāḥ saṃjñātvaṃ na pratipadyeran dvirvacanavad eva iti*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

356. If the whole name, together with its parts, is expressive of the 'named', then it is not possible for what looks like parts to be expressive of it.

[What is emphasised here is that what looks like a part is really not a part. It only looks like it.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the parts which depend upon the whole cannot perform the same function apart from the whole :—*na hi samudāyatantrāṇām avayavānām ekārthakriyāyām hitvā pradhānaṃ pravṛttiḥ sambhavati*.]

Another view is now given.

357. According to some, from the part the whole is remembered. From the whole thus remembered, the meaning of the whole is understood.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that it is not merely a word that is actually heard which can convey a meaning. A word which is regularly inferred can also, like the word which is heard, convey a meaning :—*Kecit tu manyante—nāvaśyaṃ śrūyamāṇa eva śabdaḥ pratyāyakaḥ. nīyamenānumīyamāno' pi śrūyamāṇavad eva pratyayam utpādayati*. From the parts, perceived apart from the

whole, one does remember the whole and the whole thus remembered, does cause the cognition of the object named :—
*tathā ca smaryamāṇaḥ sa eva kṛtasambandhaḥ samudāyaḥ saṃjñīnaṃ
 pratyāyayati.*

That view is now refuted.

358. How can there be remembrance from the part of the whole which is different from it ? How can a word which is only understood (and not heard) be expressive of its meanings;

[The whole is different from the part. So, on seeing the part, one cannot remember the whole. Even if one does remember it, it cannot convey the meaning because the whole has not been uttered or heard. To believe that what has not been heard can convey a meaning would result in undesirable conclusions.

The *Vṛtti* points out that what looks like a part can be a part of many wholes having different meanings. Which whole would one remember on seeing the part ? :—*sādhāraṇo'asāv
 ekadeśas tulyena rūpeṇā nekasamghātānupātī. Tatra bhinneṣu saṃ-
 ghāteṣu niyamāt katham smṛtiḥ ?]*

Now the *siddhānta* is set forth.

359. (When names are applied to objects) words similar to their parts and endowed with their different characteristics arise later and are applied as names to the same object.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that when full names are given to objects, other names, similar in form to parts of the full names, come into existence as by-products. The process is similar to the coming into existence of by-products when we try to obtain any main product; *Keṣāñcittu samudāyasvarūpe saṃjñātvena prakal-
 pyamāṇe saṃjñāntarāṇyeva parikalpitaikadeśarūpāṇi ekasādhanaṇ-
 yanuniṣpadyante. Niyatā ceyam apauruṣeyikasarvasaṃjñāsaṃjñīni
 sambandhaviṣayā śabdāntarāṇāmekadeśasarūpāṇāmanuniṣpattir iti.*

What is pointed out is that these words which arise later (*anuniṣpattiḥ*) are not really parts of the name, but only look

like them. According to the doctrine of indivisibility, they cannot be parts.]

These words which arise later and look like parts of names sometimes cannot invariably convey the individuals expressed by the names themselves. *Deva* which looks like a part of *Devadatta* can mean a god or the person whose name is *Devadatta*: The form is the same in both cases and so a doubt can arise. How the doubt is resolved is now stated—

360. The form being common, their meaning is doubtful and their substratum (in the form of meaning) is determined through competence (*sāmarthyāt*). The *śāstra* teaches elision etc. in the case of those which are grammatically correct.

[Of the words which arise later, some like *Deva* and *Datta* are grammatically correct and the *śāstra* teaches elision (*lopa*) etc. in their case. Others like *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are grammatically incorrect. It is in the case of the former that the meaning can be doubtful because of similarity of form. The doubt is resolved through context taken in its widest possible meaning. The *śāstra* also says something about their derivation. But not about the derivation of *jye*, *drā*, *ghā* etc. which are therefore rejected. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*tatra sādhaso lopaśāstreṇānvākhyāyamānarūpaparicchedaḥ parigṛhyante. Tato' nye tyajyante.*]

361. Though there is similarity as far as arising later is concerned, *jye*, *drā*, *khā* are incorrect. Therefore, in the *śāstra* which explains derivation, they are not mentioned as *Datta* etc. are.

[According to the *Vṛtti*, the incorrect forms are *jye*, *drā* and *khā*, abbreviations of *jyeṣṭhā*, *ārdra* and *viśākhā*, all names of stars. But these abbreviations are mere collections of phonemes and not words and, therefore, meaningless. Therefore, the *śāstra* takes no notice of them: *Tatra ye nānvākhyātāḥ śāstreṇā tulyāyāmanu niṣpattau jyeṣṭhārdra viśākhā ityevamādiṣu jye-drā-khā ityasādhavo vijñāyante. Na hi te 'nvākhyāyake smṛtiśāstre*

dattādivat smaryante. There were apparently some who believed that once the whole is taught as a name, its parts are also automatically taught as names. In other words, it is not necessary to derive the parts separately as names:—*Tathāsyāpi tantreṇa prasaṅgena vā samudāyasya saṃjñātvenopādāne tadavayavānāmāpi saṃjñātvaṃ vyavatiṣṭhate*.]

A doubt as to the eternity of the relation between names and the named is removed as follows—

362. Names like *kharanasa* have *ṇ* instead of *n* eternally and as they denote a particular individual, they have been declared to be correct.

[The word *kharanasa* has this form when it is not a name but it becomes *kharanāsa* when it is a name. They are really two different words. It is not that the word *kharanasa* becomes *kharanāsa* when it is to be used as a name. So the question of the non-eternality of the relation between the name and the named does not arise at all.

The *Vṛtti* quotes a verse stating the doubt to resolve which the present verse has been given. The doubt is: If the word *kharanasa* is formed before it was a name then how did it get *ṇ* which depends upon its being a name? If the word was *kharanasa* when it was formed and it was changed to *kharanāsa* when it became a name, the eternity of the relation is affected. To resolve the doubt, it is stated that forms with *na* and forms with *nā* are both eternal. One is not a transformation of the other:—*kṛtaṇatvāścākṛtaṇatvāśca nityāḥ samudāyā vidyante*. *Tatra kṛtaṇatvāḥ samudāye niyujyamānāḥ sādhaveḥ*. *Anyatrākṛtaṇatvāḥ sādhaveḥ*. Whether with *n* or with *ṇ*, they are both incorrect if used outside their scope:—*ubhayeṣāṃ ca viśayaviṇyāyā sādhutvaṃ na vidyate*.]

363. These words (like *kharanasa*) are names of individuals because the power to be a name inheres in them. In such cases one does not necessarily look for the presence of the corresponding characteristic (*nimitta*) in the named.

[What is meant here is that even though the word *kharāṇasa* means 'one who has a sharp nose', one does not look for a sharp nose in a person before giving him that name. It can be applied to any body. The power to be a name exists in that word because of the *ṇ* in it. A word having a particular form is given as a name to an object irrespective of whether that object has any feature corresponding to the meaning of the name: *Kānicit tu nimittasyābhāve viparyayeṇa svarūpamātrānibandhanāni sannipatanti* says the *Vṛtti*.]

The fact that names are given to objects by persons according to their *wish* does not mean that the relation between the names and the named is not eternal.

364. For the sake of worldly transactions some names are restricted to particular objects in particular places. But the relation in the case of a name like *Ḍittha* is as eternal as in the case of the name *go*.

[Even though we see persons giving names to objects, it is not they who create the relation between these names and the objects. That relation, being eternal, was already there. Persons only make use of it in particular places and times.

The *Vṛtti* points out that all names have the capacity to denote all objects and all objects can be called by all the names : *saṃjñānāṃ sarvasaṃjñīpratyāyanaviṣayāḥ śaktayo vidyante. Saṃjñīnāmapi pratyekaṃ sarvasaṃjñāpadaviṣayatākhyāḥ śaktayo vidyante*. It is only for the sake of convenience that particular names are given to particular objects in particular places.

In the *śāstra* also, names are restricted to particular things in order to facilitate grammatical operations.

365. In this *Śāstra*, the non-artificial relation of names like *Vṛddhi* (with the named) consists in restricting their power to particular objects. This relation is like the relation of the qualifier and the qualified.

[All words are capable of being the names of all things and

all things are capable of being named by any word. But in the *śāstra*, a particular name is restricted to a particular thing. In other words the relation of the name and the named is eternal. All that human beings can do is to restrict it in particular cases for the sake of convenience. The person who says blue jar does not create the relation between the blue and the jar. The expression *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* only states a relation which was already there: *tad yathā nīlam iti sarvāśrayaviśeṣaṇaśaktir utpalādiviśayā parigṛhyate. Utpalādināpi sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśayā viśeṣyaśaktir nīlādiṣu niyamate* = when one says *nīlam utpalam*, the power of blue to qualify any substance is presented as relating to the lotus and the power of the lotus to be qualified by any quality is here restricted to the blue, says the *Vṛtti*.

Something is now said about the two kinds of names.

366. A name is given on the basis of its own form, sometimes when there is some circumstance in the object corresponding to the form and sometimes when there is not.

[Both in the world and in the *śāstra* names are given mainly on the basis of their form. Sometimes, a name is said to be *anvārtha* when there is some circumstance in the object corresponding to the form of the name as when a person who is good at destroying his enemy is called *śatrughna*. But there is no need for it: for example, the name *Ḍittha* in the world and the names *tī*, *ghu*, *bhā* etc. in the *śāstra*.

Not only small names consisting of just one syllable but also big names are given in the *śāstra* on the basis of form only.

367. In the *śāstra*, a big name is based on its form but when some circumstance is present in the object, that is also inferred to be the basis of the name.

[When the form only is the basis of the name, the meaning of its parts is not considered to be the basis. But when there is some circumstance in the object and it is expressed by

the parts of the name, then the meaning of the parts also becomes the basis of the name.]

How it is inferred is now stated.

368. Because of repetition of form, its repetition is inferred. Or it is understood as another word altogether or a difference of power is understood.

[In the case of the long names found in the *śāstra*, three possibilities are envisaged : (1) it should be taken twice, once as a whole having a particular form and again as a whole made up of parts through the meaning of which it denotes the object, (2) it should be taken as two separate words, (3) it should be taken as one name having two distinct powers. Both the *Vṛtti* and *Puṇyarāja* speak about these three possibilities, the former in a somewhat obscure language and the latter a little more clearly.]

It is now shown that there are four possibilities in the matter of names in the *śāstra*.

369. Sometimes, a technical name is applied differently in different contexts. In the case of the name *Samkhyā*, both the technical and non-technical meanings may be applicable in the same text.

[In P. 1.3.14, the word *karma* has a non-technical meaning, namely, action, but in P. 3.2.1, it has its technical meaning namely *karmakāraka*=the object of an action. In P. 5.1.22, the word *saṃkhyā* has to be understood in both its technical and non-technical meanings.]

370. Sometimes, a worldly name when used, covers the field of the technical name also, as the word *saṃbuddhi* in P. 1. 2. 33, where it should be taken both in the technical and non-technical senses.

[*Samṃbuddhi*, in the world, means calling or addressing somebody. Technically, it is the vocative singular by P. 2.3.49. In P. 1.2.33, both the meanings apply according to this verse.

Compare, however, the following remark of the *kāśikā* on P. 1.2.33—*Dūrāt sambodhayati yena vākyena tat sambodhanam sambuddhiḥ. Naikavacanam sambuddhiḥ.* The *kāśikā* seems to exclude the technical meaning here but it does not really do so. All that it means is that while understanding the *sūtra*, the non-technical meaning should be taken and not the technical one, though the latter is also included in it. The *Vṛtti* with a little correction in the text, makes this point clear—*Dūrāt sambuddhāv ityatra laukika eva kriyāśabdaḥ kṛtrimāyā api viśayaṃ sannidhānād vyāpnoti.* If the *sūtra* is understood by taking the technical meaning of the word, it would not cover all cases :—*kṛtrimā tu na śaknoti vyāptuṃ sarvakriyāḥ śabda-viśayāḥ.*]

It is the sentence which is being discussed in this part of the text. One point which is discussed is whether the action conveyed by the sentence is carried out individually or by the group.

371. Scholars declare that when expressions relating to the class are used or when there is retention of one or when the *dvandva* compound is used, the actions are related to each one of their substrata because of the nature of the word itself.

[By substrata (*āśraya*) of the action, the agents are meant. The examples of the three cases envisaged are : (1) *brāhmaṇā bhojyantām* (*saṃgha* = class). (2) *brāhmaṇo bhojyatām* (*ekaśeṣa*), and (3) *Devadatta-Tajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā bhojyantām* (*dvandva*). In all these sentences, the action of feeding has to be applied to each agent separately.]

It is now stated why an action like eating cannot rest in many at the same time.

372. The action of eating, consisting of a particular form and a particular result, rests in each person separately. Otherwise the meaning of the root *bhuj*=to eat, would not be carried out.

[The action of eating is not like the action of dramatic

representation (*nāṭya*) which is a name applied to the different actions of many taking place at the same time. The name 'eating' is applied to a particular action of a person, resulting in his satisfaction (*tr̥pti*). If its parts and its result are found in different individuals, it would not be called eating at all. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tadi hi bhinneṣu bhoktṛṣv anyatra rūpaṃ rūpaikadeśo vānyatra dṛśyate, anyatra phalaṃ phalaikadeśo vā vyavastheta bhujir evāsau na syāt.*]

373. All eaters individually perform the act of taking the food and so on and attain the result namely satisfaction and not (collectively) as in the case of dramatic representation.

[The different subsidiary acts which constitute a dramatic performance are meant to be performed by different individuals and it is only when they do so that it is said to be well-done : As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tathaiva ca sā nirvartyamānā samyaganuṣṭhitetyucyate.* This is not true of eating where each individual has to do all the acts like taking the food, moving the jaws etc. himself, right till final satisfaction: *Annādānahanucalanarūpo hi bhujis tr̥ptiphalo bhoktṛbhiḥ pravibhaktāḥ parisamāptarūpaphalo nirvartiyate.*]

Another illustration is now given.

374. It (the action of eating) is like the water for washing the feet of guests; by its very nature (*sāmarthyāt*) it is arranged separately for each person. The action of eating does not produce its effect (satisfaction) for several at the same time as a lamp does.

The difference between the action of eating and the action of seeing is now pointed out.

375. An action like seeing is one and without being repeated in each case it can cover all its objects which are suitably situated at the same time.

[An action like eating can cover many agents only if each agent performs that action separately. But the action of seeing can cover many objects at the same time, provided they are situated in the right place. Of course each object can be seen separately also but the point here is that they can be seen at the same time also. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Vanam dṛśyatām, saṅgho dṛśyatām iti dṛśirūpasyobhayathā darśanasambhavād ekaṃ vā darśanam samudāyakarmakaṃ nirvartyate, pratyavayavaṃ vā krameṇa bhinnadarśanamāvartate.*]

The question now arises as to whether the name 'cooking' is applied to one particular act or to a series of acts understood as a whole.

376. The perception of the different accessories (*kāraṇa*) with their different activities when one observes worldly transactions makes one conclude that the action (of cooking) covers the activities of the different accessories taken together.

[Two views are mentioned about the action of cooking. One view is that it stands for the softening of the material that is cooked, that is, for *viklitti*. Another view is that it stands for all the activities taken together of the different accessories which play a part in the cooking, such as the cook, the fuel, the pot and so on.]

It is now shown that in the *śāstra* also sometimes the sentence-meaning is applied to each case separately.

377. As the form to be derived is well-known in the world and as there are indications in the *śāstra* itself (for separate application) and as each item requires application, one applies the name *Vṛddhi* to *ā*, *ai* and *au* separately.

It is now shown that sometimes the meaning of the sentence is applied to the group as a whole.

378. As the taking of one hundred is the main thing in an order relating to the realisation of a fine

of hundred, even though the persons to be fined are many the amount of fine to be realised by the authorities does not vary.

[According to the order : *Gargāḥ śataṃ daṇḍyantām* = Let the Gargas be fined a hundred, all of them are collectively fined hundred and not each one hundred separately. Because the total amount to be realised is hundred and that is the main point in the order. If each one is fined a hundred the total would exceed hundred and the order would be violated. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tatrādānasyāpi śatārthatvāt tādarthyaena śataṃ pradhānaṃ na guṇabhedād bhidyate . . . Yathaiva śataṃ daṇḍyantām ityukte na sahasraṃ daṇḍyante tathā pratyekaṃ śataṃ na daṇḍyante.*]

It is now stated that in the *śāstra* also, the meaning of the sentence is applied to the whole.

379. As, in order to teach some grammatical operation, it is the name of the whole that is taught, the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* are connected with them (the wholes) by *tantra*.

[*Tantra* means the power of a word, uttered only once, to convey more than one thing. The *sūtras* : *saha-supā* (P. 2.1.4.) and *ubhe abhyastam* (P. 6.1.5.) teach the names *samāsa* and *abhyasta* respectively. The words *saha* and *ubhe* show that the names are to be applied to all the items together.]

It is now stated that sometimes the meaning of a sentence is applied to the whole as well as the parts.

380. When a word standing for a certain property denotes many things in relation to a certain action, it does so severally and collectively.

381. According to the order : *Śūdras* should not enter this house, their entrance is prohibited severally and collectively.

The same idea is now expressed differently.

382. When a collective prohibition in regard to earning and the like is expressed, merely because the prohibition is not stated severally, its application severally is not contradictory.

[What is pointed out is that the use of the singular or the plural number in prohibitory orders is accidental. In either case it can apply severally or collectively.

The *Vṛtti* points out that when the prohibition is collective, it is the collection or the group which is the object of the prohibition. As to the individuals, it is left to them to do what they like. . . *Samhananātmadharmaśya śrutya prakrāntatvāt saṅghāta eva līpsatikriyāsāadhanabhāvena pratisiddhyate. Pratyekaṃ tu kāmācāraḥ.*]

An illustration from the *śāstra* is now given.

383. In the same way, as in P. 8.4.2. *aṭ, ku, pu, āñ* and *num* are causes of separation (*vyavāya*) whether they do so severally or collectively, they do not prevent the change of *n* to *ṇ*.

[P. 8.4.2 does not say in so many words that *aṭ* etc. do not prevent the change of *n* into *ṇ* when they come between the *nimitta* and the *nimittī* individually or collectively. The fact is that either way they do not prevent the change. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Tathā ca pratyekaṃ samastair vā vyavāye ṇatvaṃ bhavatyeva.*]

Whether the action of eating is one or many is now considered.

384. When the act of feeding is done for favouring those who eat, then, if there is no difference in time, place, etc. it does not favour them.

[The idea seems to be that it is not by feeding them irrespective of time and place that one favours them. One would

favour them either way, by observing difference of time and place and by not observing it :—*Bhedena tu pratyekaṃ prakrame sarvo'nugrhyate*, says the *Vṛtti*. If the feeding is for favouring the eaters, one has to act in such a manner that they are favoured, by not observing difference or by observing difference, according to what is needed : *Tathā teṣāṃ anugraho bhavati tathā viniyogavyapekṣā.*]

After this preliminary remark, the question is considered.

385. The action of eating which is one has been declared to be many because of difference in vessels etc. Or the action of eating which is really varied (because of difference in the satisfaction of the eaters) is thought of as one (because of identity of time, place etc).

[Thus difference of opinion on this matter has been shown.]

The final position is now stated.

386. The eaters, mentioned separately and acting together, eat their food served separately but together (that is, at the same time).

What has been said in v. 378 is now further explained.

387. The fine of hundred is to be applied to the group (of Gargas) because (1) there has been no separate mention (of the persons to be fined), (2) otherwise the amount to be realised would conflict with the other amount (that is, the amount actually realised) (3), the meaning of the sentence cannot be applied in a two-fold manner.

[*Gargāḥ śataṃ daṇḍyantiām* is the order and not *Gārgyo gārgyo śataṃ daṇḍyatām*. *Gārgya* has not been repeated. Instead of that, the *ekāśeṣa* has been used. If each *Gārgya* is fined a hundred, the amount realised would far exceed hundred which

is the amount mentioned in the order. Lastly, the order cannot be applied in two ways, individually as well as collectively. By two ways, Puṇyarāja understands that the verb cannot be connected with the main object (hundred) as well as the secondary object (the Gargas). The conclusion is stated by the *Vṛtti* which, otherwise, is none too clear, as follows—*Tasmāt saṅghāta evaikam śatam avatiṣṭhate*=A hundred has to be realised from the group (of Gargas).]

Sometimes, however, the meaning of a sentence is connected both individually and collectively.

388. Where the action of eating is ordered to be performed together with others, either through the *dvandva* compound or through *ekaśeṣa*, there also the meaning of the sentence is to be connected in a two-fold manner because the verb conveys its meaning through *lakṣaṇā*.

[Sentences like the following are here kept in mind :—*Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitraiḥ saha bhoktavyam*=Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra must eat together. Here the action is ordered through *dvandva*. In *brāhmaṇaiḥ saha bhoktavyam*=the Brahmins must eat together; it is done through *ekaśeṣa*. Here the root *bhuj* in *bhoktavyam* conveys the action of eating in a general manner. The verb *bhoktavyam* must be repeated for fully understanding the meaning of the sentence.]

389. Some point out that major sentences apply individually (and collectively). Therefore, they include minor sentences, different from one another.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the *dvandva* sentence ordering the action of eating quoted above should be split up into several sentences like *Devadatto bhojyatām*, *Yajñadatto bhojyatām*, *Viṣṇumitro bhojyatām*.]

It is now stated that this does not mean that the major sentence is expressive of the meanings of the minor sentences.

390. The minor sentences do not become the expressed meanings of the major sentence but when the latter is uttered, one understands the other meanings of the minor sentences.

[The *Vṛtti* elucidates the point as follows:— The major sentence does not bring about the minor sentences through the relation of *abhidhānābhidheyabhāva* = the relation of word and its expressed meaning. The minor sentences which are, after all, words cannot be the expressed meanings of the major sentences : *Na tasya vākyasya śabdapadārthakatvaṃ śakyamabhyupagantum*. All that is meant is that when the major sentence is uttered, the minor sentences, though not uttered and heard, come to the mind. Therefore, a minor sentence comes to the mind in regard to each of the eaters and thus the meaning of the major sentence is applied to each eater:—*Tasmāt pratyekaṃ vākyāntara-prādurbhāvaḥ pratyekaṃ vākyasamāptir abhipretā.*]

The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes the upholder of the individual word.

391. According to those who believe that the whole of the sentence-meaning is contained in that of the individual word, of what use then is the existence of the meaning of the individual word ?

[If the whole of the sentence meaning is contained in the meaning of (any) individual word in the sentence, of what use is the meaning of the remaining individual words . . . *teṣāṃ evaṃbhūte pratīpadam avasthite'rthe kimavaśiṣṭenāpareṇa padārthena vikalpitenā*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

The upholder of the indivisible sentence criticizes both the possibilities in the opposite view.

392. If the sentence meaning, produced by the meanings of the individual words exists in each one of them, it is either opposed to it or it co-exists with it.

393. If the particularised and the non-particularised co-exist, there would be opposition between the two. If the meaning (of the individual word) is abandoned, then the relation becomes impermanent.

[What is meant here is this : The individual words ultimately convey the sentence-meaning after having first conveyed their own meaning. If, once the sentence-meaning is understood, they abandon their own meaning, then the relation between the word and the meaning becomes temporary which is against the opponent's own belief. Therefore, according to this view, there cannot be real individual words and their meanings.]

The *Vṛtti* points out that the meaning of the individual word is of a general nature and it can become particularised only when its general nature ceases to be : *Sāmānyarūpani-vṛtṭyaiva hi viśeṣa ātmānam labhate*. But if the general meaning which is first conveyed is abandoned, then the relation between the word and the meaning cannot be considered to be eternal and that would go against the accepted view of both sides:— *Atha tu pūrvam upāttārthaḥ (am ?) parityajati nityatvam sambandhasya hīyate*.]

If the sentence attains completion in the collection, is the sentence-meaning the meaning of the collection of words or is it the meaning of the individual words also?

394. The one sentence-meaning is the common expressed meaning and it is related to each individual word. It is related to the collection and to each unit in the collection and it is understood when all the words are there.

[The *Vṛtti* here brings in the analogy of the relation called *saṃyoga* = contact. When two things are united by the relation called contact, does this relation exist in each of the two objects or in both of them together? Some think that it exists in both ways :—*kecīn manyante yathā saṃyogasañjnā dvayor*

dvayor̥ samudāye cāvatiṣṭhate tathā pratyekaṃ dvayor̥ samuditeṣu ca sa evaiko'rthātmā vyavasthita eva. In this connection, the *Vṛtti* reminds us of the *dvandva* compound. When two words together form a *dvandva* compound, they stand for the group and that group is expressed by each one of them. Each word in the compound expresses the group in which the parts are also manifested. Each word conveys at the same time all the things meant to be conveyed by the *dvandva* compound as a whole. This principle is called *Yugapadadhikaraṇatā*. (See Bhartṛhari, p. 371ff). The *Vṛtti* says:—*Tathā tarhi dvandvavācya bhedānugataḥ samudāyaḥ pratibhedam samāpto'bhidhīyate, dvandvasaṃjñakasya samudāyasya sa evārthaḥ.*

Samyoga and *dvandva* were brought in only for the sake of analogy. The point that has been sought to be made here is that both the sentences as a whole and the individual words become meaningful with the meaning of the sentence.]

An illustration is now given.

395. Just as all have the feeling of ownership towards common property and all enjoy the fruit of charity (given out of the common property) and all feel the same amount of joy, in the same way, the meaning is related to its words (the individual words and their collection.)

An illustration is now given from the *śāstra*.

396. Even if the phonemes are expressive of meaning and the stem having the phonemes also has the same meaning, the case-ending expressive of the singular number comes after the stem which is a collection and not after each phoneme.

[This verse is based on *M. Bhā.* I. p. 220, l. 10-24. The particular sentence in the *M. Bhā.* referred to here is : *Saṅghātasyaika'rthyāt subabhāvo varṇāt* = As it is the whole group of phonemes which is expressive of meaning, the case-ending is not added to (each) phoneme.

The *Vṛtti* has a gap, but the relevant passage is this= *Samudāyasya tadarthayogād ekatvam, samudāyād ekenotpadyamānena supā vyaktam ityekatvāntarābhāvāt prativarṇaṃ vibhaktiutpattau nimittaṃ na bhavati.*]

The same idea is explained by an illustration.

397. Just as everybody sees common property by means of the same lamp, in the same way, by means of one case-ending the number is understood.

[The *Vṛtti* points out that the one case-ending added to the stem as a whole expresses the singular number and there is no need for another case-ending : *Tathaikena supā prakāśitam ekatvaṃ sarvasambandhigate tasminnarthātmani pratīyamānaṃ na subantareṇābhidhīyate.*]

398. As far as meaningfulness is concerned, there is no difference between the individual word, the phoneme and the sentence. This procedure based on practice (tradition) is different and appears to contradict the accepted doctrine.

[It was stated in v. 396 that the case-ending added at the end of the stem indicates the meaningfulness, not only of the stem but also of the phonemes and of the individual words if, any, included in the stem. This seems to go against the accepted doctrine of the grammarians that only the indivisible sentence is real and expressive of meaning. Really speaking, there is no contradiction. It has already been said that the meaningfulness of the individual word is accepted for the sake of convenience. But as this question of convenience comes up on so many occasions, it appears to be taken seriously but it is not so. It is accepted only for the sake of convenience. Convenience includes also accommodation to other *śāstras* because *Vyākaraṇa* is *sarvaparśada*=common to all schools of thought, as so often repeated by commentators like Helārāja and Puṇyarāja.]

The function of the word in conveying its meaning is now considered.

399. Without its application, a word does not convey its meaning. That is why it has been declared that the relation between a meaning and the word is through *ukti*, that is, application.

[The following are the points in the *Ambākartrī* on this verse. The power of a word to convey its meaning is called *abhidhā*. Some consider this *abhidhā* to be different from *pratibhā*, others not. *Pratibhā* when conveyed by the words *ukti* and *vinīyoga* is a *vāgdharma*, a property of words. When conveyed by the words *anusandhāna* and *abhisandhāna*, it is a *mano-dharma*. When conveyed by the word *prañidhāna*, it is a property of the vision. Here the word *pratibhā* is used in a sense different from its usual one. It only amounts to the conscious use of a polysemic word in one of its meanings. In other words, it becomes a synonym of *ukti* and *vinīyoga*. What is conveyed in this verse is that when a polysemic word conveys a particular meaning in a particular context, it is due to the deliberate application of that word in that meaning by the speaker. This is called *vinīyoga* or *ukti*.

Two new words are used in this verse: *ukti* and *vinīyoga* and they seem to have the same meaning, namely, the use, by the speaker, of a word deliberately in a particular meaning. Puṇyarāja understands them in this way and for him, *ukti* or *vinīyoga* is necessary in the case of words having more than one meaning: *Iha eka eva śabdo bahvarthaḥ*, he says at the beginning of his all too brief remark. The *Vṛtti* also seems to speak about the deliberate use of a word in a particular meaning by the speaker. The relevant words of the *Vṛtti* are: *Tatrānenāyaṃ vaktavya ityubhayor vācyavācakayoḥ parigrahaṃ kṛtvā buddhiśabdo buddhiśthe yatra vinīyujyate pravanīkriyate satyapyane-kārthatve tatrāśya sāmāthyam avacchidyate*. What the *Vṛtti* says amounts to this: when a word has more than one meaning, the speaker mentally chooses one of them and decides that it should be expressed by the word: *anenāyaṃ vaktavyaḥ*. The word

in the mind is applied to the meaning which is also in the mind: *buddhisthaśabdo buddhisthe yatra viniyujyate*. Then the capacity of the word to convey that meaning is brought out fully: *tatrāśya sāmāthyam avacchidyate*.]

The fact that conscious and deliberate application of a word to a meaning is necessary does not make the relation between word and meaning man-made. It is eternal.

400. Just as it is when the eye is directed towards an object that it perceives it, in the same way, a word denotes an object when deliberately applied to it.

[The power of the eye to see the object is natural and eternal but it does so only when it is consciously directed to an object. Similarly, the power of the word to convey its meaning is natural but it has to be deliberately applied to it especially when it is a polysemic word.

Puṇyarāja uses the words *abhisandhāna*, *pratibhā* and *pracāra* in his commentary on this verse. The word has the power called *abhidhā* but unless the speaker has the desire to apply a word to a particular meaning, this *abhidhā* of the word will not function. So some identify the *abhisandhāna*, the deliberate application by the speaker, with the *abhidhā* of the word. This *abhisandhāna* of the speaker is nothing more than *pratibhā*. It is this very *pratibhā* which becomes *pranidhāna* when we direct our eye to a particular object.

The analogy of the word to the eye is already given in verse. While explaining it, the *Vṛtti* concludes: *Tathā śabdo'pyanekārthapratyāyanayogyo yamarthaṃ pratyabhisamhito bhavati tam upasaṃgrhṇāti svātmani sanniveśayati prakāśayati* = In the same way a word, even though capable of conveying many meanings, whatever meaning it is directed at by the speaker, it embraces it, it becomes one with it and it illuminates it.]

Something is now said to explain the use of new words like *viniyoga*, *ukti*, *abhisandhāna* and *abhidhā*.

401. One sees that the relation between the object and the instrument is through action.

Similarly, the relation of expression and expressed between the word and meaning is through the function called *abhidhā*.

[It is this function called *abhidhā* which is called *ukti*, *vinīyoga* and *abhisandhāna*. The words may be new but they denote a well-known function.]

The *Vṛtti* makes the following points:—The accessories of an action, like the steps of a ladder, are not directly connected with one another. But they are directly connected with the action and through the action indirectly connected with one another. In the process of the word conveying the meaning, the word is the *karaṇa*, the meaning conveyed is the *karma*. There can be neither *karaṇa* nor *karma* except in regard to an action or process: *karaṇakarmaṇośca kriyām antareṇa(na) prakṛptiḥ*. It is the action or the process which brings about the result and not anything else: *Phalavatī ca kriyāiva, nānyasyārthasya phalavattā*. The process can be compared to that of unhusking grain in which the mortar and pestle are the *adhikaraṇa* and *karaṇa* respectively and the grain is the *karma*. Raising and lowering the pestle is the action which produces the result, namely, unhusking: *udyamana-nipātana-rūpo' vahantiḥ phala-prasavanimittam.*]

402. When many things are denoted by a word and all of them can be equally well-connected, with an action, that thing, which the speaker intends to convey, is conveyed by the word.

[The purpose of the verse is to emphasize the speaker's intention in the process by which words convey their meaning: As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*Tatra yat prayoktābhisandhatte tadvacana-tvam avyabhicāreṇa śabdasya pratiyate.*]

403, 404. Some scholars who believe in the sameness of the word (in all its meanings) declare that at the time of the practice (of learning the words of the Veda) they are without a meaning, that they stand

for their form only when they are taught to others but that (at the time of the performance of a sacrifice) they are expressive of different meanings because of difference in expressive power based on difference of intention.

[*Niyogabhedāt* = *Abhisandhānabhedāt* = due to difference in intention. *Abhidhānakriyābhedāt* = due to difference in expressive power.

The same Vedic passage is put to different uses and therefore, functions differently. As the *Vṛtti* concludes—*Ekaśabdatve hi nimittabhedād ekasyaiva tathā tathā vyavasthā manyante.*]

All this has been said according to the view that a word having many meanings is the same word. What particular meaning it conveys in a particular context depends upon *abhisandhāna*, *pratibhā*, the intention of the speaker and not the context itself.

Something is now being said according to the other view, namely, that the word is not the same. There are as many words as there are meanings.

405. Those who believe in difference declare that the word is absolutely different in each case, like the words *akṣa* etc. though it appears to be the same because of the presence of sameness (that is, the same sequence of phonemes.).

[The word *akṣa* can mean a kind of fruit, or playing dice, or the axle of a cart and so on; but it is a different word in each case, according to this view.]

406. In such cases, there is no intention beyond utterance. As the power of the word is restricted to a particular meaning, it is attached to it.

[In the other view, the intention of the speaker was given as the factor which makes a polysemic word convey a particular

meaning in a particular context. In this view, that factor is eliminated. As the form of the word resembles that of others having other meanings, only the context can tell us which meaning is to be understood.

The *Vṛtti* points out that undue importance should not be given to the speaker's intention because, sometimes, meaning is understood from words uttered by children who do not know the many meanings of a word and who cannot, therefore, have the intention of conveying one of them: *Tathā hi bālenāpyartham aviduṣā prayuktena śabdenānabhisamhitenāpi bhavati śrotṛṇāmarthapratipattiḥ*. In this view, there is no such thing as one word having many meanings. What looks like the same word is really a different word. So each word has one meaning only which is invariably linked to it: *Yasya śabdasya yo viśayaḥ sa tatāvyabhicāreṇa vyavasthita eva*. As the word may look another because of the sameness of the sequence of the phonemes, the help of context may be needed to get at the meaning invariably linked with it.

407. From the fact that the meaning is determined with the help of the context (*artha* and *prakaraṇa*), one understands that it is a different word. A word which has a certain meaning cannot express another.

[What is pointed out here is that the very fact that one has to have recourse to the context to determine the meaning shows that it is a different word : *Yat tu tat svābhāvikaṁ asaṁkīṛṇam arthāyattam nityam śabdānām svenārthena nityasambandhān nānātvaṁ tatpratipattāraṁ pratisandehanivṛttyartham prakaraṇādibhiḥ pravibhajyate*. The relation between the word and the meaning being eternal and not man-made, a meaning once conveyed by its word, cannot be abandoned nor can a meaning not conveyed by it be ascribed to it : *na tu kadācid upāttasya vāśabdena punastyāgo' sti, anupāttasya vopādānam. Apauruṣeḥ hyautpattikaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ*.]

If context can determine the meaning of a word and if such a word is different from another having the same sequence

of phonemes, the established doctrine of the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning seems to be affected. But that doctrine stands.

408. These considerations apply to a sentence consisting of a single word with the verb *asti* mentally supplied and not to an individual word which is part of a sentence (and which has been obtained by analysis).

409. Just as it is stated by others (the *Mīmāṃsakas*) that the meaningless phonemes manifest the expressive word, in the same way, the meaningless individual words manifest the sentence having a particularised meaning.

We do seem to understand word-meanings before the sentence-meaning is understood. How is that ?

410. The cognition of the meanings of the individual words which takes place in the middle is only a means (to the understanding of the sentence-meaning) because the sentence-meaning is not understood at the beginning.

[As illustrations of the process of understanding something in the middle, the *Vṛtti* takes the words *bhavati* and *brāhmaṇakambala*. In the first case before we understand the meaning of the full word we may understand something from *bhava*, but that is not real. In the second word we may understand something from *brāhmaṇa* but in the meaning of the full word it has no reality : *Tadyathā bhavatīti bhavaśabdāmātrasyārtham brāhmaṇakambale ca brāhmaṇaśrutimātrasyārtham*.]

The nature of the sentence-meaning according to *anvitā bhidhānavāda* is now stated.

411. Just as (according to *abhihitānvaya*) the meaning of each succeeding word particularised by

the meaning of the preceding word is the sentence-meaning, in the same way, the connected meaning, present in the very beginning, made clear when the meanings of the subsequent words are understood, is the sentence-meaning.

[It is a connected meaning from the very beginning. Each succeeding word-meaning makes this connection clear. It is in the nature of an action associated with its accessories. The very first word of the sentence conveys this connected meaning but not sufficiently clearly. The grammarians' view is that it is in the nature of intuition, without inner sequence and indivisible.

The *Vṛtti* makes the same idea clear as follows—*Tathā saṃsargasya prakrāntatvāt prathama eva śabdaḥ śaṣṭyartham upādāya pravṛttaḥ, sa tu nityo viśiṣṭo nitya eva padāntarasannidhānāt pratipattiṣu vyaktim labhate.*]

412. According to some, once the need for the accessory is accepted because of the action to be accomplished, the accessories are again actually mentioned in order to specify the substrata of the power of the accessories.

[Those who hold the *anvitābhidhānavāda* are referred to here. If, from the very beginning a connected meaning involving an action and its accessories are understood, why the accessories are again mentioned in the sentence is explained in this verse. It is for specifying the substrata of the powers of the accessories.

The *Vṛtti* points out that action is a process, something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and the accessories which help in the accomplishment are already there (*siddha*) and they exist for the sake of the action (*parāartham upādānāt*) and they are *śeṣa* (secondary) in regard to the action (*śeṣabhāvenāṅgī-kṛteṣu sādhanēṣu*) and they assume the form of the action so to speak (*kriyārūpa-manupraviṣṭeṣviva*). This connection between

action and the accessories is understood from the very beginning and if the accessories are actually mentioned, it is in order to make clear what the substratum of the power of the accessories is : *ādhārapratipattiyarthā dravyaśrutih.*]

413. As the substratum is not specified it is not understood. In the nature of things, there is the possibility (of a specific substratum) and the actual mention is for excluding others.

[The *Vṛtti* says :—An action may bring to the mind all the possible powers which can help in its accomplishment but not any particular substrata of these powers : *kriyā sambhavinah saktiviśeṣān sarvān ākṣipati, naivam asyā dravyaviśeṣāpekṣā pratibandho rūpalābhe*. But it brings the substratum of the power of the accessory in a general manner to the mind and if any particular substratum is mentioned in the sentence it is in order to exclude others : *Dravyasāmānyam tu sādhanādhāratvena sāmārthyam gṛhītam. Tatra viśeṣaśrutir ādhārāntaranivṛttyarthā pratīyate*, says the *Vṛtti*.]

414. An action with specific accessories as its substrata and (therefore) different from other actions, is understood from the very beginning and its specifications (*bhedāḥ*, mentioned in the sentence) are for the sake of the understanding of the listener.

[This is also *anvitābhīdhānavāda*.]

415. According to others, the sentence and the sentence-meaning, indivisible and devoid of the sequence of the words shine from words having a sequence.

[By *anyeṣām* the grammarians are meant here. They include, of course, Bhartṛhari himself. Another example of Bhartṛhari giving his own views as though they were those of others.]

According to Puṇyarāja, the purpose of the following verse is to state that the meaning of the real word, that is, the sentence, is the real conditioned by the unreal.

416. That which has a form, its essence is indefinable. That which has no form, it is the essence of that which is definable.

[Couched in very general terms the meaning of this verse is not too clear. Puṇyarāja understands the first half as relating to the meaning of the individual word and the latter half as relating to the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of the individual word is said to have a form *svarūpaṃ vidyate yasya*) because the object meant by it can be perceived. But it does not thereby become fit for verbal usage. That is why it is said to be indefinable (*tasyātmā na nirūpyate*). The meaning of the individual word, isolated from the meanings of the other words, especially the verb, is unfit for verbal usage. It is at best a means to the understanding of the sentence-meaning, the essence of which is interconnection of the meaning of the individual words and which is, therefore, fit for verbal usage and thus real.

It is a pity that the *Vṛtti* on this verse is obscure. It has gaps in several places. As usual, Puṇyarāja's commentary seems to be based on it. Sentences like *taccāsāṃ vedyam vyavahārātītam* in the *Vṛtti* have obviously influenced the wording of Puṇyarāja's commentary. But one cannot ignore the strong impression which one gets while reading the *Vṛtti* that its analysis is deeper and that it contains some points not found in Puṇyarāja at all. Unfortunately due to the unsatisfactory nature of the text, it is not possible to note down those points.]

417. Others think that the meaning (of a sentence) cannot be determined through the word. A remembrance resembling the experience of the object takes place through the words.

[Some think that words are not the means of understand-

ing the meaning of a sentence which is in the nature of an interconnection (*samsarga*). According to them, this interconnection is understood by means of an integral cognition by the mind, (*nirvikalpakaikasamadhiḡamyam*—Puṇya-rāja) and not through the meaning of individual words. Individual words do no more than cause a remembrance similar to the experience of objects. Thus they are too far away from the sentence-meaning. This is the gist of Puṇya-rāja's commentary.

The *Vṛtti* comments on this and the next verse together, more on the next verse than on this one. The only point which it mentions relating to this verse is that the idea which we get of an object from its word is far removed from the real nature of that object. The next verse explains this very point by means of an example : *Sarvatrāśabdām arthānām svabhāvā-vadhāraṇam, śabdavṛttam tvanupatad dūribhavati tasmād ityēkeṣām darśanam* = The understanding of the nature of an object takes place everywhere through other means than the word, what the word brings is far removed from them, such is the view of some.]

418. One who gets burnt experiences the burn through contact with fire in one way and one experiences it in another way through the word burn (*dāha*).

[The word *artha* in Sanskrit denotes both the external object and the 'meaning' of the word for that external object. The big difference between the two is pointed out here. As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *Anyathā hyagniḡhimaśastrādīsannipātād dāhādāyo 'vasthāḡ pratyavabhāsante. Anyathā dāhādibhiḡ śabdaiḡ pratyāyyante.* The rest of the *Vṛtti* is unfortunately not clear.]

419. Just as the senses which have each their own essential nature and their own field of operation, cannot perform their function without the body.

420. In the same way, the individual words

though expressive of their own meaning, have no meaning at all if they are isolated from the sentence.

[Punyarāja says that the understanding of the meaning of the individual word is an error and as such it is either *viparītakhyāti* or *asatkhyāti*, two well-known interpretations of error in Indian philosophical circles. In any case, if they have any meaning at all, it is only as long as they are within the sentence and not in isolation. This is what the *Vṛtti* also emphasises in its concluding sentence :—*Tathaiva pṛthagarthānāmāpi padānām vākyaopanibandhanatām antareṇārtha pratyāyanaśaktir na vidyate.*]

421. The meaning in the nature of an inter-connection is grasped when the things are connected together. (When the word meanings are in isolation) the essence (of the sentence-meaning) does not become clear because it is seen to be different from the word-meaning.

422. Even knowledge (or consciousness) does not appear in its true (pure) state. It is formless but appears as coloured by the object.

[Knowledge or Consciousness is brought in here for analogy. Just as pure consciousness is formless but always appears as coloured by the form of some object or other, in the same way, the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible and undifferentiated but appear as the inter-connection between words and meanings. The isolated word and word-meaning are unfit for communication and that is why they are said to be unreal (*asatya*).]

423. Inasmuch as even the meaning of a single word is expressed as connected with existence or non-existence, it is the sentence which is used (for communication).

[Only the sentence and its meaning are real because only they are fit for communication. That is why, when a communication is made by means of a single word, it is completed by adding mentally the word or atleast the idea of existence or non-existence.

The text of the *Vṛtti* is doubtful at the beginning but becomes clearer later. After having said that like existence or positive activity, non-existence or absention from activity is conveyed by the sentence. That is why it is the sentence with the verb actually present in it or inferred which is used in all communication :—*Pravṛttivacca nivṛttisaṃsargo'pi vākyadharmā eva. Tasmācchrūyamāṇa-kriyāpadam anumīyamāṇakriyāpadam iḍ vākyam eva sarvavyavahāreṣu avatarati.*]

424. No word-meaning, whether real or unreal, is understood in communication except as connected with some action. Therefore, it does not really exist.

[Explaining this verse, the *Vṛtti* says that one cannot predicate the truth or otherwise of the meaning of a single word: . . . *kevalapadaḥ prayoge satyatvaṃ viparyayo vā na prakhyāyate*. It is only when it is completed by a verb that the listener understands it as true or untrue : *kriyāpadopasaṃhāre tu satyāsatyabhāvena pratipattiṣu vyavahāro'vatiṣṭhate*. Without connection with some verb, the completion of the meaning can be done in one of many possible ways, in a way that would come under any one of the six transformations of Being = *ṣaḍbhāvavikārāḥ*. That is much too vague : *so'rthaḥ pariplavamāno'pi hy asau ṣaḍ bhāvavikāraparyāyeṇānu dhāvati*. That is why, the isolated word-meaning is beyond the scope of communication and is said to be unreal : *Tasmāt kevalapadārtho vyavahārātītātvaṃ nāstīti vyapadiṣyate.*]

425. Even a sentence having the form of the single word *sat* (=it exists or existent) cannot be so understood without connection with some word expressive of action such as 'it was' (*tad abhūt*), or

it is (*tad asti*), or it was not (*tan nā bhūt*) or it is not (*tan nāsti*).

[The point here is that action and accessory require each other. So where only one is mentioned, the meaning is incomplete and the other is mentally supplied to complete the meaning. Once that takes place, there is a sentence which is fit to be used for communication.

Without some process or action being mentioned or mentally supplied, what an isolated noun brings to the mind is too vague and not firm says the *Vṛtti*—*Atrāpi sādhyābhīdhānam antareṇa pariplavamāna ivārtho na vyavatiṣṭhate.*]

426. The requirement (that is, the incompleteness) which is felt in the meaning expressed by the verb which depends upon an accessory is not removed unless the thing which can be the accessory is also mentioned.

427. It is the action which is first analysed from the meaning (of the sentence) because it is the main thing. The accessories are employed for the sake of the action to be accomplished. As for the action, it is the result aimed at that sets it in motion.

[If the action requires the accessories and if the accessories require the action, there is equality in dependence. Why should the dependence of the nouns expressive of the accessories be emphasised? *yāvatā yathāiva nāmnāṃ kriyāpadam ākāṅkṣāṃ vicchinatti tathāivākhyātānāmapi vinā sattvābhīdhānapadenākāṅkṣā na vicchidyate*, asks the *Vṛtti* and answers as follows—*Sādhyastv arthātmā svaphalaprāyuktaḥ prādhānyāt sarvasya vākyaopasaṅgrahārthasya pūrvam pravibhajyate* = The process or action, set in motion by the result to be attained is the most important element and it is, therefore, analysed out of the sentence-meaning first. Once that is obtained by analysis, the accessories on which depends its coming into being, are automatically understood,

Tena tu pravibhakte(na) sādhanapralabhyatvād ātmalābhasya sāmārthyākṣiptāni sādhanāni pratiyante. This is not the case with the accessories which are all already there (*siddha*) and are set in motion by the process (*sādhya prayukteṣu*—*Na tu sādhanēsu siddhatvāt sādhyaprayukteṣu etat sambhavati.*]

It is now stated that all this conception of process and accessory and their mutual relation is artificial and relative and not real.

428. It is the speaker who thinks of something as a process and something else as its accessory and it is he who thinks of the relation between the two.

[The point here is that there is nothing fixed about these three things: that which is to be accomplished, that which helps in its accomplishment and the relation between the two. It is a matter of the speaker's choice. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Yogyasaktinibandhanayā vivakṣayā śabdapramāṇakaḥ prayoktā śabdaśaktim anugacchann api vivakṣantaṁ tamarthaṁ tathā tathā samīhate. Na hi vastutaḥ sādhyatvaṁ siddhatvaṁ vā śabda-pravṛttinimittam. Kiñcāvyavasthitam aniyataṁ vidyate.*]

If these were fixed, nobody would be able to change them. But we see that the same thing is presented differently by different speakers.

429. The action of cooking is expressed as the object in the sentence : I do the act of cooking (*pacikriyāṁ karomi*). But the actual doing (of the act of cooking) is understood as a process (*sādhyatvena*).

[The point here is that the action of cooking, taken as an example, is presented now as a process and now as the accessory (*sādhana*) called *karma*=object of action, according to the wish of the speaker. There is no pre-determined fixity in this matter. The *Vṛtti* also emphasises this very point : *Pacikriyāṁ karotītyubhayor avīṣiṣṭe sādhyātmakatve pakṭiḥ sādhyatvena vivakṣitā siddharūpeṇa sādhyarūpeṇa vābhidhīyate.* It is not clear

what is meant by *ubhayorū*. The reference may be to the two actions mentioned in *pacikriyām karoti*: (1) The action of cooking expressed by the noun *pacikriyām* and (2) the action of doing expressed by the verb *karoti*. The former is presented by the noun as a thing (*siddha*) and the latter as a process (*sādhya*) by the verb. Apart from presentation by words, an action is really a process and it is so meant in *karoti*, : As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *karaṇaṃ tu sādhyatvenaiva vivakṣitatvād (vi ?) prakṛtāvasthām na jahāti.*]

430. As an object has all powers, it is presented as rendering whatever service the speakers think of.

[An object is as the speaker sees it and wishes to present it in words and so it is presented differently by different speakers. The simple act of cooking can be presented differently as in the following expressions : *pākaṃ karoti, pacati, pākasya nirvṛtīm karoti*. Irrespective of what it is in reality, an object follows the intention of the speaker and appears to be as he presents it. As the *Vṛtti* says : *Vastu-sambandham anapekṣamāṇaḥ prayoktur vivakṣām anupataṃs tathaiva vyavatiṣṭhate.*]

431. Sometimes objects which are far from one another are presented as being connected and those which are near one another are presented as being apart.

432. Separation of what is united and union of what is separated; what are many are presented as one and what is one as many.

How the same thing is presented in different ways is now explained.

433. Because every object is everything (as it has all powers) or because it has no essence at all. This can be explained. In all this, the word, the power of which is extremely restricted, is the basis.

[In the previous verses, the author has been speaking about the great variety and the consequent lack of fixity in the way in which objects are presented by words. It has been pointed out that much depends upon the intention of the speaker and his ability to make use of the capacity of words to present the same thing in different ways. In this verse, two alternative ways of looking at the matter are mentioned. In the first way, the object is endowed with all powers, it is *sarvāt-maka* but the speaker, urged by his own purposes and intentions, cognises and determines some aspect of it and presents it through words which have the capacity to express that aspect. In the alternative way, the object has no essence of its own (*nairātmyāt*). It is as the speaker cognises it and expresses it through words whose expressive power is fixed. This is the gist of what Puṇyarāja says.

He is only putting in his own words what the *Vṛtti* had already said before in what is to us to-day a more obscure language. It begins by saying that the sentence-meaning is very comprehensive and includes everything that the speaker might want to convey and has all powers. Or it might be looked upon as having no essence at all. The *Vṛtti* says much about the speaker's intelligence and intention in all this, but what it says is not too clear].

434. The word is only an adventitious mark of an object (*upalakṣaṇa*); it does not express the service which it renders, it is not capable of touching (that is, of expressing) the powers of the object.

[The point here is that a word really does not touch the essence of an object. It stands far from it and does no more than somehow bring it to the mind, so that it can be talked about. There is no real relation between the two.

The *Vṛtti*, following, of course, the verse, also emphasises that the word can at the most denote the object, that is, bring it to the mind but it cannot express the powers of the object. It is the powers which distinguish an object from others and

enable it to render service, but the word is not capable of denoting all that :—*Sa hi vastumātrasaṃsparśitvād bhedakānyupakārīṇi śaktirūpāṇi na saṃspr̥ṣati.*]

Even the relation of expression and expressed (*vācya-vācya-kabhāva*) between word and meaning cannot be maintained.

435. The relation called contact is expressed as that which is related (*sambandhin*) by its own word (namely, *saṃyoga*); similarly, inherence is also expressed as that which has inherence.

[In the expression; *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*=the jar is on the floor; the relation of contact between the floor and the jar is understood as a relation but in the expression *dravyayoḥ saṃyogaḥ*=‘the contact between the two substances’ where the word *saṃyoga* (contact) is itself used, the relation is not presented as a relation but as a *sambandhi*=that which is related. In other words, its own word does not present it in its true nature. It presents it as the related whereas it is really a relation. The same is true of the word *samavāya* which means the relation called inherence.]

436. Objects are presented in some capacity or other and not in their real nature. One and the same object is understood as the basis of some service or other.

[Words never present an object in its true nature. They pick on some capacity or function of it and present it in that form. So what the word presents has no fixity. It is not real. It is always relative. The *Vṛtti* ends its comments by bringing in the illustration of the same woman being daughter, sister, wife or mother in relation to different persons. *Tad yathā ekā strī duhitā bhaginī bhāryā mātetyapekṣāviśeṣaiḥ pravibhajyate.*]

It is now stated that the sentence-meaning, being always new, is real.

437. The essence of the sentence-meaning which is in the nature of inter-connection does not

rest anywhere. In communication (*vyavahāre*) it is the soul of the word-meanings.

[The idea here is that the sentence-meaning, like knowledge or consciousness is difficult to be grasped except as coloured by the word meanings. As it connects together the word-meanings and makes them fit for verbal usage. It is their soul. It exists in the meaning of each word or in all of them together.

The *Vṛtti* points out that the meaning of the individual word is of a very general nature and it is only when it is connected with the meanings of the other words that it becomes particularised. The particularisation of the meaning is the chief feature of the sentence-meaning and even if one accepts division within the sentence, one has to admit that this particularised meaning exists in the meaning of each division : *Tatra bhedadarsanam āśrītya kaiścid ucyate pratipadārthaṃ tasyātmā vyavasthita iti.*]

438. In reality, it does not rest in the word-meaning or in all of them together or anywhere else. However its essence is differentiated on the basis of the artificial differentiation in word meanings.

[The form of the sentence-meaning as distinct from that of the word-meanings cannot be indicated. Its form is determined in terms of the word-meanings. In its own pure form, it is beyond worldly usage.

The *Vṛtti* points out that when the individual words are used, particularisation of meaning takes place and from this particularisation, one infers that a power, different from the power of individual words to convey their general meaning, exists which is responsible for the particularisation : *Tasya tu kevalapadaprayoge yo viśeṣo nirdhāritaḥ tena viśeṣeṇānumānena sambandhāt sā prthak śaktiḥ pravibhajyate.*]

439. The division of it which is made in order

to explain it is the means of knowing it. In that division, the parts are incomplete and require one another. Through this means, something different from it is defined.

440. Of the sentence which has many powers, a division is understood (on the basis of the differentiation of word-meanings). The unity of the sentence-meaning is understood even from slight indications.

[For the understanding of unity from slight indications, Puṇyarāja gives the following illustration. There is the *sūtra* *Ig yaṇaḥ saṃprasāraṇam* (P. 1.1.45)=The *ik* which comes in place of *yaṇ* is called *saṃprasāraṇa*. The two words *ig yaṇaḥ* convey a connected meaning, namely, the relation of original and substitute (*sthānyādeśabhāva*). It is a sentence-meaning because it comes from two connected words. But this sentence meaning can be conveyed by the single word in the singular number, namely, *saṃprasāraṇam*. This is the slight indication (*mātrayā*).

What the *Vṛtti* says may be briefly, indicated as follows:—

Those who uphold the unity and the eternality of the word believe that the sentence conveys action, particularised by time, special accessories, substance, person, aspect etc. That One indivisible word is analysed for practical purposes into parts, but it stands for one indivisible meaning, involving qualifying and qualified elements. By analysing the unified powers of the sentence, practical divisions are obtained. But without this practical division, words like *saṃprasāraṇa* are conveying a sentence-meaning. The relevant words of the *Vṛtti*, though doubtful in places, are as follows—*Tena vākyārthastvekaḥ saṃprasāraṇādīprakārayā mātrāparimāṇayā vibhāgoddeśam antareṇa pratyāyyate. Vākyārthasya hi saṃprasāraṇasaṃjñāvibhāgoddeśena vinā sambandhini vijnāyate.*]

441. From the sentence-meaning which is of the nature of cognition, a word meaning having or

not having something external corresponding to it but appearing to have it is analysed. The analysis consists in abstracting the powers capable of conveying the word meanings.

[This verse says that the sentence-meaning is something mental, not having anything corresponding to it in the external world. As it has nothing corresponding to it in the external world, it has not been seen and that is why it is looked upon as something new. It is in the nature of a connection and connection is something mental. That is why it cannot be a real part of the sentence-meaning. Anything which appears to be a part is unreal. As the sentence is mental, its parts, if any, can also be only mental, but it appears to be external or it is identified with the real external object.]

441 (a). The powers relating to the mental objects (*pratyayārthātmānaḥ*) are not clearly determined. Nor are their forms obtained elsewhere (than in the sentence-meaning).

This verse is not found in Puṇyarāja's text but it is found, in some manuscripts of the verses only and it is there in the only manuscript of the *Vṛtti* which shows that it is not a recent interpolation. It is older than Puṇyarāja, for some reason, the manuscripts of Puṇyarāja's commentary, utilised for this edition, do not have it. I have included it as it is authenticated by the *Vṛtti*. As it is connected in meaning with 441 and in order not to disturb the numbering of the following which agrees with R and RP, I have numbered it 444(a) verse.

The *Vṛtti* on this is not too clear. In one place, there is a gap also. It seems to point out the difference between the external object and the idea of it which figures in the meaning of the individual word. The latter is only an imitation of the former and yet that is all which we have in order to understand the sentence-meaning. Through it a division is made in the sentence-meaning and this division is the means of understanding the sentence-meaning : *Tatra bāhyārthaviśayāṇām*

śaktinām abhāvād anukāramātram upādāya bhedaḥ prakramyate. Ayam eva hi bhedaḥ pratipatterupāyaḥ.

What is said in 441 and 441 (a) may be briefly stated as follows, though the idea is not too clear—"The meaning of the individual word, understood as a constituent of the sentence-meaning, is something mental only, but it appears to be external. There is, of course, the external object, but it figures in the mind as the meaning of the individual word. Then it is only mental and it appears to be identical with the sentence-meaning which is wholly mental. After the sentence-meaning is understood, it is analysed out of it. The powers of the sentence meaning, favourable to the understanding of the word-meanings, are analysed out of the former. These powers are not clearly determined. According to the view that the sentence-meaning is mental and indivisible, it can have no powers leading to division. How can they be then analysed out of it? If they exist anywhere, it can only be in the external object and they are only inferred. Without looking upon the external object and the one figuring in the mind as endowed with powers, worldly transactions cannot take place. The latter is identified with the former and this is what is meant by *bāhyī-kṛtya* in 441. Because of the identification of powers, this analysis of the mental sentence-meaning is possible. If the mental object, identified with the external object, is unreal, then the external object is real. Otherwise, the mental object is real and not the external object.]

Another question is raised. When there are several phrases, each having a verb and each incomplete and requiring the others, do they make up one sentence or should they be looked upon as many sentences?

442. Even when there are many verbs, they constitute one sentence, if they require one another. In this way, the prohibition of loss of accent after verbs would be meaningful.

[There is a reference here to the difference of opinion between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. According to the former,

there can be more than one verb in a sentence, provided one of them is the main one and the others, subordinate to it. According to the latter, more than one verb means more than one sentence. See *M. Bhā.* III. p. 373, l. 10 and p. 374, l. 23-25.]

443. According to him who holds that the fixed definition of the sentence is that it should have only one verb, there would be a different sentence if there were more than one verb and, therefore, the mention of *atiñah* would be useless.

[According to the author of the *Vārttikas*, there should be only one verb in a sentence. More than one verb would result in more than one sentence. So the other words in the sentence should be non-verbs. In P. 8.1.28, a verb coming after a non-verb is said to lose its *udātta* accent. Loss of *udātta* accent can take place only if the non-verb and the verb are both in the same sentence. If the sentence can have only one verb, there is no need to say coming after a non-verb (*atiñah*) in P. 8. 1. 28, because the other words in the sentence are necessarily non-verbs. So the verb would come necessarily after a non-verb or after nothing at all if it happens to be the first word in the sentence. If there is another verb in the sentence, there cannot be loss of accent at all. Thus the mention of *atiñah* in P. 8.1. 28 serves no purpose according to this view.]

According to some, even where there are many verbs, there may or may not be difference in sentence depending upon circumstances.

444. In sentences like *mṛgaḥ paśyata, yāti* = 'Look! the deer is going'. Where there is more than one verb one being connected with another which is already connected, there cannot be unity and difference.

[The sentence *mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti* is understood differently by different people. First *mṛgaḥ* is connected with *yāti* and that

makes one sentence, meaning 'the deer goes'. Then *paśyata* is connected with *mṛga*, changed to *mṛgam* with the meaning of *yāti* transformed into an adjective. That makes the second sentence *yāntaṃ mṛgam paśyata* look at the deer that is going. In each sentence there is a verb with its own accessory, agent in the first sentence and object in the other. This is one way of understanding this sentence.

The other way is : *mṛgo yāti* makes one sentence and that sentence becomes the object of the verb *paśyata* and as *yāti* and *paśyata* require one another, the whole thing remains one sentence. Thus, in the first view there is *bheda* and in the other view there is *abheda*. In spite of this, one can hold the view that there is no difference of opinion between the *sūtrakāra* and the *Vārttikakāra*. When the author of the *vārttikas* says that there should be one verb in a sentence, all that he means is that there should be only one main verb. The presence of other subordinate verbs will not lead to *Vākyabheda* = plurality of sentences.

All that the *Vṛtti* does here is to say that there would be loss of accent (*nighāta*) if the whole thing is looked upon as one sentence and that there would be no *nighāta* if one sees two sentences in it.]

The point now to be discussed is : when is a meaning to be considered complete and when incomplete.

445. Where the mode of performance of the action (denoted by the sentence is desired to be known because of its very nature (*sāmarthyāt*), that sentence containing no verbal incompleteness is said to be complete in meaning.

[The point here is that the incompleteness must come out of the words themselves before the sentence can be considered incomplete. When one says : 'Devadatta cooks', the sentence is complete, though how and what he cooks is not mentioned. From the word 'cooks' an average listener will understand a complete meaning. But when one says 'Devadatta cooks his', one feels at once that the words themselves are incomplete.

The *Vṛtti* gives the sentence *vṛihayo'vahanyantām* as an example of a complete sentence though no details are mentioned in it. It is complete because there is no verbal incompleteness : *śabdalaṅkāṣaṇāpekṣāyogād iti*, as Puṇyarāja says.]

446. Where there is a bare statement of fact and its implications are understood from its expressive power (*śruteḥ*) without the use of words to express them, then the sentence is complete.

[In other words, the incompleteness must come from the words themselves. Otherwise, the sentence must be considered complete, even if the listener understands more than what the words actually say. The words used do not require other words for yielding a complete meaning :—*parisamāptameva śabdānibandhanāyā ākāṅkṣāyās tatrābhāvād vākyam vijñāyate.*]

Two sentences may say the same thing, and yet there may be difference of emphasis in the two statements.

447. 'Study while moving around' 'move around while studying'. In these two sentences what is enjoined is the same but there is a difference due to difference in verbal presentation.

[The purpose of both sentences is to tell somebody to study or pray while moving about. The first sentence presents the study through a verb and the moving about through the present participle and the second sentence does it vice-versa. What is presented through a verb is the more important element verbally. But in reality the purpose of the speaker is the same in both sentences, namely, to tell somebody to study (*adhī*) or to pray (*jap*).]

448. Varieties of action, having their fruit and involving many minor actions and infinite in number because of different modes of performance and different aims are expressed by the same verb.

[It is stated in this verse that though the verb denoting the action may be the same, the action may differ because of difference in the mode of performance and in the results.]

449. The verb always denotes an action without any inner variation. From the mere word, all the variations cannot be imagined.

450. In the sentences : 'the kings will perform the *aśvamedha* sacrifice 'the Brāhmaṇas are holding a sacrificial session', the variations are not understood because of difference in the verb.

[In 450, two distinct verbs are used: *yakṣyante* and *sattram āsate* but it is not because of difference in the verbs that difference in the ritual is understood but because of inherent difference in the actions themselves (*arthasāmarthyāt*.)

Commenting on 449, the *Vṛtti* points out that variations in the action conveyed by the verb are brought about by differences in the *sādhana*, the accessories to action (*sādhanabhedenā tadbhedasya caritārthatvāt*). The verb itself does not convey the variations. Commenting on 450, the *Vṛtti*, the text of which is doubtful in several places, points out a difference in the action denoted by *yaj* in *yakṣyante* and that denoted by *ās* in *sattram āsate*.]

451. The action in regard to the seventeen *prājāpatya* animals, though mentioned only once and not repeated, becomes diversified because of the nature of things.

[By *sāmarthyāt*, what is meant is that, as there are seventeen different animals, the same action necessarily becomes diversified, though the word denoting the action is not repeated.]

452. The action of eating relates to Devadatta etc. separately. Or the sentence itself is applied, to each agent (*pratisvatantram*) separately.

[In the sentence *Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā bhojyantām* the meaning of the sentence is the action of feeding which is connected with Devadatta etc. separately. That is what the first half of the verse says. The second says that alternatively, the sentence itself is split up into three different sentences, each having one of the three agents as the subject and the verb *bhojyatām* as the predicate. According to the second alternative, one verb becomes many verbs and therefore, one sentence becomes many sentences. As the *Vṛtti* puts it—*Pratīkarṭṛ ca vākye bhidyamāne bahavaḥ kriyāśabdā upaplavante. Tasmādekopanibandhanāni bahūni vākyānyupajāyante*:— If a separate sentence is made for each agent, many verbs would arise and thus many sentences based on one sentence would come into existence.]

453. At the time of utterance of the sentences, a separate form is not heard but at the time of the understanding of their meaning, the form of different (sentences) is understood.

[In the sentence under discussion, only one verb denoting one action is heard, but at the time of understanding its meaning, the verb or its meaning is construed with each agent separately.

The *Vṛtti* points out that according to some, it is in the nature of words that they are uttered in one way and understood in another way: *Śabdapravṛttidharma evāyam anyathoccāraṇaṃ anyathā pratīpattiḥ*. At the time of understanding the meaning of a sentence, it becomes diversified when many sentences arise out of it:— *Pratīpattikāle tu vākyāntareṣūpajāyamāneṣu pravibhaktam rūpāntaram pratīyate*.]

This happens in the *śāstra* also.

454. An all-embracing sentence (*grahaṇakam vākyam*) like *kartari (kṛt)* (P. 3.4.67.) is enunciated in a general manner and then it is applied separately to cases like *paśu*.

[P.3.4.67. says that a *kṛt* suffix is added to a root in the sense of the agent of the action. This general statement is applied

to particular cases as in P.3.2.25 according to which the *kṛt* suffix *in* is added to the root *hṛ* when the preceding proximate word (*upapada*) is *ḍṛti* or *nātha* and the agent is an animal. Thus we get the form: *ḍṛtihariḥ* (*paśuḥ*). If the agent is not an animal, this suffix cannot be added to the root. The form would be *ḍṛtih-āraḥ* with the suffix *aṇ* (P.3.2.1.)

455. If, once the general rule is uttered (with some special rule) and its incompleteness is removed, it would not be connected with the other (special rules).

[And so the required forms cannot be derived. The idea here is that a general rule should have some scope as a general rule, apart from its scope when associated with some special rule. Otherwise, some forms cannot be derived. The general rule, must not be tied up with any particular special rule, as that would take away its scope as a general rule as well as the possibility of its being associated with other special rules. As the *Vṛtti* puts it:—*Yadi tu kartari kṛdityekasminneva sūtre paśvādibhir ākāṅkṣā vicchidyeta sāmānyena sādhuvaṃ na syāt. Ekena vopādhiṇā kṛte'vacchede tatraivāvaruddhatvād upādhyantarasambandho na prakalpeta.*]

456. It has the same form, it has many applications and, therefore, it is the basis (*upanibandhana*) (of the subordinate rules); it is the source of the rules of elaboration (*vibhāga-vākya-nām*) and it appears to be one with them.

[A new point of view is discussed: how can action which is something to be accomplished and has parts arranged in a temporal sequence be looked upon as a universal and as a particular? The next verse tries to answer the question.]

457. Sometimes action renders service through its individual aspect and sometimes it is its general aspect which fulfils some purpose.

[How can action which is a process (*sādhya*) and has parts arranged in a temporal sequence be looked upon as the universal or the particular? It is like this: where the accessories are mentioned, in prohibitions, in optional instruction, in accumulation in expressions of excellence and praise, it is its individual aspect which counts. Where the accessories or time and place are not mentioned, it is the general aspect that counts.

458. Where variations are due to time or in expressions like *uṣṭrāsikā*, it is the general aspect that works and they do not affect the form of the word.

[This stanza states where the verb denotes the general aspect of action.]

It was stated before how many actions conveyed by the same word are connected with different accessories conveyed by different words. Now how many actions conveyed by different words are connected with different accessories conveyed by the same word is stated.

459. Where actions differ from one another in their universals etc, (and are conveyed by different words) and the accessories are also of the same number but are conveyed by the same word uttered once, the former are separately connected with the latter.

[In *akṣā bhajyantām*, *bhujyantām*, *dīvyantām*, the three verbs denote three different actions unconnected with one another and are conveyed by three different words. The word *akṣāḥ* conveys three different accessories though it is uttered only once by the speaker. But the hearer connects each accessory with one of the verbs and thus gets the complete sentence.]

460. Different actions like breaking, eating and playing are connected separately with the accesso-

ries, namely, the *akṣas* even though the latter are conveyed in one utterance and simultaneously.

461. In the case of the three kinds of *akṣas* conveyed by the same word, the use of the same word is a means (of conveying them at the same time). When they are separately conveyed, there is sequence; the single utterance is for conveying them at the same time and connecting them separately.

462. There are two ways of presenting things through words : sequence or simultaneity. The world does not go beyond them.

463. Where words are used in a sequence, their form varies but not when there is simultaneity. Even when there is simultaneity (in the presentation of the accessories) the action follows sequence.

[To say that the action follows sequence means that each action is connected separately with the different accessories.]

464. Difference and unity are two powers which appear to be different from the word. Even where many (accessories) are conveyed at the same time by the same word, the latter becomes diversified (when its many meanings are construed) in usage (with different actions).

[Though the word *akṣāḥ* is one word which conveys many accessories at the same time, it becomes many when it is connected with the different verbs, each conveying a different action.]

465. Where a complex whole with its parts in a patent state is meant to be conveyed, there the

complex whole is strengthened by the property of the parts.

[The word *akṣāḥ* conveys a whole consisting of three things. The plural number in the word shows that there are several things in that whole. These several things are connected in a certain order with the verbs. The order is the attribute of the several things included in the whole.

The complex whole here is the first kind of whole mentioned in the *Vṛtti* which speaks about three kinds of wholes. In this first kind of whole, there are three distinct parts : As the *Vṛtti* puts it : *tatrākṣā ityavayavabhedānugata ekaḥ samudāyaḥ.*]

Another way of looking at the same thing is now stated.

466. When the complex whole is analysed into its parts, the meaning of the sentence is connected with each part. Or the mention of the accessories is split up into many because of the plural suffix in it, results in the splitting up of the sentence.

[What is meant is that *akṣā bhajyantām, bhujyantām, divyantām* becomes *akṣo bhajyatām, bhujyatām, divyatām.*]

467. Either each word *akṣa* can be used in the singular number or according to the original utterance, each word *akṣa* can be separated in the plural number.

[What is meant is that each word *akṣa* standing for one thing only can be used in the singular or plural number. Thus, it is shown that the splitting up of the original utterance *akṣāḥ* can take place in two ways.

Normally, one would use a separate word for every idea or object which one wants to express : *Pratyartham śabdaniveśaḥ*, as it is generally put. *Pratyartham* is explained usually as *artham artham prati*. But it can also mean *arthāu arthau prati* or *arthān arthān prati*. In the last two cases *pratyartham śabdaniveśaḥ* would mean for every two ideas or objects or for many

ideas or objects, one should use a word. It means that the same word can express more than one idea or object. Those who hold this view are *abhedavādināḥ* = those who hold that the word is the same even when it denotes many things. According to them, the sentence *akṣāḥ bhajyantām, bhuḥjyantām divyantām* is not to be split up on the basis of the word *akṣāḥ* understood as including more than one word *akṣa* each being connected with one of the verbs because, according to this view, there is only one word *akṣa* which has three meanings. That is possible only if it has three distinct powers. In other words, *abhedavādināḥ* believe in *śaktitantra* and not in *śabdatantra*.]

468. According to those who believe in the identity (of the word) in the case of polysemic sentences, it is the power of the many-powered sentence which is split up (and not its form).

[The other view is that in the sentence in question, the word *akṣāḥ* contains three separate words, all having the form *akṣa*. These three separate words are mentioned in a condensed form but at the time of understanding the meaning, each of them should be taken out and connected with one of the verbs. This is the *śabdatantra* view.

469. Or it is a case of mentioning in a condensed form (through *tantra*) two separate words. The inter connection between the words differs according to the hearer.

470. What were two separate sentences having the same form have been used in a condensed form by the speaker for the benefit of the hearers.

The views of the *bhedavādin* and the *abhedavādin* are now put differently.

471. Even if only one of the condensed sentences is meant by the speaker, the other (being of the

same form) comes to the mind. Without any intention on the part of the speaker, the other comes to the mind as a power.

[The first half of the verse gives the view of the *bhedavādin* and the other half that of the *abhedavādin*.]

Another way of putting the view of the *abhedavādin* is this.

472. Sometimes, both the powers of the word are utilised at the same time just as fire is used sometimes both for its heat and for its light.

It is now shown that the same thing happens in the *śāstra* also.

473. The sentence, heard only once but having more than one meaning, either through repetition of the sentence or through more than one power, presents itself as more than one (*vibhāgena*) either through *liṅga* or through *tantra*.

[According to the *bhedavādins* it presents itself as more than one through *liṅga* and according to the *abhedavādins* it presents itself as more than one through *tantradharma*, that is, through its multiplicity of powers.]

An example is now given.

474. In regard to the name *Samprasāraṇa*, through two indications, the same *sūtra* can be understood separately as presenting either the phoneme or the sentence meaning as the named.

[The *sūtra*: *igyaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam* (P.1.1.45) teaches the name *samprasāraṇa*. What is the named? One view is that the phonemes *i, u, ṛ, ḷ* are the named. Another view is that the

sentence-meaning, namely, the coming of *ik* in place of *yaṇ* is the named. There are indications for both in the *sāstra*.]

475. Similarly, it has been shown in the *Bhāṣya* itself that conveying of more than one thing by mentioning the word only once has taken place in the *sūtra dvirvacane aci* (P. 1.1.59).

[In P.1.1.59, even though the word *dvirvacane* is mentioned only once, it has to be construed twice in slightly different meanings by following the principle of *tantra* which is similar to, but not identical with the grammatical process called *ekaśeṣa* where a word, mentioned only once, may stand for the same word repeated. For example, in *rāmau*, the word *rāma*, occurring only once, stands for two *rāmas* and in *rāmāḥ*, it stands for three or more *rāmas*.]

The following verses relate to the history of the Grammatical Tradition in India.

476. After the *San̄graha* declined when it came into the hands of Grammarians who were fond of abridgements and had acquired only little knowledge.

[The *San̄graha* is mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I.p.6.1.12. We are told that there the question whether the word is eternal or only an effect is discussed as one of the main topics. Commenting on this, Bhartṛhari says in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* that there were 14 000 topics discussed in the *San̄graha*: *Caturdaśa sahasrāṇi vastūni asmin saṅgrahagranthe* (M. Bhā. dīpikā, p. 21, l. 4-5. B. O. R. I. Post Graduate and Research Department Series no. 8.)]

477. And when the Master Patañjali who knew all the traditions (*tṛtha-darśinā*) had incorporated into his *Mahābhāṣya* all the arguments and principles.

478. It was found that those who were not

sufficiently equipped (*akṛtabuddhīnām*) could not arrive at proper decisions while studying that work at once bottomless because of its depth and clear because of its lucidity.

[According to Puṇyarāja, Bhartṛhari wants to say here that only his Guru Vasurāta could really understand the Mahābhāṣya properly.]

479. When that sacred work which was an epitome of the *Saṅgraha* was ruined by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa who merely followed dry reasoning.

480. The Grammatical Tradition slipped away from the hands of the disciples of Patañjali and in time, the mere text of it survived in the South.

481. Then Ācārya Candra and other followers of the principles of the Bhāṣya obtained the true Tradition from the mountain and elaborated it into many branches.

[Puṇyarāja says that by 'mountain', the Trikūṭa is meant. He also refers to the belief that there on that mountain the original Grammatical Tradition, composed by Rāvaṇa and engraved on stone, existed. Some Brahmarakṣas brought it from there and gave it to Ācāryas Candra, Vasurāta and they understood the true nature of the Science of Grammar from it and imparted it to their disciples and incessantly elaborated it. In the end it became a discipline with many branches.]

482. After mastering those principles and cultivating his own discipline this collection of traditions was composed by our Teacher.

483. Here only the gist of a few of those traditions is given. In the third *Kāṇḍa*, there will be full discussion.

484. The intellect acquires critical acumen by familiarity with different traditions. How much does one really understand by merely following one's own reasoning only?

485. The learning of those who have not sat at the feet of the earlier scholars but flit from one idea to another does not attain complete definiteness.

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CHAPTER III

SECTION 1. ON THE UNIVERSAL

1. Some analyse a sentence as consisting of two kinds of words, others of four kinds and others still of five kinds, just as a word is analysed into base, suffix etc.

[In the Vākyapadiya, the eight topics mentioned in Chapter I, 24-26, are dealt with, namely, the two kinds of meanings, the two kinds of words, the two kinds of relation and the two kinds of purpose. In Chapter I, the purposes and other matters were considered. In Chapter II, the sentence which is to be grammatically analysed (*anvākhyeya*) and its meaning which has a fixed character (*sthitlakṣaṇa*) were determined. In Chapter III, words and their meanings, obtained by artificial division (*apoddhāra*) are going to be considered. Words are obtained by artificially analysing sentences and a sentence may be analysed in different ways according to one's point of view. Strictly speaking, a sentence is indivisible and it is such a sentence which is expressive (*vācaka*). The cognition of individual words and their meanings is really an illusion (*vibhrama*) and they are the result of an artificial analysis of sentences. This artificial analysis is a means of understanding and explaining the indivisible sentence, just as the division of a word into stem and suffix is a means of explaining the indivisible word. Sentences are infinite in number and no two sentences are alike. Their artificial parts seem to resemble one another and these parts are abstracted from the sentence as that is the only way of explaining the sentence. The individual word which is abstracted from the sentence on the basis of meaning is as unreal as the stem and suffix abstracted from the individual word on the basis of meaning by following

the method of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* (agreement and difference) mentioned by Kātyāyana in his Vā. 9 on P. 1.2.45—

Siddham tv anvayavyatirekābhyām

When the sentence is divided into individual words, the sentence-meaning is automatically so divided. The former depends upon the latter. That is why we cannot divide a word into so many phonemes, because these would have no meaning. The sentence-meaning is of a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*). It is really indivisible, but we divide it artificially and we get two kinds of meanings out of it: action and accessory to action. That which expresses the former is called the verb (*ākhyāta*) and that which expresses the latter is called noun (*nāman*). Thus we get two kinds of words. In a noun, there are two parts: the root and the suffix. Number and the like are the meaning of the suffix and even though, formally, it is the meaning of the suffix which is the predominant one in a noun, from the point of view of the meaning, that which comes from the word as a whole, namely, the individual (*dravya*) qualified by the universal (*jāti*), something which is in the nature of a thing (*siddha*), is the predominant meaning, because it is this individual which is the substratum of number and the accessories (*śādhana*). Particles (*nipāta*), Prepositions (*upasarga*) and Postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) come under nouns and verbs. Some particles express some peculiarity belonging to the thing (*siddha*), the meaning of nouns and, therefore, come under them. It makes no difference whether a word expresses a thing (*siddha*) directly or expresses a peculiarity in it. Some particles like *svaḥ* are primarily expressive of things (*sattvapradhāna*). Thus they also come under nouns. Particles like *hiruk* come under verbs, because they are primarily expressive of actions. It is not merely words ending in verbal affixes (*tiṅ*) which are verbs. Any word which is primarily expressive of a process is a verb. That is why prepositions (*upasarga*) and postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) and particles (*nipāta*) are also verbs, because they also can express some peculiarity in a process.

But, if one wants to emphasize their special feature, particles and prepositions are classed separately. They do not express a meaning directly, but express a peculiarity in the meanings expressed by nouns and verbs and so they are classed separately. Particles (*nipāta*) and prepositions (*upasarga*) differ from one another also, because the former express a peculiarity found in things and processes whereas the latter can express a peculiarity in processes only. Postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) on the other hand express a relation brought about by some particular action. Thus, they also denote a peculiarity in processes and come under prepositions. In this way, we get four kinds of words, according to some.

Others consider postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) to be a fifth kind of word. They argue that they differ from *upasargas* because they refer to an action that is past and not to one that is present. The delimitation of a relation with reference to some action or other, is their function. Relation is brought about by action or some service (*upakāra*) rendered through action. Sometimes the verb expressive of the action is actually heard and sometimes it is not. Where it is actually heard, the understanding of a particular relation is direct as in *mātuḥ smarati*, *mātuḥ smṛtam*, *sarpiṣo jñānte*. Action can spontaneously and directly enter into relation with things, without another action coming in the middle. Where the verb is not used, there are two possibilities: the very nature of the things related brings the action to the mind and, without the help of the *karmapravacanīya*, we understand that the relation must have been preceded by a particular relation of action and accessory between two things. *upagor apatyam*, *vrkṣasya śākhā* are examples. In *upagor apatyam*, there is the relation of father and offspring, it is brought about by the act of procreation. In *vrkṣasya śākhā*, there is the relation of whole and part, brought about by the action of standing and supporting (*sthitikriyānimittatḥ*). Sometimes, the relation has not the power of bringing any particular action to the mind. For instance, in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, the relation is that of master and servant (*svasvāmibhāva*)

and it may have been due to one of many actions: maintenance, abduction, purchase and begging. (Cf. M. Bhā I. p. 463, l. 12). From the expression 'the King's man' (*rājñah puruṣaḥ*) the particular action which was the cause of the relation of *sva* and *svāmin* is not understood. Sometimes, it is the presence of the post-position which tells us about the particular action which has brought about the relation in question. For example, in the sentence *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvṛṣat*, there exists the relation of cause and effect between the *saṃhitā* and rain and this relation is due to the action of reciting the *saṃhitā* text. The post-position *anu* tells us that it is due to this action. (Cf. Vāk. a. II, 109-201; 204-205). The word *anu* is found associated elsewhere with the action of hearing, as in *anu-niśamya*. But that is not a reason for considering it as directly expressive of the action here. Nor does it suggest action because a verb expressive of the act of reciting is not used here at all. Nor can *anu* suggest a verb here in the way in which *vi* suggests the gerund *vimāya* in *prādeśaṃ vi-parilikhati*. In *Prādeśaṃ*, there is a suffix (case-ending) expressive of an accessory to action; therefore, *vi* can suggest a word expressive of action. But in *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvṛṣat*, there is a case-ending expressive of *śeṣa* in *saṃhitām*. Nor does *anu* directly express the relation of cause and effect, because that is done by the accusative case-ending which is specially taught instead of other case-endings. (P. 2.3.8.). The real function of *anu* is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action called 'recitation' (*paṭhanam*). This is what is called *Sambandhāvachcheda*, the delimitation of the relation. This is made clear in the verse *Kriyāyā dyotako nāyam, sambandhasya na vācakaḥ* etc. (Vāk. a. II, 204). This is the function of *anu*. There is no use of attributing to *anu* something which is the effect of something else.

Nor can it be maintained that the delimitation of the relation, referring it to a particular action, is the function of the sentence and that *anu* merely expresses the idea of posteriority. Those who maintain this rely on the principle

that the meaning of the sentence is that which is understood over and above those of the individual words. But it must be remembered that 'over and above' does not mean going against the meaning of individual words. Sentence-meaning, even when it is an 'extra', must be based on those of individual words. It really consists of the relation of the process or the thing primarily conveyed by a sentence with its accessories or its attributes. This delimitation of the relation cannot be considered to be the sentence-meaning, because it is not based on that of any individual word. It is, therefore, better to consider it as the meaning of the *Karmapravacanīya*. About this delimitation of the relation by the post-position, there are two views: (1) that it is delimited in its own form (*svarūpeṇāvacchidyate*); (2) that it is delimited as brought about by a particular action. According to Bhartṛhari it means that it is delimited by reference to the particular circumstance (*nimittaviśeṣāvacchedaḥ*). Thus in *adhi brahmadatte pañcālāḥ*, *adhi* indicates that the relation of ruler and ruled (*svasvāmibhāva*) is due to the act of protection which is the particular circumstance (*nimittaviśeṣa*).

Thus the abstraction of words from a sentence on the basis of meaning is the only means of explaining a sentence.]

The nature of the abstracted meanings is now explained

2. When the meaning of a sentence is analysed into those of individual words, two word-meanings have been declared to be the eternal meaning of all words, either the universal (*jāti*) or the particular (*dravya*).

[Once the meanings of words are abstracted from that of the sentence, the next question is: what is the nature of these meanings? According to some, the universal (*jāti*) is the meaning of all words. According to others, it is the particular (*dravya*) which is the meaning of all words. A third view is that it is the particular as qualified by the universal. This third view is indicated by the dual number

in the word *padārthau*. If the third view is the correct one, then a word would convey both the universal and the particular at the same time, because it is inconceivable that a word should convey one thing first and another thing after a little interval. When both are conveyed, one would be more important than the other in a particular context. The dual number in *padārthau* might be taken to mean that the universal and the particular are equally important, but, in particular contexts, only one of them is conveyed. A word like *gauḥ* conveys the universal 'cow-ness', but, as a universal without a substratum is impossible, the particular is also necessarily understood. Similarly, the verb denotes the universal aspect of action, present in the different moments of action and causing the same cognition and the use of the same word. The universal of the accessory (*kāraka*) conveyed by a verb plays a subordinate part in the cognition produced by a verb. The universal of action, conveyed by the verb, enters into relation with the universal of the accessory conveyed by the noun through the particular (*vyakti*). In the particular inheres the universal which enters into relation with action through the power called accessory which also inheres in the particular. It will be explained in the section on the Accessory (*Sādhanaśamuddeśa*) that what is called 'accessory' is really a power or a capacity. The universal of an action like cooking is manifested by the different moments of it like putting the pot on the fire. Even though the universal of action is eternal, it becomes a process (*sādhya*) through the particular. According to this view, prepositions (*upasarga*) also express the universal, because they do no more than denote a peculiarity in the meaning of the verb which is a universal. A postposition is also based on the universal of a relation. Similarly, words like *śukla* express the universals of qualities (*guṇa*). So do proper names like *Dittha*. This is the view of Vājapyāyana. (See M. Bhā I. p. 242, l. 10).

According to Vyāḍi, the particular (*dravya*) is the meaning of all words, because it is the particular which is connected with action. What Vyāḍi calls *dravya* is often called

Vyakti, the individual, also the correlative of universal. Thus, according to *Vyāḍi*, the particular or the individual becomes an integral part of the meaning of a sentence. It is to this that Vedic injunctions refer as declared in the *Vārtika*.

Codanāsu ca tasyārambhāt (Vā 47 on P. 1.2.64). Even though the universal is not directly expressed by the word, it is also understood. In the verb also, it is the particular which is predominant, according to *Vyāḍi*. The meaning of a verb is the particular penetrated by action (*vyāpārāviṣṭaṃ dravyam*). Words like *śukla* also denote the particular.

Alternatively, one might understand by *dravya* what is going to be explained in the next section: that it is Brahman, conditioned by this or that limiting factor and that is the meaning of every word.

Ordinarily, the word *dravya* is a synonym of *vyakti*, the individual. As the two word-meanings in question are declared to be those of all words (*sarvaśabdānām*) they are also attributed to the parts like base and suffix which are abstracted from the individual word. The truth is that both are recognised meanings of words, even though one or the other may be emphasised in particular contexts. Whether the meaning of a word is *jāti* or *dravya*, in either case, it is something which is eternal (*nitya*). By *nitya*, it is continuity (*pravāhanityatā*) which is meant, as is made clear in the statement—

Tadapi nityaṃ yasminstattvaṃ na vihanyate

(M. Bhā I, p. 7, l. 22).

Thus, it has been shown that the universal and/or the particular can be the meaning of a word. In this section, the considerations which favour the view that it is the universal will be explained.]

Now a doubt arises: If the universal is the meaning of every word, how can it enter into relation with action which is the meaning of the verb in the sentence? It is only the accessory (*sādhana*) which can be connected with action and

the universal can never be the accessory. No doubt, its substratum can be the accessory; but, after all, it is the universal which is directly conveyed by the word. So, when something having the universal prescribed in a Vedic injunction is not available, we cannot use a substitute, because it would not have the prescribed universal. Thus Vedic injunctions cannot be carried out. This difficulty is removed as follows—

3. According to some, the universal is the means of conveying 'power' because of association. If the 'acacia catechu' etc. are powerless (i.e., not being available, are powerless to accomplish the action in question) a substitute having that power is taken.

[According to the view of some theorists, the universal is the means (*upalakṣaṇa*) whereby power or capacity is conveyed, because the universal and power reside in the same substratum. Others, on the other hand, think that it is the universal which is primarily conveyed by the word and that, in some cases, it enters into direct relation with action, while, in other cases, it does so through the medium of power. The word *keṣāñcit* in the verse can also mean: 'in the case of some words'. Those words which express the accessories denote mainly capacity. In such words, it is the case-endings which stand for power or capacity and as the case-ending cannot be used by itself, the stem must necessarily be used and that expresses the universal which qualifies the capacity conveyed by the case-ending. All this is true where the thing prescribed is available. Where it is not available, power or capacity becomes associated with the nearest universal. The Vedas enjoin actions which must be performed. Particular materials for the performance of these actions are also taught. If any material is not available, the action must still be performed with a substitute.]

The author now points out how, even according to those who hold that the word primarily conveys the universal and

not capacity through the universal the use of substitutes can be explained.

4. (In the injunction 'khādire badhnāti') the root 'bandh' (to bind) denoting an action which results in loss of independence is taught like the act of killing (*pramāṇa*) etc. Therefore, though the universal is the primary meaning, nothing that is devoid of 'power' is taken.

[Even according to those who maintain that the word primarily conveys the universal, the use of a substitute can be explained. In the injunction *khādire badhnāti*, the action denoted by the verb is that of binding the animal to the sacrificial post, resulting in its loss of independence. That can take place only if a post which has the power to yield the desired result is used. Therefore, a substitute is allowed if the original article, the khadira wood, is not available.]

The author now points out that there is an indication on the basis of which a substitute can be allowed.

5. Even if the meaning of the root *bandh* is nothing more than contact (with the sacrificial post) the very fact that killing etc. are taught as the next step is an indication that an efficient thing is to be taken.

[Even if it is maintained that the root *bandh* means nothing more than contact (with the sacrificial post and not loss of independence) the fact that killing etc. are taught as the next step is an indication that the animal must be well tied to the post. Therefore, something which is fit to be used as a post must be taken. Khadira has this fitness or capacity, but if it is not available, something else which has this capacity must be substituted. Thus, on the view that a word denotes the universal, the use of a substitute becomes

justifiable in three ways: (1) on the basis of the meaning of the word (*padārtha*) as shown in verse 3 where it was said that the meaning of the word, the universal, stands for something which has the required power, (2) on the basis of sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) as shown in verse 4 where it was said that the word must convey something which has the capacity to help in the accomplishment of the main action conveyed by the sentence and (3) on the basis of context (*prakaraṇa*) as shown in the present verse which says that a substitute must be allowed if one takes into consideration the other acts like killing which are taught in the same context.

Here Helārāja mentions two further arguments in order to justify the use of a substitute. The first one is called: *asambhavanīyamatyāgaḥ*. An injunction like *khādīre badhnāti* must not be understood as an *asambhavanīyama*, that is, a restrictive injunction (*nīyama*) making alternatives impossible (*asambhava*). The second argument is called *nīyamamātratyāga*. The injunction in question is so interpreted that its positive aspect is retained; that is, one understands from it that the animal should be tied to a post. One rejects the negative or restrictive aspect of it. In other words, one rejects the restriction that the post should necessarily be made of khadira wood. By adopting these two arguments, one avoids going against scriptural injunction, because one follows the positive aspect of it, even if one rejects its negative or restrictive aspect.]

6. All words first express their own universal which is then thought of as being superimposed on the universals of the meanings.

[When we hear a word, it is its own form which we understand first. And we do so, no matter who utters it. The form remains the same in all utterances. This form is, therefore, a universal (*jāti*) and it is this which we understand invariably. This invariable cognition of the uni-

versal of the word is what is meant by the word 'first' (*prathamam*). See Vāk I. 66. After this is understood, or while it is being understood, the meaning which is also a universal, is understood. The two appear to be one. The form of the word is understood by us as having been superimposed on the meaning. We take the two as one. To understand the one as being superimposed on the other implies that we consider the two to be different. We do, but this is only a fiction (*kalpanā*) on our part, because the meaning (the object), according to Grammar, is only an unreal manifestation (*vivarta*) of the word. Therefore, the two are not really different from each other. This superimposition of the word on the meaning is the basis of convention and also of the relation of expression and expressed (*vācyavācakahāva*) between the two. This universal of the word is progressively clearly revealed by each sound of the word, just as each moment of a movement like the lifting of the arm reveals it fully and progressively more clearly, or just as a passage of a text, not fully learnt by heart at the first reading is gradually memorised by repeated reading or just as the genuineness of a precious stone, not fully clear at the first gaze, becomes so progressively.]

The author now says how the universal of the word, existing in the word, can convey the universal of the object as identical with itself.

7-8. Just as 'redness', residing in the quality red is attributed to the substance 'lac' and then, on account of its intimate union with the intimately united, it is perceived in clothes etc., in the same way, on account of the intimate connection between word and meaning, the universal residing in the word performs the function of universal for the universals of objects also.

[It was declared in the previous verse that the universal of the word is superimposed on that of the meaning and that

the latter appears as one with the former. Here a doubt might arise: the universal of the word is inherent in the word and not in the meaning; how can it then denote the meaning through the relation of identity? This doubt is sought to be removed by means of an example. Redness is inherent in a particular case of red, in what is red. It is also attributed to the substance which is red. Due to contact with the substance which is red, redness is attributed to another object also like cloth when we speak of it as being red. In other words, due to the contact of the cloth with a substance which is red, the cloth is also said to be red. Similarly, there is the eternal relation between the word and its meaning, a relation which is grasped only at the time of the learning of the convention. This relation is evident from the fact that both about the word *gauḥ* and the object *gauḥ*, we can say: *ayaṃ gauḥ*. Through this relation, what belongs to the word is superimposed on the meaning. The universal of the word is superimposed on the universal of the meaning. The latter becomes the expressed meaning (*vācya*) of the former. Not only that. The universal of the word becomes a kind of universal among the different universals, though, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, there cannot be a universal of the universals. But the universal of the word plays the part of a universal among the universals of the meanings. It performs the two functions of such a universal. The two functions are: persistence of the same word (*sabdānuvṛtti*) and persistence of the same cognition (*pratyayānuvṛtti*). How this happens is explained in verses 9 and 10.

This universal of the word exists in the word considered as a unity and not in the different phonemes, because it is this unity which is expressive (*vācaka*). This unity is called *vyaktisphoṭa* and the universal, *jāti*, inheres in it. It is called *jātisphoṭa*. Thus *sphoṭa* is of two kinds. The particular relation through which *vyaktisphoṭa* expresses the meaning is fitness (*yogyatā*) which is eternal and not the work of man (*apauruṣeya*). When a meaning is understood from a word, it appears as one with it. With all that, the form of the meaning is not completely obliterated. When an object is revealed

through light, it appears as enveloped in light, but with all that, its own form appears distinctly. Light and the word reveal other objects by superimposing their own form on them. This is the eternal character of words, not due to human agency. This can happen only in the case of one who knows a language. In the case of one who like a child does not know it yet, there cannot be superimposition of the word on the meaning, because he does not know the word yet. The universal of the object appears to him as distinct.]

How it performs the function of a universal is now explained.

9. When one has to form the 'ekaśeṣa' of words denoting universals, the universal of words is the universal of the universals of objects. In the formation *śabda-jātayaḥ* (universals of words) the universal of the word (is the cause of the *ekaśeṣa*) when the universals of the words have to be expressed.

[When we apply the same word, say 'cow' or 'tree' to a large number of objects, it is because we see some common characteristic in all of them called *jāti* or universal. When we apply the word *jāti* to a large number of universals, the natural conclusion would be that, in all of them, there is a common characteristic, another universal above the original universals. But this is impossible according to the *vaiśeṣika* principle: *niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāni*. And yet we do apply the word *jāti* to a large number of universals. How to explain this? It is explained in this way: the universal for which the word *jāti* stands does the work of such a super-universal which really does not exist. Similarly, if each word stands for its universal, there would be as many word-universals as there are words and when all these universals existing in the different words are referred to by the expression *śabda-jātaya imāḥ*, what really happens is that the universal existing in the word *śabda-jāti* itself does the work of such a super-universal.]

10. The universal of words, residing in words and differing from the words themselves, includes also the universal existing in the word *śabdajāti*.

[The universal which exists in words and which is different from the words themselves is so comprehensive that it includes the universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* itself. When we say: *śabdajāti*, it does not denote a universal which is over and above such universals as *gośabdatva*, *aśvaśabdatva* etc. Because, one does not believe in a universal over a universal. So the universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* itself does the work of such a universal. The universal which exists in the word *śabdajāti* is in the same category as the universal which exists in the word *gauḥ* or *aśvaḥ*. *Atikramya vartate* has been translated as 'includes', following Helārāja.]

The author now tries to show that all words denote the universal without resorting to the concept of 'adhyāsa'.

11. (Some) words may denote the universals of objects, but all denote the universal, since the meanings of words are determined by the functions (*vyāpāra*) of words (i.e., they are determined by what the words actually convey).

[So far, the author has established the doctrine that all words denote the universal with the help of the grammarian's idea of *adhyāsa*, the idea that the universal of the meaning appears as one with that of the word, or rather that the universal of the word is superimposed upon that of the meaning. Even without recourse to the idea of *adhyāsa*, it is possible to show that all words denote the universal. If one does not accept *adhyāsa*, the alternative is to say that words denote the universals of the object, pure and simple. Even then, one will have to maintain that all words do so. By 'all', what is meant is: not only words like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, etc., but also words like *jāti*. Here one has to meet the Vaiśeṣika objection that if the word *jāti* also stands for a universal, it must

be a universal existing in other universals. And that is not possible. If there is universal in universals, where would one stop? But grammarians have a different point of view. Their chief concern is to find out the nature of meanings conveyed by words. What they find is that in all universals as conveyed by words, there is a common point or characteristic which can be looked upon as another universal and can be called by the name *jāti*. The existence of the first universal was postulated because a common characteristic was experienced in the individuals. Even invisible things are assumed to exist if they somehow produce a cognition in regard to themselves. What to say of things conveyed by words? Grammarians go by what the words convey. They are not really concerned with things as they really are, but with things as conveyed by words. If a quality is conveyed by words as a common characteristic, it becomes a universal for them. The word *śyāma* is considered to be expressive of a quality but Pāṇini gives to its meaning the name of *sāmānya* in the compound word *śastrīśyāmā* according to his sūtra: *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*. (P. 2.1.55). The same is the case with action. In such matters, grammarians are more anxious to follow worldly usage than the views and conventions of other systems of thought. To them, *artha* means what words convey and all words convey the universal, because that is a matter of fact. In reality, the universal which a word conveys may or may not exist. But the word in question, through its function called *abhidhā*, does convey it. So that is the meaning of the word.]

The author now makes clear the function called *abhidhā* of words.

12. In the view that the universal is the meaning of words, the universal or even the particular becomes the meaning of words in the same way as (the well-known) universals; therefore, they (the words) denote the universal.

[The peculiar features of an object, not found in any other object in the world, cannot be expressed by words at all. At

the time of learning the convention about words, it is with the common characteristics of objects that we connect the words. Thus the words become expressive of them. The universals may really differ from one another, but words cannot express them. Even proper names denote universals. The name of a person stands for that unchanging recognisable element which persists in all the changes which he undergoes.]

The author now states that even the other view, namely, that words denote substance (*dravya*) depends on the function of words.

13. In the view that substance is the meaning of words, the meaning of all words can have the characteristic of substance. As the meanings of words are susceptible of assuming the properties of substance, the latter is said to be the meaning of all words.

[The other view about the meaning of words is that it is *dravya* which can be rendered as substance (as distinguished from attribute) or individual (as distinguished from the universal). This is the view of Vyāḍi as stated in Vā. 45 on P. 1.2.64. According to this view, all words denote *dravya*, some primarily and directly, others secondarily and indirectly. Just as, in the other view, some words denote the universal primarily and directly, while others do so secondarily and indirectly. According to this view, whatever may be the reality, a thing as conveyed by words is seen to possess the characteristics of *dravya* which are: the capacity of being referred to as 'this' or 'that', a certain completeness and independence, the fact of having gender and number. A quality like 'whiteness' may or may not in reality possess these attributes, but as presented by a word, it can have these properties or rather these properties are attributed to it.]

So far, it has been shown that all words have the same meaning (the universal or substance) on the basis of word-function (*śabda-vyāpāra*). The author now proceeds to show

that, according to the Vaiśeṣikas also, i.e. on the basis of the common characteristic of objects, all words denote the universal.

14. In all universals, the fact of being a universal consists in being found in all (the individuals which belong to the class) while in all particulars (*viśeṣa*), the universal consists in this that they distinguish (the things in which they reside from others).

[So far it has been maintained that it is in the nature of a word to convey the universal, whether that universal really exists or not. A word conveys it through its function, its power to convey meanings. But even by following the Vaiśeṣika line of reasoning, one can show that the universal is the meaning of words. What is, after all, a universal? It is something which exists in all its substrata, as a result of which all of them produce a uniform cognition and are called by the same name. Another characteristic of a universal is that it pervades the whole of its substratum and not merely a part of it. A universal like *gotva* has these characteristics. But there are many universals and it is not unreasonable to believe that there is another universal existing in all of them and sharing the characteristics of a universal in general. The word *viśeṣa* also denotes a common characteristic of the same kind. There are as many *viśeṣas* as there are eternal things (*nityadṛavya*) and they all have this common characteristic, namely, that each one exists in one eternal thing and not in any other. This is also thus a common property, something like a universal. Words like *abhāva* also denote a universal of the same kind.

What Helārāja wants to point out is that all the *viśeṣas* produce a uniform kind of cognition and are the cause of the same name (*viśeṣa*) being applied to them.]

The author now explains how words like *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *dik*, which stand for things which are one and eternal, denote the universal.

15. Once parts are postulated on the basis of the properties of the different objects (with which space (*ākāśa*) is) in contact, the universal of space also is found in these parts.

[Words like *ākāśa*, *kāla*, *dik*, stand for that common feature which is present in all the contingent divisions which we make in these things. For instance, *ākāśa* is one, but we artificially divide it into localities according to the different objects which exist in space. The space occupied by a jar is *ākāśa* just as the space occupied by a piece of cloth is *ākāśa*. In regard to all these divisions, we have the cognition that they are *ākāśa* and that is what the word stands for. The same thing can be said about time, direction, soul and the relation called *samavāya*. Soul is one, but it can be looked upon as different in each person with whom it is associated. We can say also that there are as many *samavāya*-s as there are pairs of things united by *samavāya*; but everywhere there is *iḥabuddhiḥ*: which is the connecting link.]

It is also possible to look upon these divisions of *ākāśa* as real ones and not merely as contingent ones.

16. Just as the connected (potsherds etc.) are parts of the jar and the like which (as such) are without divisions, in the same way, the connected objects are the parts of *ākāśa* which is really without any division.

[In the previous verse, it was declared that words like *ākāśa* denote a kind of universal on the basis of the contingent divisions of such things as *ākāśa*. But, perhaps, one can speak of these divisions as real and not contingent. An object like a jar, a whole, is, in itself, partless. Its parts, the potsherds, are its causes and connected with it by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Similarly, the various objects of the world which are in contact with *ākāśa* and which delimit it are the

real divisions of *ākāśa*. They become the *deśa* of *ākāśa* which, being their background, become their *deśa* too. *Ākāśa* and the objects become *deśa* to each other.]

The author now states where the divisions (*deśa*) are primary and where they are secondary, as, unless they are primary somewhere, we cannot speak of them as being secondary elsewhere.

17-18. The idea of difference persists in the case of objects joined together by the relation called conjunction (*saṃyoga*) whereas in the case of objects joined together by inherence (*samavāya*) the perception of difference disappears.

Therefore, the divisions consisting in objects joined together by conjunction are secondary whereas the divisions consisting in objects joined (to the whole) by inherence are primary because (the wholes) so united are not really different from the divisions.

[When we have the idea of two things being in contact, it is based on a difference between the two things. Even when we see the contact, we continue to see them as different from each other. The two things which come into contact make a kind of whole, but the two things are not essential parts of that whole, because we continue to perceive them as apart from the whole. But when two things are related to each other by inherence, the position is different. When we see a sphere, we do not see its two halves as distinct from the sphere. They form the very body of that sphere. They are, therefore, real parts of the whole called sphere. The division is a primary one and not a secondary one. But even within the field of things related by *saṃyoga* or contact, one must make a distinction. When an all-pervasive thing like *ākāśa* comes into contact with things, it is an invariable contact. The contact between the clothes and the

body is not an invariable contact. In the former case, we do divide the all-pervasive substance on the basis of the objects with which it is in contact].

The author now explains the universal according to the Vijñānavādins.

19. Some consider the universal to be merely something which figures as a common characteristic in our mind and the particular (*dravya*) to be that which figures as differentia.

[According to the Vijñānavādins, this attempt to show that words like *ākāśa* also denote the universal is futile, because, according to them, there is no such thing as the universal at all. They do not believe in the reality of the external world. They only believe in the different states of consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common properties while others appear as distinguishing features. A word denotes only this thing which figures in the consciousness and this is what is called *jāti*. In such matters, the grammarians are governed by two principles: (1) Grammar is common to all disciplines, (2) for Grammarians, meaning (*artha*) is just what the word conveys. The second principle enables them to explain the universal according to the Vijñānavādins. According to the latter, the universal is something which occurs in the mind when a word is heard. In other words, it is *śabdārtha* and for Grammarians also, *artha* means *śabdārtha*.]

The author now points out the need for postulating the existence of the universal.

20. To say that things are different or that they are identical presupposes some external basis (*paropādhiḥ*). This diversity in objects arises only when they are united in some way.

21. Neither identity nor difference, neither existence nor non-existence of objects is possible if they are not linked with one another.

[The above two verses are meant to be an answer to one who might say that things differ from one another only because of time, place and circumstances. If such differences are ignored, all things would be the same. Why then postulate an universal? It is pointed out here that unless it is postulated, all *vyavahāra* or verbal transaction, would be impossible. *Vyavahāra* depends upon some basis (*upādhi*) or other].

The author now puts forward the *advaita* view on this subject, namely, that it is the powers of the One which are the basis.

22. The ultimate view is that it is the One which has all the powers. To postulate difference between the objects themselves is unnecessary.

23. Therefore, substance etc. are only powers (of the Supreme), made known by their different functions. United, they help man to reach his goal and not separately.

24. Just as the collocation of the senses etc. is not an entity over and above the things composing it, in the same way, the connection between the different powers of the Supreme is not a separate entity.

[All the previous discussion arose in connection with the question: how do words like *ākāśa* denote the universal? The answer was based upon contingent divisions of *ākāśa*. Contingent divisions are only artificial divisions which really do not exist. But when it comes to the other things of the world, they were assumed to be real. In verse 22, the author states that, according to *Advaita*, *Brahman* is the only reality.

Everything else, that is to say, all distinctions such as the universal, the particular and so on are unreal. They are all the products of the powers of *Brahman*. The seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas are only the powers of *Brahman*. These powers are inferred from their effects. Though the various objects of the world, produced by the powers of *Brahman* are distinct from one another, still they join together in order to do their work. But one cannot, because of that, maintain that it is their connection and not the things themselves which are effective nor that the connection which is eternal, is an entity different from *Brahman*. That would go against monism. The connection is not over and above the things connected. Just as in perception, the senses, the mind and the object must come together and this coming together, this collocation (*sāmagrī*) is not an entity over and above them, so is the case here. Thus, there is no damage to monism].

Remark: *Sambandhi-sambandha-saṁsarge'pi*. *Sambandhin*=the Supreme, *sambandha*=the powers of things, *saṁsarga*=the connection of the powers.

The author now says how the universal which is eternal helps the effect.

25. Nothing is produced in which its universal does not exist. The universal sets the causes (of the particular) in motion for its own manifestation.

26. The universals, after having obtained a footing among the eternal and non-eternal causes, manifest themselves again and again in some effects.

[The universal requires the particular or the individual for its manifestation. It, therefore, prompts, as it were, the causes of the particular, so that the latter may come into existence. It becomes a kind of contributory cause in the creation of the particular. The word used here is *prayojikā*. In Vaiśeṣika terminology, it would be a *nimittakāraṇa*. The universal exists in the material cause of an object, whether eternal or otherwise and makes its appearance when the parti-

cular is produced. The effect is supposed to exist in the cause in the form of the universal which is manifested in the particular which is produced. Thus, the universal helps in the production of the particular which is the effect].

As the universal exists even before the individual is produced, it is eternal. How it helps is now stated.

27. The universal is the cause even of that object which is newly produced. In order that its substratum might be produced, it prompts the action to come to be.

[In a sentence like *sa Kaṭam Karoti* (he makes a mat), 'mat' is the object of the action of making. In other words, it is a *sādhana*, an accessory of the action of making. Before it is made, it does not exist. How can it then become a *sādhana*? To this objection, the answer is that its universal was already present in its causes and it is that which helps in its production. The universal aspect of it is the *sādhana* and the individual (*vyakti*) aspect of it is the effect (*Kārya*). After all, the universal and the individual are not two totally different things like a cow and a horse. They are indissolubly mixed up. They are two aspects of the same thing which gets two names accordingly. Why the universal is called *prayojikā* is this: Before a man makes a mat, he has the universal of it in his mind and then proceeds to assemble the material. But for that, he would not act. It is the universal which prompts him].

The author now states that, according to the view that the word denotes the universal, it is not the individual which is the accessory of an action (*sādhana*), but the universal.

28. A universal such as brāhmaṇa-hood is the accessory in the case of a command or a prohibition. This universal is qualified by the one belonging to the number of the individual.

[It is the universal which is the object of all the actions, commands or prohibitions, which are found in the *Vedas*. In

carrying them out, it is the universal which is the accessory, that is, the means (*sādhana*). Not only that. The universal of the number expressed by the suffix qualifies this universal].

As the universal is never found apart from the individual, would it be right to maintain that the word expresses the former only? This doubt is now answered.

29. Just as a face, reflected in water etc. is only called as such (that is, a face without any connection with water etc.), in the same way, a word expresses only the universal manifested by the individuals.

[In reality, we never see the universal apart from the individual in which it inheres. But in spite of that, a word conveys only the universal through its expressive power (*abhidhā*). We use the word *mukha* for the face which is reflected in a mirror and not also for the mirror which reflects it. Similarly, a word conveys by *abhidhā*, on the basis of convention, the pure universal and not also the individual which manifests it. In perception, however, the two are mixed up. A word, on the other hand, conveys a meaning according to convention.

See Vāk. I. 100 and the Vṛtti thereon].

The author now states how, if the individuals are not conveyed by the expressive power of words, they can distinguish the universals.

30. Just as the difference in the organ of sense, though unperceived because of the non-perception of the organ still leads to an awareness of the difference in the knowledge (produced by the senses) of their respective objects,

31. in the same way, some individuals, though themselves unperceived, still become the cause of the difference in the knowledge of the universals.

[The individuals, though not conveyed by words, still serve to qualify the knowledge of the universal which arises from words, just as, in perceptual knowledge, the senses, though not themselves perceived, still serve to distinguish one kind of sense perception from another].

So far, the view that the word conveys the universal only by its expressive power has been explained. There are two other views: (1) that it conveys the individual as qualified by the universal, (2) that it conveys the individual.

The author now states that the distinction between the universal and the individual can be explained on the basis of the view that everything is the result of the different powers of the One Reality.

32. Of the real and unreal elements which are found in every object, the real element is the universal, whereas the unreal one is the individual.

33. It is Being which, being differentiated according to the object in which it is present, is called the universal. All words are based on that.

[That element in objects which is peculiar to them, which comes and goes, is a transformation of nescience (*avidyā*). It is that which is called *vyakti*. It is not real, because it is not permanent and not found in all objects. Only that is real which is permanent and which constitutes the pervading essence of an object. That is what the monists call the universal (*jāti*). In such gold ornaments as *rucaka*, *svastika*, *kuṇḍala* etc., the particular shape of the ornament is the impermanent thing. These shapes are mutually exclusive, whereas gold is the persisting essence of all. That is real or *satya*. But it has only a relative reality. Gold is fire (*tejas*) which is more pervasive and, therefore, the persisting element compared to goldness. But even the reality of *tejas* is relative. If we go on seeking wider and wider realities, we will come to *Brahman* which is the only Reality

which is everywhere and in everything. That is the highest universal. So it is called *mahāsattā*, the great Being. It is this *mahāsattā* which is found in all objects in the form of their universals, as 'cowness' in a cow, 'horseness' in a horse and so on. What is called *gotva* is nothing but *gosattā*, Being as it exists in a cow. All words thus ultimately express this great Being and it is only through the limiting factor with which it is associated in each object that it appears as *gotva*, *aśvatva* and so on].

34. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is eternal, it is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes *-tva* and *-tal*.

[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called 'Being'. Even negative entities have it because they also figure in our mind. Hence every noun-stem denotes this, whether it is the name of a positive or negative entity. Roots also do the same. They denote 'Being' as existing in the different individual actions which depend upon the accessories (*sādhana*) for their accomplishment. Thus, it is this Being which is presented as finished or accomplished (*siddha*) by nouns and as a process (*sādhya*) by roots and there is no third possibility. It is not merely the stem and the root which thus denote Being, but also the suffixes. They denote Being as associated with such limiting factors as number, accessory etc. Not merely according to the monists, but according to the followers of Sāṅkhya also, all words denote Being which is the same as what they call 'Mahat' or Buddhi].

Remark: For the Sāṅkhya view, see *Vyāsaśāstra* on Y. Dar. II. 19.

This idea is now further explained—

35. It is this universal, (namely, Being) which is called 'action' when it assumes sequence in the details. When the form having sequence is destroyed, it is just called substance (*sattvam*).

[In all things, there is the comprehensive universal called 'Being'. What is called 'action' and what is called 'substance' (*sattva*)—both these are only transformations of Being (*sattā*). A verb expresses this *sattā* as a process, something which has parts arranged in a sequence and which depends upon accessories endowed with movement for its accomplishment. Every verb expresses a process of this kind. Even though these processes differ from one another, they are all processes. The fact of being a process is their common feature. This is the universal of action which is a *vivarta*, an unreal manifestation of *sattā* or Being. This is the meaning of all roots. When a process of this type is not understood from a root, when the inner sequence which is the essence of a process is not understood, what we understand is called *sattva*, substance or thing, which is also a transformation of Being. This is also called *dravya*. Action is *sādhya* and *sattva* is *siddha*, and they are the two unreal manifestations (*vivarta*) of Brahman. To say that all words convey Being is equal to saying that all words convey the universal (*jāti*) because Being is the greatest of all the universals and it is identical with Brahman. Thus according to the view that all words convey the universal (the *jātipakṣa*), they really convey Brahman. According to the other view also, namely, that all words denote *dravya*, they denote the same thing, namely, Brahman, because it is going to be explained that what is called *dravya* is also Brahman. *Jāti* and *dravya* are only two ways of understanding Brahman. When it is thought of as the persisting feature in everything, it is called *jāti*. When it is thought of as a finished thing, it is called *dravya*. Thus both the views really stand for the same view, namely, that all words denote *Brahman*.

All this has been said according to *Brahmadarśana*. But *Vyākaraṇa*, as a *śāstra*, is not particularly attached to any system of philosophy. It is *sarvaparīṣada*, it is common to all schools. Therefore, points of Grammar are sometimes sought to be explained by reference to other systems also].

The author now states that, according to the author of the Nirukta also, all actions are unreal manifestations of Being.

36. It is this universal which assumes six states in the transformations of Being. On account of its powers, it appears so in a sequence.

[That all actions are only unreal manifestations of Being (*sattā*) is supported by Yāska also. He quotes with approval the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi who said that *bhāva* or Being undergoes six transformations: it is born, it exists, it changes, it increases, it decreases and it is destroyed. A thing is first born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes change, change means growth and then decay and, finally, comes destruction. (See Ni. 1.2.9.) These so called transformations (*vikāra*) are not real. Here *vikāra* only means *vivarta*, an unreal manifestation. Followers of Āgama maintain that Brahman who is omnipotent has a power called 'Nescience' on account of which the one Brahman is presented as many. Because what is manifested has multiplicity, the power which is One, is spoken of as being many].

The author now explains how the manifestations appear in a sequence.

37. Sequence also belongs to the very essence of this Being. In it, Time is seen, as though divided into forms like priority and posteriority.

[What is called Time is a power of *Brahman*. Sequence is the very essence of Being and it is also the very essence of Time. Sequence is really not different from what has sequence. Time is not an entity quite apart from the things which appear in a sequence. Time is just a power of *Brahman*, as a result of which actions appear with sequence within them].

The author now explains how destruction is also essentially "Being".

38. If one accepts the eclipse of objects, that is their non-existence. When this eclipse assumes inner sequence, one gets the cognition that the object is perishing.

[The question now arises: how can birth and destruction which are not positive things be transformations of Being? The answer, as far as destruction is concerned is this: what is called destruction is nothing more than hiding (*tirobhāva*), not being visible. When a thing exists in its causes as a mere potentiality, it is called destruction. This condition exists before a thing is produced and when it is destroyed. When, due to the activity of the accessories, the process of hiding becomes perceptible and is conveyed by a verb, in its first stage it is expressed by the verb *apakṣīyate*—it declines, and, in its last stage, by the verb *vinaśyati*—it is destroyed. Thus, out of the six transformations of Being; two relate to the process of hiding or disappearing. Hiding or existing in the causes in the form of a potentiality is a form of 'Being'].

The author now points out that 'birth' is also a transformation of 'Being'.

39. It is Being which, fallen from its previous state and not having yet attained the later state, is called 'birth' on the basis of the different moments coming between the two.

[To say that something is being born amounts to this: that it has moved from the previous condition of existing as a mere potentiality in its causes, but has not yet reached a condition where it can be said to exist. Birth is not the coming into being of something which did not exist at all before. It stands for that intermediate state between existing

in the causes as a potentiality and existing as an actuality, a state conceived of as a process. In the list of the six transformations of Being, each represents the coming into being of some new feature. In that sense, each stands for birth].

The author now points out which associated things bring about multiplicity in 'Being'.

40. It is its substratum or its (fictitious) parts or things appearing to be different from it or its own powers which are the causes of differentiation in Being.

[The substratum causes variety or multiplicity. Just as the same face, reflected in oil or water or mirror, appears to vary, similarly, the same 'Being', manifested by a cow or a horse, appears to be different. Or, one can say that the universals like 'cowness' or 'horseness' etc. which are nothing else than artificial divisions of Being, make the one appear to be many. The whole which is one appears to have multiplicity through its own parts. Sometimes multiplicity is due to things like space, time and the senses. We speak of things thus: 'this is here now', 'that was there then' and so on, showing how time and space bring about difference. To one who is suffering from jaundice, white appears to be yellow. The ultimate truth is this: Brahman which is omnipotent appears as many for the worldly experiencer].

After having pointed out that, according to the views of others and of the Grammarians, the universal is the meaning of words, the author now explains its properties.

41. The universal does not depend upon any particular shape for its manifestation in Earth etc. Nor does it become destroyed with its substratum, though the latter is not eternal.

[Universals like earth-ness, water-ness do not require any particular shape or disposition of parts for their mani-

festation. A jar appears as earth just as much as a mountain does. But such universals as cowness (*gotva*) require a particular shape for their manifestation. Secondly, a universal, like a quality exists in its substratum by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), but if the substratum is destroyed, the quality is also destroyed, but not the universal. A universal depends upon a substratum only for its manifestation and cognition and not for its very existence].

Where would the universals, inhere when, at the Great Dissolution, even eternal things are destroyed? To this, the author replies as follows:

42. Others declare that the substratum of all universals cannot be destroyed, holding the view, that, at the Great Dissolution, everything is not destroyed at the same time.

[The universals require a substratum for their manifestation. But, at the time of the Great Dissolution, all effects and transitory things which form the substrata of the universals disappear. What happens then to the universals? This question is answered by some by saying that such a thing as Great Dissolution does not take place at all. So all universals always have some substrata or other. Others say that all things are not simultaneously dissolved with the same universe and secondly, there is no end to the number of universes. So, somewhere or other, there are always substrata for the universals.]

Remark: The Mīmāṃsakas do not believe in *Mahāpralaya*.

What is the answer of those who believe in the Great Dissolution?

43. Those who believe in Unity hold that, once the different objects are dissolved in the ultimate cause (*Prakṛti*), the universals have their existence as one with the ultimate substance.

[Those who believe in the Great Dissolution must naturally answer this question differently. They say that what is called the Great Dissolutoin is nothing more than the merging of everything in the root-cause, the Great Universal (*mahāsāmānya*). The universals also merge in it which is here called substance (*dravya*). This root-cause is nothing more than the Great-Universal. According to Advaitins, it is nothing more than the cause which is found in all effects. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that, in the Great Dissolution, the universals exist without any substratum. But here the author has stated his own view].

The author now makes a statement on the basis of the view that all universals exist everywhere.

44. Universals like brāhmaṇa-hood reside in all living beings. Once they are manifested, they produce their effects. This is another tradition.

[Universals like brāhmaṇa-hood exist everywhere, but are manifested only through particular substrata. So one cannot argue that if the universals exist everywhere, jar-ness would exist in a cloth also and thus confusion would result. Only a jar can manifest jar-ness and not anything else. Thus, according to this view, all universals exist in the ultimate cause like the atoms at the time of the Great Dissolution.]

45. Some declare that the universals are manifested in pictures etc. But they become the cause of the attainment of merit and demerit only when they have living beings as substrata.

[Some go to the extent of saying that the universals of sentient things exist in their non-sentient images. But this is not correct. All that happens is that, due to similarity between the original and the image, similarity of cognition takes place. That does not prove the presence of the universal.]

The author now states how the omniscients acquire their knowledge of the universals.

46. The knowledge regarding the universals of those who are different from us proceeds from all the senses, just as that relating to the characteristics of precious stones and coins comes through practice in the case of those who know them.

[All words denote universals which exist in the particulars that manifest them. But here a doubt arises. If the particulars manifest the universals, how is it that they do not do so for one who does not know the language. Such a person, after seeing a large number of cows and other animals, does not seem to see the 'cowness' which exists in all cows and does not exist in the other animals and give expression to it by the word 'cow'. If the individual cows do manifest 'cow-ness', how is it that he does not perceive it? And if he ultimately comes to see it through others, how did the latter know it? Such reasoning will ultimately take us back to one who is naturally omniscient and knows all the universals and their words and teaches others. The assumption of the existence of such a person or persons becomes necessary for the knowledge of such universals as 'brāhmaṇa-hood' which differs from such universals as 'cow-ness' in that the latter can be observed by all as existing in all cows and not existing in other animals, whereas the former cannot be so observed. These omniscient beings were the original teachers of mankind and they were taught by God (*Īśvara*). As the *Yogasūtras* say: *Sa pūrveṣāṃ api guruḥ, Kāle-nānavacchedāt.* (Y. Dar. I. 26). When, after the Great Dissolution, *Brahmā* and others are created again, it is *Īśvara* who teaches them and they pass on the knowledge to others. All the *śāstras* testify to the existence of omniscient Beings, *Īśvara* and the deities. They directly see the universals and the substrata which manifest them. They differ from us in that their senses are not restricted in their scope. They can hear with the nose, see what is behind them and do the work

of all the senses with the tips of their fingers. For them, knowledge of Brāhmaṇa-hood is not merely visual, but proceeds from their other senses also. They can see subtle universals in words. Besides Tradition, there is another proof for the existence of omniscient beings. We do see in life that practice increases both knowledge and power in some individuals. Jewellers acquire great skill in detecting the genuineness of precious stones. Whatever has degree reaches its climax somewhere. That Being in whom knowledge and power reach their climax is Īśvara. From Him, some Yogis get their knowledge. These Yogis are superior to us. They can see what we cannot. They can see Brāhmaṇa-hood directly, just as we can see 'cow-ness'. It is they who teach us that such and such a word denotes such and such a universal. In doing so, they only make known what is already there. The relation between word and meaning is eternal.]

The author now considers whether, in words like *jāti-gandhatva*, '*utpalagandhatva*' etc., the abstract suffix-*tva* expresses the wider universal, namely, the fact of being smell or the lower universal, namely, the fact of being the smell of *jāti* flower etc.

47. The particular fact (smell) which is resorted to in words like *jātigandha* and *utpalagandha*, is not conveyed in the world by the abstract suffixes, it being (relatively more) transitory.

[It was said before that all words denote universals. Here a question arises: in words like *jātigandhatva*, *utpalagandhatva* etc., does the suffix-*tva* denote the universal of smell or the universal of a particular smell? The answer is that the suffix expresses smell in general and not the fact of being a particular smell, the smell of a particular flower. That is because the former is wider and more comprehensive. The quality of being a particular smell is relatively '*anitya*', less comprehensive. So the suffix must be taken to express that which is relatively more permanent and more comprehensive.]

The author now points out that some universals have no words to express them.

48. Universals like the fact of being a 'man-lion' have no words of their own to express them. They are conveyed by other words the (fictitious) parts of which are similar (to other words in the language).

[Universals like 'the fact of being a man-lion (*nara-siṃhatva*) have no words to express them. The word *nara-siṃha* has two parts, each of which is like another word in the language. The result is that each of these words brings to our mind its own universal. The word *nara* brings the fact of 'being human' to the mind and *siṃha* brings to the mind the fact of 'being a lion'. But the universal 'the fact of being a man-lion' is something quite different from *naratva* and *siṃhatva*. It is not a mixture of the two. The word *narasiṃha* is really an indivisible word and to say that it has two parts which resemble two other words in the language is really a fiction. Because the two fictitious parts of the word bring to our mind two other universals, the word can cause only an error in us. The fact is that such universals have no words of their own to express them.]

The author now states that like the stem, the suffix also denotes the universal and that the two are coordinated.

49. In any consideration of the scope of the universal (of a thing or of an action) the number or the universal in it (denoted by the suffixes) is of use because of its connection, even though it may be separated.

[The universal exists in a thing or in an action by the relation of inherence. The determination of its scope is based on the consideration whether it resides in one thing or in more than one thing. When such a consideration is made, the universal of the number conveyed by the suffix in the

noun or the verb plays a useful part. It does so, not because it is directly connected, but by the relation of *ekārthasamaveta-samavāya* = inhering in what inheres in a thing. Between the universal of number conveyed by the suffix in a verb and the universal of action, there is this relation through their substratum. The universal conveyed by the stem and the particular number reside in the same thing. Only that which has been understood can qualify, it does not matter whether it is understood directly or indirectly. According to the view that all words denote the particular, the particular number is conveyed directly by the word and not indirectly understood. In such expressions as *gauḥ*, *gāvau*, *pacati*, *pacataḥ*, a thing having a particular number is understood as the main thing. Thus the meaning conveyed by the suffix becomes the *viśeṣaṇa* and the meaning conveyed by the stem becomes the *viśeṣya*. This is also in keeping with the well-known saying that a verb is a word which primarily expresses an action. In the word *pacati*, for instance, the action of cooking which is the meaning of the root is the main thing and it is qualified by the accessories etc. which are conveyed by the suffix. In the word *aupagava*, on the other hand, the idea of progeny, conveyed by the suffix, is the main thing and it is qualified by the meaning of the stem. It is in reference to words like that that the saying *Prakṛti-pratyayau pratyayārtham saha brūtaḥ* applies.]

The author now points out that, sometimes, the meaning of the suffix is not meant to be coordinated with that of the stem.

50. Even when the powers of number, the accusative case and the like have the same verbal element to express them, it is seen that there is secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) when they (are not actually meant but merely exist to) give a certain completeness to the word or that they help in the accomplishment of the action (which is the real meaning of the sentence).

[Thus, speaking generally, one can say that the word conveys the meaning of the stem as qualified by that of the suffix. That is how the meanings of the two elements of a word, both universals, are co-ordinated. Sometimes, things happen differently. That is, though the suffix is used in order to lend a certain completeness and correctness to the word, its meaning does not play any part. In the sentence *graham sammārṣti*, the second case-affix expresses the singular number, but it is not to be taken seriously, because more than one vessel (*graha*) is wiped. Similarly, in the sentence *saktūn juhoti*, the accusative case expressed by the second case-affix in *saktūn* is not to be taken seriously. All that the sentence means is: the sacrifice is to be performed with ground grain (*saktu*). The act of performing a sacrifice is meant to serve an invisible purpose and, therefore, that is the important thing. The *homa* is not performed in order to reduce the flour to ashes. It is performed in order to attain an invisible fruit, with, of course, ground grain as the material. Somebody at this stage might argue as follows. If this is the case, it is wrong to say that the accusative case in 'saktūn' is not significant. One can speak of something which actually exists as not seriously meant. For example, in *graham sammārṣti*, the second case-affix does convey the singular number which, therefore, really exists, but is not significant. But nobody says that the accusative case is not significant in *Kāṣṭhāni pacanti*=the fuel cooks, because it does not exist at all. There, the nominative case is used instead of the usual instrumental case which, therefore, can be said to be not meant. But this line of argument is not right. Because, if, in the sentence *saktūn pacati*, *saktu* is not the grammatical object (*karma*), that is, if it is not what the agent wishes to reach most, the invisible purpose itself cannot be attained. What one means by saying that the accusative case is not significant is that the sacrifice is not performed for the sake of ground grain. It is the latter which is made use of in order to attain some other purpose.

Sometimes number and the accusative case serve the purpose of accomplishing the action which is the meaning

of the sentence and that is done by specifying in some way the things which are the accessories of the action. For example, in the sentence, *paśunā yajeta*=one should perform the sacrifice by means of an animal, the singular number in *paśunā* is significant, because the sacrifice can be fully accomplished even with one animal. Similarly, in *Vrīhīn avahanti*=he threshes the paddy grains, the accusative case expressed by the second case-affix is significant, because *vrīhi* is what the agent wishes most to reach, because it is to be cleaned by means of threshing. Threshing is never for its own sake, but for the sake of the paddy-grains. When threshed, they become fit to make the sacrificial cake (*puro-dāśa*). Thus, they become accessories to the sacrifice. The grains are more important than the act of threshing. They, when threshed, are of further use *Saktu*, on the other hand, after it is thrown into the fire, is not of further use, because it exists no more. When it is said that threshing is less important than the grains, it is from the point of view of reality. As far as the language is concerned, it is threshing which is enjoined in the sentence *vrīhīn avahanti*.]

The author now points out the scope of secondary power (*lakṣaṇā*) in the formation of words.

51. No finished object (*sattvabhūto'rthah*) can be expressed without a number. Therefore, the number which is found in all expressions is not (necessarily) significant.

[A thing is what can be referred to by a pronoun such as 'this' or 'that'. It is always associated with some number. It cannot be otherwise expressed in language. So the number which a word expressive of a thing (*dravya*) has should not always be taken seriously. It is there only to lend a certain completeness or correctness to the word].

To this general rule, some point out an exception,

52. According to some, the singular and the plural numbers are not significant, as they serve only to convey the universal. But the dual number is significant.

[According to some, the singular and plural numbers may not be meant to be taken seriously. They may be only the means to convey the universal, as in the sentences: *brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ*=a brāhmaṇa is not to be killed, *surā na peyā*=wine is not to be drunk, *vṛṣalair na praveṣṭavyam*=śūdras are not to enter. Where the singular number is significant, the word may primarily convey the individual (*dravya*). The dual number, on the other hand, can never be used for conveying the universal primarily. It always denotes the individual primarily].

The author now says that, sometimes, even the dual number is not significant.

53. In such a sentence as: "if these two fall ill, this medicine should be given", the number two belonging to the objects is not significant.

[But even the dual number is sometimes not meant to be taken seriously, as, in the sentence: 'if these two (dual number) fall ill, this medicine should be given to them'. Even if only one of them falls ill, the medicine is given].

The author now points out that the number expressed by the stem is always significant.

54. In sentences like: "he digs to the accompaniment of two (mantras)", the number expressed by words like 'one' etc. is to be considered as part of the action, because this (number) arises out of the stem of the word.

[The universal of number conveyed by the stem is always seriously meant. In such expressions as *dvābhyām mantrābhyām mṛdaṃ khaṇati*, *caturbhir ādatte*, *āṣṭabhir harati*, the number conveyed by the stem is significant. Otherwise, there would be no meaning in using that particular stem at all. That particular stem denotes a particular number].

It is now pointed out that the singular number, conveyed by the suffix, is also sometimes significant.

55. In the sentence "one should sacrifice with an animal", though there is a certain completeness (*samskāra*), the number one must be considered to be as much a part of the action to be performed as the universal.

[It was said before that the dual number is always seriously meant. It does not come in merely to lend a certain completeness or correctness to the word. A word which ends in a dual-suffix denotes primarily the individual and not the universal. But, sometimes, the singular number is also significant, as in the sentence: *paśunā yajeta*. Here the universal conveyed by the stem, namely, that of an animal is an important element in the action. Similarly, the singular number conveyed by the suffix is also an important element. The two elements are conveyed by the same word, appear as one in the mind and cannot be separated. The inner relation between the different elements of the same word is *apauruṣeya*, not made by man. The injunction to perform the sacrifice, expressed by the sentence *paśunā yajeta* applies to the singular number also, through *upādāna* or inclusion or implication which is different from the six authorities, *śruti* etc. The injunction cannot, relate to a bare animal without any number].

Remark: See Mī. Sū. 3.3.14.

The author now says that, even those who hold that the suffix expressive of the singular number is only for the sake

of lending completeness to the word, consider it to be significant for other reasons.

56. The mention of second etc is an indication that the singular number is significant. It is also an indication that both the universal and number are found in the same thing.

[After having declared: *Āgneyamajamagniṣṭoma ālabheta*, it is said: *aindrāgnaṃ dvitīyaṃ ukthye, aindraṃ pṛṣṇiṃ tṛtīyaṃ ṣoḍaśini*. The very mention of *dvitīya*=second, *tṛtīya*=third etc is a proof that the number one expressed by the suffix is significant. It also proves that the universal and number are found in the same object. Unless the universal is found completely in one individual, it would be impossible to sacrifice a second animal. Unless the whole universal is found in an animal, it would not be that animal at all. As Helārāja puts it: *Yāvātā hi vinā nopapadyate tāvato'rthasyaitallīṅgam*].

57. (In the sentence *paśunā yajeta*) the animal is taught for the first time as the means of sacrifice, not taught elsewhere and also that it is subsidiary to the act of sacrifice. That is why it (the singular number) is significant.

[The reason why the singular number is significant in the sentence *paśunā yajeta* is that it mentions for the first time that the object to be sacrificed is an animal which is, therefore, an *aṅga* of the sacrifice. There is no other text where the number of animals to be sacrificed is mentioned. From this very text, we have to understand the number also].

The author now says that the sentence *grahaṃ sam-mārṣti* is a different case.

58. In such sentences as "vessels dedicated to Prajāpati are nine in number", the vessels are taught in different numbers.

59. How can the number mentioned in connection with what is (generally) understood as being subsidiary but becomes important as far as cleaning is concerned be significant?

[This is not the case in the sentence '*grahaṇ sammārṣṭi*'. Here the singular number in '*graham*' is not significant because there are other texts where the exact number of the vessels (*graha*) in the different ceremonies is mentioned. In those texts, the number comes as the meaning of the stem. Here, the main purpose of the text is to teach the cleansing of the vessels. Thus, the vessels become, in reality, the important thing (*aṅgin*) in regard to the act of cleaning, though, verbally, cleaning is the important thing. It is natural that all the vessels previously mentioned should be cleaned and not merely any one of them. Therefore, the singular number is not significant for two reasons: (1) the real number is taught elsewhere (2) in regard to cleaning, the vessels become *aṅgin*].

The author now says that the singular number becomes significant where there is a special reason for it.

60. Neither the idea that the singular number lends completeness to the language when number has been taught elsewhere nor that it becomes important is the reason for considering it as insignificant. It is significant when an effort is made to make it so.

[Though the above two reasons have been given for holding the singular in *grahaṇ sammārṣṭi* to be not significant, the real reason is the one given in verse 51. It becomes significant only if there is a special reason for it. There is no such reason in this case].

That is what the author now says—

61. No distinction has been made as far as the cleansing of vessels is concerned. They are taught (in different numbers) and they have to be purified. Therefore, all are taken.

[There is no indication anywhere that only one particular vessel is to be cleaned. The singular number in *graham* is no such indication as it does not specify any particular vessel].

The author now points out what indication there is in *paśunā yajeta*.

62. As the universal is present in full in every substratum, one would think of resorting to more than one animal only if the act cannot be accomplished with one.

[In the sentence *paśunā yajeta* there is a special reason for considering the singular number significant. If the universal of the animal were to reside completely only in more than one animal taken together, it would be necessary to sacrifice all of them before the whole of the universal is sacrificed. That is not the case. The whole of the universal is found in any single animal.]

63. When the act has been accomplished with one animal, if one takes another merely because it is possible to do so, such an act would be useless.

64. Just as it is useless to sow the seed in a woman in whom it has already been sown, in the same way, it would be useless to resort to another animal when the act has been completed with one.

[The sacrifice is complete when one animal has been sacrificed. By sacrificing more than one animal, the sacrificer is not likely to get any extra fruit. Thus, it is simpler to say that the singular number is significant.]

Others give some other reason than simplicity for considering the singular number to be significant.

65. As the act can be accomplished by that much (that is, by one) some think that there is no reason for by-passing the number one. In this way, the singular would not be (openly taught as) accessory to action.

[Some argue that we come to many only after having passed one and as the sacrifice can be performed with one, we take one and not more than one. There is no special reason for by-passing the number one. The number one would serve the purpose (*sāmarthya*). Thus, due to simplicity and because it would serve the purpose, the singular number is significant.]

66. The indications in 'second' etc. only confirm what has already been understood through reasoning. From them, number is not understood as an accessory as the universal is.

[The words *dvitīya*, *trītiya* etc. are *lingas*, indications of what has already been understood through simplicity and fulfilment of purpose (*lāghava* and *sāmarthya*). They say nothing new. The singular number in *paśunā* does not say that it is also a part of the accessory, because it has already been understood through simplicity and fulfilment of purpose. Verbally, it is not significant and still it comes in as shown above and the work is done.]

The view expressed in verses 65 and 66 was that of 'some' (*kecit*). It is now criticized.

67. If, on the basis of agreement and difference, number is actually understood from the text, it is right that it should also become an accessory and not merely be secondary to the meaning of something else.

[This is not the right way of looking at it. The real position is that the singular number is understood only if the suffix of the singular is present and not otherwise. If it is thus understood, what is the reason for abandoning it? It should also be considered a *sādhana*, accessory to action. It is not there merely to give a certain completeness to the meaning of the stem. The word *paśunā* expresses two ideas, one through the stem and the other through the suffix, and they stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other. To accept one and reject the other is not right. Secondly, unless the singular number is taken as actually taught, it would not be possible to substitute clarified butter when, for some reason or other, one of the *avadāna*-s is lost. One can use another animal, because there would be no obligation to stick to one animal. But if the singular number is openly taught one cannot resort to another animal and so one can take clarified butter as a substitute.

68. When the full meaning of the word (including both the universal and the number) is the accessory to action, the power of the word to convey both is not affected and that is an indication that number has also a function to perform in regard to action.

[When, both the universal and the number are equal because both are expressed by the same word, both become accessories. Thereby, the word does not lose its capacity to express the accessory. From this we understand the function of number. As smoke is invariably concomittant with fire, it causes the inference of the latter. Similarly, because the power of the word to convey the accessory is not lost, so it becomes the cause of our understanding the function of number. Where there is no such indication of the function

of number as for example, in *graham sammārṣṭi*, there the number is not significant.]

The author now adopts another argument and reaches the same conclusion.

69. The unknown (*apūrva*) is to be considered important as it is to be taught; the known (*vihita*) is to be considered secondary, as it exists for something else.

70. As (in the sentence in question) cleansing is to be taught and considering that the vessels are taught elsewhere (for the first time) the number found in the injunctive sentence is not to be rejected in (the interpretation) of the confirmatory sentence.

[The question which is being discussed here is when the meaning expressed by the suffix, such as number, is significant and when it is not. So far, the question was discussed on the basis of the nature of the meaning conveyed by the suffix. Now, it is being discussed from the point of view of the function of the sentence. That which is *vidheya*, that is to be primarily conveyed by the sentence is the new feature and that is the important thing. That which is already made known elsewhere is mentioned in order to convey something else through it. It is only restated (*anūḍita*). In the sentence *graham sammārṣṭi*, it is the cleaning (*sammārga*) which is the new thing to be taught in regard to the vessels already taught elsewhere. In that other passage, the number of the vessels is also mentioned. That number is the one which is meant in the sentence in question. The number expressed by the suffix here is not to be taken seriously. The suffix only serves the purpose of lending correctness or completeness to the form (*śabdasaṃskāra*). The number expressed by it is set aside by the number openly mentioned by the stem in that other sentence. Before, the line of argu-

ment was that the cleaning is for the sake of the vessels which are, therefore, more important in the sentence under consideration. Here, the line of argument is that what is mentioned in the injunctive sentence is more important than what is mentioned in a mere re-statement (*anuvāda*).]

The author now points out that the case is different in the sentence *paśunā yajeta*.

71. There is no contradictory number for the animal in some other injunctive sentence; therefore, it (the animal) is understood together with its qualities and the singular number.

[As to the sentence, *paśunā yajeta*, it teaches sacrifice with the animal as its accessory (*guṇa*). The animal is taught for the first time. Therefore, the particular number expressed by the suffix is also significant. Together with the animal which is specified, it becomes an accessory of the sacrifice. This way of looking at it is in accordance with the view of the Mīmāṃsakas. (See Mī. Sū. III. 1.7.13-15).]

The author now says something about other qualities besides number.

72. As an action depends upon substance (*dravya*), so does it on a quality which is taught in connection with an action whose relation to a substance is already settled.

[Just like number, other qualities also become accessories to action through the process of specifying a substance. Action requires accessories and it is a substance which can be so. But a substance is the substratum of qualities. It has always some quality or other. So action depends upon qualities also. It is quality which specifies a substance which is the real accessory to an action. In regard to action, a substance is an inner (*antarāṅga*) factor, whereas quality is

an outer (*bahirāṅga*) factor. That is why substance is connected with action first and, through it, quality also is connected. This sequence is significant. Substance is the substratum of power and power is the real accessory to action.]

73. Because of their mutual indispensibility a particular quality is associated with a substance. Similarly, a substratum is also invariably associated with a quality.

74. When, because of this mutual indispensibility, a relation between the two is understood, it should not be abandoned nor something not actually mentioned be brought in.

[Substance and quality require each other. This mutual requirement is called *sāmarthya*. Granting this mutual dependence, when a relation between them is understood from the very words of the sentence, it cannot be abandoned. All this about substance and quality is being said from the point of view of artificial abstraction (*apoddhāra*). In reality, the sentence is one and its meaning is an indivisible complex whole. Therefore, there cannot be any question of bringing in the meaning of a word which has not been mentioned in the sentence. As there is a mutual indispensibility between substance and quality, if both are expressed by separate verbal elements in the same sentence, they must be connected with each other. There is no justification to abandon this connection and connect any of the two with something not mentioned in the same sentence. A cognition which arises without any hitch must be taken as authoritative. The sentence is indivisible and conveys a single particularised meaning. For the sake of convenience in explanation it is divided artificially into parts and each part is assigned a meaning which is a universal. In association with the meanings of other words in the sentence, it becomes particularised. But this way of looking as it is only for the sake of convenience.

Really speaking, the meaning of the individual word continues to be a universal and only appears to be particularised in association with the meanings of other words. The word expressive of the universal disappears, as soon as it has been uttered, with its universal meaning and so with which particular is it to be identified? The speaker cannot mean to express both the universal and the particular at the same time. Besides, the other words also express universals and, so, with which particular is each universal to be identified? Therefore, the right view is that the individual sentence conveys a particularised meaning. So there is no question of bringing in an idea not openly expressed in the sentence].

It is now pointed out that, even when two relations come out in the same sentence, there need be no *vākyaabheda*, splitting of the sentence, because of the two relations. One can be the main thing and the other secondary.

75. The relation of these two with the action is expressed by means of a verbal element (case-ending). The close relation between the substratum and that which exists in it is understood from the sentence.

[In the sentence *gām abhyāja śuklām daṇḍena*, both the substance and the quality stand in the relation of accessory towards the action and this is made known by the case-ending. The words *gām* and *śuklām* stand in the relation of qualified and quality to each other and this is understood through the sentence. Thus, the sentence conveys two relations and yet it is one. There is no splitting of the sentence. Of the two relations, one is the main one and the other secondary to it. Thus, in one expressive movement, the sentence conveys both, that is, it conveys a particular substance, having a particular quality as the accessory to action.]

The author now points out a difficulty.

76. In this view, when the (prescribed) substance or quality is not available, it would be possible to have

a substitute for either. The relation expressed directly by a verbal element is stronger than the one conveyed by the sentence.

[According to this view, there would be a difficulty. When, either the substance or the quality prescribed is not available, there could be a substitute for either, because that which is conveyed by a directly expressive verbal element is stronger than what is conveyed by the sentence. Therefore, the injunction, 'One should sacrifice a white goat' could be carried out with a black goat or a white goat made of flour if the prescribed substance or quality is not available.]

If the universal is the meaning of words, everything would be alright.

77. When the view is that it is the universal or capacity which is taught in relation to action, then substance and quality are also understood because of their indispensibility.

[Accordingly to the view that the universal is the meaning of words, everything would be alright, because, then, the connection of both substance and quality with action would not be direct, that is, through the verbal element. Only the connection of the universal or of the capacity with action would be so. It is the universal which is taught as the accessory to action and it has been declared that the universal stands for that which has the requisite capacity. So it is the connection of the universal or that of capacity which is directly expressed by the verbal element (*śruti*). But both must have a substratum and so a substance is also understood and through it, a quality also.]

78. Even though universals and qualities are equally accessories of action, it is the qualities of the goat etc. for which there may be substitutes and not for the universals.

[Both the universal and qualities enter into relation with action through a substance and yet, there cannot be a substitute for the universal. Only a quality can be replaced.]

The author now says why.

79. The qualities are not as near to the substance having capacity as the universals are. The substance is directly connected with action. That is why there can be alternative only for quality.

[That is because the universals are much nearer to the substance which is actually the accessory than the qualities which come later and are liable to change. So they are a step removed from substance which is directly connected with action. No quality can be connected directly with action. As the universal is much nearer to the substance which is connected with action, there can be no substitute for it. If it is replaced, it would become a different accessory and so the action itself would become different. All this is said on the basis of the universal being the meaning of words. According to the view that substance or the individual is the meaning of words, the universal is not directly taught and so can be replaced.]

80. Some (on the other hand) think that, because of resemblance, there can be alternative for either: there can be a goat which is not of the (prescribed) colour or a sheep which is.

[The other view that there can be a substitute for both the universal and quality, because both are connected with action through substance, is not the view of the Bhāṣyakāra but of others, of those who follow Vyāḍi.]

After this digression, the author comes back to the subject-matter,

81. It is seen that the universal, together with the number attached to it, is applied (to action); sometimes, the universal alone, after discarding the number, is applied.

82. Where the universal is subsidiary to something else, there it is associated with the number of the substance (individual). Where, on the other hand, it exists on its own, it does not depend upon the number (of the substance).

[Before it was declared that the singular number in *graham* is not significant on the basis of verbal presentation (*śabdavyāpāra*) that is, whether something is presented by words as the main thing or as the secondary thing. Here, it is said on the basis of the factual situation (*vāstavam*), that is, whether something is actually the main thing or the secondary thing, that the number of the latter is significant.]

83. In the sentence 'one should sacrifice with an animal' (*yajeta paśunā*), the mention of animal is for the sake of the sacrifice and the act, (the sacrifice) the main thing, is fulfilled even with one animal.

[In the sentence *paśunā yajeta*, the sacrifice is the important thing. The animal is an accessory to it. As the sacrifice can be accomplished with one animal, there is no reason for sacrificing a second one. The universal of the animal, being subsidiary to the sacrifice, is associated with the singular number expressed by the suffix in *paśunā*. If a second animal is sacrificed, there would be another act altogether, which is not prescribed. Number should follow the main prescription and not vice-versa. If one were to sacrifice as many animals as one can, the sacrifice would follow number and not vice-versa.]

84. If one were to sacrifice with as many animals as one can, then it would be a case of the main thing being determined by the subsidiary things.

The author now gives an example of the principle referred to in stanza 82.

85. Where the act (of cleaning) is mentioned, the main thing being the vessel which is cleaned, there we disregard the particular number which is expressed.

[Where the vessel is to be cleaned, it becomes the main thing in relation to the act itself. There, the number expressed by its own verbal element, the suffix, is not significant. If the act were the main thing the number one expressed by the suffix would be significant, because the act can be accomplished even by cleaning one vessel. Cleaning more than one would be useless. But that is not the case.]

The author now points out an indication of this principle in the science of Grammar.

86. The very fact that in the sūtra teaching the retention (of a word as the main thing) the word one is specially mentioned, even though the word *śeṣa* (left over, retained) has a suffix expressive of a particular number (one) is a clear indication (of the principle).

[The principle that the number expressed by the suffix in regard to the subsidiary is significant, but not the one expressed in regard to the main thing can be known from the science of Grammar. In the sūtra: *sarūpāṇām ekaśeṣa ekavibhakatau*—Of many words having the same form, only one remains when they are followed by the same case-ending (P. 1.2.64), there is the word *ekaśeṣaḥ*. The suffix in *śeṣaḥ* expresses the singular number. So does the word *eka* (one). The very fact that the word *eka* has been put in even though the suffix is there shows that the number expressed by the

suffix is not significant. What remains is taught and is, therefore, the main thing. Hence the number mentioned in connection with it is not significant.]

An illustration of the principle from the science of Grammar is now being given.

87. In the rules teaching compound words and suffixes, just as there is express mention (of a particular number), in the same way, it is based on reason also, namely, that the secondary things (parts) depend upon something else (the whole).

[In the *sūtra saha supā* (P. 2.1.4.) the main thing is the compound word (*samāsa*) which it teaches. It is not the members of a compound word which are taught in that *sūtra*. Really speaking, a compound word like a sentence is indivisible. So it has no real parts. Parts are derived by abstraction. The elision of endings, shortening of final vowels, masculine form etc. which are taught in regard to the members of a compound word are really for the sake of the correctness of the whole. In the *sūtra* in question, the singular number is actually heard and it is justified by reasoning also. That is why, in a compound word, a word combines with one other word at a time and not with more than one. Similarly, in teaching suffixes also, the particular number mentioned is sometimes significant, as in the *sūtra nyāpprātipadikāt* (P. 4.1.1.). According to this, the suffixes taught in the subsequent *sūtras* come after a single word ending in *ñi* or *āp* and after a single stem (*prātipadika*). One suffix cannot come after many of them at the same time.]

It is now shown that there are exceptions to this principle.

88. (Sometimes) even in what is secondary, the number (mentioned) is not accepted (that is, it is not significant) in order that the main thing may be accomplished. Therefore, in regard to the teaching of

the name 'object' (*karma*), the agent is understood unqualified by anything.

[It is not that, in the *śāstra*, the number coming after every secondary thing (*guṇa*) is significant. The *sūtra* teaching the name *karma* is: *kartur īpsitatamaṇ karma*=that accessory is called the object which the agent wants most to reach (P. 1.4.49). Here the word *kartuḥ* is in the singular number and in this *sūtra*, the agent (*kartā*) is secondary, because the name 'object' is the main thing. And yet, the singular number here is not significant. What many agents together want to reach most is also called *karma*.]

This conclusion is now further strengthened.

89. When something which is possible is expressly mentioned in order to remove other possibilities, there the number is not significant, as its purpose has been served by the removal of other possibilities.

[If Pāṇini had only said *īpsitatamaṇ karma*=‘that which is most desired to be reached is *karma*,’ and not specified by whom, any accessory (*kāraka*) could occur to one. But as he has added *kartuḥ* (by the agent), the other accessories are excluded. This exclusion is the purpose of the mention of the agent in the *sūtra*. The singular number of the suffix in *kartuḥ* is not significant. It has been used because, after all, some number has to be used. Even what is desired to be reached by more than one agent gets the name of *karma*. This reasoning cannot be extended to the case of *paśunā yajeta*, because that is the main injunction in regard to the animal and so the singular number in *paśunā* is also significant.]

The author now explains how a single case-ending comes after many identical forms if the singular number in P. 4.1.1. is significant.

90. Where a case-ending comes after several identical stems, one of the latter is meaningful and is expressive of the whole group.

[The retention of one only of several identical forms (*ekaśeṣa*) is taught in P. 1.2.64 when the speaker wants to use them together (*sahavivakṣāyām*). When the meanings of the different identical forms are mutually connected, the meaning of the group comes into being. The different identical forms of the group and the group as a whole are meaningful and, therefore, get the name of stem (*prātīpadika*). There can, therefore, be a case-ending after the group also, even if the singular number in P. 4.1.1. is significant. Once there is a case-ending after the group, it will serve each individual form also. No separate case-ending need come after each identical form. Thus several identical forms would be followed by one case-ending, only one of them would remain and the others would disappear according to P. 1.2.64.]

In this way, the main thing would be fully supported.

91. According to the view that the number expressed by the word denoting what is secondary is significant, the main thing, whether it be a suffix (as in the sūtra *nyāpprātīpadikāt*—P. 4.1.1.) or a compound word (as in the sūtra *saha supā*—P. 2.1.4.) is supported in every way.

[Even according to the view that the number expressed by the word denoting what is secondary is significant, a suffix can be added after a single stem or a compound stem according to P. 4.1.1. and a compound word can be made by uniting one word with another or with many, as in the case of a *dvandva* or a *bahuvrīhi*.]

The author now begins to state a few more points about the universal.

92. Similarity consisting of absence of difference or the powers which are the very essence of things, these might be described as the synonyms of the universal.

[The universal is something the existence of which is inferred because of the similarity of the cognitions which the individuals produce. It is never seen apart from the individuals. Why not accept that the individuals are themselves the cause of this similarity of cognition on account of their resemblance? What is the use of postulating a universal? The mutual resemblance of the individuals, not different from the individuals themselves, is the cause of the similarity of cognition. It is different from the expressed conventional meaning of a word, it is a kind of power. This is just what is called universal. After all, the universal is nothing more than something in the individuals which causes a similarity of cognition. On this everybody is agreed. That something can be called resemblance, power etc. The only point on which the different thinkers differ is: Is it something over and above the individuals?]

The author now states that it is something over and above the individuals.

93-94. From a man's desire to hold a stick, one no doubt gets the idea of a stick, but still one does not get the idea that he actually holds it. From a man's desire, one does not get the knowledge which has the form 'he is one with a desire'. Therefore, even though there is power, the mind has recourse to something else.

[On this point, the followers of the Vaiśeṣika say that it is something over and above the individuals. They reason as follows— The universal is postulated because, the individuals, being different from one another, cannot account for the similarity of cognition. Resemblance and power are not over and above the individuals. Therefore one has to postu-

late the universal which is over and above them. These universals have particular abodes, namely, the individuals having a particular disposition of parts. A cow, having a particular disposition of parts is the substratum of cow-ness. The something can be said of horse-ness. If a particular arrangement of parts determines the substratum of each universal, why not attribute similarity of cognition also to this very arrangement? Why postulate the universal, apart from the disposition of parts? The reason is that particular effects have particular causes. When we get about somebody the cognition that he is the holder of a stick (*daṇḍī*), the cause of it is his connection with the stick. The cause of this connection is the desire of the person in question to take a stick. We cannot say that this desire is the cause of our cognition that he is the holder of a stick. Similarly, we have to postulate a special cause for the similarity of cognition which we have when we look at different individuals belonging to the same class. Thus resemblance and the particular disposition of their parts can account for certain things, but not for this. This can be explained only by the universal, which is over and above the individuals.]

Otherwise

95. In the end, the indeterminate nature (of things) or power would remain and all verbal usage would become difficult.

[If we do not accept direct and immediate causes for effects, but try to explain them by remote causes, it would take us back to the root cause of everything, whether it be primordial matter (*pradhāna*) or anything else. It would be something indefinable. It would, then, become impossible to make statements of cause and effect. To explain verbal usage, universals have to be accepted.]

The author now states that, according to the Sāṅkhya and the Advaitā, the universal is not something over and above the individuals.

96. When, abandoning all distinctions, the essence of the individuals is perceived as one, then a single conception comes into existence.

[We trace back the whole universe to one cause if we find some common feature in everything. That which does not exist in any way cannot come to be. Thus cause and effect are really the same thing. Everything is like everything else and yet not so. As one and the same thing becomes many, the common point is the universal and the difference is the distinguishing feature. The most comprehensive common feature would be the great universal (*mahāsāmānya*) and the less comprehensive ones would be the intermediary universals (*avāntarasāmānya*). The factors that determine the parts are also transformations of the one. Everything is a transformation (*parināma* or *vivarta*). Thus there is no absolute difference between cause and effect, *dharma* and *dharmin*, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.]

As the *sūtra* teaching retention of one only of many identical forms has been declared to be impossible if the universal is the meaning of words, the author now brings it within the sphere of the idea of collection.

97. When, that which has diversity is looked upon as one, then from the many is born the conception of a 'collection'.

[When both diversity and unity figure in the cognition, then the object is what is called a collection. Unity is superimposed on what is diversity. The cognition of collection arises from the many, to which unity is subordinate. In the cognition of the universal, diversity does not figure. Unity or identity is the predominant factor.]

The author now defines the scope of resemblance.

98. When the difference between the different individuals is kept down and the two (unity and diver-

sity) are understood together (*sakrtpravr̥ttau*) there is the idea of collection, and when they are understood in turn, there is the idea of resemblance.

[Resemblance, collection and the universal are allied things, but there is difference between them. In the cognition of resemblance, both difference and identity figure. In the cognition of the universal, only identity figures. In the cognition of collection, unity mixed up with diversity figures. The two appear at the same time. In the cognition of resemblance, on the other hand, first difference figures and then resemblance.]

The author now explains the Bauddha view in regard to the universal.

99. Just as a cognition which is dissimilar appears to be uniform, similarly, an object also appears to be the same even though it is different.

[According to the Bauddhas, the cognition of Universal is an error. All cognitions are different from one another. There is no such thing as identity of cognition, but, due to an eternal *vāsanā*, cognitions appear to be identical and on that basis, the concept of universal in cognition arises. Objects are also essentially different from one another, but due to the same *vāsanā*, they appear to be identical and this unreal identity is called the universal.]

The author now considers whether there is any external basis for this cognition of identity.

100. Nor are there words expressive of the difference between objects which look like one another nor is the difference itself perceived.

101. Because of the difficulty in perceiving the difference in our cognitions, words and objects, we perceive them to be identical.

[Things are essentially different from one another. There is nothing in common between them. But we are not able to see this difference. As our words can only express what we see, they also do not express this difference. They express a certain identity which we see on account of resemblance. Thus, our cognitions of things (*prakhyā*) and our expression of them by means of words (*upākhyā*) proceed on the basis of an unreal identity based on resemblance. The meanings of words are based on convention and convention cannot rest on the own nature of things (*svalakṣaṇa*). Cognitions really differ from one another, because their objects are different. Words also differ from one another; even when they are perceived as identical. Objects of the same class also differ from one another, but we notice only the point in which they differ from things of another class. The subtle differences which exist in precious stones, pearls, corals etc. can be seen only by experts and not by everybody.]

Those who accept universals, however, declare—

102. There are universals in all cognitions as in objects and they prove the existence of universals in objects—such is the view of those who believe in connection. (*saṃsarga*).

[Those who believe in universals believe that there are universals of cognitions also. It is the existence of universals in our cognitions which prove the existence of universals in the objects of these cognitions. This is one view of those who maintain that objects are connected with difference and identity (*saṃsargadarśana*)].

The following is another view current in the same circles.

103. The universal which exists in the object serves the cognitions also. Cognition is not determined, like the object, by something which is external,

[Just as the object is given a form by the universal which is different from it, in the same way, one cannot say that cognition also is given a form by the universal which is different from it. Cognition never becomes an object. If one seems to perceive a universal in the cognitions, it is only due to the universal in the objects. Therefore, cognitions are endowed with a form (*sākārāḥ*), self-illuminating (*svapra-kāśāḥ*) and devoid of universal (*niḥsāmānyāḥ*).]

How is cognition not determined by something external?

104. Just as light is not illuminated by another light, in the same way, the form of cognition is not determined by another cognition.

[A light which illuminates an object does not require another light to illuminate it. It is self-luminous. If the light is not self-luminous, it would not be able to illuminate the object either. The Vaiśeṣikas also accept that the universal in the object serves cognition also, but they do not believe in the self-luminousness of cognition. But the grammarians do not follow them in this respect.]

The author now points out the difference between the knowledge of an object and the knowledge of a knowledge.

105. The knowledge "this is a knowledge of the jar" is different from the knowledge "this is a jar". The knowledge "this is a jar" refers to an external object.

[Here a doubt arises: We can have two cognitions taking the forms 'this is a jar' and 'this is a knowledge of the jar.' In the former, the jar is the thing known. In the latter, however, the knowledge of the jar is not the thing known, because no knowledge can become the thing known. Knowledge illuminates something else and is self-luminous, but never the thing illuminated. This argument is not valid, because knowledge is not self-luminous. It has to be illumi-

nated by another knowledge. Nor need this lead to regressus ad infinitum.

The above doubt is answered as follows— The knowledge ‘this is a knowledge of the jar’ is different from the knowledge “this is a jar”, because the former is not produced directly by an external object. The jar which seems to figure in it has no reference to an external object. In other words, no object, different from external object, figures in it. Knowledge itself does not figure as an object.]

106. As the form of the knowledge is not cognised as an object, its form as distinct from that of the object is not grasped.

[Why not accept that in the knowledge ‘this is a knowledge of the jar’, just as the form of the external object figures, in the same way, the form of the knowledge itself, mixed up with the former, also figures? If that is so, it would mean that knowledge also becomes the object of knowledge. But this position is not valid. The external object figures in this knowledge, but not the knowledge itself, as the illuminator of the external object and as distinct from it. Therefore, what is regarded as the knowledge of a knowledge is really the knowledge of the external object that figures in that knowledge. A cognition having the form of another cognition figuring in it as its object does not arise. There can be no cognition which does not have an external object figuring in it. So, in the cognition *ghaṭam ahaṃ jñāmi*, it is the jar which figures on the object, not the knowledge of it.

Thus, it has been shown that the word conveys the universal which is capable of accomplishing worldly usage relating to visible and invisible things.]

SECTION 2

ON SUBSTANCE

Following Vyāḍi, the author now states that substance, which is the thing qualified, is the meaning of words, by first of all giving its synonyms.

1. The Self, the thing-in-itself, Being, the Body (Primordial matter), the Elements, these are synonyms of the word Substance and it has been declared to be eternal.

[According to Vājapyāyana, the universal is the meaning of every word and it figures in the mind as the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of substance which is also understood from the word by implication. According to Vyāḍi, substance is the meaning of every word and it figures in the mind as the thing qualified (*viśeṣya*). It is this which plays the chief part in purposive action and it is that, therefore, which prompts one to act. The word primarily conveys that. The universal is not conveyed by the expressive power (*abhidhā*) of words, but it specifies or determines the substance conveyed by it. Substance is of two kinds: real and expressional (*pāramārthika* and *sāmvyavahārika*). It is the second which, according to Vyāḍi, is the meaning of all words or rather all things can be presented by words as substance. Here, in this chapter, we are concerned with the first kind of substance. It is called by different names in different systems. The monists call it *ātmā*, the Self. The same Self appears as different things through different limiting factors (*upādhi*) which are the immediate meanings of the different words. According to the Bauddhas, the thing-in-itself (*svalakṣaṇa*) is the real substance. Followers of *sattādvaita* consider that substance is nothing more than the Being which is the own essence of a thing (*svo bhāvaḥ*). When inner sequence is not meant to be conveyed, Being (*sattā*) becomes a thing (*sattva*) and this, differentiated by different limiting factors, in substance.

For others, the body or primordial matter (*prakṛti*) is substance. For the Cārvākas, the four elements, air, fire, water and earth, are the substance. They call it the reality (*tattva*). When these elements combine, the body, the sense and the object result. These words are synonyms of the word *dravya*, because they denote the ultimate substance, which words like jar (*ghaṭa*) cannot do. They can be applied to anything as in the statement: *eko' yam ātmā udakaṃ nāma* (M. Bhā. I. 1.1.). Here the word *ātmā* is used for water kept in a particular vessel. Other words denote substance through *ākṛti*. These, on the other hand, denote substance directly. Patañjali has declared in one place that while shape (*ākṛti*) constantly changes, substance remains the same. Thus, it is eternal. What the Bhāṣyakāra means by eternal is the fact of something not giving up its essence even while forms are changing and, in this sense, *dravya* is eternal even according to the Cārvākas.]

After having stated what substance is according to other systems, the author now shows the comprehensive nature of it according to Grammar.

2. Through the unreal forms, it is the ultimate Reality which is cognised. By the words which directly express the unreal limiting factors, it is really the ultimate which is expressed.

[Words are, by their very nature, incapable of expressing the ultimate reality directly. So they are seen actually to express it through various limiting factors. These latter are impermanent. They come and go. It is they which fulfil the practical needs of people. Words, therefore, express the forms which are cognisable. They are applied to things as they are cognised and they are cognised through their forms. A formless thing cannot be conceived by the mind. Even though words directly express these forms, they also denote the ultimate through these forms.]

The author now shows how, if the words go beyond the limiting factors, the latter can be so considered at all.

3. It is like the house of Devadatta being recognised (or differentiated from other houses) by means of an impermanent feature of it and yet the word 'house' denoting only the bare house.

[Even though a crow sitting on Devadatta's house may help one in recognising it or distinguishing it from others, yet when one speaks about Devadatta's house, the crow is not included in it. It was just a temporary mark which served a particular purpose. When it flies away, one can still recognise the house with the help of some more permanent feature like a dais (*vedikā*) or white lotus (*punḍarika*) (See M. Bhā on P. 1.1.26.), observed when the crow was still there. In the same way, the past passive suffix *ta* is distinguished from any other *ta'* by the '*k*' which is attached to it at the beginning. But that disappears in actual usage. Then, it is distinguished from any other '*ta*' by something more permanent like the accessory to action and the tense which it expresses. In the same way, words, while first expressing a mere impermanent limiting factor, can point to a permanent reality.]

As the crow is quite different from the house, it is natural that the house should not include it. The author, therefore, gives a better illustration.

4. (Or) it is like gold etc. which even though differentiated by different impermanent forms, remains in its pure form, the expressed meaning of words like *rucaka* and so on.

[Gold is one, but is differentiated by different forms such as '*rucaka*' (the name of an ornament). These forms, however, come and go, but the gold persists. The different practical purposes are not served by the perishable forms. There-

fore, words like *rucaka* do not express these forms but go beyond them and designate the permanent reality, that is, gold. Similarly, words express the ultimate reality by going beyond the plurality which is not ultimate. The impermanent forms are not the real expressed meanings of words. As they are not real, they cannot fulfil practical purposes. That is why they are not the expressed meaning of words. There is no harm in taking the view that words primarily denote the ultimate reality as *viśeṣya* and the impermanent forms as *viśeṣaṇa*. All that is emphasised here is that the impermanent forms or the limiting factors are not the real meaning of words.]

The author now explains how, if every word ultimately points to the ultimate reality, confusion does not result in usage.

5. Just as the capacity of the eye etc. is limited by the tube etc., so is the capacity of words to convey all meanings restricted by the particular forms which they bring to the mind.

[There would be no confusion because each word points to the substance Brahman through a particular form which that word and that word alone can bring to the mind. The word jar (*ghaṭa*), for instance, points to Brahman through the form of a jar. Just as one who looks through a tube sees only as much of reality as is visible through the hole of the tube, similarly, through each word, one can see only a particular form, limited by nescience and this form points to reality. Covers and impediments only restrict the power of the senses. They do not, in any way, affect reality. Similarly, nescience only restricts or limits the *jīva*-s, does not affect ultimate reality. It is not merely such things as tubes which restrict our vision. Attention concentrated on one thing takes it away from others. The particular beauty of a thing attracts our attention towards it and takes it away from others.]

The author now says something about words like *sanniveśa* (=form, shape) which seem to denote attribute (*dharma*) only and not substance.

6. As for the word which conveys such (impermanent) forms, since these are essentially one with it (the Substance), it also conveys the eternal.

[Another name for the limiting factors (*upādhi*) is *dharma* (attribute). Words like *sanniveśa* mean form, shape, disposition of parts. It means that they denote something which is essentially *dharma*. How can they ultimately denote the substance? If they do not, the view that all words denote the '*dravya*' falls to the ground. This difficulty is removed as follows:— Really, these limiting factors are not different from the substance. If they were different, they would be nothing at all. They exist as one with the ultimate, the *upādhimat*. To be one with it is their essence. They are not the essence of the ultimate. The limiting factors are so when they are merged in the ultimate. The moment they are detached from the ultimate, they would cease to be limiting factors. They would acquire a kind of independence and themselves become *upādhimat*.]

7. The tradition which has come down from the elders is that there is no difference between the real and the unreal. The real, when not properly understood, is called the unreal.

[It might be said that, if, what is an attribute (*dharma*) now may, in other circumstances, become the *dharmin* and thus become real and eternal, the principle that the form is unreal and the substance real would break down. To meet this objection, it is pointed out that in monism, the real and the unreal are not two totally different things, because, if they were, monism itself would be undermined. There is only one ultimate reality, which, due to nescience, appears in many forms to different experiencers. The one

stands for knowledge and the many for nescience. When the one manifests itself as many, it is *prapañca*, which is wonderful as long as one does not probe too much into it.]

The author now states that it is Brahman which appears as differentiated.

8. The undifferentiated Reality appears to be differentiated. There is really no distinction of time within it and yet such a distinction is cognised.

[Thus, it is Brahman which manifests itself now as this and now as something else. Therefore, all words ultimately denote that. The Reality which is devoid of all differentiation appears to have it on account of nescience. Through the powers called *Dāk* (Space) and *Kāla* (Time), this one Reality presents itself as having spatial and temporal sequence.]

The author now explains how the non-existent appears to have existence.

9. Just as the attributes of the object cannot belong to cognition at all and yet that which is not identical with it appears as one with it.

[According to the Vijñānavādins, the external world does not exist and yet objects appear in our mind as being external. Consciousness appears to have various forms which appear as external. In other words, the unreal appears in the real.]

10. In the same way, the forms of the transformations do not at all belong to the Reality and yet that which is not at all identical with it appears as one with it.

[Another illustration of the same would be this: Primal matter, according to the Sāṅkhyas, contains within itself, the germs of all later transformations and yet, it is free in its own nature, of all these transformations. It consists of a balance or equilibrium of the *guṇas* and is, therefore, quite different from that state where there is disturbance of the equilibrium. But, in actual life, it can be cognised only through its transformations which have not the same reality. Thus Reality is manifested through the unreal. This principle is accepted by the Buddhists as well as the Sāṅkhyas.]

The author now states how we know that the forms are unreal and what is different from them is real.

11. That is real which persists till the end when all the forms disappear. It is eternal, it is expressed by the word and it is not different from the ultimate word-principle.

[It is stated in the M. Bhā: "That is also eternal which does not lose its identity" (*Tad api hi nityaṃ yasminṣtattvam na vihaṇyate* (M. Bhā on Vā I, *paspasāhnikā*). The forms of the different ornaments vary and are impermanent, but the gold persists in all of them. Similarly, Brahman is eternal and real. The eternality of the universal and other things is only relative. Compared to the different individual cows, cow-ness is eternal. Compared to cow-ness, horse-ness etc., earthness (*prthivīva*) is eternal. Compared to that, the fact of being just a thing is eternal, an idea which can be conveyed by the pronoun 'tat'. But, right through these more and more comprehensive and yet only relatively permanent things persists consciousness and, therefore, that is the real truth. And this consciousness is nothing more than *paśyantī* or *parā vāk*, or *śabdabrahman*. *Brahman* is not different from *śabda*. *Brahman* is the *vācya* of all words which are its *vācaka*-s. *Vācaka* and *vācya* are not different from each other. From the way Helarāja explains the *Kārikā*, his text probably was: *tacchābdatattvānna bhidyate*.]

The author now shows how the Reality is absolutely different from all appearances.

12. It does not exist nor does it not exist; it is not one nor is it different; it is not connected nor is it separated; it is not transformed nor is it not so.

[The Reality is beyond all transformations. It cannot, therefore, be identical with them. It is beyond all assertions. One cannot say that it exists nor that it does not exist. Nor can one say that it is one, because the Reality which is free from all limiting factors is without any inner differentiation and, therefore, it does not appear as one. Nor does difference add any peculiarity to it, because there is nothing different from it and whatever is different from it has no reality. Nor can connection or separation be its limiting factor because that presupposes the existence of something different from it and that cannot be proved. It cannot undergo any real transformation, because one does not accept such a thing; one accepts appearance instead (*vivarta*). And yet the whole wonderful universe is manifested, so that there is some kind of change. Thus it is not possible to make any positive assertion about the Reality.]

The author now says that everything is identical with it.

13. It does not exist and it does; it is one and it is many; it is connected and it is separated; it is transformed and it is not.

[And yet it is *Brahman* which appears as everything else. It appears as positive entities and as negative entities. It appears as one and as many (as one in the case of universals and as many in the case of the individuals. It appears as associated with other things and as separated from them. It appears as transformed and as not transformed.)]

The author now says that, as everything is *Brahman*, even contradictory usages are resolved in it.

14. That one Reality is seen as the word, the meaning and their relation. It is the seen, the seeing the see-er and the fruit of the seeing.

[The expression, the expressed and their relation are one in the ultimate reality. In it, the power of the expression (*vācaka*, *śrutiśakti*) and that of the expressed (*vācya*, *arthaśakti*) are united. In the manifested state, it appears as two branches, the word and the meaning (*śruti* and *artha*). Manifestation as knowledge (*jñāna*) and the known (*jñeya*) separately is nescience. This has been explained in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. It is the same reality which evolves as the see-er and the seen. What is called the seen, or the objective world figures in the consciousness. Its very essence is, therefore, consciousness. If it were not so, it could not be illuminated. It has also been declared that the see-er, the individual soul, limited by nescience, the transmigrator, is really *Brahman*, because, being conscious, cannot be really different from the ultimate reality. The mention of the two accessories (*kāraṇa*) namely, the agent and the object (*kartā* and *karma*, i.e. the see-er and the seen) is meant to include the other accessories also. Thus the whole of the objective world (*siddha*) is included. The word *darśana* refers to the main action and includes all other actions and so the whole of the world of processes (*sādhya*) is included. The manifestation called action is determined by the power called Time and the manifestation called concrete object or embodied object (*mūrtti*) is determined by the power called Space (*Dik*). Thus, the whole universe, consisting of things and processes (*mūrttivivarta* and *kriyāvivarta*) is set forth. The word *prayojana* in the verse stands for the fruit of all actions. Thus, all the three things, *sādhya*, *sādhana* and *phala* are included and it has been shown that the whole of it is a *vivarta* of *Brahman*. This has already been explained in Vāk. I. 4. The 'seen' and the 'seeing' are separately mentioned because usage consists of *prakhyā*, i.e., cognition or 'seeing' and *upākhyā*, i.e., giving expression to cognition by means of words involving *śabda*, *artha* and *sambandha* which together

stand for the 'seen'. All this, of course, is in the state of nescience. In reality, all this differentiation does not exist.]

The author now shows that when all the appearances disappear, something unchangeable does remain.

15. Just as, when forms disappear, it is the gold which is the truth (*satya*) in the ear-ring etc., in the same way, when transformations (like earth etc.) disappear, the primordial substance is the only thing which is real.

[That which persists when all the forms disappear has been declared to be real. But somebody might ask whether something does persist at all. In answer, it is said that when forms such as ear-ring (*kuṇḍala*) disappear, the gold remains. Similarly, when forms such as earth disappear, primordial substance, that is, *Brahman*, remains. For this, the authority is the written tradition (*āgama*). It would not be right to say that all this universe proceeds from something which is non-existent and inexpressible. Non-existence cannot produce existence. Nothing can come out of hare's horn. Consciousness persists in everything. Therefore, everything originally came out of it.]

The author now concludes by saying that all words express that.

16. The primordial substance is the expressed meaning of all words. The words themselves are not different from it. Though not different from one another, there is a relation between them as though they were different from one another.

[Thus, what is called substance (*dravya*) is really *Brahman*, the only persisting reality. It is that which is expressed by all words. All usage is based on differences brought about by limiting factors. It is based on nescience. All words

therefore, express *Brahman*, differentiated on the basis of limiting factors. Even words like *ātmā*, *brahman*, *vaiva* express that primordial substance through some limiting factor or other. Because that which is beyond all limiting factor (*nirupādhi*) is also beyond the range of words. In comparison with words like *ghaṭa*, words like *ātmā* are much nearer to the ultimate reality. In fact, words themselves are not different from the ultimate Reality. In the world, one talks as if they were different from one another.]

The author now gives an illustration to show that the manifestations are unreal and only unity is real.

17-18. Just as, in a dream, the one mind appears in contradictory forms, as the self and the non-self, friend and foe, the speaker and the spoken and the purpose, in the same way, while the ultimate reality is unborn, eternal and devoid of inner sequence, we see it as having birth and other contradictory attributes.

[One should not wonder that all the plurality which we see before us is being denied and the unity which one does not see is being advocated. Because that kind of thing is happening all the time. The world which we see in our dreams is contradicted in the wakeful state. Similarly, the world which we see in the wakeful state does not persist in the *turiya* (the state beyond deep sleep). So that may also be looked upon as unreal. That which persists in all states is the only thing which is real. Consciousness is the only thing which so persists. The different states come and go and they, like pleasure and pain, do not affect the real nature of consciousness. The variety which one sees in a dream is confined to a particular experiencer. This experiencer, the transmigrator, being essentially consciousness, is *Brahman*. He creates things out of himself, without any other material and enjoys them. It is this idea which is conveyed in the following verse, quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 127.

*Pravibhajyātmanātmānaṃ sṛṣṭvā bhāvān prthagvidhān,
Sarveśvaraḥ sarvamayāḥ svapne bhoktā pravartate,*

The word *bhoktā* refers to the creation of the individual self. As it is ultimately *Brahman*, it has the power to create. It does not require any external material for the purpose. As there is no real difference between the creator and the creation, it is said to be *vaikalpika*. The creation which takes place in the wakeful state depends upon external material and it is a creation which is common to all experiencers. The dream creation is impermanent, whereas the one in the wakeful state is relatively permanent. Both are unreal, because both are manifestations of nescience. In dream a further veil on consciousness, namely sleep, also takes place. On account of that, the average man looks upon the dream-creation only as unreal. But to those who know the truth, the whole universe, that of dream and that of the wakeful state, is unreal. Only the persisting consciousness is real, without sequence and eternal. But to nescience, it appears to have sequence. Therefore, it is the eternal *śakti* of *Brahman* which manifests the unreal world, the perceiver and the perceived and creates this world dream. It is the function of philosophers to remove this universe which is charming as long as we do not reflect.]

SECTION 3

ON RELATION

(1) Unless there is a relation between the word and its meaning, any word would convey any meaning and that does not happen. So the relation between the two is now being explained —

1. From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external object and the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed.

(2) [When words are uttered, three things are understood: (1) their own form; (2) an object which is a means to fulfil a certain purpose; (3) the intention of the speaker. The relation between these three things is fixed, that is, not made by man.³ Of these, the first is closest to the word (*antaraṅga*). That is why it is understood in any case. Between the own form of a word and its meaning, there is the relation of the expression and the thing expressed (*vācya-vācakabhāva*). Between the speaker's intention and the word, there is the relation of cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*).⁴ As the science of grammar is common to all systems (*sarvapārśada*), the latter relation is also spoken of, in order to meet the view of those who hold that the meaning of a word is only what figures in the mind of the speaker.⁵ In that view, the relation between the intention and the word would naturally be that of cause and effect, because the intention would evoke particular words and not others. Whatever be the relation, there is superimposition of the word on the meaning (*adhyāsa*). By 'word', it is chiefly the sentence which is kept in mind, because, according to grammarians, the individual word is only an abstraction (*apoddhāra*).]

(6) The author now says that the own form of a word is a meaning in a primary sense.

2. There is sometimes knowledge and sometimes doubt in regard to the meaning and the intention of the speaker. No mistake is possible about the forms of the words which are perceived.

(7) [The word *gauḥ* and the object of which it is the name, both appear to us in the form *ayaṃ gauḥ*. That means that a word conveys an object (a meaning) and conveys its own form in the process. This process of conveying a meaning as one with itself is called expression (*abhidhāna*). That is how the convention is understood. The very purpose of convention is worldly usage and therefore, it has to follow worldly usage. In worldly usage, the word and the meaning are identified. The senses are only a means to cognition and do not become part of it. The sense of vision, for instance, does not become part of our perception of an object. Certain things like signs enter into the cognition which they cause, but remain apart from it. For instance, the sign 'smoke' causes the inference of fire but remains apart. The word is also a means of cognition like the senses and signs, but there is this difference that the object whose cognition it causes appears as one with it.

(9) One might here object to the last statement by saying, rather sarcastically, that the letters of the alphabet are not found reflected in the object. In other words, we do not see any identity between word and meaning. But this objection derives from an imperfect understanding of fundamental doctrines. That word is said to be expressive (*vācaka*) which is the function called '*vāk*' of the power of consciousness. This function is called verbal expression (*śabdāna*). Even in silent recitation, it is so called. In its first stage, it is undifferentiated into word and meaning. It remains in the state of the supreme word. Afterwards, it enters into the region of the mind, and the breath (*prāṇavṛtti*) and becomes differentiated into the expressed and the expression (*vācya* and *vācaka*).⁽¹⁰⁾ In this state which is called the 'middle one' (*madhyamā*), the expressive word (*vācaka*), without aban-

doing the state of the supreme word which consists in undifferentiated consciousness, refers to form and meaning closely bound up and standing in apposition to each other in the form *gaur ayam arthaḥ*. There is said to be superimposition of one over the other (*adhyāsa*). There is differentiation between the expression and the expressed and yet the two are identified. In the next stage, the word, while still not giving up its basis in the previous stages, becomes audible through articulation in the mouth. The word, being thus a manifestation of the supreme word, retains its characteristic of identity between word and meaning (*śabdāna*) even after the two have been differentiated. In one single operation, a complex meaning involving a qualifier and something qualified (*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*) is conveyed as one with the words which express it. For example, in the sentence *śuklaḥ paṭo'yaṃ* = this white cloth, the cloth as qualified by the colour white, is conveyed as one single thing. The white colour is not understood as something quite distinct. Similarly, in *ghaṭo'yaṃ* = this jar, the object jar is understood as qualified by the word jar, its *viśeṣaṇa*. This process of understanding the word and meaning as one is called *śabdāna*. Sometimes, the meaning of the word is the form of the word itself as in *agnim antodāttam adhīṣva* = 'recite agni', with the *udātta* accent on the last syllable'. Where the meaning is an external object, the word and the meaning appear as one. They are not cognised separately. The word conveys both its own form and the meaning by its expressive power (*abhidhā*). Three things communicate themselves while communicating other things: Cognition, the word and the lamp. Thus, the word conveys its own form and its meaning as the expressed sense. It is not that its form merely becomes the object of the sense of hearing. Its form and its meaning become the contents of the same cognition. They are in apposition to each other (*samānādhikaraṇa*). The form as the expressed sense is different from the same thing as expressive of the meaning. In the latter capacity, the word is active (*kartr̥bhūmim upārūḍha*), it is consciousness (*parāmarśa*), it is the supreme word (*parā vāk*), it is light

(*prakāśa*) and, therefore, it is different from the word as the expressed sense (*vācya*), as the thing one is conscious of (*parāmṛśyamāna*). When the hearer hears the words of others, he understands their meaning as identical with them and infers the meaning of the speaker also as identical with the words. Thus, there is superimposition, not only between the word and the meaning as understood by the hearer, but also as expressed by the speaker. ⁽¹⁴⁾ So, from a word like *ghaṭa*, we understand three things all mixed up: the word, the meaning and the intention of the speaker. That is why the question *gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ*, has been asked in the *Mahābhāṣya* in order to isolate the word from this complex cognition. Even the cognition of a new-born child is mixed up with the word. Thus, whether the relation is looked upon as fitness or causality, superimposition (*adhyāsa*) is involved in both.

(15) Thus, due to the function called *śabdāna*, which is the very life of what is called illumination (*prakāśa*), both the word and the meaning become the contents of this cognition and both are in apposition to each other and identity is superimposed on them (*abhedādhyāsa*). In *Paśyantī*, where there is no differentiation, the question of differentiation does not arise at all. The word remains the very life of meaning even in the stage of verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) and that is why the whole universe is said to be a manifestation (*vivarta*) of the word.

(16) The form of the word is its first expressed sense because it is part of the process (*antaraṅga*), it is unavoidable (*ahēya*) and it is distinctive (*asādhāraṇa*). Here there is no dependence on convention. It may be looked upon as a universal or otherwise, as explained in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*.]

The author now says what the indication is of the existence of the fixed (*samavasthita*) relation between word and meaning.

3. That this word is expressive of that meaning, that this meaning is the expressed meaning of that

word, such a relation between word and meaning is understood from the genitive suffix. That is why they are understood as identical.

[That the relation between the word and the meaning is a natural one and not a mere matter of convention is inferred by us in the following way. We use such expressions as: This word is expressive of that meaning; that meaning is the expressed sense of this word. Here the use of the 'of' (*ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti*) can be explained only on the assumption that there is a natural relation between the word and the meaning. We never connect two such totally unconnected things as the jar and the cloth by means of the genitive suffix. Because of this natural connection it is that we identify the two in such expressions as *ayaṃ gauḥ* where the word *gauḥ* and its meaning are identified.]

4. There is no verbal element (besides the genitive suffix) which denotes this relation in its essential property. Being extremely dependent, its own form is never cognised.

[There is no word which directly denotes relation. Ordinarily we observe things and their properties and use appropriate words to define or describe them. We cannot do that in the case of relation, because we cannot observe it objectively (*idaṃtayā svarūpānavadhāraṇāt*). Qualities like 'white' reside in some substance or other and yet words like *śukla* sometimes express the whiteness in isolation. There is no word which can express this relation in isolation because it is always dependent on something (*nityaparatantra*). It is nothing more than a certain mutual requirement of two things (*saṃbandhinoḥ parasparaunmukhyasvabhāvaḥ*). It is a mere attribute (*dharma*). It has, therefore, no word of its own to express it. It has to be inferred from its effect (*kāryaikagamyah*).]

5. Where there is service rendered, there an attribute (that is, relation) is understood. It is the power of powers, it is the attribute of attributes.

[Where one thing renders service to another, one can infer a relation between the two. Two unrelated things cannot render service to each other. Relation is not the same as power or capacity, because it is the former which regulates the production of a particular effect by power or capacity. Power resides in a particular thing and it is relation which regulates it. That qualities reside in substances is regulated by relation.]

The author now says why relation is being spoken of, considering that others have already spoken about relations such as conjunction and inherence.

6. Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. They have definite conditions the purpose of which is to render service.

[Conjunction and inherence do possess the chief characteristic of relation, namely, dependence. The application of the word relation to them is really a case of secondary usage. Primarily, it is not they which constitute relation. When they themselves are conditioned by other things, the latter become dependent (*paratantra*) and they become *svatantra* and as dependence is the chief characteristic of relation, they cease to be so. They can have their own *upādhi* which render them service. When the relation between them and their *upādhi* is regulated by a relation, how can they be identified with something which is purely dependence?]

The limiting factor of conjunction is now being stated.

7. There is only one particular state in which the conjunction of one thing with another takes place and that is indicated by the effect.

[When the juxtaposition of parts results in their contact, the whole is produced. Thus, in order to explain the production of the whole, contact is taken to be the non-inherent cause. The fact of being confined to substances and connection with Being as a quality, this is the limiting factor (*upādhi*) of conjunction. It is relation which determines the service which it renders. That is why conjunction is not the same thing as relation. The latter can exist in substance, quality, action, universal etc., but conjunction is confined to substances. Conjunction has the effect of producing a positive concrete thing whereas relation only brings two things together.]

The difference between relation and inherence is now being pointed out.

8-11. It has been traditionally handed down from the elders that Relation is beyond the characteristics of all things (*padārtha*), that it is made known by everything (*sarvalakṣaṇa*) and that it favours that power called inherence (*samavāya*) by virtue of which the production of things (previously non-existent is restricted to a particular (cause) by which the effect is never separated from such a cause, there being no difference (from conjunction) in the matter of juxtaposition, by which the essence of something is cognised as that of something else, by which neither distinction nor identity of something is perceived, which renders assistance to other powers, which is beyond identity and difference and which is established differently from other things.

[According to *Satkāryavāda*, the effect already exists in the cause. Hence, it is the cause which becomes the effect. So particular effects can be found in particular causes only. According to the '*asatkāryavāda*' also, a particular effect like cloth can exist only in the threads and so on. Thus, the effect

is intimately associated with its cause, it is not separated from it even though they are different from each other. This is due to inherence (*samāvāya*) and this is where it differs from *saṃyoga*, though the two resemble each other in one respect, namely, that they bring two things together. It is due to inherence that cause and effect, part and whole, the universal and the particular, the quality and substance, though different from each other, appear to be the same. They only appear to be the same, because there is difference between the two in each pair. It is because of this that thinkers hold different views on this matter. Some think that the parts and the whole are the same while others think that they are not. What all this means is that the fact of being found together, of being intimately united (*ayutasiddhi*) is the limiting factor of inherence. It causes the cognition of a particular substratum (*ihapratyaya*) between things which are intimately united (*ayutasiddha*) and not between others. It is Relation which determines this characteristic of inherence. Inherence does not appear to be different from the two things which are united by it, just as the two things themselves do not appear to be different from each other. All of them appear to be mixed up (*sammūrchitarūpatvenāvabhāsāt*). Inherence is inferred to exist from its effect, namely, the cognition of a particular substratum (*ihapratyaya*). Inherence is here called a power. As it renders service to things, it cannot be put in the same category as them. As it is a power, one cannot say whether it is identical with that of which it is the power or not. It is not a thing (*padārtha*), it has to be put in a different category. That is why it is said to be something which is established differently (*anyathaiva vyavasthitām*). Inherence renders service to the powers called *sādhana* by making them reside in their substrata. It is such an inherence which is helped by Relation which (1) is not a thing because it lacks that independence which exists in all things, (2) is made known by everything which needs help, and not by fixed things as inherence is, (3) confines inherence to things which are intimately united, (4) gives to inherence the name of relation

because of the common characteristic called dependence. Relation which does all these things must necessarily be different from the *padārtha*-s. That is why, in this *śāstra*, it is not merely conjunction and inherence which are relations.]

The author now explains this point further.

12. Others accept relation everywhere as a separate category. But that cannot explain the relation between word and meaning.

[The Vaiśeṣikas have put conjunction among the qualities, that is, it comes under one of their categories. They have made inherence into a separate category, even though it is a kind of power and, therefore, resides in something else. The fixed relation between word and meaning which finds expression in such statements as: 'this is the meaning of this word' cannot come under inherence. Therefore, there is incompleteness in the Vaiśeṣika conception of the categories.]

13. Through inherence, words convey their substratum and their universal. Through inherence in the same thing, they convey the qualities which exist in their substratum.

[Words like *kha*, *ākāśa*, *gagana* convey their meaning through the relation called inherence, because they are words and all words are qualities residing in *ākāśa* by inherence. All words convey the particular universal existing in them through inherence. As for the special qualities like *mahattva* which exist in *ākāśa*, words convey them through inherence in the same thing (*ekārthasamavāya*), because both words and these special qualities exist in the same thing, namely, *ākāśa*, by inherence.]

14. The universals 'substance-ness and Being and conjunction are linked to their own and other substrata. So are qualities like duality etc.

[A word like *dravyatva* conveys substantiveness, the lower universal and Being, the higher universal through the relation of inherence in the same thing. They exist in *ākāśa*, the substratum of the word *dravyatva* as well as in earth etc. Thus the universals of words exist in their own substratum as well as elsewhere through inherence.]

15. Some objects are in conjunction with the substratum of their words, some, on the other hand, inhere in them; others still inhere in the things which inhere in those which are in conjunction.

[*Śabda*, being a quality, inheres in *ākāśa* which is, therefore, its substratum. Objects like chariot, jar etc., are connected with *ākāśa* by the relation of conjunction. These objects are conveyed by their words through *samavetasamyoga*, conjunction with the intimately united. The qualities and movements inhering in objects like a jar are conveyed by their words through *svāśrayasamyuktasamavāya*, inherence in what is in conjunction with one's own substratum (*svāśrayeṇa ākāśena samyukto yo ghaṭaḥ tatra rūpasya samavāya-sambadhena vṛttiḥ*). The quality of being colour (*rūpatva*) which exists in the colour which exists in the jar is conveyed by the word *rūpatva* by means of *svāśrayasamyuktasamavetasamavāya*, inherence in what is inherent in what is in conjunction with one's substratum.]

16. A word conveys an all-pervasive object which is in contact with what is in contact with its substratum. But no other relation is seen for inherence.

[Space, Time and Soul are all-pervasive. They cannot, therefore, come into any new and direct contact with *ākāśa* which is also all-pervasive. They are conveyed by their words (*Dik, kāla, ātmā*) by the relation of *svāśrayasamyuktasamyoga* in the following way: Earth etc. are in contact with *ākāśa*. Space, Time and Soul are in contact with earth etc. The qualities which inhere in all-pervasive objects are con-

veyed by their words by *śvāśrayasaṃyuktasamavāya*. The universal which inheres in these qualities is conveyed by *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*. Thus, how substance, quality, action and universal are conveyed by words has been shown. The word *viśeṣa* conveys the particularity (*viśeṣa*) inherent in atoms by *saṃyuktasamavāya*. It conveys the particularity inherent in *ākāśa* by inherence in the same thing. It conveys the particularity inherent in *Dik*, *kāla* and *ātma* by *svāśrayasaṃyuktasamavāya*. Thus the way in which words convey five out of the six categories accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas* has been explained. Nothing has been said about inherence, also one of their categories. It is not a substance and so cannot be related to anything by conjunction. Nor can there be another inherence. Nor can one argue as follows:—“The word *samavāya*, being a word, inheres in *ākāśa*. Jar etc. are in conjunction with *ākāśa* which is all-pervasive. Inherence exists in jar etc. Therefore, the word *samavāya* conveys its meaning by *śvāśrayasaṃyuktasambandha*, relation with what is in conjunction with one's own substratum”. Inherence can exist in jar etc. only by inherence and there cannot be a second inherence.]

17. As there is no special relation, there would be no fixity (in the conveying of meaning by words). Therefore, relation (consisting of conjunction or inherence) is not applicable to words and meanings.

[If it is maintained that there is no special relation by which the word *samavāya* conveys its meaning, that would be impossible. There must be some relation. Otherwise, the word would become meaningless. If the word *samavāya* conveys that category without any special relation, any word would convey any meaning, because the absence of a special relation is not a bar to the conveying of a meaning. *Sambandhasyāviśiṣṭatvāt* may also mean: because the relation is the same as in other cases. That is, if the word *ākāśa* conveys its substratum (ether) through inherence, the word *ghaṭa* also should convey ether through inherence, because it is also a

word and, therefore, a quality of *ākāśa*. The word *ghaṭa* would also mean *paṭa*, because conjunction with the substratum *ākāśa* exists in the case of *paṭa* also. Thus, there would be both narrowness and excessive width (*avyāpti* and *ativyāpti*) in the relation between word and meaning. Therefore, the attempt to explain the way in which words convey their meaning by having recourse to conjunction and inherence is a failure.]

The author now hints at a possible justification of the Vaiśeṣika view on the basis of mere logic (*prauḍhivāda*).

18. Just as the Self, while it is connected (with everything) has the relation of ownership in regard to certain things only through *adṛṣṭa*, in the same way, elsewhere also the same thing holds good even though the relation is the same.

[Just as the all-pervasive Soul which is in contact with everything feels a sense of ownership only in regard to the body, in the same way, even though all words, being words, inhere in *ākāśa*, each one through *adṛṣṭa*, means some particular thing only. Thus there is no excessive width. One might argue thus from the Vaiśeṣika point of view, but it is not right. Even though the Self is all-pervasive and, therefore, in contact with everything, yet everything does not belong to the Self nor does the same thing belong to all the selves, because what belongs to which self is regulated by *adṛṣṭa*. In the same way, all things are not expressed by all words. Which word expresses which thing is regulated by usage and convention. The relation between word and meaning is fitness (*yogyatā*). There is, therefore, no use of thinking about conjunction and inherence in connection with word and meaning.]

The author really holds that inherence is not the expressed meaning of any word.

19. Neither the speaker nor the hearer can reach through words that juxtaposition (*prāpti*) called inherence which is beyond the attributes which things expressed have.

[All things like a cow which are expressed by words are characterised by some properties and are mixed up with them. These two things are their limiting factor. But for them, they could not be expressed by words. Inherence has no quality or universal as its limiting factor, according to the Vaiśeṣikas. Thus, it is beyond the range of what is characteristic of all that is expressible (*vācya*). The capacity to be referred to by a pronoun as 'this' or 'that' is the sign that something can be expressed by words. This is also absent in the case of inherence. It cannot be understood even from the word *samavāya* by the speaker or by the hearer. There is no word which can touch its essence. The word *samavāya* is not such a one, because it is also used to denote an assembly of men. It is only among the Vaiśeṣikas that it is used to denote this category].

Now the Naiyāyika indulges in some casuistry.

20. If what is said to be inexpressible is expressed as inexpressible, it would thereby become expressible.

[The Naiyāyika points out that to say that inherence is inexpressible (*avācya*) is a contradiction in terms because it comes within the range of the expression 'inexpressible' (*avācya*)].

21. If it is said to be not capable of being expressed even by the word 'inexpressible' the condition that is meant to be conveyed would not be understood.

[If it is maintained that it is not expressed even by the word 'inexpressible', then what is intended to be conveyed by all this is not understood, namely, that inherence does not come within the range of words].

22. If what is meant is that it is inexpressible in some aspect or other or in all aspects, even then those words would not deny that particular condition.

[If what is meant is that 'inherence' is not expressible in its nature as dependence (*pāratantrya*) it is as good as saying that it is not expressible at all. There cannot be a negation of an attribute (*dharma*) without there being a negation of that which has the attribute (*dharmin*). Therefore, even if only its dependence aspect is declared to be inexpressible, it itself becomes inexpressible. Even to deny any particular aspect of a thing, it has to become the object of verbal knowledge and if it becomes the object of verbal knowledge, it has become '*vācya*'. How can it then be said to be *avācya*?]

The author now answers the casuistry employed by the *Naiyāyika* by giving an example.

23. When knowledge in the form of doubt has assumed the form of *śeṣa* (meant for something else), it cannot become the object of another doubt without losing its original form.

[When the particular form of a thing like a post is not perceived, a doubt arises: is this a post or a human being? This cognition in the form of a doubt is chiefly concerned with finding out the true nature of the object which figures in it. Just at that time, another doubt, doubting this very doubt, cannot arise. The first doubt is concerned with finding out the nature of the object. Just at that time, it cannot become the object of another doubt. If it does, it would lose its former condition of being a doubt. As a doubt, it was *viśayin* and as the object of another doubt, it would become *viśaya* and one and the same thing cannot become *viśaya* and *viśayin* at the same time.]

The author now gives another example.

24. When, in a decisive cognition, decision as such takes place, then the cognition retains its characteristic.

[When a decisive cognition is engaged in clearly determining the nature of the object, it cannot become the object of another cognition. If it did, it would lose its proper nature and become the 'object' of another cognition. To be engaged in determining the nature of the external object is the nature of cognition. When it is so engaged, it cannot be the 'known' (*jñeya*). In the same way, the nature of a word is to convey a meaning, to bring the object within its range; to say about something that it is '*avācya*' which is a word and to say at the same time that the thing is inexpressible is a contradiction in terms.]

25. The sentence 'all that I am saying is wrong' is not literally meant. If what it says is wrong, the point in question would not be conveyed.

[When one says: 'all that I am saying is wrong', the incorrectness should not be applied to that very sentence. Otherwise, the incorrectness of what the person had been saying before — the point which is sought to be conveyed — would not be conveyed. On the other hand, if that sentence is held to be expressive even though it is incorrect, the same could be said of the previous sentences and that would mean that what was meant to be conveyed would not be conveyed.]

26. What is expressive cannot at the same time be the expressed. What conveys something else cannot at the same time be conveyed by something else.

[What is engaged in conveying something else cannot turn back and become the object of the expressive activity of something else. What is acting as the agent cannot at that very moment become the object. What is expressive

cannot at that very moment be the expressed. The following syllogism expresses the idea well.

*Yat pratipāḍakam na tat pratipāḍyam,
Yatkā saṁśayaññānaṁ nirṇayaññānaṁ vā
pratipāḍakam cābhidhānam,
ato naitat pratipāḍyam.*

“What conveys something else cannot itself be conveyed
by something else.

As, for example, a doubt or a decisive cognition.

The word conveys something else,
And so it cannot itself be conveyed
(by something else).]

27. The statement: “a mere assertion does not prove the point” does not apply to that statement itself. Similarly, the property (incorrectness) is not understood as applicable to this sentence.

[It is true that incorrectness cannot be attributed to the meaning of the sentence *sarvaṁ mithyā bravāmi* without its giving up its expressivity (*vācakatva*) and becoming the expressed (*vācya*). But incorrectness may be attributed to it in another way. After all, it is also one of the sentences uttered by the person in question and if all that the person says is wrong, this sentence would also be wrong. To meet this objection, another illustration is given. *Sādhyanirdeśaṁ pratiññā sādhanāṅgam na bhāvati* is a statement of the Bauddhas which means: “A statement of the thing to be proved is what is called assertion and it cannot become part of the proof.” This does not apply to this very statement. Otherwise, it cannot convey what is intended to be conveyed. Therefore, the statement that assertion is not part of the proof does not apply to this assertion. It applies to others. In the same way, the incorrectness mentioned in the sentence; ‘*sarvaṁ mithyā bravāmi*’ does not apply to that-

sentence itself. All this reasoning applies to the word *avācya* as applied to *samavāya*.]

28. Since one function has not another function, therefore one should not point out anywhere contradiction or *regressus ad infinitum*.

[‘Anywhere’ means not only in the matter of being the expressed meaning, but also in regard to relation. Or it might be understood as relating to what was said in verses 25 and 27.]

The author now proceeds to explain relation as accepted in his own circle.

29. Just as the senses have an eternal fitness to perceive their objects, in the same way, the relation of words with their meanings is an eternal fitness in regard to them.

[Because we understand a meaning as soon as we hear words, a natural capacity in the words to convey the meaning must be presumed. This natural capacity is made known through convention (*saṅketa*). This capacity is as natural as that of the eye to perceive form and colour. This capacity has to be understood by us on the basis of the meaning which we understand from words. As words and their meanings are understood as one, there is a kind of mutual superimposition (*adhyāsa*): the word is understood as the meaning and the meaning is understood as the word. *Adhyāsa* or superimposition is the main relation between word and meaning. The senses are causes (*kāraṇa*) in the process of the production of the cognition of objects. The word, on the other hand, makes known (*jñāpaka*) the meaning. Being so, it must itself be known before it can cause the meaning to be known. The resemblance between the senses and the word is that their power or fitness is natural, not due to human effort.]

The author now points out that the meaning is not related to the corrupt form of a word.

30. The corrupt form, according to some, is expressive only through the inference (of its correct form). Even if its expressivity is equal (to that of the correct form) the *śāstra* makes a restriction in regard to usage keeping merit and demerit in view.

[This capacity belongs to the correct forms of words and not to their corrupt forms. People who know do not understand the meaning directly from the corrupt forms of words which have, therefore, no connection with meaning. They are not expressive (*vācaka*). They cause us to infer the correct words from which the meaning is understood. But corrupt forms of words have become current and ignorant people understand meanings directly from them. But merit comes only from the use of the correct forms. The correct form of a word is only one while its corruptions may be many. Just as Brahman is One and stands for *vidyā* and the multiplicity of the world for *avidyā*, in the same way, the correct word stands for *vidyā* and its corruptions for *avidyā*.]

31. The relation which the word relation expresses is this capacity (fitness) and it is through that that the word *yogyatā* itself conveys the meaning of fitness. This capacity is made known through convention just as the relationship between parent and child.

[It was pointed out before that if inherence (*samavāya*) is postulated as the relation between word and meaning, there would be difficulty of having to postulate another inherence for the word *samavāya* itself. This difficulty would not arise if fitness is accepted as the relation between word and meaning. The word '*sambandha*' would denote the relation consisting of fitness through its fitness to do so. Simi-

larly, the word *samavāya* would denote inherence through its fitness. Even the word *yogyatā* would denote its meaning through its fitness. This eternal fitness of words is made known through usage or convention, the uninterrupted practice of elders (*vr̥ddhavyavahāraparamparā*). Mere convention cannot give words that fitness if they did not already have it before, just as usage can only make known the relation of parent and child if it was already there. The sages also do no more than make known which word means what on the basis of this eternal fitness.]

The relation of cause and effect is now being stated.

32. The word is the cause of the meaning which is indeed produced by it. Similarly, it is from the meaning which is in the mind of the speaker) that the word (arises and) is heard (by the listener).

[Of the meaning which figures in the mind of the listener, the word is the cause. That meaning presents the thing as something external. The meaning which was in the mind of the speaker before he spoke is the cause of the word which he subsequently utters and which the listener hears. Thus the word and the meaning are causes of each other. They are conceived and perceived as mixed up, as identified with each other by both speaker and hearer. The meaning which the speaker intends to convey is already united with the word. It appears as inner speech. Even the cognition of animals is mixed with this eternal word (*anā-diśabdabhāvanā*). The word which the hearer hears is mixed up with the form of the meaning and the meaning which he ultimately understands from it is mixed up with the form of the word. What is called verbal usage (*vyavahāra*) is the exchange of ideas between the speaker and the hearer. What the word does is to transfer to the hearer the meaning which was in the speaker's mind and which was already mixed up with the word.]

If the meaning of the word is mental, how does one say: 'he eats rice'?

33. The ideas of meal etc. which one considers to be impossible on the view that the meaning of a word is mental becomes possible when, after one mental meaning is understood, another one comes into existence.

[According to the *Vijñānavādins*, the external world does not exist. Both action and its accessories are mental. Therefore, the relation of accessory (*sādhana*) and action (*sādhya*) is also mental. On this view, the ideas of meal, eater and their relation which, at first seemed impossible, become possible. When? When, after the idea of cooked rice has arisen in the mind, another one, that of its being eaten, also arises in the mind. The meaning of one word in a sentence is necessarily incomplete. It becomes complete only when the meanings of other words are also understood. According to those Buddhists who accept the external world, the meaning of words is something mental.]

It is now stated that the meaning of a word has eternality in the sense of continuity.

34(a.b.) Even in impermanent things, there is eternality in the form of being the expressed meaning of words.

[From words, one understands always a meaning in which the form of something or other figures. That thing may or may not exist outside the mind but as the meaning expressed by a word, it is eternal. This eternality is continuity.]

It is now stated that it has eternality in the sense of unchangeability also (*kūṭasthanityatā*).

34(c.d.) What is called impermanence is nothing more than the power which is not different from the eternal reality.

[It is the power of *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, which causes things to appear as non-existent in the past or in the future. This power is not different from the Ultimate Reality. What is called impermanence or non-existence is only an appearance. Every word denotes this ultimate Reality through some limiting factor (*upādhi*) or other, as explained in the section on Substance. As every word ultimately denotes *Brahman* who is unchangeable (*kūṭasthanitya*), therefore, the relation between word and meaning is also unchangeable.]

It is now stated that, according to some, even meaningless words produce results.

35. (Even meaningless) words have an influence over objects leading to visible or invisible results. How is that possible unless there was a (natural) relation (between these words and the results)?

[Some people maintain that another proof that there is a natural relation between word and meaning is that words uttered by Śabarāś, even though meaningless, cure cases of poisoning. Similarly, magical syllables (*bījākṣara*) known in the different sects (though meaningless) produce invisible results. All this shows that between words and things, there is a natural relation.]

But this is not right.

36. One does not invariably see such influence on objects conveyed by words. Nor is such a relation meant here.

[The meaning understood from words like *ghaṭa* does not produce the same result as the above mentioned words but that does not mean that there is no natural relation between words like *ghaṭa* and their meanings.]

37. The fact of particular words being the cause of the understanding of particular meanings can be explained only if there is a relation between the two. So it is presumed that there is such a relation.

[It is better to look at the whole thing as Grammarians do. In order to explain the fact that we understand a particular meaning from a particular word, we assume that there is a relation between them, a kind of fitness similar to what the senses have in regard to their objects. It is not that we infer the existence of such a relation on the basis of some visible or invisible result which words might produce. Such a result may be produced merely by the sequence of the phonemes of the words through the influence of a great personality. It is not due to their capacity to convey meanings.]

It is now stated that the relation cannot be mere convention.

38. Whether the expressed meaning of words is eternal or transitory, no human being can establish a relation (between words and meanings) with the help of words whose relation with their meanings has not yet been established.

[According to the view that the meaning of a word like the universal is eternal, nobody can establish a relation between word and meaning for the first time. According to the view that the things denoted by words are impermanent and that words are also impermanent, the position would be the same. The person who would like to establish a relation between particular words and particular meanings cannot, of course, see all things with his own eyes. Even if he sees them through their universals, many universals may exist in the same thing and it would be difficult to choose between them. Nor can inference be of much help because the thing inferred can only be understood as mixed up with

words and, therefore, it cannot be of much use in first establishing a relation between the two. By a process of elimination, he has to rely on words to do the job. He would have to determine things through words and then establish the relation. But the words used for determining things also depend upon convention (*saṅketa*) and, therefore, other such words would have to be brought in and thus there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. Nor can the nature of things be determined with the help of words the convention of which has not been established. Thus one has ultimately to depend on words which have a natural and eternal capacity to denote their meanings.]

The eternity of the relation between word and meaning is now explained in another way.

39. In verbal usage, there is another Being, a secondary one, which presents the real nature of things in all circumstances.

[When words convey objects the things so conveyed have a Being distinct from their external Being. It consists in their figuring in the mind. Such a Being is called *aupa-cārikā*, to distinguish it from Being outside the mind, in the external world. Through this Being, things are presented as past or as yet to come. That is how words like past (*atīta*) and future (*anāgata*) also convey a meaning. When words present things as standing in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, it is this Being in which they participate. Things in the world exist in a mixed-up state, not *viśeṣaṇa* separately and *viśeṣya* separately, but words present them separately. This separation participates in this Being. The objects denoted by words are conceived in the mind and the mind can conceive objects which have no external Being and words convey them as they are conceived by the mind. That is why words like *alātacakra* and *śaśaviṣāṇa* have a meaning. They convey something conceived by the mind but having no external being. Thus words are never without a relation, with their meanings. Till something figures in the mind, its

existence or Being is a matter of faith only. In verbal usage, it is this secondary Being which plays the main part. Things come to be because of this Being. They do not assume their proper form till they are mixed up with words. When all usage can be explained in terms of this Being, if one still wants to think of some other kind of Being, consisting of fulfilling practical purposes (*arthakriyākaraṇa*), let one do so. But such a Being cannot enter into verbal usage. It is another matter if such a Being is also reflected in this one. That is what is now going to be shown by means of an example.]

Now follows the example.

40-41. Just as crystal etc., in association with objects of different colours, seem to become one with them on account of their power (of assuming different forms) in the same way, the word, taking its stand at first on this secondary Being, becomes related to various properties, contradictory and non-contradictory.

[The external object has its fixed form, it cannot co-exist with both existence and non-existence and, therefore, if that is the meaning of the word, it cannot enter into relation at the same time with the meaning of the words '*asti*' and '*nāsti*'. Therefore, the meanings of words have this secondary Being. The meaning of a word is capable of entering into association with the meanings of all other words. It is like the crystal, or glass or the sky. It is sometimes associated with the meaning of '*asti*' and sometimes with that of '*nāsti*'. An object like crystal is very clear and when in contact with, say, a blue object, does not give up its own clarity, but appears to be blue. Similarly, this secondary Being, when linked with such ideas as negation, becomes coloured by it, without giving up its own form. It appears to be identical with negation. The clarity of crystal consists in its being able to assume various forms and colours. That is its power. The power of this secondary Being also consists in its being able to assume the forms of all particulars. The word (*śabda*) is so called because the object is reflected in it (*arthah śabdyate*

iti kṛtvā). The word has its footing in this secondary Being in the beginning (*pūrvam*), that is, when the meaning of the individual word is understood. At the time of the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of the individual word which has its basis in this secondary Being, enters into relation with opposites and non-opposites. Positive objects are the non-opposites. They are favourable to this secondary Being, just as jasmine flowers are to crystal. That is why this Being assumes the form of these non-opposites in their presence. External Being is not opposed to it. In fact, it is very near to it. The opposites are the negative entities. Being negative in nature, they affect the nature of this secondary Being, just as a *japā* flower which is red affects the colour of crystal. It is due to this secondary Being that external objects which are combinations of substance and quality are presented by words separately as substance and quality.]

Association with opposites is now being shown.

42. Similarly, negation relates to the objects of negation, resorted to through secondary usage, in order that negation may be possible.

[It is only on the view that the object which figures in the mind is capable of assuming different forms that such expressions as non-brāhmin (*abrāhmaṇa*) can be explained, that the use of the negative particle in them can be accounted for. If words denote things which have an external Being, how can we say *abrāhmaṇa*? In the person to whom the word is applied, there is no brāhmaṇa-hood in reality. The word *brāhmaṇa* cannot, therefore, be applied to him. But if it is applied, the negative particle cannot be joined to it. But on the view that the meaning of words has a secondary Being, which is common to positive and negative objects, the expression *abrāhmaṇa* can be explained. The word *brāhmaṇa* would denote the quality of being a brahmin attributed, say, to a Kṣattriya on the basis of resemblance. This attribution is thus the object which is going to be negated. It has come in through *upacāra*, secondary usage, which supplies the thing

to be negated, without which there cannot be negation. So what happens in *abrāhmaṇa* is this—The negative particle denies real brāhmaṇahood attributed to somebody either through mistake or resemblance.]

See M. Bhā on P. 2.2.6 and the Pradīpa thereon. The difficulty which arises if words denote things having external reality only is now pointed out.

43. Birth means attaining one's own form, what already exists attains what is to be attained. If it (already) exists, why should it be born and if it does not, how can it be born.

Remarks. *sattā labhyaṃ ca labhyate* is a doubtful text. *sattā* should probably be *labdhā*. *labhyate* may be an error for *lābhaśca*.

[If words denote things having external Being, expressions like *aṅkuro jāyate* would be impossible. *Jāyate* stands for birth. Birth means the assumption of its form by something. There is the thing which assumes its form, the form which it assumes and the act of assumption itself. All the three exist. That is why one cannot speak about a thing being born, as in *aṅkuro jāyate*. That which already exists cannot be born. If it does not exist who is the agent denoted by the suffix of the verb expressive of the act of being born? If it already exists, how can it be born? The meaning of the root also becomes impossible.]

Another illustration of the same difficulty is given.

44. If the go-er exists and if there is a destination, the going can take place. If the one who is born is like the go-er, he cannot be born at all. If he is not, there cannot be birth at all.

[The act of going is like that of being born. Only that which already exists can go, provided that there is a destination as distinct from that which goes. But if one who takes

birth already exists like the one who goes, he cannot be born at all. Secondly, as birth means 'attaining one's self', there is no object as distinct from the agent as in the case of going. These are the difficulties if words are taken as denoting things having external Being.]

It is now stated that the difficulties are removed on the basis of secondary Being.

45-46. By conceiving it as agent in order that the name (sprout) may be given to it, by further conceiving it as the object and by postulating the action (of being born) based on it there results the secondary Being. The suffixes 'la' etc. (the verbal suffixes) can be applied to it. But there is no primary Being here because it would conflict with the idea of birth.

[The secondary 'Being' is capable of assuming all forms. What already exists in its finished form cannot be said to be born, nor what is totally non-existent. About something which neither is nor is not, which participates in the former and later condition and is about to attain a Being, one can say that it is being born. When one says that 'the sprout comes out', what one means is that when the causes are about to produce their effect, what is yet to be is thought of as being already there and to that we give the name of sprout and it is presented as the agent of the action of being born. There is further secondary usage when the agent becomes the object of the action of attaining one's form which is the meaning of being born. The agent which thus becomes the object through secondary usage is said to be born, that is, it is the agent of a process the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. Explained in this way, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* is seen to rest in secondary Being. The agent, the object and the action are all the result of *upacāra*: There is *kartr-kalpanā*, *karmakalpanā* and *kriyākalpanā*.]

It is now pointed out that the expression 'asti' which expresses the state coming after being born, is also based on secondary Being.

47. One says about a thing that it exists when it 'maintains itself'. As the object (of the action of maintaining) is included in the meaning of the root, the latter is not a transitive one.

[Similarly, the expression *aṅkuro'sti* can be explained only on the basis of this secondary Being. When one says: *aṅkuro'sti* 'the sprout exists', what is meant is that the sprout maintains itself. In this meaning of the root 'as', the agent and the object of the action are the same. The agent itself becomes the object (*karma*) in the explanation of the meaning of the root itself. That is why the root 'as' is said to be intransitive.]

48. Before connection with existence, how can there be primary Being? What does not exist cannot be the agent of 'to exist'. But there is secondary usage as before.

[The verb 'to exist' denotes existence conceived as a process, the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. In this state, there cannot be an agent in a finished form. Nor can there be the action of existence if there is no connection with the agent of that action. Nor does one see any other accessory here. Being itself cannot really become both accessory and action. The accessory has to be something that is completed, accomplished (*siddha*). What is in the process of being '*sattā*' (existence) cannot be something that is completed. What has already assumed existence cannot be a process (*sādhya*). Therefore, what has attained its form (born) is conceived mentally as having existence, the parts of which are arranged in a sequence. The first part of it is the agent, the latter part is a process, the object is included in the action based on both. Thus, as in the case of birth, the expression 'it exists' is based on an agent which has only secondary Being. Thus the expressions *asti*, *nāsti* and *jāyate* have been explained on the basis of secondary Being. These stand for three out of the six transformations of Being (*ṣaḍ bhāvavi-*

kārāḥ). The other three are included in them. What is called growth or increase of parts is included in birth. What is called change or the appearance of new properties is also included in birth. What is called decay (*apaksīyate*) is included in destruction (*nāsti*). As all actions come under the six transformations of Being, they have all to be explained on the basis of secondary Being.]

It is now stated that this secondary Being is all-pervasive.

49-51. No meaning of a word can go beyond this secondary Being which is not opposed to things which are opposed to one another, which is resorted to by different words in order to present difference and opposition, which has no temporal distinction but exists in things belonging to different times, which is the cause of the use of all words. It has been shown as something different from primary Being in the *Bhāṣya*.

[Things which are opposed to one another have no opposition in this secondary Being. It is on the basis of this that words present difference where there is no difference in reality. For example, words present the jar and its blueness as two separate things, whereas in reality, the two exist as one concrete thing. Words like past and future present things which are opposed to and different from what words like *varṇamāna* denote. This secondary Being presents as separate what is really united, but only to unite it again. It extends to all things, present, past and future. It is the cause of the use of all words, because we first conceive things in our mind and then give expression to them in words. What has not yet been mentally conceived cannot be expressed. Even what is actually present cannot be expressed unless it has been conceived by the mind. To conceive of things as related to one another by the relation of action and accessory is also a case of secondary Being, because it is the work of the mind. When we utter a sentence consisting of nouns and verbs and expressive of an action which is being done,

the action is not there yet and nothing can, therefore, be an accessory in reation to it. Therefore, the meanings of the verbs and nouns in that sentence have an existence only in the mind. Thus, all words move in the realm of this secondary Being. What is called non-existence is also something which can be conceived by the mind. No word is separated from its meaning understood as something moving in this secondary Being. This is accepted by the *Bhāṣyakāra* when he says: *na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati* (M. Bhā on P. 5.2.94). The past and the future have no outside reality, but they have this Being. When we use the word 'asti' in regard to a thing, what we are doing is to say that it has outside reality in addition to having secondary Being. Even external Being becomes capable of being expressed by words only when it is grasped by the mind. Past and future Being have an existence only in the mind.]

See Kaiyyaṭa's Pradīpa on the Bhaṣya sentence "*na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati*", on P. 5.2.94. What is stated in detail on 'upacārasattā' in this section of Helārāja's commentary is stated there briefly.

It is now shown that all words positive or negative are in the same position.

52. Verbal communication relates only to a part of an aspect of reality or to the determination by means of an external factor or to a reversal of reality or to an absence of it.

[No word expresses reality faithfully. Words like 'past' and 'future' also express things which do not exist and so do not express reality faithfully. Thus words expressive of positive and negative entities are all in the same position. No word can express the full reality. All words express only a part of it, because everything in this world is only a part or an aspect of the Ultimate Reality. In fact, no word can fully express even that part. A word like *ghaṭa* cannot express even that part of reality fully. It just expresses a part of

that part, namely, the universal in it. Anything else which that thing may possess requires another word to express it. If it is red in colour, the word *rakta* has to be used to express it. A thing can be expressed in words only through some such property as the universal which exists in it. A thing as such cannot be expressed at all. The One Brahman is presented by words as many on the basis of different limiting factors or they present what is within us as external to us. They are responsible for *viparītakhyāti*. According to the *Śūnyavādins*, there is no external reality at all. The different forms which occur in our consciousness cannot have reality. They are mere dreams and it is these unreal forms which words present. In other words, they present what does not exist (*abhāva*). As words can present only one of these four distortions of reality, as stated by (1) grammarians (2) *saṃsargadarśana* (3) *Vijñānavādins* (4) *Śūnyavādins*, there cannot be an eternal relation between words and the actual reality.]

53. Just as, through a defect in our senses, objects produce cognitions in which something is superimposed, as it were, such is the nature of cognitions produced by words.

[In this matter of presenting reality in a mutilated form, words are like defective senses. With a defective eye, one sees two moons instead of one; with jaundice, one sees the conch as yellow. Objects produce cognitions in which a form different from what they actually have figures. Words also produce a cognition in which a non-existing form figures.]

54. Words are based on cognitions which do not reveal the full reality and so present things in another form, not determined by their real form.

[Effects correspond to their causes. The cause of words is our cognitions of things (*nirūpanāpratyaṃ*). Cognitions are in the nature of mental constructs (*vikalpa*) which never

perceive things in all their aspects. How they present only a part of reality was mentioned before (verse 52). Due to the relation of causality, the cognition which arises from a word is a *vikalpa*. Our determinate cognitions are based on words and vice versa. Therefore, due to a certain incapacity born of *avidyā*, our determinate cognitions are not capable of seeing things as they are. They see them in an unreal form according to all thinkers and words convey these unreal forms. All words do this, words which convey positive things like *ghaṭa* and those which convey negative things like 'past'. 'future' (*atīta*, *anāgata*.)]

55. The child and the scholar, when they are both at the worldly level, see things and communicate them. Therefore, they are in the same position as far as cognitions and words are concerned.

[It might be said that those whose vision is not blurred and who, therefore, see the full reality express it through words and we learn words from them. Why should not words then express the full reality? The answer is: What is called social intercourse means exchange of ideas. Therefore, even those whose vision is not blurred are not different from ordinary people at that level. They also observe objects and give expression to what they see. In other words, their words also express their determinate cognitions and, therefore, present only a part of reality.]

As cognition always relates to limited objects, in what its purity consists is now stated.

56. Purity of knowledge consists in its embracing all objects and not having (sense-contact as its) basis. When no form of objects figures in it, purity, some say, reaches a still higher stage.

[When sages go beyond the worldly level, there comes a certain purity in their cognitions. Purity is of two kinds,

initial and final. The knowledge of the omniscient which embraces all objects and which does not arise through sense-contact has initial purity. Dependence on the senses is itself an impurity. In its finished form, it is free from the appearance of the forms of objects or of any differentiation, it is pure Consciousness like the sea without the slightest ripple on its surface. It is the supreme Brahman.]

57. When knowledge exhibits the forms of external objects, it is a kind of disturbance, a kind of impurity consisting in its being mixed up with them as a result of contact.

[When pure consciousness comes into contact with objects and gets mixed up with them, a certain impurity results, a certain proneness towards outside objects, just as pure water is tainted when it comes into contact with dust. When this impurity goes away, the consciousness is restored to its original purity.]

58. Just as knowledge becomes impure through being coloured by the object, in the same way, an object falls from its real form when it is expressed through some limiting factor.

[The object also is susceptible to impurity. A thing can be spoken of only through some characteristic of it, some limiting factor such as the universal. This is a limitation of the object and so it constitutes a kind of impurity of the object.]

59. The object, the word and the cognition being thus distorted, existence and non-existence thus enter into verbal or worldly usage in an identical manner.

[The impurity of the object consists in its being coloured by the universal and the like, that of the word in not being

able to express the whole object, but only as coloured by some limiting factor or other and that of cognition in being coloured by the external object. Thus any positive entity, when expressed by words or cognised by the mind, appears in the form of some limiting factor. In this respect, it is like a negative entity, which cannot be cognised as such. It can be cognised only as the negation of something. In other words, its nature is determined by something extraneous to itself. It can never be cognised in its own real form. Even though an error is a defect of the perceiver, the fact remains that, in an error, three things, the word, the object and the cognition appear in an erroneous form.]

60. Just as the non-existence of a thing is cognised on the basis of its existence, similarly the existence of a thing is conceived on the basis of its non-existence.

[Non-existence, unless related to some positive entity, cannot enter into usage. Positive entities also exist only during the middle stage, between previous non-existence and later destruction. Even eternal things are as good as non-existent till they are manifested. Being thus mutually dependent, they are similar in their position in worldly usage. All this has been said on the assumption that positive and negative entities are two different things.]

61. It is not non-existence that is transformed into existence nor existence which becomes non-existence. Existence and non-existence are two appearances (*vikalpita*) and are not different from the one Self.

[According to dualists, existence comes into being after having destroyed non-existence and non-existence comes into being after having suppressed existence. This position is untenable, because existence and non-existence can merge into each other. If they were totally different from each other, one cannot be cognised in terms of the other. The fact is that the Self, the only Reality, manifests itself now as *bhāva*

and now as *abhāva* which are thus two limiting factors of one reality. This only reality is in the nature of light and always remains so. When, through nescience, it manifests itself as the external object, is associated with the present time and has causal efficiency, it is said to be a positive entity (*bhāva*). When it is associated with past and future time, it is in the form of a residual trace only and then it is said to be a negative entity (*abhāva*). But it is not absolute non-being because it is remembered if it is associated with past time and imagined if it is associated with future time. In this condition, it is not perceptible to the senses. There is no non-existence which has not even got the form of residual trace (*samśkāra*) and is devoid of all powers. Things are either present and can be perceived by the senses or they are past or yet to come and are, therefore, remembered or imagined. That is why things are said to be *traiyyadhvikāḥ*, that is, belonging to three paths, the present, past and future. Thus absolute non-existence does not exist.]

The untenability of the relation of causality is now stated.

62. Non-existence being intangible, cause cannot bring it about. Nor can cause do anything to what is already tangible.

[It might be said: why look upon existence and non-existence as mere mental constructs? Why not look upon them as two different effects, due to different causes? The reason is that the relation of causality itself is untenable. Causes are supposed to act in such a manner that effects come into being. How can causes act keeping in view something which does not exist yet? It is true that it exists in the form of the universal, but the universal, being eternal, cannot be an effect. Nor would it do to say that the universal and the particular are identical and as the particular is not eternal, it can be an effect. Because how can the causes work keeping the particular in view? Moreover, if the causes work for the coming into being of the non-existent effect, why should the latter come from one particular cause rather than another.

Why should oil, for instance, come from sesame-seeds and not from sand, considering that it was non-existent in regard to both? Nor can one argue that the power of causes to produce effects is limited. We see that when something is there, something else is produced and not otherwise. Well, it is only a matter of our understanding such a connection between two things. There is really speaking no such connection. *Satkāryavāda* is also not tenable. If the effect is already there, the cause cannot be said to produce it. The idea that the already existing effect is merely manifested by the cause is also not tenable. The manifested effect is either different from the cause or it is not. If it is different, it either existed or did not exist before manifestation. If it did not, then there can be birth of what did not exist and that is not possible. And so on. The net result of this argument is that causality as understood by others is not possible and that it is based on the notion of existence and non-existence as two distinct things.]

63. Therefore, everything is either existence or non-existence. There is no other state which proceeds from the one Reality.

[The fact is that they are not two distinct things. They are only two unreal appearances of one ultimate Reality (*vivartā*), due to nescience. As this does not appear as it is, the whole of the phenomenal world is a kind of non-existence, *aparamārtha*.]

64. Those who believe in a positive reality do not accept non-existence and those who believe in non-existence only do not accept any positive entity.

[The sages hold the view that birth and death are nothing more than the manifestation and the hiding of the real. What is called non-existence is not something distinct from existence. It is nothing more than the previous and later conditions of existence. The previous non-existence of

a jar is clay and its later non-existence is potsherds (*ka-pāla*). The *Śūnyavādins* consider non-existence alone to be the truth. But even they have to admit existence at the worldly level. Thus through '*saṃvṛti*' or hiding of reality at the worldly level, everything can be explained.]

How the distinction between existence and non-existence arises, is now explained.

65. While all this visible world is naturally one, there is an extraordinary order in this multiplicity.

[All this variety is really pervaded by a certain unity, namely, Brahman. But due to nescience, this unity appears as multiplicity. It is this very unity which appears as existence and non-existence; but, of course, this distinction is unreal.]

66. Just as four states are postulated in what is intangible (*nirupākhyā*), in the same way is this two-fold division into existence and non-existence postulated.

[If non-existence which is intangible can have such artificial divisions as previous non-existence, non-existence after destruction, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence, the ultimate Reality also can have artificial distinctions. What is called existence is the fact of being cognisable to the external senses and fulfilling some purpose or other. What is called non-existence is the fact of being imperceptible and not fulfilling some purpose.]

It is now stated that neither existence nor non-existence has separate Being.

67. Non-existence can rationally be neither opposed nor non-opposed (to existence) can be neither existent nor non-existent, neither have sequence nor not have it.

[As non-existence in intangible, there cannot be opposition between it and existence. Non-existence neither helps

nor hinders existence. One cannot predicate existence about it, because what exists cannot be non-existent and what has already attained its form cannot get anything further. Nor can it have a separate form because, in that way, there would be no difference between it and existence. Sequence is an attribute of existent entities and, therefore, non-existence cannot have it. Nor can there be absence of sequence, that is, simultaneity, because that depends upon something external.]

68. Existence which is opposed or otherwise, existent or non-existent, sequenceful or sequenceless, does not, therefore, exist.

69. There cannot be any division within non-existence on the basis of the three divisions of time and, if that is not possible, there cannot be triple time for existence either.

70. Abandoning one's own essence due to something external is not possible, nor is it possible to maintain that one's own essence depends upon oneself or something external.

71. There is contradiction in identity (between existence and non-existence) and if they are different, they cannot render service (to each other). If both are abandoned, all usage would cease.

[Verses 67-71 are intended to show on the basis of logic, that really speaking it is not possible to show the validity of existence or non-existence. They are no more than appearance and disappearance or hiding of something unreal. The ultimate Reality is eternal and is not affected by its appearance and disappearance as unreal forms of something which is eternal and quite free from these unreal forms.]

The truth is now stated.

72. Those who know the final portion of the Vedas have declared that entity alone to be real which is differentiated into the see-er, the seen and the seeing.

If the text is: '*vā avikalpitām*', the translation should be: 'in which there is no real differentiation into'.

[Knowers of Brahman have declared that the world consisting of the perceiver and the perceived, brought about through differentiation is not real. What is real is beyond all differentiation, beyond the range of words and mind, with no beginning and no end. The final portion of the Vedas, consisting of *Ṛk*, *Yajus*, and *Sāman*, is the *Upaniṣad* where the essential truth is propounded. Those who know this portion have declared that monism is the truth and not dualism suggested by the performance of actions. Differentiation is due to *avidyā* which is neither identical with nor different from the ultimate reality.]

It is now stated that words move about in the world of unreal differentiation.

73. Inasmuch as words express the universal or the particular as differentiated, they move about in the world of unreal differences.

[Words express the unreal which appears in our cognition and do not touch the undifferentiated reality but move about in the world of differentiation. Words express even universals as distinct from other universals. That is, even when they express universals which stand for unity, they are still associated with differentiation. Similarly, a *viśeṣa* (particularity) is different from other *vśeṣas*, as expressed by words.]

The author now says something about non-existence as understood by the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

74. When non-existence is brought about, existence cannot be destroyed nor can existence be brought when

non-existence is destroyed (if non-existence is also a separate category).

[So far, all reasoning has been going on on the basis of the view that non-existence is something intangible. But, for the *Vaiśeṣikas*, it is a separate category. That means that it is something tangible. If that is so and it is different from 'bhāva', how can *bhāva* be destroyed when *abhāva* is produced and how can *bhāva* be produced when *abhāva* is destroyed?]

75. The existence of *śābaleya* does not prevent that of *bāhuleya*, nor does the non-existence of *śābaleya* bring about the existence of *bāhuleya*.

[Just as the existence of *śābaleya* does not prevent that of *bāhuleya* and vice-versa, in the same way, if *abhāva* is also a separate category, its existence or non-existence would not bring about the non-existence or existence of *bhāva*.]

76. Such considerations would arise if non-existence were a positive entity and in regard to its own non-existence, the whole question would arise again.

77. Therefore, being a non-entity, it is beyond the scope of verbal communication and variation within it does not deserve to be explained.

[If we proceed on the Buddhist assumption that what is called non-existence is only the disappearance of a positive entity, and, therefore, something intangible, all these considerations would not arise at all. The objection that when non-existence is destroyed, why should a positive entity come to be, would not be raised. If the object comes into existence when its previous non-existence is removed, it is because of its nature to come to be. Therefore, non-existence is something intangible and does not deserve to be classed into a

separate category. It is intangible and it cannot be thought of in the same way as *bhāva*.]

The untenability of causality, already stated, is now repeated and *vivartavāda*, the final doctrine, is expounded.

78. There is no such thing as the cause working towards something which has not even a word to express it. Even when the cause is present, there is the absence of the effect (before it is born).

[As the effect does not exist before it comes into existence, it has no word to express it. The cause, therefore, cannot work towards it. A cause operates in relation to an effect which is fit to be born and which is something positive. So unless the effect exists already, the cause cannot work towards it. Causes do not work towards something which is nothing. That which does not exist cannot be an aim and if it already exists, there is no need for a cause. If, by what is called the cause working towards the effect, it is the agent's plan which is meant, that is also not possible. An insentient cause can work still less towards the effect. So what is called causality is nothing more than something appearing to come into existence only when something else is present.]

79. 'What is its previous condition' is a question which relates to something which exists. Both the ideas of 'previous' and condition are inapplicable to something which does not exist.

[No one can say that because, before its production, there is its previous condition, therefore, it is not right to say that there is no word to express it. Because, one can legitimately ask 'what is this previous condition' only in regard to something which exists. Neither the idea of previous nor that of condition applies to something which is nothing. Something which is devoid of form or shape cannot be said to be 'previous' either spatially or temporally. The idea of condition pre-

supposes one who is in that condition and no such thing is visible. Thus, both according to *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda*, there cannot be a previous condition of the effect.]

80. After destruction, one cannot say about a thing that it exists or does not exist, because of the absence of any ground for doing so. It is beyond the range of words:

[After destruction, one cannot say of a thing whether it exists or not. The *Sāṅkhyas* affirm that it does exist, but that is not right. The fact of being cognised is the basis of such statements and that cannot happen with something which has been destroyed. Therefore, before it is produced and after it is destroyed, one cannot speak about a thing at all.]

It is now stated that it is only in the middle stage that it is visible.

81. It is indeed a wonderful activity by virtue of which the indivisible and sequenceless essence of previously non-existent things manifests itself.

[Causality has already been shown to be unsound. So the effect, previously non-existent, suddenly appears under certain conditions, that is, when something else is present. It only appears to be an effect, but it is not so. People, blinded by nescience, imagine it in many ways. It is only a *vivarta*. When the one, without ceasing to be one, assumes different unreal forms, there is *vivarta*.]

Helārāja here quotes the definition of *vivarta* found in the *vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 1.

82. All worldly usage is carried out with objects created by mental construction as with primary objects.

[After having seen the object during the middle stage, one imagines a previous and a posterior stage for it and thus

it becomes endowed with sequence and then one postulates a relation of causality and talks about *bhāva* and *abhāva*. This is worldly usage which is the result of nescience.]

83. Those who believe in the Eternal (Brahman) look upon this as the power of the only Reality. They declare sequence to be the same as the objects and not as something apart from them.

[In reality, the plurality which is visible is not the truth. Only monism is the truth. It is seen as plurality by those whose eyes are dimmed by nescience. The one sequenceless Brahman appears as many and as possessing sequence because of the power called *svātantrya*. These two powers, that by which the one appears as many and the sequenceless appears as having sequence are not really different from Brahman. Nothing besides Brahman can shine and that which shines cannot be different from Brahman. Sequence appears as conditioned by objects which are identical with Brahman. So sequence is really not different from what has sequence.]

84. In reality, simultaneity is not different from sequence just as non-existence is not different from existence.

[The opposite of sequence is simultaneity and that is also a mere appearance. The One Reality cannot be cognised as such by ordinary people. It manifests itself as having spatial and temporal sequence. When two or more things appear together, they seem to have simultaneity. But sequence and simultaneity are not different from the things themselves. It has been said before that *abhāva* is not different from *bhāva* and that it is not anything positive. Simultaneity is only absence of sequence. Association in time with something else is not different from that which so associates.]

85. People of the world speak about time within time. But one cannot bring about a distinction by merely speaking about it.

[By speaking about time which exists to-day and time which will exist tomorrow, some people make a distinction within time. They speak of time as *ādhāra* or as *ādheya*. But Time is One. Similarly, sequence and simultaneity do not differ from each other nor from the things which are sequential or simultaneous.]

86. Even if non-existence is imagined to be a substratum, nothing can really exist in it. Nobody can be prevented from imagining totally non-existent things.

[When we say *śātror abhāve sukham* the use of the locative case seems to imply that non-existence can be a substratum. But that is not right. It is a mere fiction. There is nothing which one cannot imagine.]

87. Therefore, the one eternal Reality, consisting of existence and non-existence, shines through its different powers, in many forms when conveyed by words.

[The substance of this section can be stated as follows—The ultimate Reality is beyond all differentiation. It is endowed with all powers. Words express this Reality, according to occasion, either as a positive entity or as a negation and as having this or that limiting factor. Those words which express negative things are similar to words expressive of positive things as far as their relation to their meanings are concerned. This ultimate Reality is one, because there is no differentiation within it. It is eternal, because there is no such thing as *abhāva*, non-existence.]

88. Verbal communication in the world is done with meanings of words fashioned by the mind and in the science of grammar, it is the meanings adopted in the world on the basis of which the work (of explaining the forms) is done.

[Therefore, in everyday life, it is the norm for words to express the limited reality and it has been so stated in this *śāstra*. Therefore, all the different views of the *tārkikas* are out of place. Ordinary people do not follow the conclusions which may have been reached by different thinkers. In the matter of using words in accordance with our cognitions, both the scholar and the child are equal. On that basis, they proceed to exchange views. Ordinary people understand things in a superficial manner and use words accordingly. This *śāstra* is an attempt to explain words as used by ordinary people. In this attempt, one should take the help of the ordinary man's view of the world. From the indivisible sentence-meaning, by a process of abstraction, one derives the root expressive of action, the nouns expressive of things, the suffix which conveys its own meaning for the sake of explaining the forms. The notions of action, substance, quality and so on, used by the science of grammar, are worldly notions. In worldly usages, all words whether expressive of positive or negative things, are in the same position. Therefore, the meanings of words have continuity. Thus the relation between word and meaning is eternal.]

SECTION 4

FURTHER STATEMENT ON SUBSTANCE

1-2. Some meanings of words which exist in the sentence looked upon as interconnection (*ṣaṃsargarūpāt saṃbhūtāḥ*) which are isolated by a process of abstraction (*saṃvidrūpād apoddhṛtāḥ*) which are separated from the meaning of a sentence like the meanings of the stem and the suffix (from that of a word), which are the basis of the correctness of words and which are inferred from indications in the Science of Grammar, will now be explained according to Tradition.

[The previous section ended with the remark that, in the Science of Grammar, meanings of words, agreeing with worldly usage, are isolated for the purpose of explaining the formation of words. The sentence is indivisible and so is its meaning. For the purpose of conveniently explaining the forms of the language both are artificially divided. These divisions become the means of the derivation of the forms of the language. For the purpose of this division, the meaning of the sentence is looked upon as connection (*saṃsarga*). In that way, the meanings of the individual words whose connection the sentence-meaning is, can be separated. They exist only if the sentence-meaning is looked upon as a combination. If they do not exist at all or if they are like bits of iron, they cannot combine and there cannot be any question of analysis. Of course, the sentence and its meaning are indivisible. So there are no word-meanings. There cannot be any question of their previous separate existence. The hearer does not understand the meaning of the whole sentence all at once. He understands it little by little, part by part and then joins the parts together. The taste of 'sharbat' (*pānaka*) is really an indivisible whole, but those

who drink it can, if they make an effort, taste each ingredient separately and assess the part played by it in making up the taste of the whole. As the indivisible sentence—meaning cannot be understood in a flash all at once, the unreal word-meanings are abstracted in the middle as mere means to an end. Once the sentence-meaning is understood, they disappear. This artificial division is done with a purpose. It is to facilitate the teaching of forms, so that each form may be made in its own meaning. These meanings are not taught in the *śāstra*, they are not ‘*vidheya*’. They are natural and they are made use of to teach forms. This is the meaning of the M. Bhā. statement: *svābhāvikam ity āha. Kuta etat. arthānādeśanāt*—“It is declared that it is natural. Why so? Because meaning has not been taught.” (M.Bhā. I, p. 363, 1.8). The mention of meaning in a grammatical *sūtra* is only by the way. It is only a means to an end. The artificial division of a sentence is like the division of a word like a noun or a verb into parts and assigning a meaning to each, though a word is really indivisible. These artificial meanings are indications of the correctness of the word. That is why they are analysed. They are of two kinds: (1) those which are known in the world, (2) those which are known in particular *śāstras*. These latter are defined by grammarians in their own way. These definitions are inferred from Pāṇini’s practice. For example, from the *sūtra* which teaches ‘*ekaśeṣa*’ (P. 1.2.64) we gather that the individual or the particular (*dravya*) can be the meaning of a word and that it means something which is to be differentiated (*bhedyā*). From the *vārttika* — “*yasya guṇasya hi bhāvād dravye śabdāniveśaḥ* etc.” (Vā. 5 on P. 5.1.119), we understand that *guṇa* is something which rests on something else. Even the universal (*jāti*) can be said to be *guṇa* when it is expressed by an abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*). Words like *śukla* in *śuklaḥ paṭah* denote an object having white as its quality. That what is called time is essentially action is known from the fact that Pāṇini has used such words as ‘*bhūta*’, ‘*vartamāne*’, ‘*bhaviṣyati*’ as expressive of the limiting factor of the meaning of the root which is action. That

number is something which enables us to count difference is made clear in the *sūtra*-‘*jātyākhyām ekasmin*’ etc. (P. 1.2.57). The *Vaiśeṣika* conception of number is that it is a quality which inheres in a substance. We gather that *saṁstyāna*, *prasava* and *sthiti* constitute the nature of the genders from the expressions ‘*striyām*’, ‘*pun̄si*’, and ‘*napuṁsakhe*’ which are found in connection with the explanation of the forms of words. Gender cannot mean sex because such things as a ‘*khaṭvā*’ cannot have sex in the ordinary sense of the term. That it is power or capacity (*śakti*) which is the real accessory (*sādhana*) and not substance can be gathered from these indications: (1) from the fact that an accessory can sometimes be *śeṣa* (2) from the fact that the object can sometimes become agent — changes which substance, being uniform, cannot undergo — (3) from the fact that an ‘*avyayībhāva*’ compound has been taught in the sense of a case-ending. The concepts of ‘*puruṣa*’ and ‘*upagraha*’ have been taken from previous grammarians. Space and action are well-known in the world. Action has been defined as a process the parts of which are arranged in a temporal sequence. One and the same word can convey many of the things mentioned above, but one of them as the main thing and the others as subordinate to it. Thus, the verb denotes action, time, accessory, number, person and aspect. The noun denotes substance, gender, number, accessories, action and time. All these things have been explained according to the tradition of the grammarians.]

As quality etc. depend upon substance, the latter is first defined.

3. That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.

[Pronouns can do one of two things. Some merely denote things in general, like ‘*sarva*’. Others denote particular things like ‘*anyatara*’. It is the former which are used to refer to substance. In fact, that is just the characteristic

of substance, namely, that it can be referred to by a pronoun (*sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyatvam*). Pronouns refer to things in general either as present or as past. When the element of present or past is discarded, what remains is just the thing in general and that is substance. It is presented as something to be qualified by such limiting factors as the universal. What is meant by 'presented' is that what is being defined is not external reality, but reality as presented by words. Thus, even a universal, when presented as something to be qualified, becomes substance. This conception of substance is quite different from that of other schools. In this way, anything can be presented by words as substance, as something to be differentiated. This is true of the other conception also, namely, that of Vājapyāyana who held that all words denote the universal i.e. something which is the cause of the same cognition arising and the same word being applied to something. Such a universal exists in action also. That is why we cognise every step in the process of cooking as cooking. If only the last stage in the process, that is, the softening of the substance cooked, were the meaning of the root 'to cook' (*pac*), then the other stages would have to be understood through inference or implication and would not be the actions of the cook. If the activity of the agent is not expressed by the root, but is understood by inference or implication, then there would be no connection between the meaning of the suffix, namely, the agent and his activity which would not be expressed by the root but only understood by implication. If the root '*pac*' denotes only the softening of the material (*viklitti*), then the material can only be *kartā* or *karmakartā*, but never the object. In other words, we would never be able to say—*devadattaḥ odanaṃ pacati*. Secondly the softening is only the last stage or moment. So it cannot be the action at all. Action is a process of which the parts are arranged in a sequence. The action of cooking is in the same position. Such moments as putting the vessel on the fire must be part of that process, because at these moments also we get the idea of cooking. So there is such

a thing as the universal of cooking inhering in every moment of the process. This is true of all actions. Even though every verb denotes the universal aspect of action, the accessories become connected with the individual aspect which is something to be accomplished (*sādhya*) and only *sādhya* can be connected with '*sādhana*' (the means).

Just as it has been shown that action is a universal, it can also be shown that it is a substance. Even according to the view that the verb denotes action primarily, it must denote substance, that is, the accessory secondarily. Otherwise, in regard to what would action be the primary meaning? Would it not be simpler to say that the verb denotes primarily the accessory in activity? Even according to the other view, the accessory comes in secondarily. Otherwise, the expression '*devadattaḥ pacati*' where the word expressive of action and the word expressive of accessory are in apposition to each other, would be inexplicable. Action, the meaning of the verb, can be referred to by a pronoun, characteristic of substance. In the expression '*sādhu pacati*' we see that the meaning of the verb is modified or differentiated by the word '*sādhu*'. Similarly, the verb '*āsyate*' can be qualified by the word '*sukham*' and so its meaning becomes '*bhedyā*', a characteristic of substance, as stated in the verse under consideration.

The Mīmāṃsakas argue that the verb expresses 'bringing about' (*bhāvanā*) and that substance is understood by implication only and is not the expressed meaning of the verb. This is wrong. It is the root which expresses *bhāvanā*. The suffix denotes the accessory. Thus the former expresses the *sādhya* and the latter the '*sādhana*' and that is how the two are correlated. If '*sādhana*' is understood only by implication, there would be no relation between the two].

Now the definition of quality (*guṇa*), based on indications found in the *śāstra*, is being given.

SECTION 5

ON QUALITY (GUṆA)

1. Whatever rests on something else (*samsargi*) differentiates it (*bhedaka*) and is understood in that function (*savyāpāra*), is, being dependent, called 'quality' in the *śāstra*.

[Quality is said to rest on its substratum, because the forms of the two are mixed up, as it were. That is why it distinguishes its substratum from other substrata. The force of the repetition of the relative pronoun (*yad yad*) is that anything, even a universal, can become a quality, if it is understood as something which distinguishes the substratum. This is the implication of the *M.Bhā.* on *Vā* 21 on P. 2.1.1. This definition of *guṇa* follows worldly notions. *Vā* 5 on P. 5.1.119 also stands for the worldly notion of *guṇa*. That *vārttika* says something about the meaning of the suffixes 'tva' and 'tal' when added to stems. If the stem stands for something to be distinguished (*viśeṣya*), these suffixes express the distinguishing quality (*viśeṣana*). When a stem like 'go' stands for the individual characterised by class or universal, the suffix added to it stands for the class or universal. When the stem stands for the class only, then the suffix stands for the form of the word itself. That the form of the word also is the expressed sense of the word has already been explained. It can also be looked upon as a quality which qualifies the meaning of the stem. It is superimposed on it, it is identified with it. When a stem like 'śukla' stands for the individual qualified by the quality 'white' the suffix 'tva' added to it stands for the quality. If the stem stands for the quality the suffix denotes the universal inhering in it. If it stands for the universal, the suffix stands for the form of the word as before. Even when the suffix 'tva' is applied to a proper name like 'Dittha', it denotes the universal, that element which persists in the individual named, through all the changes which he undergoes.

In words like *rājapuruṣatva*, *pācakatva*, *aupagavatva*, the suffix denotes relation. The word *rājapuruṣa* denotes a person qualified by a relation with the king and the suffix denotes that relation. In '*hastitva*' and *kumbhakāratva*' the suffix denotes classes, relation being the basis of the formation of the stem itself. From all this, it is clear that in P. 5.1.119, the word '*bhāva*' stands for something which qualifies something else, due to which a thing appears as what it is (*bhavaty asmāt tenākāreṇa dravyam iti*). This conception of quality (*guṇa*) has been adopted by the Science of Grammar. Sometimes, however, rules have been framed on the basis of other notions of quality. For example, P. 4.1.44. Here the word '*guṇavacana*' means a word expressive of substance to which an attribute is subordinate and the feminine suffix comes after such a word. The word *guṇa* in this *sūtra* cannot mean what is defined in the present verse because then the feminine suffix would have to be added even to a word expressive of the universal. It stands for the *Vaiśeṣika* notion of *guṇa*, mentioned in the verse "*sattve nivīśate*" etc. given in the *M.Bhā.* under P. 4.1.44. This definition would not include the universal. The other verse given in *M.Bhā.* under P. 4.1.44, namely, '*upaity anyaj jahāty anyad*' etc. also gives the *Vaiśeṣika* definition of *guṇa*. According to some, these two verses are not meant to define '*guṇa*' but to say what kind of word '*guṇavacana*' is. *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.4.1. denies the name '*guṇavacana*' to a compound word, a word ending in a primary or secondary suffix, a pronoun, an indeclinable, a proper name and a word expressive of universal. It is a word which denotes a thing qualified by an attribute. After such a word, the suffix '*ṣyañ*' can come according to P. 5.1.124. Thus, this *sūtra* is also based on the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of *guṇa*, though not in a consistent manner.

In P. 5.2.94 and P. 8.1.12, a word which denotes a thing to which a quality is subordinate, is *guṇavacana*. For example, the word '*śukla*' which means not 'white' but 'that which is white'. Or the word '*paṭu*' which does not mean cleverness, but one who is clever. A word which denotes quality only is not '*guṇavacana*'. For example, '*kārṣṇyam*'. In P. 5.2.47 the

word *guṇa* stands for an equal part. The meaning of the word 'guṇa' in P. 2.2.11 has to be clarified. The *vārttikas*: *tatsthaiś ca guṇaiḥ* and '*na tu tadviśeṣaṇaiḥ*', given under P. 2.2.8 must be taken together with P. 2.2.11. In the last *sūtra*, the compounding of a word ending in the genitive case affix with a word expressive of *guṇa* is prohibited. There the word *guṇa* is used in the *Vaiśeṣika* sense. So we cannot have a compound word for *kākasya kārṣṇyam*'. This prohibition is set aside in some cases. Words express *guṇa* in two ways. Sometimes they present it as quite separate from the thing in which it exists as in *candanasya gandhaḥ*'. We cannot say '*candanam gandhaḥ*' because the word '*gandhaḥ*' denotes smell itself and not smell as existing in sandal wood. When we say '*śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*' the word '*śukla*' denotes 'white' as an attribute of cloth. It means something that is white and not whiteness itself. '*Gandhaḥ*' is what is called '*tatstha guṇa*' that is, *guṇa* which is presented as something separate from its substratum. A word ending in the sixth case affix can be compounded with such a word. That is why we can say: *candanagandhaḥ*. A word which presents a quality sometimes as separate and sometimes as one with its substratum cannot be compounded. We can say '*paṭasya śuklaḥ*' and '*suklaḥ paṭaḥ*'. In the former expression 'white' is presented as something separate; in the latter, it is presented as existing in the cloth. Therefore, we cannot have the compound word *paṭaśukla*. So the word 'guṇa' in P. 2.2.11 means, not a word which means a thing to which a quality is subordinate, but a word which presents a quality as something separate and independent, though elsewhere it might be dependent. In Vā. 1. on P. 2.2.7 and in P. 5.3.58, the word *guṇa* has the *Vaiśeṣika* sense. In P. 6.2.155, it has the meaning given to it in the present verse. From all this it follows that the meaning of the word *guṇa* varies in the *śāstra* and that the meaning given to it in the present verse is the special grammarian's meaning.]

Here certain doubts arise. Why is it that only quality admits of degree and not the thing itself? How is it that when degree is expressed in regard to quality, degree in

regard to the thing is also understood? How can one say that everywhere some quality is present which brings about difference of degree in the thing, considering that qualities cannot have qualities, universals cannot have universals and actions can have no qualities? How can excellence in one thing bring about excellence in something else? An attempt is made in the following verses to remove some of these doubts.

2. Whatever distinguishing quality is adopted to determine a thing which is otherwise indeterminable, any excellence caused by it is expressed (by the suffix).

[A thing cannot be determined except with the help of its quality. If a thing cannot even be determined in its own form, there cannot be any degree in it except through some quality or other. Through it, a thing can be distinguished from other things. Only that quality can distinguish which is actually mentioned, and not those which are understood. There are too many of the latter and one would not know which one to take. Degree comes as a kind of excellence of the meaning of the stem and only that which is expressed can be the meaning of the stem and degree in it is expressed by the suffix. In this verse, the word *guṇa* stands for the notion defined in the previous verse. Even a stick can be a quality, because it can distinguish one with it from one who does not have it.]

It is now stated that just as difference in degree in a thing cannot exist except through a quality, in the same way, when a word presents an attribute as apart from the thing in which it exists, as something independent, difference in degree in it can be expressed only through another quality.

3. Without a distinguishing quality, that which is (presented as) the main thing cannot admit of degree nor come within the range of words.

[That quality through which it comes within the range of words is the very one through which difference of degree is also expressed. The universal becomes the cause of something being expressed by words, but not of difference of degree in it, because it exists everywhere in the same degree. It does not admit of difference in degree. It exists from the very time when a thing comes into existence. So some other quality co-existing in a thing with the universal, becomes the cause of difference of degree in it. Similarly, when a word presents a quality as the main thing, difference in degree in it can be expressed only through another quality, as in 'śuklataram rūpam' where it is some such quality as 'brightness' (*bhāsuratva*), or purity (*vaimalya*) through which degree is expressed. If brightness is presented as something independent, that is, as a thing, it would require another quality to express degree in it, as in *bhāsuratara*. The idea has already been set forth in Vāk. I.64.]

It is now declared that 'brightness' is actually conveyed by the word 'śukla'.

4. All the attributes present in the (main) thing do not serve to distinguish it. They are conveyed by special words expressive of some distinguishing mark.

[It cannot be said that 'brightness' through which degree is expressed is not directly conveyed by the word 'śukla'. The fact is that there is no one word which can express all the distinguishing qualities which exist in a thing. Each word expresses only one of them. Difference of degree can be expressed only through an attribute actually expressed by the word. 'Brightness' is actually expressed by the word 'śukla'. This word cannot be applied to any object which is not bright. If we say 'śuklatara', it is because there is a greater degree of brightness. Therefore, one must assume that 'brightness' is actually conveyed by the word 'śukla'.]

The very attribute which brings an object within the range of words can also be the cause of the expression of degree.

5. If a special attribute is useful only for making a thing namable, then difference of degree would remain without a cause to make it known, as there would be no restriction (as to which other attribute should do it).

[One cannot argue that, even though a thing may come within the range of words through some attribute, the latter cannot serve to express degree also. If it serves only to bring the object within the range of words, then we would see difference of degree being expressed through some other attribute such as weight. But that is not what happens. We understand difference of degree through the first attribute itself as in '*śuklatara*'. Therefore, we must conclude that the very attribute which gives something a name serves also to express degree in it.]

It is now explained how expressions like *nikṛṣṭataraḥ prakṛṣṭataraḥ* are possible.

6. Everything can differ in degree from everything else (of the same kind) either on the basis of an attribute of inferiority or of superiority.

[When there is excellence of that which is the cause of something coming within the range of words, there is excellence of the thing itself. When the cause is of an inferior nature, the degree relates to inferiority and when it is of a superior nature, it relates to superiority. Thus within the same kind, there can be difference of degree.]

Expressions like '*gotara*' are now being explained.

7. If the object does not require a basis (*nimitta*) for the expression of degree, its mention, when degree is to be expressed, would be useless.

[In the expression *gotara*, difference in degree cannot be due to the universal and there is no word expressive of any

quality. Difference in degree is, however, understood. Why then insist that in 'śuklatara' it is understood through a quality? The fact is that it cannot be understood from the object itself. And if the attribute also is not the basis of the cognition of degree, there would be no point in mentioning it. But it is actually mentioned in śuklatara. The reason is that the attribute is the basis of the difference in degree. In 'śuklatara', the attribute is brightness. In 'gotara', it would be some such attribute as superiority in carrying loads or in giving milk.]

8. Therefore, quality, performing its function (*śavyāpāra*) and based on its own difference in degree, involves the object (*dravya*) also in such difference and distinguishes it from others.

[The object, in itself, does not admit of any degree. Therefore, quality, by expressing quality within itself, serves to distinguish its substratum from others.]

It is now stated how difference of degree in one thing results in difference of degree in another.

9. Just as the formless object is expressed through the form of another (its quality), in the same way, being itself devoid of difference in degree, it acquires it through such a difference in its quality.

[An object, in isolation from its attributes, cannot come within the range of speech. When qualified by an attribute it can be expressed in words. It is also difficult to distinguish a thing from its attribute. Therefore, excellence of the attribute results in the excellence of the object. It is not confined to its own excellence, isolated from the object, nor to that of the object, isolated from its attribute.]

SECTION 6

ON POSITION (DIRECTION)

1. The words Direction (*dik*), Means (*sāadhanam*) Action (*kriyā*) and Time (*Kāla*), (if taken) as expressive of things, would not refer to their nature as powers of things.

[Words like Direction (*Dik*) convey a meaning which is an attribute of things having an independent character. They do not express independent things. The four words Direction, Means, Action and Time stand for power, capacity and not for independent entities. They are dependent on something else. The *Vaiśeṣikas* look upon *Dik* as an independent entity, a *dravya*. That is not right. It is something to be inferred from its effect, from the service which it renders to positive entities. Words which express an accomplished thing cannot convey it directly. Its definition must be made on the basis of indications in the *śāstra* as in P. 5.3.27.]

The definition of Direction (*Dik*), based on inference, is as follows:

2-3. Direction is that power which is the cause of the opposition of the limit (*avadhi*) and the limited (*pratipādyā*) of the cognition of straight without the help of anything else, of the manifestation of the minor universals of action and which is divided through its contingents.

[We make statements like this: 'This is to the east of that', 'this is to the west of that'. Here, 'that' is the starting point and 'this' is what is determined by it. One has to explain such expressions. It is the notion of Direction (*dik*) which explains them. Universals etc. which exist in objects cannot explain them. As we have to infer its nature from its effects and as, in linguistic expressions, it always

appears as an attribute of something else and not as something independent, we conclude that it is a power. The same is true of Time and Inherence. When we say 'this bamboo is straight', we are giving expression to a cognition which does not involve the notion of limit (*avadhi*) and limited (*avadhimat*) and does not depend on something else. It is caused by the notion of Direction. The idea of something being bent can also be explained by the same notion only. It is this very notion which manifests universals like *bhramaṇatva* and *utkṣepaṇatva* which exist in particular actions like 'turning' and 'raising'. This Direction is one, but due to particular associations it is looked upon as ten in number. That particular region which is in contact with the sun daily at the beginning of the day is called the East. The West, the North and the South are similarly named. The intermediate regions are called by their respective names because of the association of the Sun with the regions looked after by the Guardians. A particular association with the Sun is the auxiliary cause which brings about the apparent division of what is One.]

4. The notion of 'first' and 'next' in regard to concrete limited objects is based on regional distinction. The notion of earlier and later, consisting of sequence, arises on account of time.

[Form (*mūrti*) means measurement of things which are limited in extent. Things having form are here referred to as concrete and limited (*mūrta*). The all-pervasive entities such as space (*ākāśa*) has no prior-posterior distinction. It is about limited objects that we use such expression as 'first' and 'next' on the basis of their contact with the first or the next region. Priority or posteriority of a region is based on Direction. The notion of 'earlier' and 'later' amounts to sequence which is an effect of the Time-Power of *Brahman*. Thus Direction and Time are two distinct things.]

It is now pointed out that immaterial things can also have artificial distinctions of priority and posteriority.

5. Direction becomes the basis (*upādhi*) for the contacts and separations of Space with its divisions and of parts of other objects with them.

[Even all-pervasive entities can have artificial divisions such as 'first' and 'next' or 'farther' and 'nearer'. It has already been pointed out that space can have artificial divisions on the basis of objects which are in contact with it. This contact takes place in a particular region (*deśa*). That region is an artificial division of space. There is contact between such regions and parts of the objects which are on them. These objects are also described as 'first' or 'next' and 'farther' or 'nearer' on the basis of such a description of the divisions of space. Direction becomes the basis for the contact between objects.]

Remarks. The words *Ākāśa*, *Dik* and *Deśa* occur in the *Vākyapadīya*. It is, therefore, necessary to try to understand the three notions for which they stand. In *Vaiśeṣika*, *Ākāśa* and *Dik* come under the category of Substance. The former is defined as that Substance which is the substratum of the quality called sound. It is an all-pervading substance and is the medium for the propagation of sound. It is usually translated as 'ether'. It fills the whole of Space and is, therefore, different from it. In the *Upaniṣads*, however, *Ākāśa* often means Space itself and not a substance which fills space. In the *Vākyapadīya* *Ākāśa* is looked upon as One without any real division of its own. In this sense, it is equal to space. That is why it is in contact with all the objects of the world to which it provides room or accommodation. Helārāja actually says that *ākāśa* is so called because it provides room (*avakāśa*) to everything: *avakāśadānāddhi tadākāśam*. ('Vāk. III. Jā. 15). Even though One, it can be looked upon as many in terms of the various objects of the world which occupy space. The space occupied by each object is a part or a portion of the one Space. Each of these parts or portions is a region (*deśa*) within Space. Moreover, these regions have a position in the scheme of things. We can say of a particular region that it is to the right of an object or to the

left of it. There is something which is the cause of such notions as right and left and that is called *Dik* (Direction). According to the *Vākyapādīya*, it is not a separate entity. It is only a power or capacity of what is real. To say, therefore, that *Bhartṛhari* does not make any distinction between *Ākāśa* and *Dik* would not be correct. *Ākāśa* is Space and *Dik* is position or Direction. In this translation, I have used the word Direction for *Dik*.

6. Regions are regulated through Direction and nothing regulates 'Direction. Powers of objects are postulated on the basis of the service which they render.

[The nature of a region is to be the substratum of things. Whatever distinction of priority or posteriority there is among regions cannot arise out of their own nature. That depends upon some other factor and that is called *Dik*. Thus, we postulate the existence of *Dik* because of the service which it renders. Being a power it rests on something else (*paratantra*). That being so, there cannot be another power to regulate it. If another power is postulated, Direction (*Dik*) would cease to be 'power', because it would become '*saktimat*', the one having power. The quality of being prior, posterior etc. is inherent in *Dik*. Contact with the Sun only manifests it.]

7. What is called the East is something imposed on objects. That due to which the notion of priority arises is Direction. Otherwise, it would be a mere name.

[What is called East is an attribute imposed on objects. It is because of Direction that things are talked of as being in the east or as being 'prior'. If it is not so regarded, it would be a mere name, there being no independent entity like that. So it should be looked upon as a power, postulated on the basis of its effects.]

It is now shown that expressions like prior and posterior cannot be based on one's own body.

8. The Directions would not be fixed if they were based on one's body. What is behind when one faces west would be in front when one faces the other way.

[It has been said so far that *Dik* has to be postulated in order to explain the notions of the prior, posterior, etc. But cannot they be explained in relation to one's own body? What is in front of one's body would be 'prior' (*pūrva*) and what is behind would be posterior (*paścāt*). We also use such expressions as *hastadakṣiṇa* and *hastavāma* (M. Bhā. I. p. 118, l. 23.) to designate what is on our right or on our left, showing that our own body can be the basis of the expression. This view is not correct, because there would be no fixity in our notions of *pūrva*, *para* etc., because one would be constantly changing the position which one faces. Therefore, it is better to accept the view that notions of priority and posteriority are based on *Dik* which has come down from time immemorial.]

9. The determination of the regions is not based on the notion of Directions (*dikṣu*). One does refer to as '*pūrva*' what has been long known as *apara*.

[It has been stated that the notions of East, West etc. are based on *Dik* (Direction). Here a difficulty arises. Sometimes we apply the term '*pūrva*' to what from the point of view of *Dik*, is '*pāścātya*'. When we face west, the region in front of us is in the west but we use the expression '*pūrva*' for it. When one goes from the South (*Dakṣiṇāpatha*) to the Eastern country, one is said to go to '*pūrva*', but he is really going north (*uttara*). Thus, it is clear that we sometimes use the expressions *pūrva*, *para* etc. without meaning *Dik* by them. In other words, the notions of '*pūrva*' (in front) and *paścāt* (behind) are not based on *Dik*. The remark of the M. Bhā. on '*pūrvasmīn deśe vasati*' confirms this. The M. Bhā. is trying to explain why the suffix '*astāti*' cannot come after

the word 'pūrva' in 'purvasmin deśe vasati'. The reason is that the suffix in question is taught after words like *pūrva* when they directly express *deśa* (region) whereas, in the expression in question, the word 'pūrva' is only an adjective qualifying the word 'deśa' which is the word expressive of region. The word 'pūrva' is not a 'dikśabda' expressive of 'deśa' as required by the sūtra P. 5.3.27. Those who maintain that the word here specifies the particular direction (*digviśeṣāvaccheda*) where the region is, are wrong. The conclusion is that in applying the words *pūrva* etc. to *Dik*, there is no *upādhi* or underlying notion, because they are *rūḍhi* words, that is, words based on immemorial usage. In applying the words to *deśa* (regions), *dik* (direction) is the underlying notion.]

It is now shown that this conclusion is supported by the *M. Bhā.*

10. It is because the words (*dakṣiṇa* and *uttara*) have not the same meaning when they are in the masculine gender that they cannot take the masculine form (*pumvadbhāva*). In this sense (of *dik*), the masculine gender (*prasavaḥ*) is never expressed by the words.

[That is why there cannot be assumption of the masculine form by the words *dakṣiṇā* and *uttarā* when the suffix 'atasuc' (P. 5.3.28) is added to them. These two words have a masculine form also, but with a difference in meaning. When they are masculine, they express 'vyavasthā' and not *dik*. Unless the meaning is absolutely the same whether the word be masculine or feminine, there cannot be assumption of the masculine form (*pumvadbhāva*). If it is held that even when these words express Direction (*dik*), the idea of *vyavasthā* (limit, mutual requirement, starting-point) is present, there would still be difference between 'dikśabda' and *deśasabda*.]

11. Words like *pūrva* are invariably used in the sense of Direction (*Dik*). It is like the word *ṣaṣṭi* (in

the word *śāṣṭika*) which denotes time when duration of life is measured.

[The words East (*Pūrva*), etc., are applied to the direction (*Dik*) irrespective of any other implication. But when they are applied to the Regions or to the divisions of Time, they are based on '*vyavasthā*' (mutual requirement). When applied to Directions, these words are really proper names. The notion of limit or mutual requirement may be there in a completely hidden form. In the expression '*pūrvo ghataḥ*' the word '*ghata*', conveys its own meaning and the word '*pūrva*' provokes the question: in relation to what? Thus there is a clear difference between *pūrva*, etc. as applied to Direction and as applied to the Regions and the Divisions of Time. Because of resemblance, they appear to be the same. But they cannot be the same. What is based on mere immemorial usage cannot be the same as something based on a cause. In the case of Regions and Time, the words only look like *dikśabda* but are really not so. Such words are used in a fixed meaning. It is like the word *śaṣṭi* in *śāṣṭika*. Though a numeral, it denotes time here without the help of any other word, by mere usage. Similarly, *pūrva*, etc., denote Directions (*Dik*) by long usage, even though they may denote *vyavasthā* elsewhere. That is why they are not '*bhāṣitapumska*'.]

12. (It is on account of Direction that) division based on light and shade is possible in mountains etc. Such a division is not possible in things which do not have that attribute.

[Another effect of what is called *Dik* is that things like mountains seem to be illuminated by the light of the sun on one side and to be covered with darkness on another. Without *Dik*, this division of parts would not be possible. It serves as an indication for the inference of *Dik*.]

13. It is through *Dik* that division is made in the indivisible atom. That indeed has been declared to be the first power for effecting all division.

[Division of parts in limited material objects is due to Direction (*Dik*). Even in atoms which are supposed to be indivisible, one can imagine four sides, a top and a bottom on the basis of *Dik*. Other atoms can come into contact with these six parts and produce such things as binaries, etc. It is because of this division into parts from the very beginning, that it continues in all the later products. So division of all material objects into parts in the first service which *Dik* renders. Some explain this and the previous verse as follows :— "In all divisible objects, division into parts is due to light and shade. In all indivisible objects like the atom, division is imaginary and it is brought about by *Dik*." What they mean is this: Where there is some basis for the division of parts such as light and shade as in the case of divisible objects, that is the basis of the division. Where there is none as in the case of indivisible objects like atoms, there it is *Dik* which is the cause of such division. But all this is wrong. It is due to *Dik* that division in any object is possible, not merely in the indivisible atom.]

14. Objects are (in themselves) without regions, divisions, sequence and contingencies. Variation in their power takes place because of difference in their associations.

[Why not assume that things have a special disposition of parts in their own nature? Why bring in *Dik* to explain this? The answer is: Things like *ākāśa* which are all-pervasive have no divisions at all. Material wholes have no divisions which are part of their own nature. In both cases, parts are artificially made. If they have no parts, there cannot be any question of sequence of these parts. Because of difference in their associations, they seem to have varia-

tion of power and so appear to have divisions and sequence. In the same way, when divisions in them are brought about by *Dik*, we describe them as prior and posterior.]

It is now explained how visible material wholes are really partless.

15. Indivisibility is the same in an atom and in a jar. What is called their division is only a power and so is their dimension.

[One might here ask: 'One does see objects like jars, associated with different regions, having visible parts and magnitude. How can they be looked upon as indivisible? The answer is, this: A jar and an atom are alike in that neither has any parts in its own nature. Divisions having sequence are imagined in them on the basis of the power called *Dik*. These parts are not different from the wholes. Because of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*)) between the whole and the parts, they do not appear to be different from one another. If objects had parts in their own nature their unity would be destroyed. Division based on association with an external thing is not real division. Otherwise, even the atom would become divisible. Nor can one say that division is real because it is caused by dimension. Dimension is a power and it is the cause of the cognition of the 'smallness' or 'bigness' of things.]

16. That by which a division is made is also susceptible of division. And a division which has no end has been said to be improper.

Remark. The last *pāda* of this verse, printed '*ato yuktataram viduḥ*' should really read as '*ato*' *yuktataram viduḥ*. There is elision of the initial 'a' of '*ayuktataram*'.

[No division artificially made through an external factor is part of the nature of a thing. An artificially made part

can also be artificially divided into further parts, until one reaches the atom. Even there, one can imagine parts on the basis of *Dik*. Unless *Dik* itself has parts, it cannot cause parts in other things. Divisions in *Dik* are based on association with the Sun. Association with the Sun is based on differences in the regions of Mount *Meru* and that also on something else. There would be no end to this process. Division which does not come to an end is unacceptable. Thus things are indivisible in themselves and they are divided on the basis of limiting external factors. All divisions have, therefore, only a relative reality.]

17. Because its effects can be seen everywhere, it is said to be all-pervasive. Its all-pervasiveness consists just in this. It is otherwise with corporeal things.

[The effects of *Dik*, previously explained are found everywhere. That is why it is said to be all-pervasive. The all pervasiveness of immaterial things consists just in their producing effects everywhere, whereas that of material corporeal things consists in their occupying extensive space with their parts.]

18. The assumption of the existence of Direction (*Dik*) and Time (*Kāla*) is as established as that of Consciousness. Who indeed would order otherwise that which is the very nature of living beings?

[Even a thing which exists is as good as non-existent if it is not cognised, because it cannot fulfil any purpose. Consciousness is, therefore, accepted by all disputants. The self is of the nature of consciousness. Similarly, Direction and Time are based on our cognitions. As explained before, things have neither difference nor identity, neither existence nor non-existence. They appear in many colours on account of beginningless *avidyā*. All experiences take place in time and direction. Otherwise they would not lead to any pur-

poseful activity. It is the nature of beings (*prakṛtiṃ prāṇinām*) to have experiences in *dik* and *kāla*.]

19. There would be confusion of activities if this nature were not accepted. Therefore, even while abandoning these things, one has again recourse to them.

[If this conception of *Dik* and *Kālu* is not accepted, if this assumption of *Dik* and *Kāla* which has become our nature is abandoned, there would be confusion in regard to the observance of Vedic injunctions. Even though the Universe is without sequence spatially and temporally, still even one who knows the truth must act on the basis of the assumption of *Dik* and *Kāla*. Even he can cognise things only as having sequence.]

It is now stated that *Dik* performs a function parallel to that of *Kālā*.

20. From that Power, distinctions such as East etc. arise on the basis of association with other things. Thus differentiated, *Dik* brings about differentiation in the cognition of things.

[Just as Time, the power of *Brahman*, exercising the functions of permission and prevention, brings about temporal sequence, in the same way *Dik* is also the cause of the notion of spatial sequence among objects, due to association with other things. By 'other things', contacts with the sun are meant. *Dik* brings about cognitions of objects as qualified by itself. It is then that *Dik* which is One, appears to be many.]

The result of the notion of *Dik* in grammar is now set forth.

21. When the idea of limit (starting point) is to be expressed it is the ablative of position which is used. When some other idea (as that of part and whole) is to be expressed, it is the genitive case which is seen as in: 'the upper part of this' (*pūrvam asya*).

[Certain operations in grammar are based on the notion of *Dik*. In the world, there is the idea of limit: 'this is on the east of that' and so on. There one uses the ablative case. Where some other idea such as that of part and whole is to be expressed, the genitive case is used according to P. 2.2.1.]

It is now explained why the notion of prior and posterior is not based on one's own body.

22. Where there is no confusion in regard to the limit, there cannot be any mistake in the use of the expressions prior (or east) etc. Nor does an indication like the expression 'this is straight' become false.

[Where there is fixity in regard to the starting point, there is no confusion in the meaning of words like prior, eastern etc. Notions of prior etc. if based on *Dik* (Direction) are fixed. What is prior to (to the east of) something cannot be posterior to (or to the west of) the same thing. Also, such an expression as 'the base of this bamboo is straight' is a clear indication of the notion of *Dik* and is not liable to confusion. It does not depend on any notion of starting-point. If it did, there might be occasion for confusion. If one has to have a starting point, it is better to take contacts of the Sun as such.]

It is now stated that *Dik* is something internal.

23. It is an internal function (*dharma*) which appears to be external. Or rather, according to this mode of thought, there is neither internal nor external.

[According to those who hold that it is an internal function, the universe is manifested within the consciousness itself, though on account of an eternal metaphysical limitation, it appears to be external to it. *Dik* is in the same position. It is something which exists within. There is nothing corresponding to it outside. In fact, notions of internal and external are relative. In reality, there is neither the one nor the other. Notions such as prior and posterior proceed from *avidyā*. There is no such thing as *Dik* as an external entity.]

It is now stated that it is really useless to discuss whether *Dik* is one or many.

24. Knowing that the notion of unity and plurality in regard to these powers are speculative and have no relation to the thing itself, one must not take them to be real.

[The powers of *Dik* are primarily one but appear to be many due to association. Or they are primarily many, being eternal and inferred from their many effects. Both these views are only speculations and have no relation to the thing itself. One must not take them to be real.]

25. In regard to objects whose reality is beyond speculations, the world follows the usages based upon conventions.

[Things in the world are quite different from what the different thinkers (*tīrthika*) speculate them to be. They obviously cannot have the contradictory characteristics which thinkers attribute to them. Therefore, one has to follow the usages based on convention. Even thinkers have to do it. This applies to the ten Directions (*Dik*) current in the world.]

26. There is no unity and no multiplicity and without unity there cannot be multiplicity. In reality, there is no difference between the two.

[If things are mutually dependent, the disproving of one would disprove the other. Thus neither multiplicity nor unity of *Dik* would stand examination. Worldly usage is based upon what appears to the mind. In reality, both multiplicity and unity are unreal.]

It is now stated that unity and multiplicity cannot be predicated of Power.

27. There is not the same difference between the powers as between objects having power. Nor is there any worldly unity in their nature.

[Objects having power can be cognised as something distinct. But powers which can only appear as resting and dependent upon their substrata, do not appear as distinct from one another, nor from their substrata. Powers are really indefinable.]

28. Unity cannot be explained if multiplicity is not conceived nor would multiplicity stand if unity is not conceived.

[If plurality is not conceived, there would be no unity. If unity is not conceived, there would be no plurality. They are mutually dependent. The best thing then is to accept the worldly notion of *Dik*.]

SECTION 7

ON THE MEANS (SĀDHANA)

1. What is called 'Means' is the Power of a thing to accomplish actions, inherent in its own Substratum or in other substrata.

[The power of a substance to bring about an action is what is called 'means' by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* and others. In the *M. Bhā* on P. 3.2.115, it has been declared that what is called *sādhana* is a *guṇa*. It is power which is called *guṇa*, here, because it helps to distinguish a thing from other things (*bhedaka*). A power is dependent upon what has power and it also helps to distinguish its substratum from other things. So it is a *guṇa* as defined here in the *guṇa-samuddeśa*, verse 1. There is a *M. Bhā* passage in the context where a distinction is sought to be made between *bhāva* as conveyed by a primary suffix (*kṛt*) and *bhāva* as conveyed by a verbal suffix (*tiñ*). It runs as follows: "*dravyam kriyābhiniṣṭṭim prati sādhanabhāvam upaiti*" (*M. Bhā*. II, p. 57, l. 9) = 'Substance (*dravya*) becomes the means of the accomplishment of action'. There is no contradiction between this statement and the present verse which declares 'power' to be the means. What is meant in the *M. Bhā*. passage is that substance is the means inasmuch as it is the substratum of power. A substance or a thing having power is the means. A power must always have a substratum. The same interpretation must be given to the *M. Bhā*. passage on P. 3.2.115 *M. Bhā* I, p. 120, l. 11:—*yadi guṇasamudāyah sādhanam sādhanam apy anumānagamyam. atha anyad guṇebhyaḥ sādhanam bhavati pratyakṣa-parokṣatāyāḥ sambhavaḥ* = 'If what is called means is a collection of qualities (powers) then its existence is to be inferred. If it is something else, one can discuss whether it is *pratyakṣa* or *parokṣa*. What is called 'power' is invisible. In the *M. Bhā*. on P. 5.1.118 (*upasargāc chandasi dhātvarthe*) *dhātvartha*' is explained as 'means'

(*sādhana*) or substance qualified by power (*śaktiviśiṣṭam dravyam*). When the *M.Bh.* on P. 5.3.55 (*Atiśāyane tamab iṣṭhanau*) says:—'*sādhanam vai dravyam, na dravyasya prakarṣāpakarṣau staḥ*' = 'it is substance which is the means and there cannot be greater or lesser degree in substance', it is because power and what has power are taken as one. A given action inheres in the agent or the object. They are both 'means' (*kāraka*). Instrument (*karana*) is a means of an action which does not inhere in itself, but in the agent or the object.]

How we know that power is the means and not substance is now stated.

2. Since the universe which is a bundle of powers is always there in all its aspects, some power or other is intended to be conveyed in a particular context.

[Objects like a jar are bundles of powers to perform such actions as holding water. These powers are parts (*mātrā, bhāga*) as it were, of the objects. They are of many kinds. Some arise spontaneously, like the power of light or of knowledge to illuminate and they disappear when their substrata disappear. Some are of human origin and disappear even when the substratum continues to exist. For example, physical strength which can increase through exercise and nourishing food. Some are checked by the efforts of others, even when the substratum exists. For example, the power of poison to kill or the power of seed to produce the sprout. Some are changed by persons having great personal gifts. A yogi can, for instance, change the form of anything and everything. Some are manifested by the passage of time, like *dharma* and *adharma*. Thus, powers being many, one can explain the variety which one sees in the effects. If the thing itself, apart from its power, is the means, one cannot explain the diversity of effects, because a thing is one and simple. That is why a thing is said to be a bundle of powers. The

main action cannot be brought about individually by any one power. That is why the word *samudāya* has been used in the *M. Bhā.* A subordinate action can be accomplished by some one power individually. If the thing, apart from its power were the means, it could not become, now agent (*kartā*), now instrument (*karana*), now starting point (*apādāna*) and so on, because it is, in itself, uniform in nature.]

3. Speaking of something as the Means is a matter of the speaker's intention. Difference in things, whether real or unreal, is conceived by the intelligence.

[Here a question arises: If a thing has powers, it is natural that one or more of them should become the means; but if it has not got any, how can it become the means? In such sentences as *śaktiṃ ādadhāti*, *śaktiṃ sādhayati*, etc., *śakti*=power has become a means, even though *śakti* cannot have *śakti*. Similarly, in '*dhanavināśam karoti*' *dhanābhāvo na yuktaḥ* destruction or non-existence has become a means, even though, being nothing, it cannot have power. This doubt is answered as follows: The use of words depends more on the speaker's intention than on outside reality. Words follow cognition. A thing may actually exist, but if it is not cognised, it does not become the object of verbal knowledge. Similarly, even what does not exist may become the object of verbal usage, provided it has become the object of cognition and the speaker's intention. When power which is ordinarily a property of things in itself thought of as a thing, there is no contradiction in thinking of it as having power. Similarly, we can think of non-existence as a thing (*dravya*), in which case it can also have power. Everything is a matter of the speaker's intention and cognition. That is why expressions such as '*hanti ātmānamātmanā*' in which one and the same thing is agent and instrument are possible. Ordinarily one thinks of a cooking pot (*sthālī*) as a vessel in which to cook something, as a receptacle (*adhikaraṇa*). But when it is made of thin material and so what is

put in it cooks quickly, one may want to emphasize that point and speak of the pot itself as the agent of cooking: *sthālī pacati*. Here through the speaker's intention what is ordinarily a receptacle has become an agent. Similarly, if we want to emphasize that it is more through the quality of the pot than through fuel 'that the cooking has been done quickly, we could say '*sthālyā pacati*' in which case the pot has become an instrument. Similarly, when we say : *ātmanah svātmany avasthānam*, one and the same thing is presented as the agent and the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) when one wants to emphasize that nothing else can be the agent or the abode. Even though a stone statue is no more than a body and is not different from it, we talk as if they were different from each other when we say : *śilāputrakasya śarīram*. Thus the position is this : when grammar explains the formation of words abstracted from the sentence, when no other word of the sentence has been uttered and one is not conscious of the particularity which one may be intending to convey, it is possible to have a mode of formation which does not consider the sentence, but takes into account only the individual word. Word formation taking into account only the individual word is recognised in the *śāstra*. This does not mean that a word can have any form. It can only have a form abstracted from a real sentence. Grammar is not called upon to explain the formation of a form abstracted from something which is not a real sentence at all like the following : *sthālīm odanena kāṣṭhe pacati*. Such strings of words are not sentences at all.]

That the 'means' is something essentially mental is now confirmed.

4. When the speaker first unites the Pāñcālas and Kurus mentally and then divides them, we understand what separation is.

[It is because everything is a matter of cognition and intention that separation can be purely mental. Separation is taking apart preceded by joining (*samśleṣapūrvako viśleṣaḥ*).

In *Kurubhyaḥ pāñcālā abhirūpatarāḥ*’, there is, first of all, a bringing together (*saṁśleṣa*) of *Kurus* and *Pāñcālās* mentally on the basis of their resemblance in good looks and then their separation (*viśleṣa*) on account of the superiority of one over the other. The whole thing is mental. Even what is purely mental is quite enough to explain verbal usage. In the section dealing with the cases (*kāraka*), maximum degree is not ordinarily very important, because where it is important, Pāṇini tells us so in some way, as by the use of the suffix ‘*tamaḥ*’ in the *sūtra* : *sādhakatamaḥ karaṇam* (P. 1.4.42)]

Another confirmation of the *M. Bhā.* view follows.

5. One considers *Kaṁsa* and others whose form is presented to us by words and who become the object of our mental perception to be the means (of the accomplishment of the action) as though they were present before the eyes.

[Another proof that everything in language is a matter of cognition and intention is that the *Vārttikas* on the *sūtra* ‘*Hetumati ca*’ (P. 3.1.26), namely, ‘*Dr̥śyarthāyāṁ ca pravṛttau*’ (Vā. 8) *Āñlopaśca kālātyantasamyoge maryādāyām* (Vā. 9), ‘*Citrīkaraṇe prāpi*’ (Vā. 10) ‘*Nakṣatrayoge jñi*’ (Vā. 11) have been declared to be unnecessary by the *M. Bhā.* The cases which are meant to be explained by these *vārttikas* can be explained by the *sūtra* itself. When story-tellers tell an old story, they sometimes use the present tense: *Kaṁsaṁ ghātayati, baliṁ bandhayati*. That is because the whole story is present in the mind of the tellers at the time of telling and it is evoked in the mind of the hearers also. What figures in the mind is the meaning of words and not outside reality. Thus the story-tellers cause the mental *Vāsudeva* to kill the mental *Kaṁsa*. In the section dealing with cases (*kāraka*), maximum degree is not important. The name of a particular *kāraka* can be applied to something which is really so as well as to something which is not fully so, that is, something which only figures in the mind as such.]

6. Thus speakers impose on objects a form which is the creation of their own mind and thus difference of powers is brought about.

[One and the same thing can figure in the mind as having many powers. When outside reality and what figures in the mind appear as one, a variety of powers figuring in the mind appears to be eternal. What appears to have many powers also appears to be different means (*sādhana*).]

Another advantage in looking upon 'means' as a matter of the speaker's intention is now stated.

7. According to the view that the meaning of the word is the particular, the character of being the means of sounds and the like yet to be produced becomes possible on the basis of the idea thereof.

[In the sentence '*ghaṭam karoti*', '*ghaṭa*' is a 'means' in the process of making it. But how can it be so considering that it is not there yet? It was said in the *jāṭisamuddeśa*, 27, that the *jāti* aspect in the 'means' (*sādhana*) and the '*vyakti*' aspect of it is the object to be brought about (*nirvartya karma*). But the expression can be explained from the point of view of the *vyaktivāda* also, the view that the meaning of a word is the particular. The particular *ghaṭa* can come into existence only after it is made. How then can it be a 'means' in the process of its being made? The answer is that the idea of the *ghaṭa* to be made is already in the mind of the maker and that is the 'means' (*sādhana*). The *ghaṭa* which is actually made becomes the object accomplished (*nirvartya karma*).]

8. It has been shown that independence and dependence and sequence of objects which are devoid of all movement are based on mental construction (*kalpanopanibandhanam*).

[It is not only the object (*karma*) called *nirvartya* (to be made, brought about) which thus becomes the 'means' by figuring in the mind of the person who is going to make it. The *vikārya* (to be modified) and *prāpya* (to be reached) kinds of objects (*karma*) are also in the same position. The causal relation has previously been shown to be a mere mental construct. All things in the world are devoid of motion or activity. Certain things appear to be intimately connected with the action and others seem to be remotely so. Some appear to be agents (*kartā*) and others present themselves as objects (*karma*). All this is really illusion. The whole of what is called '*kiryākāra**kābhāva*' is really an illusion. For Advaita, all except the ultimate Reality is an illusion. All verbal usage is based on '*vikalpa*' which is only a mental construct. What was said earlier about *Dik* applies to *sādhana* also. It is a wonderful thing only as long as we do not reflect upon it.]

Thus the idea of '*sādhana*' as a power distinct from the thing in which it resides has been explained. Now it is going to be explained as a power not distinct from the thing itself.

9. According to the *Saṃsargavādins*, all objects are powers and things having powers. The fact of their being the means is not conveyed by their own words.

Remark. The meaning of "*teṣv asvaśabdeṣu sādhanatvam nirūpyate*" is not clear. The translation is tentative.

[The Vaisesikas maintain that due to the relation called 'inherence' (*samavāya*) things which are different from each other appear to be the same. For example, the whole and its parts. That is why they are called '*samsargavādinah*'. They believe that things produce their effects through their own name helped by auxiliary factors. The thing itself would be the cause and the auxiliary factors their power in producing the effect. Or the thing itself may be looked upon as the power of the auxiliary factors in producing their effects.

What it all amounts to is that things themselves are powers of one another. There is no such thing as Power, apart from the things themselves, as the *Mīmāṃsakas* believe. This character of things, namely, that they can be powers of one another, cannot be conveyed by words like 'apādana'. That can be conveyed only by the case-endings. In the sentence 'ghaṭam paśyati', the second case-ending conveys the power of the jar, co-existent in it with bigness. It is then that *ghaṭa* becomes the means (*sādhana*). When a thing is conceived as helping something else, it is a power (*śakti*). When it is conceived as being helped by something else, it is *śaktimat*. And this *śakti* is not over and above the thing of which it is the *śakti*.]

10. It is magnitude etc. which are the means whereby a jar becomes the object of vision and it is the quality of being colour and the like which are the means whereby colour becomes the object of vision.

[In the expression 'ghaṭam paśyati' = 'he sees the jar', *ghaṭa* has become the object of the action of seeing. The qualities of being 'big' and of being made up of compound things which inhere in the jar are the means whereby the jar has become the object of the action of seeing. Kaṇāda has said; "Things having magnitude are perceived because they are made up of compound things and have colour." (*Vai. Sū.* 4.1.6). A binary (*dvyaṇuka*) is called a compound because it is made up of more than one thing and a tertiary and other things are said to be made up of compounds. The atom (*paramāṇu*) has colour, but it cannot be perceived because it is not made up of more than one thing. A binary is not perceptible because it is not made up of compounds. What is said of the atom is applicable to other imperceptible things also. The fact of having colour is a second cause. Air has magnitude, is made up of compounds, but is not perceptible because it has no colour. Though magnitude is not a cause of perceptibility, it is connected with it, because what is perceptible has magnitude. That is why we have the plural

number in '*mahattvādīni*' occurring in the verse. Or it may be because the author wants to include such universals as *dravyatva* among the causes of perceptibility. Universals are causes of perceptibility because it is because of them that we perceive things as different from other things. That the fact of being made up of compound things is a cause of perceptibility implies that a thing must be a whole having parts before it can be perceived. The quality of being colour (*rūpatva*) is a means of perceiving colour, Colour is perceptible because it inheres in an object which is a whole having parts and also because it is in a manifested state. The colour of the ocular ray is not perceptible because it is not in a manifested state. The colour of the atom is not perceptible because it does not inhere in a whole having part.]

11. Taste etc. have powers in the form of their own universals by means of which alone they are perceived. These powers are similarly perceived through their substrata.

[It is not only in the case of colour that its universal (*rūpatva*) is a cause of perception. That is true of other qualities also. In the cognition of taste, the quality of being taste is a means. So is the case with smell. In fact, they can be cognised only in that way. Substance, on the other hand, can be cognised through other factors also. It can be cognised through its universal, its quality or its action. Universals, on the other hand, depend upon their substrata for their cognition. When the universal '*rasatva*' is cognised, the *rasa* in which it inheres is the means or power by which it is cognised. So is the substance in which the *rasa* is found one of the factors or the means by which *rasatva* is cognised. What it all amounts to is that things are powers to one another, powers which help the thing having the power to produce its effect. Therefore, the power of a thing is not something fixed.]

12. The contact between the sense, the object, the mind and the agent sometimes constitutes the means, i.e. the power. Whatever helps anything at any time is its means or power for that time.

[Objects like colour are perceived because of contact between the soul, the mind, the senses and the object and this contact thus becomes the means or the power by which the perception takes place. Whatever helps something else in producing its effect becomes its power or its means. Thus all things are power to one another. In short, power may be defined as: *paropakāri paratantram sarvam śaktīlakṣaṇam*—Anything that helps another and is subordinate to it is its power.]

It is now stated that it is the case-ending which expresses this power.

13. When its own words are used, that attribute is not expressed. It is through the case-endings etc. that this service is conveyed.

[Words like do-er (*kāraka*), means (*sādhana*), starting point (*apādāna*) denote primarily things which help in the accomplishment of the action. They do not express the power of those things to help. That is done by the case-endings. Sometimes also by the secondary nominal affixes as in *śatena krītaḥ śatyah*. In *yatra* and *tatra*, it is the suffix *tral* which expresses it. In *antarā māṃ ca tvāṃ ca kamaṇḍaluḥ*, the indeclinable 'antarā' expresses location.]

14. It is for the sake of rendering help (to the action) that finished objects are looked upon as cause (*nimitta*). It is an inclination to render service (*nati*) or self-surrender. Thus what is a finished thing (*siddha*) becomes the means (*sādhana*).

[Actions are yet to be accomplished and things which are already there help in their accomplishment. Anything which is already accomplished and is inclined to help in an action becomes means (*sādhana*).]

It is now stated that grammar is indifferent on the question whether a power is different from the object of the same.

15. Others consider this causal power to be either different from the objects or to be identical with them. (Here), on the basis of difference, it is considered to be the means.

[Some think that the powers of objects to accomplish actions to be different from the objects themselves and to be invisible. Others on the other hand, do not believe it, but consider that things themselves, helped by the accessories, produce their effects. To Grammarians, it is immaterial whether power (*śakti*) is considered to be different from or identical with objects. They are only concerned with how words present the matter and they see that words present things and their powers as distinct. In other words, they are not expressed by the same elements in the word or the sentence. The stem expresses the thing and the suffix expresses the power: *tathā ca prātipadikena dravye 'bhīhite śaktau kṛtapadabandhā vibhaktiḥ pravartate*.]

The view of the Bhāṣyakāra that action can also become the means in the accomplishment of other actions is now explained.

16-17. Seeing leads to desire, the latter to decision and decision to effort.

That which was action before becomes the means in the next stage. As far as seeing is concerned, it is the self which must be considered to be the special means.

[It has been said that whatever helps another is its means or power. It is not merely things which can be means or power for the accomplishment of actions. Action itself can be so. It has been said in the *M. Bhā.* that, not only that for which the object (*Karmā*) is destined is the recipient (*sampradāna*) but also that for which action is destined as in *patye śete*'. Somebody sees a thing, then desires it, decides on a course of action, then acts, completes his action and attains the object. Each previous act becomes the means for the accomplishment of the succeeding one. The agent attains each succeeding act by his previous act. By seeing (*saṁdarśana*) he attains desiring; by desiring (*prārthanā*) he attains decision (*vyavasāya*) and so on. Thus each later stage comes under the definition of 'karma'. That is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *kriyāpi kṛtrimam karmā* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 330. 1.21). Seeing well or seeing all round is what is meant by *saṁdarśana*. It is a kind of contemplation of the ultimate fruit. It becomes the means for the accomplishment of *prārthanā*, desire relating to the means of obtaining the fruit. Desire does arise when the object is seen. The next stage is the decision that a particular action will lead to the attainment of the fruit. It is the previous act of desiring which leads to this. Desire leads to decision and the latter to activity. because it is due to decision that one begins purposeful activity. That which was action in the previous stage becomes the means (*sādhana*) in the next stage. As far as the action of seeing itself is concerned, it is the self who experiences the objects that is the *sādhana*, the self that is capable of desiring the fruit. Even though action is a process and not an accomplished thing, yet it becomes a thing as soon as it is completed and so it can be a *sādhana*].

It is now stated that the word do-er (*kāraka*) has been applied to the agent (*kartā*) etc. in accordance with the true meaning of the root in that word.

18. The quality of merely bringing about exists in all the accessories: It is when the particular function of

each is desired to be known that the quality of being instrument etc. is recognised.

[All actions are brought about by a set of accessories. All of them thus become agents. If one wants to know how each one becomes the agent, it is like this: Each of them performs a particular function in regard to the main action and thus acquires a special name such as instrument (*kīraṇa*). That which sets the other accessories in motion is the real Agent (*kartā*). That which the Agent seeks to reach by his action, to make, to mar or to modify, is called the object (*karma*) and so on. All these functions having a special name come under the general heading of do-er (*kāraka*). The word *kāraka* and the special names can be used in apposition to each other for this reason. Nothing which is not already a *kāraka* can get one of the special names. Of the six *kārakas*, one is the Agent (*kartā*) and three more can be treated as such. The starting point (*apādāna*) and the recipient (*saṃpradāna*) cannot be so treated. We can never say *rāmo dadāti* for *rāmāya dadāti* or *vrkṣaḥ patati* for *vrkṣāt patati*. But in certain circumstances, we can say *odanaḥ pacyate*, '*kāṣṭhāni*' *pacanti* and *sthālī pacati*. In other words, '*karma*', '*karaṇa*' and '*adhikaraṇa*' can be sometimes treated as agents (*kartā*).]

An illustration is now given.

19. As far as the birth of the son is concerned, both the parents are said to be agents. When one wishes, there can be distinction and (then one would say): he, in her and she, from him.

[Both the parents are responsible for the birth of a child and as long as one does not want to make any distinction, one looks upon both as agents (*kartā*) in the act of procreation. When distinction is sought to be made, one says that the father sows the seed in the mother and the mother receives

the seed from the father. Speaking generally, the root 'jan' means 'to bring into existence'. But when it is applied to particular cases, the particular function may vary.]

The author now elucidates the *Bhāṣya* passage about the main action and the subordinate actions.

20-21. The agents of the minor actions subordinate their functions to the Agent (of the main action). Even in the state of subordination, they retain fully their activities. According to the differences in these activities, they are known as instrument (*karaṇa*) etc. After having attained independence (in regard to their own activities) they become agents of the main action.

[So far, it has been shown that one and the same thing can be *kartā* (*kāraka*) in a general sense in regard to the main action and *karaṇa* etc. in a special sense. As Kaiyaṭa puts it: *sarveṣāṃ kārakāṇāṃ sādhyatvena sādharāṇī kriyā tatasca sarveṣāṃ tasyāṇ kartṛtvam. Avāntaravyāpāravivakṣyāṇi tu karaṇādirūpatvaṃ* (Kaiyaṭa on P. 1.4.23). It is now stated that a thing may be dependent in regard to the main action, but independent in regard to its own minor action. There is no contradiction between the two. This is another way of understanding the *M. Bhā.* statement: *sāmānyabhūtā kriyā vartate* (*M. Bhā.* I, p. 326, l. 15). The accessories other than the Agent are independent in regard to the minor actions such as the burning of the wood. In regard to the main action they are under the agent who employs them. That is why they are said to be '*nyakṛtāśaktayaḥ*'. But they do not lose their independence as far as their own minor action is concerned. Nor can anything be considered to be the cause of an action if it does nothing, that is, if it has not some kind of independence. So, by each one doing its own minor action, all become accessories of the main action. Even though they are under the agent, they are independent as far as their own minor action is concerned.

So they acquire special names such as 'karaṇa' according to the nature of their own minor acts. While retaining this character or rather because of that, they participate in the accomplishment of the main action, that is, they are *kāraka* in addition to being 'karaṇa' etc. Under the direction of the agent (*kartā*) they perform their own minor actions and thus become *karaṇa* etc. as well as *kāraka*. It is only when they become *kāraka* etc. that the agent attains his '*kartṛtva*'. Thus, there is no contradiction between their independence, in regard to their own minor action and dependence in regard to the main action. In fact, what is independence in regard to one's own minor action is the same thing as dependence in regard to the main action. In fact, the former materialises only after the accessories have been employed by the agent. Till then, it was only a potential state. Thus, every accessory is a do-er (*kāraka*, *kartā*). That is why we can sometimes say *sthūlī pacati*, *edhāṃsi pacanti*, *odanaḥ pacyate*. It has been shown in the *M. Bhā.* that one can even say: *valāhako vidyotate* instead of *valahakād vidyotate*, that is, the starting-point (*apādāna*) has become the agent (*kartā*). But ordinarily, the root is not in a position to express the activity of the *apādāna* or the *saṃpradāna*. One cannot say '*vrkṣaḥ patati*' for *vrkṣāt patati* nor *rāmo dadāti* for *rāmāya dadāti*. Thus, *karaṇa*, *adhikaraṇa* and *karaṇa* can also be called *kartā*. And yet they are not so called, because their independence is only relative. It is mixed up with dependence. Only the Agent (*kartā*) has independence unmixed with dependence. So the name has been reserved for that.]

An illustration is now given.

22-23. Just as the quality of being fighters is in the soldiers appointed by the king and the king obtains victory or sustains defeat according to the way in which they fulfil their duty, in the same way, as long as the accessories appointed by the main agent work towards

the same object, there is no opposition between the agent and the instrument etc.

[An illustration is now given of the principle that only that which is independent in regard to the minor action can become dependent in regard to the main action (*svavyāpāre svatantrāṇam eva pradhānavyāpāre pāratantryam*). The king orders his soldiers to fight and the fighting is done by them. According to the way they fight, the king attains victory or sustains defeat. Before the command, the soldiers were already potentially fighters. When the king commands them, they come under him and so lose their independence. But, after all, the fighting is done entirely by them and they do not ask at every step how they should fight. The same is the case with the instrument etc. in a sentence.]

The difference between 'hetu' (cause) and *sādhana* (means) is now pointed out.

24. The circumstance (*nimitta*) which works without depending upon any particular operation is called cause. That which assumes the form of a limit is called a sign (*lakṣaṇa*).

[If all that helps in the accomplishment of the action is *kāraṇa* or *sādhana*, the cause (*hetu*) would also come under it and the third case-affix would be added to it by the *sūtras*: *karṭṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* (P. 2.3.18) and P. 2.3.24 would become unnecessary. To meet this difficulty, the difference between means (*sādhana*) and cause (*hetu*) is pointed out. By 'hetu' is meant anything which is looked upon as the cause of something irrespective of whether it performs a function or operation or not. It should take a case-ending which is not connected with a means (*kāraṇavibhakti*). Such a case-ending is the sixth one (*ṣaṣṭhī*), but the *sūtra* 'hetau' (P. 2.3.23) prescribes the third case-ending instead. For example: *adhyayanena vasati* = He resides for study. Here study (*adhyayana*) is the cause (*hetu*) and residence (*vāsa*) is the

effect (*hetumat*). *Naiyāyikas* say that only that which causes a substance or a quality can be called '*hetu*' and that takes a case-ending not connected with a 'means' (*Kāraṇavibhakti*). That which is the cause of an action expressed by an action word is *kāraṇa*. Ex. *vidyayā vasati*, In the *sūtra* '*anur lakṣaṇe*' (P. 1.4.84), the word '*lakṣaṇa*' can mean '*hetu*' also. But there is a difference between the two. That cause in which there is also the quality of being the limit is *lakṣaṇa*. Others distinguish between the two by saying that cause (*hetu*) is that which produces an effect and '*lakṣaṇa*' is that which makes known something, or produces knowledge. That is not right because *hetu* also produces knowledge. When a person lives on his knowledge, the latter produces the knowledge as to how he lives (*vidyāder api vāsādinīścaye vyāpārāt*). In *vrkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut*, *vrkṣa* is a *lakṣaṇa*. Irrespective of the consideration whether it produces lightning or not, it is taken as the point of indication of lightning, Lightning flashes from the tree, after reaching the tree. But this is an example of P. 1.4.90. For P. 1.4.84, the example is: *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat* = It rained after (*anu*) the recitation of the *Samhitā* by Śākalya. Here the *Samhitā* is not only the point of indication, but also the cause (*hetu*). It is called *lakṣaṇa*, because this *hetu* is also something which makes known (*gnāpaka*). Similarly, smoke is the sign (*lakṣaṇa*) of fire because the sight of it leads to the inference of fire. One has seen the two together so many times that when one sees it alone, one infers the existence of the other. It is true that one does not see rain following *saṃhitā* so often in real life. But if one has understood that a certain thing has the power to produce a certain effect it can become its sign (*lakṣaṇa*) also. The rising of the clouds becomes the cause of our understanding that it will rain. One might argue that invariable concomitance is understood only after seeing two things together many times and not just once. One has not seen *saṃhitā* followed by rain many times. It may be the cause but seeing them together just once does not enable us to decide. So it cannot be a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) of rain just

as the rising of clouds can be. To this the answer is that sometimes we decide that there is a relation of cause and effect between two things even after seeing their sequence just once. The reason is that if a thing is not the cause, the effect will not follow it even once. A rice plant will not come out of barley seed even once. To think of something else as the cause would upset the whole scheme of casuality. Nor can it be an accident because what is not the cause cannot produce the effect even once. If we see the *saṃhitā* produce rain definitely even once, we conclude that it is the cause. As the cause is also something which makes known, it has been called 'lakṣaṇa' in P. 1.4.84. The *M. Bhā.* says that *lakṣaṇa* includes *hetu*. The rising of the clouds is not only the cause of rain, it is also an indication, a sign of it. Even that which is a limit (*avadhi*) becomes a sign only if it causes the knowledge of something. The fact is that a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) is of many kinds. Sometimes, a thing is a *lakṣaṇa*, because it is a limit (*avadhi*) as the tree in the case of lightning. Sometimes, it makes the cause to be known, as in the case of the smoke. Sometimes, it makes the effect to be known, as in the case of clouds. *Samhitā* is both the cause and the sign of rain. P. 1.4.90 makes 'anu' a *karmapravacanīya* (post-position) in the sense of 'sign' which includes cause also. P. 1.4.84 has been given in order to exclude the third case-affix expressive of cause (P. 2.3.23). 'Anu' has been given the name of *karmapravacanīya* twice, once in P. 1.4.84 to exclude the third case-affix and again in P. 1.4.90 to bring in the second case-affix.

The conclusion is: A do-er (*kāraka*) is that which helps in the accomplishment of an action by assuming different forms; that which helps in a general way is cause (*hetu*) and that which makes something else known is a sign (*lakṣaṇa*).]

The author now points out the difference in the scope of 'hetu' and 'sādhana' though they both produce effects.

25. The cause (*hetu*) has substance etc. as its scope whereas an accessory (*kāraṇa*) is restricted to action. When an agent depends upon another for the accomplishment of the action, it is also called cause (*hetu*).

[The difference between '*hetu*' and *kāraṇa* is this. That which can bring about a substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*) is *hetu*, as in the following sentences: *bijenāṅkuraḥ* = 'through the seed, the sprout,' *dhanena kulam* = 'through wealth, the family, *vidyayā yaśaḥ* = 'through learning, fame, *śilpābhyāsenā naipuṇyam* = 'through practice of a craft, skill,' *agninā pākaḥ* = through fire, cooking. That which helps in the accomplishment of the action but is not presented as performing any operation is called '*hetu*'. That is why fire is the '*hetu*' of cooking (*pāka*) and takes the third case-ending. The same is true of the other sentences. An accessory (*kāraṇa*) can bring about action only. Each one performs some operation or other. There is only one thing which performs some operation and is yet called '*hetu*': that which prompts another to do something (P. 1.4.55).]

The difference between '*hetu*' and *kāraṇa*' is now stated.

26. The instrument is for the sake of action, hence a substitute for it is allowed. Action exists for its purpose; therefore no substitute for the latter is allowed.

[That which helps most in the accomplishment of the action is called instrument (*kāraṇa*). It is subordinate to action which is the more important of the two. That is why if the prescribed instrument is not available a substitute can be used. The action being the chief thing, it would demand some instrument or other. If the prescribed one is not available a substitute can be used without violating the injunction. According to some, this applies to all the accessories (*kāraṇa*). In the sentence '*adhyayanena vasati*' = he resides for study, the third case-ending has been used, not because study is an

instrument (*kāraṇa*) but because it is a cause (*hetu*). The action understood from the verb '*vasati*' is subordinate to study. Residing somewhere is for the purpose of study and, therefore, subordinate to it and not *vice versa*. There cannot be a substitute for the main purpose. Thus '*hetu*' (cause, purpose) is more important than action, whereas instrument (*kāraṇa*) is always subordinate to action.]

The difference between '*hetu*' and '*tādarthyā*' is now pointed out.

27. A cause (*hetu*) brings about an effect either in favourable or unfavourable circumstances; what is for the purpose of something else works in favourable circumstances. It has the quality of a *hetu*.

[There is a difference between '*hetu*' and '*tādarthyā*' (what is meant for something else) also. A cause brings about its effect in two ways: either in unfavourable circumstances or in favourable circumstances. If it is in a declining condition, it produces an effect which is also in a declining condition. When water comes into contact with the heat of the sun, it decreases and continues to decrease. When, on the other hand, a cause gets the help of other things, its strength increases and the effect also correspondingly increases. For example, when the seed is strengthened by water and sunshine, it is capable of producing a stronger seedling. What is called '*tādarthyā*' (what is meant for something else) is a cause of the latter type. It is a fully manifested state of causality. The fourth case-affix (dative case) is used in order to express it, as in *kuṇḍalāya hiranyam* = 'gold for ear-rings'. The word *tādarthyā* is formed by combining *tadartha* and *ya*. *Tadartha* means '*tasmai idam tadartham*'. Here *idam* stands for the *upakāraka*, that which is going to help something else, meant for something else and *tasmai* stands for that which is going to be helped. The suffix '*ya*' which comes after the compound *tadartha* expresses the manifested state of the relation of causality existing between what '*tasmai*' and '*idam*' stand for. As the main purpose of the compound '*kuṇḍalā-*

hiraṇyam is to convey the idea that *hiraṇya* (gold) is the material cause of *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) the meaning of the second part of the compound is more important than that of the first part.]

Now that the difference between *kāraṇa*, *hetu*, *lakṣaṇa* and *tādarthya* has been stated, consideration of *kāraṇa* is continued.

28. Power is inborn and lasts as long as the object itself. As it is manifested at the time of action, it is useful (to the latter).

[Things which have the requisite power come into existence out of their causes. Power is not something which is added to them after they come into existence. The power exists in the object. It cannot exist without a substratum. The power of an object is manifested when it is about to produce its effect. It is then that it is called the means (*sādhana*).]

29. The power of a wall to screen and of sword etc. to cut is always there and is manifested at the time of action.

[The power of a wall to screen and of a sword to cut is seen when the thing to be screened and the thing to be cut are present. The power is already there but it requires the presence of the object to become manifest. Though it exists at all times, it can be seen only then by ordinary people.]

The same idea is now elaborated.

30. Just as the *vāruṇa* nooses of *Dāityas* are always united to their bodies but are manifested only when they desire victory, so are the powers of objects.

[It is like the powers of *Dāityas*, their *vāruṇa* *Paśas* (Nooses acquired through the favour of God *Varuṇa*) which according to tradition, always exist in their hands but become manifest only when they have to overcome an enemy.]

31. When the sword, endowed with its sharpness, heaviness, hardness and particular shape is directed towards the thing to be cut, it is perceived as something having power (*śaktimān*).

[When the sword possessing sharpness, heaviness, hardness and a particular shape, is directed towards the thing to be cut, it is seen to be something having power. Sharpness is the climax of the tendency to become gradually thinner of the closely-knit parts of an object. The cohesive nature of metals heated to a high degree is called hardness. It affects the nature of the blows delivered with them. The shape of a sword enables one to distinguish it from other swords and to use it in a particular manner. A sword having these qualities is seen as something having power only when it is operated. This is true of other objects also.]

Other views on the topic of 'means' (*sādhana*) are now stated.

32. Some are of the opinion that power is produced in a thing before action through other causes; others say that it is inborn in a thing; others still that action takes place first.

[There are some other views concerning 'means'. The question of manifesting something arises only when it is already there. As the existence of power is inferred from its effects, it is not known before the action which produces the effects. We conclude, therefore, that the powers of things favourable to action, are produced by the circumstances which must be presumed to have existed before the action. Even when it does exist, there must be something to manifest it and that would be the cause. Things become causes when the accompanying circumstances are present, that is, they lend their powers to one another for producing the effect. By themselves, they cannot produce it. That which produced the substratum of power cannot produce the power also.

Some other circumstance must have done it. Before power is generated and after, the thing remains the same. This is one view. Others believe that the power of a thing is not different from it. It is a thing's nature to have a certain power or not to have it. Others think that the power of a thing is born with it and thus support the previous view. Others still are of the view that the cause of action is not the same as that of the power of a thing to act but different. The different things which cooperate to produce an action lend their powers to one another. Therefore the powers and action are produced at the same time. In that sense the powers are *sahaja*. As the powers produce action in the next moment after their own production, the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* between the two is not impaired.]

How some consider that action preexists power is now stated.

33. It is the creative force which, not residing anywhere in particular, brings together, like a stream, all the powers (required for producing an action) in a particular substratum.

Remark. In the second line of this verse, the reading should be 'śaktīre'° not 'śakire'°.

[According to some, what is called *pravṛtti*, a force leading to action, eternal, exists before everything. In that condition, it exists in nothing in particular. It is 'anapāśritā'. It is this force which gives to different things in the world their power to do particular actions. In this sense, 'pravṛtti' or 'action' in a very general form is there before particular actions. This is the view of the old Mimāṃsakas. The Sāṅkhyas think that what is called 'pravṛtti' is 'rajoguṇa' existing in everything in an eternal form and it is this which enables a thing to do particular actions.]

Other views on 'means' are now given.

34. Others maintain somehow or other that it is *apūrva* (the previously non-existing, new factor, that is, merit (*dharmā*) or demerit (*adharma*) or the power of Time or action or Time itself which is such a factor.

Remark. From here till the words *nā kācit kṣatīḥ* in the commentary on the verse 49, the commentary of Helārāja is not available. The text gives that of one Phullarāja.

[What is this creative force which resides nowhere in particular? Some think that it is *adrṣṭa*, in the form of *dharma* or *adharma*. It is due to this that things happen or do not happen. Others think that it is Time or the power of Time which exists in *Brahman*. Nothing can act in order to produce its effect except according to Time.]

Something is now being said about number in regard to this power.

35. According to others, there reside, like the universals, in all objects, six powers leading to action, different and yet not so from the objects.

[Now the question arises: how many powers (that is 'means' considered as a power) are there? Some think that, like the universals, six powers inhere in all things. They are called *karma* (object or the accusative function) etc. They are neither identical nor non-identical with the objects whose powers they are. They are really infinite in number, but for convenience, they are classed under six headings.]

36. These powers seem to be unlimited according to the shape etc. of objects. The truth about them is that it does not go beyond the number six.

[The same power varies according to the thing in which it resides. For example, the power to cut varies according as

it exists in a knife or a sword. And yet, speaking generally, it is of six kinds and no more.]

37. Or rather, power is one but appears to be divided into six kinds according to circumstances. It is the fact of being an agent (*kartā*) which is the basis (of all the varied activities).

[Or rather one might say that power is one and that it assumes six forms according to circumstances. That one power is the power of being an agent which is called by different names under different circumstances.]

After having considered whether power is one or many, something is being said as to whether it is different or not from its substratum.

38. As to whether it (power) is identical with or different from (its substratum), it is held that it is different. For the world, the word is the authority and the *śāstra* (that is, Grammar) follows it too.

[The next question is whether power is different from its substratum or identical with it. It is difficult to say definitely what it is. In grammar, it is held to be different. The world goes by the word and the *śāstra* also follows it. On the basis of the word, the world looks upon the power which leads to action as different from its substratum. Otherwise, the latter would always lead to action.]

39. In reality, identity is not different from distinction. It is unity (*tattva*) which shines as distinction and identity.

[If one wants to go to the bottom of this matter, the position is that there is no identity apart from difference. Truth or Unity (*tattva*) shines, now as identity and now as

difference. In the phenomenal stage, it appears as difference. When 'avidyā' disappears, it shines as Unity.]

40. Difference, clearly conceived, is not apart from Unity and unity (identity), clearly conceived, is not different from difference.

41. Heaven (space), Earth, Air, Sun, Oceans, Rivers, Positions (Directions) are all parts of an inner Reality, manifested externally.

[When unity or identity reaches its climax, one comes to the Ultimate which it is that manifests itself as the different things of the Universe. The whole universe is an external manifestation of an inner Reality. Really speaking, even the distinction between internal and external does not exist. An inner Reality, of the nature of Consciousness, called *Śabdaṭattva-brahman*, shines now as this and now as that. This is the meaning of the verse.]

After having stated that it is the One Reality which manifests itself as the great Elements (*Mahābhūta*) and the Directions (*Dik*), it is now stated that it manifests itself as Time also.

42. That One Reality shines with the divisions of Time. It is an entity without priority and posteriority, but shines as having sequence.

Remarks. The second line should read: *sa hy apūrvāparo bhāvaḥ kramarūpeṇa lakṣyate.*

[This One Reality is without any inner temporal differentiation. But due to *kālaśakti*, things appear to have temporal sequence.

To sum up the discussion in the foregoing verses: following worldly usage, for the grammarians, what is called

'means' (*sādhana*) is a certain power existing in things. According to the *viññānavādins*, it is a mere construction of the mind. According to the *Mīmāṃsakas*, it is an invisible force (*adr̥ṣṭa*) called '*apūrva*'. According to *Saṃsargavāda* (*Vaiśeṣika*), it exists in a thing, but is different from it. According to *Advaitins*, it is the power of *Brahman* called Time. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, it is *rajas*, activity, one of the three qualities existing in all things. According to those who look upon time as an eternal substance, it is that.

While considering the nature of *sādhana* (means), the meaning of the word *kāraka* was discussed and that led to an explanation of the difference between *hetu*, *lakṣaṇa*, *tādarthya*, *karāṇa* and *kāraka*. Then the question arose as to whether 'power' precedes or follows action or is produced at the same time as action. Next the point whether power is one or many was discussed. And lastly the question whether it was identical with or different from its substratum was discussed. All that led to a statement of the nature of *Brahman*.]

As a preliminary to the establishment of difference, the author now shows the existence of 'power'.

43. When the meaning of the stem is the same, that of the suffix is seen to vary. When (the meaning of the suffix) is not the same, that of a stem like *vr̥kṣa* remains the same. Therefore, the meaning of the suffix is said to be different.

[Even when the stem with its meaning remains the same, the suffix, with its meaning varies and when the suffix varies, the stem, with its meaning remains the same. For example, *Vr̥kṣaḥ*, *vr̥kṣam*, *vr̥kṣeṇa*, *vr̥kṣāya* and so on. One can, therefore, conclude that there does exist something called '*śakti*' expressed by the suffix, different from the meaning of the stem and constituting the means whereby action is accomplished.]

The author now concludes what has been said so far and introduces the next topic.

44. What is called '*kāraka*' is of a general nature. It has seven main (*ādyāḥ*) sources of distinction. Six beginning with the object and the seventh is what is called 'the rest'.

[*Kāraka* or 'means' in general has so far been explained. It has seven main sources of distinction, six beginning with the object (*karma*) and the seventh called 'the rest' (*śeṣa*).]

Of the seven kinds of *kāraka* referred to, what is called 'object' (*karma*) is being dealt with first.

45. Of these (*tatra*), the object called 'that which is most desired to be attained' (*īpsitatama*) is of three kinds: product (*nirvartya*), modification (*vikārya*) destination (*prāpya*). The rest has been thought of as of four kinds.

[The order in which the *kāraḥ* are dealt with here is that in which the case-endings are taught in P. 23. In P. 14 on the other hand, the *kāraka* called *apādāna* is taught first and then *sampradāna* and so on. *Kāraka* is of two kinds: 'already expressed' (*abhihita*) and not yet expressed (*anabhihita*). The first case-ending stands for whatever *kāraka* is already expressed. It is taught in the sense of the meaning of the stem only. The case ending from the second onwards express the *kāraḥ* like *karma* which have not yet been expressed. The object (*karma*) is what the agent seeks to attain most by his action. It is of three kinds: product, modification and destination. Besides these three, there are four other kinds.]

What the other four kinds are is now explained.

46. (1) That which is attained indifferently, (2) that which the agent dislikes, (3) that to which the

name of any other *kāraka* cannot be given and (4) that which had another name before.

[They are: (1) that which the agent attains, though he is indifferent to it, as grass (*trṇa*) in the sentence: *grāmaṃ gacchans trṇam sprśati*; (2) that which he positively dislikes as in the following sentences: *coraṃ paśyati*, *viṣaṃ bhukṣte*; (3) that which helps in the accomplishment of the action but does not come under the definition of any other *kāraka*, as in *māṇavakaṃ panthānam prcchati* and (4) that which was some other *kāraka* before but has now become *karma* because of the presence of some preposition, as *māṇavaka* in the sentence: *māṇavakam abhikrudhyati*.]

The three varieties of the main object (*karma*) are now explained.

47. That object is called product (*nirvartya*) the transforming material cause of which, whether existing or not, is not presented as identical with it.

[Of the three varieties of the main *karma*, product (*nirvartya*) is that which is presented by language as different from its material cause as 'ghaṭa' in the sentence: *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*. Here the jar (*ghaṭa*) is presented as something made out of mud and different from it. In '*mṛdam ghaṭam karoti*' = he makes the mud into a jar, the jar and the mud are presented as the same. It is a question of presentation by language.]

48. When the material cause is intended (to be so presented), the object (*karma*) is called modification (*vikārya*). Others, however, define product and modification differently in the *śāstra*.

[Where the product is meant to be presented as a transformation of the original material, as identical with it, as in

the sentence: *mr̥dam ghaṭam karoti*, the object (*karma*) is called modification (*vikārya*). Some, however, define the *nirvartya* and *vikārya* objects differently as will be shown below.]

49. That non-existent thing which comes into existence or that existing thing which is manifested by its birth, in the *karma* called product. Modification has been established (*vikārya*) to be of two kinds.

[That object (*karma*) is called product (*nirvartya*) which did not exist before. That which existed before and is manifested by its birth is called *vikārya*. In other words, according to this view, the distinction between the two is based on *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*. But this is not right.]

50. One kind of modification (*vikārya*) is the result of the destruction of the original material as ashes from (burnt) wood. Another kind is the result of the coming of a new property as the transformation of gold (into ornaments).

[A general definition of modification (*vikārya*) has been given. It is of two kinds and they are defined in this verse. When the original material is completely destroyed, we have one kind of modification. For example, ashes when the wood is completely burnt out. In the sentence: *kāṣṭhāni bhasma karoti* = 'he makes the wood into ashes, if wood is not presented as identical with the ashes, the latter would be product (*nirvartya*) according to the previous definition and modification (*vikārya*) if it is so presented. According to the present definition that object (*karma*) is modification (*vikārya*) which is left behind after the original material is completely destroyed. 'Bhasma' is *vikārya* because ashes can result only when the wood is completely destroyed. According to the previous definition, in this sentence, it is the wood

(*kāṣṭhāni*) which is primarily the *vikārya* and *bhasma* is so secondarily as it is presented as identical with *kāṣṭhāni*. According to the present definition, it is '*bhasma*' which is primarily the *vikārya*. In *kāṣṭhāni dahanti* = 'wood burns', *kāṣṭhāni* is *vikārya*, because that is the only thing which is mentioned. Sometimes, the material remains intact, but changes shape as in the sentence: *suvarṇaṃ kuṇḍale karoti* = he makes the gold into ear-rings. Here also, the object is a modification (*vikārya*).]

The object called 'destination', or 'thing to be attained' is now explained.

51. That object is called destination (or thing to be attained) on which the accomplishment of the effects of the action cannot be seen or inferred.

[As far as '*nirvartya*' is concerned, the very coming into being of the product is the result of action and it can be directly perceived. Similarly, in *vikārya* also, the effect of action, the coming in of a particular property can be seen. Sometimes, the effect of action cannot be perceived, but can be inferred as when we infer other people's happiness by observing their facial expression or when we conclude that the growth of the tree is due to previous watering and other care. This is not the case in such sentences as *ādityaṃ paśyati*, *nagaram upasarpati*, *vedam adhīte*. Here one neither sees nor infers 'any effect' on the object by the action mentioned in each sentence. Such an object is called '*prāpya*'. It merely becomes the object (*viṣaya*) of the action, without undergoing any change and becomes technically also the object (*karma*) of the *prāpya* type.]

Some do not admit that '*prāpya*' is a separate kind of object.

52. Actions like seeing make some difference everywhere, according to some. It is clearly mani-

fested and proved in the case of snakes having poison in their vision.

[Some do not admit a separate kind of object called 'prāpya', because they maintain that all actions like seeing do produce some effect or other on the object, whether that effect is perceptible or not. In some cases, the effect can be actually seen. For example, who do see things being burnt up when looked at by snakes having poison in their vision (*drṣṭi-viṣa*). On that analogy we can conclude that other actions also have their effects. But this view is not endorsed by the author. We do not see the effect of actions everywhere. In the case of snakes, in addition to the fact that the sense of vision itself is a kind of fire, there is also poison in it and so it burns up the object. The burning is not due to the action of seeing. Therefore, a separate object (*karma*) called 'prāpya' must be recognised.]

It is now stated how a 'prāpya' object becomes the 'means' of an action (*sādhana*) if the action has no effect on it.

53. Being in the right place (*ābhāsopagamah*), being illuminated (*vyaktiḥ*) and having natural fitness (*śoḍhatva*) these are the properties of a *prāpya* object connecting it with the accomplishment of an action.

Remark. The word 'śoḍhatva' occurs in Vāk. I, 82 also. There it means: well-fixed in the mind.

[If the action has no effect on the *prāpya* object, how can it be considered to be a means (*sādhana*) of the action? The answer is, that it can be connected with action in one of three ways. Taking an action like seeing, an object can be helpful (1) by being in the right place, (2) by being illuminated by a light when vision is obstructed by some such thing as fog, (3) by having natural fitness to be seen. Unless a thing is in the right place, it cannot be seen. Light is a well-known condition for seeing something. Lastly, only visible things can

be seen and not invisible things like ghosts. But these are causal factors of the action of seeing and not its effects. Such factors exist for other actions also and through them a *prāpya* type of object becomes the 'means' (*sādhana*) of an action.]

The author now introduces the subject of *karma-kartā* (object-subject).

54. After having enjoyed independence at first in regard to actions like coming into being (*nirvṛtti*), they become the object in regard to the actions of other agents.

Remark. The reading should be *nirvṛtīyādiṣu*, instead of *nirvartyādiṣu*.

[It was remarked before that all accessories (*kāraṇa*) are agents as far as their minor actions are concerned. How then can they become object (*karma*)? They can, when, instead of their minor actions being emphasised, that of the main agent is emphasised and the main agent wants to reach them by his action. They then become subordinate to the main agent and become object (*karma*). They were agents at first and become object, etc. (*karma*) etc. later.]

How what was *karma* at first becomes '*kartā*' later is now explained.

55. When the activity of the main agent is not meant to be expressed, then the object attains the status of agent in regard to its own activity and the *sāstra* prescribes that the word expressive of it (that is, the verb) should possess the marks which it would have if it expressed the object.

[The previous verse spoke about agents of minor actions becoming object, etc. in regard to the main agent. How some-

thing becomes agent (*kartā*) after having been *karma* is now explained. When the activity of the main agent is not meant to be expressed as in '*bhidyate kusūlaḥ svayam eva*' = 'the granary breaks by itself' in order to emphasise the rickety nature of the granary or as in '*pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva*' = 'the rice cooks by itself', in order to emphasise the extreme facility with which a particular kind of rice cooks, the granary and rice which would have been objects in sentences where the activity of the main agent is meant to be expressed, become agents and the suffix in the verb expresses the activity of the new agents. But the verb shows also elements like '*yak*' which it normally takes when it expresses the object and not the agent. This happens only, in the case of verbs made from roots which are *karmasthabhāvaka* or *karmasthakriya* and not *kartṛsthabhāvaka* or *kartṛsthakriya*. Examples of these four kinds of roots are given in the following verse.

*karmasthaḥ pacater bhāvaḥ karmasthā ca bhideḥ kriyā/
māsāsibhāvaḥ kartṛsthaḥ kartṛsthā ca gameḥ kriyā//*
(Kāsikā on P. 3.1.87).]

56. When the object is free from any prompting, it is connected with its own action. When it is no longer the object, it becomes agent in regard to its own action.

[A thing is said to be object (*karma*) in regard to the activity of the main agent and if that is not meant to be expressed, it cannot become object at all. But how can it be called agent for that reason? When the verbal suffix does not express the main agent, the root cannot do so. That is what happens in the sentence: *pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva* = 'the rice cooks by itself'. Here the verbal suffix expresses the activity, not of the main agent, but of the rice which has become agent now but which was '*karma*' before. It has become agent as far as its own activity is concerned, but as it was '*karma*' before, it is called *karmakartā* = object-agent. Thus two conditions have to be fulfilled before a '*karma*' can become '*karma-kartā*' (1) the activity of the main agent should not

be meant to be expressed, (2) the object should be presented as independent and, therefore, the agent in regard to its own action. All this is made clear by P. 3.1.87 and the *Vārttikas* thereon. In '*bhidyate kusūlaḥ svayam eva*', all the usual causes of the breakdown of a granary are excluded and its own susceptibility to breakdown is emphasised. In this way, instrument (*kāraṇa*), location (*adhikaraṇa*) can also become agent in a sentence, but not object-agent (*karma-kartā*). Only the object can become *karma-kartā* and the verb in the sentence would show signs of both the agent and the object.]

57. It has been said that they (the different uses of a root) are as different from one another as the root '*pac*' and '*sidh*'. Though they are different, they are imagined to be the same because of the similarity in the sounds.

[How can one and the same root denote sometimes a thing which is subordinate to the activity of the main agent and sometimes denote a thing which is not so subordinate but stands, on its own, as in the two following sentences: '*deva-datta odanam pacati*' and '*pacyata odanaḥ svayam eva*'. The fact is that they must be looked upon as two different roots, as different as '*pac*' and '*sidh*' from each other. Though different, they are looked upon as the same, because they have been so treated. But where there is something to be gained by looking upon them as different, that also has been done. For example, the root '*kṣi*' comes in '*bhṣādi*', '*tudādi*', '*divādi*' and '*kṛyādi*' groups of roots.]

The question is now considered according to the view that the word is the same even when it has more than one meaning.

58. Roots like '*pac*' denote a part or all the activities spontaneously, even when their forms remains the same.

Others, on the other hand, maintain, that even when the meanings are different, the word is the same, if the sounds are the same. In other words, they maintain that the same word can have more than one meaning. We do perceive the word as the same and nothing contradicts this. The plurality of meaning can be explained on the basis of difference of powers of the same word. In fact, a large number of words in the language have more than one meaning. Even a word like "grāma" stands for different things in different contexts. When in a sentence, the former object of the root 'to cook' now becomes the agent the root only means the material becoming soft, as in *pacyata, odanaḥ svayam eva*. Here the activity of the main agent is not expressed at all. In 'deva-datta odanaṁ pacati', the verb expresses primarily the activity of Devadatta (making the rice soft) and secondarily that of the rice (becoming soft).]

Now something further is going to be said about a direct object becoming an agent.

59-60. From the pure root 'ruḥ', both 'causing to bend' and 'bending' are understood. From the root with the causative affix 'ṇic' also, both 'causing to bend' and bending are understood. When the object (*karma*) becomes agent and the causative affix is also used, there is a fifth condition. When the root does not express the idea of somebody causing an action to be done (*preṣaṇa*), the causative affix is used to express the original meaning (of the root).

Remark. In explaining these two stanzas, Helārāja takes the root *ruḥ* as an example. Though this root is ordinarily considered to be *kartṛsthakriya*, Helārāja treats it as *karmasthakriya* on the authority of Kātyāyana and brings it within the scope of *karmavadbhāva* according to P. 3.1.87.

[In the sentence *ārohani hastinaṁ hastipakaḥ* = 'the elephant-keepers mount the elephant', the meaning involved is

that the elephant keepers cause to bend (*nyagbhāvana*) the elephant which is bending (*nyagbhavana*). When there is a desire to emphasise the docility of the elephant, the function of the elephant-keepers is not mentioned at all. The sentence would then be: *āruhyate hastī svayam eva* = 'the elephant bends of its own accord'. Here the root only stands for bending and not for causing to bend. This is the second stage. So far the root is in its pure condition, that is, the causative affix has not been added to it. In this pure state, it expresses *nyagbhāvana* (causing to bend) in the first stage and *nyagbhavana* (bending) in the second stage. Now if the function of the keepers is meant to be conveyed, the causative affix *ṇic* would be added to the root and we would get the sentence: *ārohayanti hastinam hastipakāh* = 'the elephant keepers mount the elephant. This is the third stage and the meaning is the same as in the first stage even though the causative affix has been used here. When there is again a desire to emphasise the docility of the elephant and dispense with the function of the keepers, the root would stand for bending only and we would get *ārohayate hastī svayam eva* = 'the elephant bends of its own accord'. This is the fourth stage and the meaning is the same as in the second stage. Thus, in the last two stages also where the *ṇic* is used we understand both *nyagbhāvanam* (causing to bend) and *nyagbhavanam* (bending). When the function of the keepers, namely, *preṣanam* = prompting is dispensed with (*nivṛtta-preṣanād dhātoḥ*) what remains is the activity of the elephant only and that becomes the meaning of the root. It is to such a root that the *ṇic* is added.

In this connection, Helārāja speaks about a fifth stage. There is no separate sentence expressive of this stage. It consists in looking upon the activity of the elephant itself as the prompter because of its extreme docility and the consequent dispensing with any other prompter. See Nāgeśaś *Udyota* on the M.Bhā. on P. 1.3.67.]

An example is now given of roots with and without the suffix '*ṇic*' conveying the same meaning.

61. The root 'sidhyati' cannot express the meaning of the root 'pac' without the causative affix. But when it takes the causative affix (ñic), it expresses the original meaning of the root 'pac'.

[We sometimes see that roots ending in the causative affix have the same meaning as others not having a similar ending. In 'sidhyaty odanaḥ', the root 'sidh' means only 'becoming soft'. But the same root with 'ñic', that is, 'sādhayati', means 'making soft' to which becoming soft is subordinate. In the same way, the root 'ruk' can have the same meaning whether it has 'ñic' or not.]

It is now stated that the object becomes agent when the initiative (preṣaṇa) of the latter is not meant.

62. According to some, the function of an agent like Devadatta in regard to the action (of making a mat) denoted by a transitive verb, is, when without Devadatta etc. attributed to the object of action, mat etc.

[It has been shown so far that when what was formerly the object now becomes the agent, there has been an abandonment of the idea of somebody making somebody else do something. Sometimes, the same result is attained when such a function is attributed to something. In 'Devadattaḥ kaṭam karoti', there is the idea that Devadatta gets something done by employing or setting in motion various accessories. Sometimes, however, we want to give expression to the idea that, due to the existence of special facilities, it is very easy to get the mat made. We, then, suppress the part that Devadatta normally plays, that of being the agent. We attribute it to the mat itself and say: *kārayati kaṭaḥ devadattena* = 'The mat gets itself made by Devadatta. In the next stage, when we completely suppress the idea of somebody getting somebody else to do something we get *kārayate kaṭaḥ svayam eva*.]

63. When the organising activity of the agent is not meant to be expressed and is superimposed on its object, the latter, as the prompter of its former agent, is expressed by the verbal suffix when the verb has the causative affix expressive of the superimposed organising activity.

[In '*kārayate kaṭaḥ svayam eva*', the activity of the agent is not mentioned at all, in order to convey the idea that there are special facilities for making the mat, so that the mat is said to prompt itself to be made. This prompting itself of the mat or rather the superimposition of prompting on the mat is different from the maker's activity and it is conveyed by the causative affix and the *ātmanepada*. All this happens when what was object before becomes the agent in another context, when prompting is superimposed on the object.]

Remarks. All that is said in this context about "*Karma-kartā*" is based on the two sūtras: *ṇer aṇau yat karma ṇau cet sa kartā anādhyāne* (P. 1.3.67) and *karmavat karmaṇā tulya-kriyaḥ* (P. 3.1.87). These two sūtras are connected. Both teach the use of the *ātmanepada* when, in a sentence, what was at first the object becomes the agent. There are, however, differences in the scope of the two sūtras. The first one teaches the use of the *ātmanepada* even when the fruit of the action does not accrue to the agent. When it does accrue to the agent, *ātmanepada* would come according to P. 1.3.74. Secondly, the first sūtra teaches *ātmanepada* when the causative affix *ṇic* is used. Thirdly, the root must be *kartrsthabhāva* as '*ḍrs*' or '*kartrsthakriya*' as '*ruh*'. As against this, the second sūtra teaches '*yak*', '*ātmanepada*' and '*cin*' when what was *karma* becomes '*kartā*'. Here there is no question of the use of the causative affix '*ṇic*', at all. The root must be '*karmasthabhāva*' like '*pac*' or '*karmasthakriya*' like '*bhid*'. This distinction in roots is set forth in the following stanza:—

*'karmasthaḥ pacater bhāvaḥ karmasthā ca bhideḥ kriyā/
Māsāsibhāvaḥ kartrsthaḥ kartrsthā ca gameḥ kriyā//*
(*Kāśikā* on P. 3.1.87)

It is to be noted that what is called 'karmavadbhāva' does not take place in the case of roots to which 'ñic' is added nor in the case of roots which are 'kartṛsthabhāvaka' or 'kartṛsthakriya'. Though in the case of the two latter kinds of roots, when ñic is added to them what was 'karma' becomes 'kartā', still there is no real 'karmavadbhāva' because 'yak' and 'cin' cannot come. Only 'ātmanepada' can come. In the example given under P. 1.3.67 in the *Kāśikā*, namely, 'ārohaṇti hastinaṃ hastipakāḥ' 'arohayate hastī śvayam eva', what was an object in the first sentence has become *kartā* in the next sentence but this is not what is technically called 'karmavadbhāva'. That is taught in P. 3.1.87. But there is a kind of 'karmavadbhāva' here also, but 'yak' and 'cin' do not result.]

64. In words like 'sadṛśa' where a 'former' object becomes the agent, 'becoming' and 'causing to become' are the two actions involved (when something becomes) the object (of the action of seeing).

[In this section devoted to a consideration of the topic of *karma* (object), something was said about the object sometimes becoming an agent. That led to a consideration of P. 1.3.67, because that is also connected with the idea of the object becoming the agent. The *sūtra* "tyadādiṣu dṛśo 'nālocane kañ ca' (P. 3.2.60) is also connected with the same idea. Words like *tādrk'* formed according to this *sūtra*, express the idea of similarity and not the agent of the action of seeing and yet that is what they should express, because they have the suffix 'kañ', which being a *Kṛt*, denotes the agent. Nor can such forms come under 'ive pratikṛtau' (P. 5.3.96) as suggested by the *Vārttikakāra*. The *Bhāṣyakāra* explains it as *karmakartā*. It can be so according to the principle enunciated in stanza 56. For this, it is necessary to look upon the root *dṛś* as expressive of an action involving *āpatti* and *āpādanam*. In the sentence, *ghaṭam paśyati*, *āpatti* 'becoming' is the activity of the jar and 'causing to become' *āpādana*, the activity of the person who sees. The sentence really means: helps something which becomes the object of seeing to become it. When caus-

ing to become' is not meant to be conveyed, becoming becomes the chief thing. In other words, the jar becomes the object-agent (*karmakartā*). Applying the same principle to the word 'tādṛk' the word would mean: *tamivemaṇ paśyanti janāḥ so 'yam sa iva dṛśyamānas tam ivātmānaṇ paśyati iti tādṛk* = 'people see him as the other; he, being seen as the other, sees himself as the other (thus, he is) *tādṛk* = that-like.]

It is now being shown that this way of explaining it is not right.

65. If one explains by bringing some extraneous word from somewhere, even roots, having the meaning of 'seeing' would become *karmasthabhāvaka* (that is, roots the action denoted by which resides in the object).

[This way of explaining *tādṛk* is not right, because the root *dṛś* does not involve 'becoming' and 'causing to become'. All that it means is: Knowledge of one who sees (*karṭṛsthaṇ darśanamātram*). One does not think of something becoming the object of seeing. If one begins to analyse the meaning of roots in this way, all roots would become *karmasthabhāvaka* or *karmasthakriyā* and there would be no *karṭṛsthabhāvaka* or *karṭṛsthakriyā* roots at all and that is against facts.]

The author now draws a line of demarcation between these two kinds of roots.

66. According (to some) action resides where its effect is seen. According to others, where it resides is revealed by the words themselves.

[Some say that whether a root is '*karṭṛsthabhāvaka*' or '*karmasthabhāvaka*' depends on the effect of where the action is found. They make no distinction between *bhāva* and *kriyā*. But the idea that action rests on where its effect is found does not work. According to that, the root '*pac*' would be *karmasthabhāvaka*, because the effect of the action of cooking is found in the thing cooked. But the action is not without effect

on the person who cooks. Therefore, it would be better to rely on another principle and that is the way words present the matter. In *ghaṭam paśyati*, the words present the *ghaṭa* as unaffected by the action of seeing, but in *kāṣṭham bhinatti*, they present the object, namely, the wood as affected by the action of cutting. Therefore, the root *drś* is *kartṛsthabhāvaka* and the root *bhid* is *karmasthabhāvaka*.]

It is now pointed out that the *vārttika* on P. 1.4.51 which makes words expressive of time, action, distance to be covered and country objects of intransitive verbs is unnecessary.

67. When words expressive of time, action, distance to be covered and country come together with any intransitive verb which implies another action, they become the object (of that action).

[So far the three kinds of object (*karma*) all coming under P. 1.4.49 have been considered. This was followed by a consideration of how what was object before becomes agent in some cases and matters arising out of that. Now the author takes up the consideration of some points arising out of other *sūtras* relating to *karma*. On P. 1.4.51, there is the following *vārttika*.

‘kālabhāvādhvagantavyāḥ karmasaṃjñā hyakarmaṇām. Deśāsca. (M. Bha. I, p. 33, 1.1).

This *vārttika* declares that words expressive of time, action and distance to be covered are objects of intransitive roots. But this *vārttika* is unnecessary in order to make them objects (*karma*). Because they would become *karma* without it. The intransitive roots imply another action than the one which they openly express and the words expressive of time, etc. become the *karma* of that action. For example, *māsam āste* means *māsam vyāpya āste*=he stays, covering a period of one month. The period of one month has become the object of covering, by the original *sūtra* itself, that is, P. 1.4.49. There was no need for this *vārttika*. Even though time, etc., thus become

the *karma* of *akarmaka* roots, these do not cease to be *akarmaka* (intransitive) roots, because it is only when a root has an *antaraṅgakarma*, that is, a *dravyakarma*, an object in the form of a thing, that it is called a transitive (*sakarmaka*) root. As, thus, roots like 'ās' continue to be *akarmaka* even after time, etc. have become their objects, the suffixes *la*, *kṛtya*, *kta* and *khal* can be added to them according to P. 3.4.69 in the sense of *bhāva*'. Thus action, etc., become *karma* according to P. 1.4.49 itself and not according to the *vārttika* under discussion, because the *āsanakriyā* (the action of staying) in *māsam āste* involves that of covering (*vyāptikriyā*).]

It is now stated how time, etc. are only minor objects whereas an object in the form of a thing or substance (*dravyakarma*) would be the main object.

68. Having become a kind of substratum for the substance—objects, time etc. later become objects having a different status (*bhinnakakṣyam*).

[It has been said before that time, etc. are only external *karmas* and not internal (*antaraṅga*). They are secondary objects. They become a kind of substratum in which the main object or the agent resides. In *kurūn svapiti* = 'he sleeps in the Kuru country,' it is clear that the country is the place where he sleeps; in other words, it is a kind of *ādhāra* (substratum). In *māsam odanaṃ pacati* = 'he cooks rice for a month', where the main object also comes in the sentence, it is clear a month' is a kind of *ādhāra* for the main object also. The point of the comparison may be that just as a place becomes connected with action through the agent or the object, in the same way, time, etc. become objects through the main object. Action becomes connected with the main object first and then only with the secondary object. Therefore, the latter becomes an object only in the second stage. In cooking, for example, the time taken depends upon the nature of the main thing which is cooked. Thus time, etc. become connected with action through the main object. When both the ob-

jects are mentioned in the same sentence, the suffixes 'la', 'krtya', etc. express the object, and not time, etc. They are expressed by the second case-affix found in a separate word.]

What follows because of time, etc. coming within the range of all roots and because of their being objects having a different status is now stated.

69. Therefore, when the root comes together with those objects which are not things, it is intransitive and it becomes the occasion for taking verbal suffixes in the sense of object (*karmanī*) or action (*bhāve*).

[Where there is no main object in the form of substance, there the verbal suffix comes in the sense of minor object or mere action. In *māsa āsyate devattena* = 'a month is spent by Devadatta', the verbal suffix is expressive of a minor object which, in this case, is 'a month'. In *māsam āsyate devadattena* = 'for a month, a stay is made by Devadatta' the verbal suffix is expressive of action. This is according to P. 3.4.69, where the word *akarmaka* means a root which has no object in the form of a substance (*dravyakarma*). Though time, distance to be covered, etc. have been declared to be objects (*karma*), yet a root which has only such an object and not an object in the form of substance is deemed to be 'akarmaka'. See M. Bhā. on P. 1.4.52.]

It is now stated that time, etc. are not the only objects having a different status.

70. All that is not declared (to be something else) and so becomes object (according to P. 1.4.51) is understood to have a different status, because, it is not what is most desired to be attained by the agent, coming, as it does, within the scope of the meaning of the root in a different way (*dhātvarthoddeśabhedena*).

[It is not only time, etc. which are objects having a different status. All that becomes object according to P. 1.4.51 can be so looked upon. In *gām dogdhi payaḥ* = 'he extracts milk off the cow', the cow is the object of a second order compared to milk. The cow is only a means to an end. The cow comes within the scope of the meaning of the root as its object in the second stage and milk in the first stage. The cow is resorted to as a means (*upāya*). This is what is meant by *dhātvarthoddeśabheda*. The author does not accept this way of looking at it. He is going to show that *karma* is one. Here a doubt arises: Time, etc. may be considered to be objects of a second order. But how can the cow be so considered? Because, after all, milk depends on the cow. One who wants milk must first find a cow. This is true and yet the cow does have a different status as an object. See M. Bhā. on P. 1.4.51.]

This point is now further clarified.

71. That which causes the action to be done is said to be the main object (*pradhānakarma*). That which becomes connected with the action in order that it (the main object) may be attained is something else and has been called 'that which has not been declared to be anything else' (*akathita*).

[The difference in status is due to difference in importance. That to attain which all the accessories are set in motion and after attaining which relax is the main object, that which is most desired to be attained by the agent. In the sentence *gām dogdhi payaḥ*, it is milk which is in this position. The cow is resorted to only as a means. It is therefore, relatively unimportant. Where milk is not the objective and the milking is done only to prevent the cow from drying up we say *gām dogdhi* and here *gām* is the main object. In *gām dogdhi payaḥ*, there is the relation of *nimitta* and *nimitti* between the cow and the milk. Therefore, they belong to

two different categories. There the cow cannot become the object according to P. 1.4.49. It does so according to P. 1.4.51.]

The author now says something about the objects of the roots 'nī' and 'vah'.

72. As (the cow etc.) in the case of roots *duh*, etc. (village etc.) in the case of roots 'nī' etc. they become objects because no other name has been taught for them. As for one who expounds (*ākhyātā*), where there is no acquisition of knowledge in the prescribed manner (*upayoga*), he would come under the rest (*śeśa*) because of the restriction due to the specification of roots.

[As the cow in the case of roots like *duh*, in the case of roots like 'nī' etc. also, the destination is an object by P. 1.4.51. A *vārttika* under this *sūtra* enumerates the roots where this takes place. That is why in *naṭasya śṛnoti* = 'he listens to the actor', the actor does not become the object. The actor would become *apādāna* if there was *upayoga*, that is, acquisition of knowledge in the prescribed manner. Where this does not exist, the actor should really become an object according to P. 1.4.51, but does not do so because the roots have been specified and *śru* = 'to hear' is not one of them.]

It is now stated that, according to some, the object is the main one in the case of these enumerated roots also.

73. In the case of roots like 'duh' which involve the meaning of the causative affix, cow, etc. become objects by the first rule (P. 1.4.49) as in the case of roots ending in the causative affix. That is why there is restriction in regard to the roots ending in the causative affix.

(The last part of the *kārikā* should be: *ñijantaniyamas tathā*).

[Others think that the object taught under P. 1.4.51 can be looked upon as the main object, because the roots enumerated under that *sūtra* imply the idea of somebody causing somebody else to do something (*praiṣa*), that is, the meaning of *ṇic*. Something becomes the *karma* of *ṇic* by P. 1.4.49. *gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ* = "he extracts milk off the cow" would be explained as: *Kṣarantīm gāṃ kṣārayati* = 'he prompts the cow which drips (milk) to do so. Here, in reality, milk is more important than the cow, but linguistically, it is vice-versa. that is why in '*gaur duhyate payaḥ* = 'the cow is milked milk, the verb expresses the fact of the cow being the object and not that of the milk. Strictly speaking, the cow being the starting point of the milk, it should be *apādāna* and take the fifth case-affix, but it becomes the object because the latter is taught later. All the roots enumerated under P. 1.4.51 can be explained as involving the meaning of the causative affix. The restriction taught in P. 1.4.52 does not apply to these roots because that restriction applies only to roots ending in the causative affix and these roots are not so.]

It is now explained how the important and the unimportant can both become the object.

74. Just as there is no difference in degree in the instrument within its own sphere, similarly, there is no difference in degree in the object within its own sphere.

[It might be said that both what is important and what is not important should not become the object (*karma*) by the same rule. After all, there is the suffix '*tamaḥ*' in the *sūtra*: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* (P. 1.4.49). According to that, only the important should become the object. To this, the answer is that difference of degree is not considered within the same kind. For example, in *aśvena pathā dīpikayā yāti* = 'he goes along the path on horse-back with a light, all the words ending in the third case-affix are instruments (*karaṇa*) even though there may be difference of degree between them. Simi-

larly, between two things both of which are objects, no difference of degree is considered.]

It is now stated that this view is not right.

75. As difference of degree is accepted in regard to the quality of being desired to be attained (by the agent) of the object, therefore, a great difference is accepted (between that which becomes object by P. 1.4.51) and that which becomes object by the first rule (P. 1.4.49).

[There is a difference between the instrument and the object in this respect. All the accessories (*kāraṇa*) are means (*sādhana*) and that which reaches the climax in being the means is called the instrument (*sādhakatama*). Thus, it is a difference in degree within its own sphere. But all the accessories are not desired to be attained (*īpsita*) by the agent. Only the object is so. Therefore, that which reaches the climax in being *īpsita* has difference in degree within the sphere of the object and not outside it, whereas in the case of the instrument, the difference in degree is in regard to all the accessories. In the case of the object, as the difference in degree is within its own sphere, there should be different degrees. It is only by understanding it in this way that the sphere of the *apādāna* (starting point) can be distinguished from that of the object.]

Something is now being said as to whether the cow, in connection with the root 'duh', can become the object according to P. 1.4.49.

76. Just as, in the case of a verb ending in the causative affix, it is the active agent who is prompted, in the same way, in the case of roots like 'nī', the agent, though inactive, is prompted.

[One cannot compare cases like *gāṃ dogdhi payah* with *gamayati grāmaṃ devadattam*. In *gamayati*, the root expresses one action and the causative affix (ṇic) another. Each has its own object according to P. 1.4.49. In *dogdhi*, there is only one action and the cow and milk become objects in regard to the same action. Between the two, there is difference of degree in the matter of being desired to be attained by the action of the agent. Milk has a greater degree of it and so it becomes the object under P. 1.4.49 and the cow becomes so under P. 1.4.51.]

Just as *gamayati* is explained as: 'he prompts to go the person who goes', in the same way, why not explain *dogdhi* as: he prompts to yield (milk) that which yields?

77. As for the explanatory sentence in regard to verbs ending in a causative affix and to the roots *nī* and *duh*, it consists of different words and has no connection with the root in question.

[As for explanatory sentences like *gacchantam prayuṅkte* = 'he prompts to go the person who goes', in the case of *gamayati* and *grāmaṃ prāpnuvantīm ajām prayuṅkte* = 'he prompts the goat which is going to the village' in the case of *ajām grāmaṃ nayati*, they are really different from the verbs which they are supposed to explain. They only draw out the implication of the meaning of the verb. They should not be taken too seriously. Therefore the meaning of the causative affix is really not implied in the meanings of the roots *duh* and *nī*. These roots express only one action having two objects, the main object comes under P. 1.4.49 and the secondary object under P. 1.4.51. They belong to two different categories as mentioned in stanza 70. In the case of roots like *nī* and *duh*, the passive verb expresses the secondary object as taught in the *vārttika*.

pradhānakarmaṇyākhyeye, etc. under P. 1.4.51.]

The author now states the accepted doctrine,

78. Just as the starting point (*apādāna*) which is one is shown in the Science of Grammar as many, in the same way, the object (*karma*) also, which is one, is expounded as many.

[Just as all that can be called *apādāna* comes under the *sūtra*: *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam* (P. 1.4.24), similarly, all that can be called the object (*karma*) comes under the very first *sūtra* (P. 1.4.49). The other *sūtras* in both cases, are only meant for elaboration, for making things easier for the uninitiated. Where the same root denotes two actions, the objects of both are so called by P. 1.4.49. In the sentence, *taṇḍulān odanaṃ pacati* = 'he cooks the rice grains into rice', the root '*pac*' means to make something soft. Becoming soft is included in it. Rice-grains (*taṇḍula*) are the object of making soft, through becoming soft, whereas rice (*odana*) becomes so directly. Thus both are *karma*, each in regard to one of the two actions expressed by the same verb and stands towards each other as primary (*pradhāna*) and secondary (*guṇa*). The meaning of '*dogdhi*' can be analysed in the same way and both the cow and the milk would then become the *karma* in regard to one of the two actions expressed by '*duh*'. In this way, there is no harm in holding the view that the meaning of the causative affix is included in the meaning of '*duh*'. Even in a verb actually having the causative affix, the agent who is prompted loses his independence and becomes somewhat inactive (*niṣ-kriya*). In '*dogdhi*', there is no causative affix at all. What is expressed by *sādhayati* is expressed by the plain root in '*pacati*'.

In P. 1.4.49, the suffix '*tamap*' is not to be taken seriously. So whatever is desired to be attained (*īpsita*) becomes *karma* by that *sūtra*. If, in *dadhnā bhuñjīya* = with curds, I might eat. (M. Bhā. I, p. 322, l. 22) '*dadhi*' is not *karma*, it is because it is not desired to be attained (*īpsita*).]

As different kinds of objects such as 'that which is to be made' (*nirvartya*) are mentioned in the science, how is it that it is here declared to be one? This question is now answered,

79. Whether the object be something to be made or something to be modified or something to be reached, it is the substratum of power and is presented as an accomplished thing (*siddharūpa*), because it is only actions which are to be accomplished (*sādhya*).

[The object is One. Division such as '*nirvartya*' do not take away this one-ness. They are names given to the objects on the basis of the particular kinds of action with which they become connected. In all these connections, the common point remains: it is something which the word presents as accomplished (*siddha*) as against action which the verb presents as something to be accomplished (*sādhya*).].

The author now considers cases like: *viṣam bhakṣayati* == he eats poison.

80. Just as, through greed, one (that is, a sick man) has the desire (to eat) what is not good, similarly, through fear one acts in regard to poison etc.

[In sentences like *viṣam bhakṣayati*, *coram paśyati*, it is not really according to P. 1.4.50 that poison and thief becomes objects, but by the main *sūtra* itself (P. 1.4.49). In certain circumstances, one may wish to take poison. All one's actions are not the result of careful consideration. A sick man may want to eat what is not good for him through greed. In such cases, *īpsita* would only mean becoming the object of the action of eating and that happens in the case of poison. Similarly, a thief is '*īpsita*' in the same sense. The grass which one treads on while going to the village is also *īpsita* in the same sense. Thus everything can become an object by the main *sūtra*, including such cases as *akṣān dīvyati* = he throws the dice, *rāmam abhikrudhyati* = 'he gets angry with Rama.']

The author now states what happens when a thing becomes the object of two actions in the same sentence,

81. When one and the same thing has the power (of being the object) in regard to two actions, the main one and the secondary one, the power in regard to the secondary action follows that in regard to the main one.

82. Where the power (of being the object) relating to the main action is expressed by the verbal suffix, then the one relating to the secondary action, though not expressed, is understood.

[It has been said before that where the one and the same action has two objects, the verbal suffix expresses the main one and the other is expressed by the case-ending as in *ajā nīyate grāmam* = the goat is taken to the village, when the same object is connected with two actions and the verbal suffix expresses the object in regard to the main action, that in regard to the other need not be expressed. It would be understood without it.]

An example is now given.

83. Where the root 'to cook' (*pac*) takes the suffix *ktvā* in the sense of pure action, the power of being object in regard to it which is not expressed is in the same position as the other one in regard to the root 'to eat' (*bhuj*) which is actually expressed.

[An example of the principle laid down above is: *paktvā odano bhujyate* = the rice is eaten after cooking. Here the suffix *ktvā* has only *bhāva* = 'action' as its meaning according to the M. Bhā. According to the *vārttika ā ca tumunaḥ*, etc. (*vā.* 3. on P. 3.4.26), on the other hand, the suffixes *tumun*, etc. have the same meaning as the verbal suffixes added to the roots used together with *ṇamul* etc. In *svādumkāram bhujyate yayvāgur devadattena* = 'Barley gruel is eaten by Devadatta after making it tasty', the verb *bhujyate* expresses the object; therefore the suffix *ṇamul* in *svādumkāram* also

does the same. That is why there is no second case-affix after *yavāgū*. Similarly in *paktvā odano bhujyate*, the *ktvā* expresses the object because the verb expresses it. The former expresses it in regard to the action of cooking and the latter in regard to the action of eating. As both the aspects of *karma* are thus expressed, there is no need to use the second case-affix after *odana*. According to the M.Bhā. the *ktvā* has the meaning of *bhāva* and not of *karma*.]

Another example of the same is now being given.

84. (In the sentence *iṣyate grāmo gantum* = the village is desired to be reached), because of the connection of the verb *iṣyate* with *gantum*, the verbal suffix which is prescribed to express the power of the village to be the object of *iṣ* also expresses its power to be the object of *gam*.

[Another example of the above principle is the sentence *iṣyate grāmo gantum*. Here the verb expresses the power of being its object which exists in the village (*grāma*). But the village is the object of the root *gam* also in *gantum* and that is also understood from the sentence though there is nothing specific to express it.]

An explanation of the same according to another view is now given.

85. In the sentence 'after cooking, it (the rice) is eaten (*paktvaudano bhujyate*), according to some, the root 'to cook' does not require rice as its object. That (rice is the object) is understood by inference.

[Others explain the sentence *paktvaudano bhujyate* differently. According to them, the rice is not the object of the action of cooking at all. All that the sentence means is: after cooking, the rice is eaten. It does not say that the rice is cooked. In other words, this is not a case of one and

the same thing being the object of two actions openly. Openly it becomes the object of one action only, that of eating. That it is the object of cooking also is understood by inference rather than from the words. The inference is due to the fact that cooking is also mentioned in the same sentence. The inference is possible because the two actions stand in the relation of primary and secondary to each other. That is why the former view is better.]

The author now extends this principle to the other accessories (*kāraka*).

86. (In the sentence: 'after eating, the city is entered = *bhuktvā nagaro 'bhiniviśyate*) that which is the object of the verb *abhiniviś* and is expressed by the verbal suffix is the substratum of the action denoted by the word ending in *ktvā* and yet the use of the locative case-ending to express it is not wanted.

[It is not merely the power of being an object which is sometimes understood though not expressed. Other accessories are also sometimes in the same position. In *bhuktvā nagaro 'bhiniviśyate* = after eating, the city is entered, the verbal suffix expresses the fact of the city being the object (*karmatva*). The fact that the city is the substratum of the action of eating is not openly expressed by anything and yet it is understood. Similarly in *nagare 'bhiniviśya bhunkte* = he eats in the city after entering it, the city is the substratum of the action of eating as expressed by the verbal suffix. By inference it is understood to be the object of the action of entering.]

The author now explains how, in the sentence *guḍam bhakṣayati* = he eats sugar, sugar comes within the definition of an object.

87. The object which is already accomplished and which does not acquire any special feature because of

coming within the range of action is *īpsita* (desired to be attained) inasmuch as it becomes the object of actions like eating.

[How does sugar (*guḍa*) come within the definition of object (*karma*) in the sentence *guḍam bhakṣayati*? As it is already there it cannot be the *nirvartya* kind of object. Eating does not make any difference to it as sugar. As sugar, it is already there. Its mention gives completeness to the action of eating, because unless there is something to eat, eating cannot be done. Sugar becomes *īpsita*, because it attains differentiation according as it becomes the object of the action denoted by this root or that. In this way, it becomes the kind of object called '*prāpya*' (something to be reached). Although sugar is already there, in the sentence under discussion, it is presented as becoming the object of the action of eating and not of any other action. That is the special feature which it acquires here and that is why it is considered to be *prāpyam karma*. Nothing more than this is required for something to become this kind of object. Satisfaction is the result of eating sugar. Sugar is the means in regard to this satisfaction, but it becomes the means only when it becomes the object of the action of eating. Just as the *guru* is the means in regard to the production of merit but can become so only if he is served. Thus it has been shown that in the sentence in question sugar and the action of eating it are both *īpsita*.]

If something which is not in any way affected by an action can still be looked upon as its object, how can the distinction between transitive (*sakarmaka*) and intransitive (*akarmaka*) among roots be maintained? This is now answered.

88. (1) When the root is used in a meaning other than its usual one (2) when the object is included in the meaning of the root (3) or is well known (4) or is not meant to be expressed, the action (denoted by the root) is said to be without an object.

[The distinction between transitive and intransitive roots is not affected. Some actions denoted by roots imply an object as part of the meaning of the root. Other roots denote actions which have an object outside their meaning. The former are intransitive and the latter transitive roots. *āste* which can be analysed as *āsanam karoti* = 'he does sitting,' denotes an action which has an object which is part of the meaning of the root. But *pacati* in *odanam pacati* denotes an action which has an object outside the meaning of the root. That is why the root *pac* = 'to cook' is said to be a transitive root (*sakarmaka*). Sometimes a root is said to be intransitive even if the action which it expresses has an object outside the meaning of the roots. That will be explained later. A root which is ordinarily transitive becomes intransitive when it is used in a meaning other than its ordinary one. For example, in *bhāraṃ vahati* = 'he carries a load', the verb 'carries' is transitive. But when we say *nadī vahati* = the river flows, that meaning is absent and so the root *vah* is now intransitive. 'To flow' means an action which is not presented by the word as affecting something else than the agent. When the meaning of the root itself includes a hidden object, such a root also is intransitive. For example, *jīvati* = he lives. This verb really means *prāṇān dhārayati* = 'he maintains life'. So an object is implied in it and is, therefore, intransitive. Another similar case is that of verbs which invariably bring an agent and an object to the mind even though neither is mentioned. For example, *varṣati* = 'it rains'. Here 'deva' is understood as the agent and water is understood as the object. Such verbs are also intransitive and that is why the suffix 'kta', when added to such roots, denotes the agent. Sometimes the speaker does not want to say anything about the object. Then the verb, though ordinarily transitive, becomes intransitive. We can just say *pacati* in answer to the question *kim karoti*. It is then intransitive.]

It is now stated that, in addition to the four ways mentioned in the previous stanza, there are other ways in which a verb becomes intransitive.

89. The four kinds (of objectless actions) which have been shown in a general way have many variations because of difference in circumstances etc.

[The four ways in which a root becomes intransitive can have many variations because of difference in circumstance, place, time etc. The verb *carati* = 'he goes', is ordinarily transitive, The preposition *ut*, when added to it, makes it intransitive. *Tapati* = 'burns', is transitive, but *uttapate* = 'he shines' is intransitive. In *yāvad bhuktam upatiṣṭhate* = 'he is present whenever it is meal time, the root *sthā* has become intransitive, though with the preposition *upa*, it is usually transitive. In *nadī vahati*, the verb is intransitive because of the nature of the agent, the river. When something becomes *karmakartā*, the root has only half its original meaning and so becomes intransitive: *pacyata odanaḥ svayam eva* = 'the rice cooks by itself'. Similarly when the object is included in the meaning of the root, there are various possibilities. In *jīvati*, due to the nature of the action, an object is included in it. In *putrīyati chātram* = 'he treats his pupil as a son', it is only at the time of grammatical analysis that the son appears as the object and as the standard of comparison and it is included in the meaning of the verb *putrīyati*.]

The topic of 'object' has now come to an end.

The author now takes up the treatment of the accessory called instrument (*karaṇa*).

90. When, after the activity of something the action is meant to be conveyed as accomplished, then that thing is said to be the instrument.

[Many things are accessories to an action, but the speaker usually means to convey that the action is accomplished after the activity of some particular thing. It is then called the instrument (*karaṇa*). It is a question of what the speaker wants to convey. This is a general principle in grammar. Ordinarily, the speaker might say *dātṛeṇa lunāti* = he cuts

with a sickle. Here sickle is the instrument. But sometimes he might say *balena lunāti* = 'he cuts with strength'. Here *bala* (strength) becomes the instrument. Ordinarily, the pot is presented as a receptacle for cooking as in *sthālyāṇ pacati* = 'he cooks in the pot'. But sometimes the speaker might present it as the instrument, as in *sthālyā pacati* = he cooks with the pot. Ordinarily, the eye is presented as the instrument of seeing as in *cakṣuṣā paśyati* = he sees with the eye, but when the speaker says *ālokena paśyati* = 'he sees with light', *āloka* becomes the instrument.]

The same idea is now further explained.

91. In reality, nothing can be indicated as the instrument, nothing is predetermined to be so. Because, one does see speakers wishing to say that the cooking is done with the pot (*sthālyā pacati*).

[What is called instrument is not something having any particular characteristic such as a particular universal. Nothing is predetermined to be the instrument. The pot is known to be the receptacle of cooking, but a speaker may sometimes say that the cooking is done with the pot when he wants to emphasise its particular suitability for the purpose.]

It is now stated that agents pay special attention (*saṁrambha*) to the instrument as it is the most useful accessory.

92. In order to accomplish the main thing (that is, the action) agents improve their instruments again and again and apply them in various ways.

[Those who desire the fruit have to improve their instruments again and again. Sharpening the sickle is a way of improving it. Raising it and lowering it are various ways of applying it. Applying ointment (*añjana*) to the eye is a way of improving it; focussing it is a way of applying it.]

It is now shown how in a sentence like *aśvena pathā dipikayā yāti* = 'he goes on horse-back along the path with a light', several things are presented as rendering maximum service (*upakāraprakarṣa*) at the same time.

93. Among instruments themselves, all belonging to the self-same category (*svakakṣyāsu*) there is no difference in degree. The definition refers to superiority in regard to other (accessories).

[Among instruments themselves, there is no difference of degree. The suffix '*tamap*' in P. 1.4.42. is added to the word *sādhaka* = accessory in general. So instrument is that which is an accessory in the highest degree in comparison with the other accessories and not in regard to other instruments.]

It is now stated why the agent who employs all the other accessories, is not considered to be the best accessory.

94. Even though independent, agents help action only from a distance. The activity of all the other accessories is separated from action by that of the instrument.

[Nor can one look upon the agent himself as the accessory in the highest degree on the ground that all the accessories are employed only after the agent comes on the scene. The action is accomplished immediately after the activity of the instrument and not after that of the agent whose work consists in setting the other accessories in motion. So there is a big interval between the activity of the agent and the accomplishment of the action. But, the action is done immediately after the activity of the instrument. That is why it is the accessory in the highest degree.]

It is now stated that there cannot be any comparison with the agent.

95. It is in regard to the accomplishment of the action that there arises the question of degree. Towards the agent, there is subordination (*nyagbhāva*). The common feature of being an accessory attains degree when it has come into being.

[What is meant here is that in regard to the accomplishment of action, the instrument has a certain superiority. The question whether the agent or the instrument is the accessory in the highest degree should not arise at all. Nothing is an accessory until the agent employs it in order to accomplish the action. In that stage, the question of degree can arise only among the accessories set in motion by the agent and not between them and the agent who is in a different category altogether. The agent is independent (*svatantra*) and the others are independent and dependent (*svatantra-paratantra*).]

It is now explained how sometimes the instrument itself becomes the agent.

96. When the sword etc. are themselves presented as agents, sharpness etc. become the instruments. When sharpness etc. are presented as independent (agents) then they appear in a two-fold capacity.

[The fact is that sometimes the speaker wants to convey the extreme sharpness of the sword and says: the sword cuts (*asiś chinatti*). The fact that the real agent cuts with the sword is not presented here. The sword itself is presented as the agent and its extreme sharpness, weight, hardness and shape are presented as the instruments. The speaker can go further and say: the sharpness cuts (*tailkṣṇyam chinatti*). In this case, one would postulate something else as its instrument, because sharpness has become the agent. The new instrument may not be different from the agent, but words would present it as different.]

If a thing cannot be agent and instrument at the same time, what was the need of the *vārttika*: *karaṇam parāṇi* (vā. 32. on P. 1.4.1.)? This is now explained.

97. In spite of this difference (brought about by the speaker's intention) a thing remains as it is, being the basis of the fictional difference. That is why the fact of being an agent sets aside (the instrument).

[Sometimes there seems to be a conflict between the two capacities in regard to the same thing, in which case, it has been declared in the *vārttika*: *karaṇam parāṇi* (on P. 1.4.1.) that the accessories taught after the instrument in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* would prevail over it. The idea is this. Even though it is true that whether a particular thing is the agent or the instrument of an action is a matter of presentation by the speaker, still a thing cannot lose its own nature. For a speaker to present a thing now as agent and now as instrument is, after all, a kind of fiction. For all that, a thing cannot change its identity. The fiction is, after all, based on the same thing which would become the recipient of two names. Thus a conflict would arise between the two names and the *vārttika* in question is meant to resolve the conflict.]

Nor is it necessary that the instrument should have external existence.

98. Just as instrumentality is understood when a thing is present, in the same way, it is understood when a thing has no existence because the action in question is accomplished.

[Sometimes an action is accomplished by the absence of something. A sword can become an instrument of cutting if it is available. But in the sentence: *dhanābhāvena muktaḥ* = 'freed because of the absence of money, it is the absence of money which is the instrument.]

It is now shown that this is confirmed by the *sūtra* of Pāṇini.

99. 'Little' etc. attain the status of instrument when only little is forthcoming or when what is not forthcoming is only little, so it has been declared.

The sentence *stokān muktaḥ* = 'freed because it (the debt) is small' is an illustration of P. 2.3.33. Here the word '*stoka*' (small) does not express '*sattva*'. In the sentence in question, it is the instrument of the action of liberation. The debtor has paid a little of what he owes but cannot produce the little more that he owes. So he has been freed. The interpretation may be that only a little of what he owes remains unpaid and so he has been freed. Similarly, when we say *ekāṇna viṃśatiḥ* 'not twenty by one', we mean that the negation of twenty is due to the absence of one which thus becomes the instrument.]

It is now stated that, as the notion of means depends upon the speaker's intention, whatever is intended by the speaker to be the means in the highest degree becomes the instrument.

100. Action differs according as things and their properties are looked upon as identical or different from one another, just as it differs according to the different ways in which the starting point is looked at.

[Thus what is called instrument is a matter of the speaker's intention. He can look upon things and their properties as identical with one another or different from one another. The instrument will vary accordingly. When he says: *devadattaḥ kāṣṭhair odanaṃ pacati* = 'devadatta cooks rice with wood-fuel', the fire is the fuel which does it. Here wood-fuel and the fire have been identified. When he says: *edhāḥ pakṣyanti tejasā* = 'the wood-fuel will cook with its fire', fire is the instrument because it is now presented as something different from fuel. When the speaker goes further and says: *tejaḥ pacaty auṣṇyena* = 'fire cooks with its heat, fire and heat

are looked upon as different. All this is similar to what happens with actions which differ according to difference in starting-points. The following sentences illustrate this principle: *grāmād āgacchati*, *grāmasya samīpād āgacchati*. In the first sentence, the word *grāma* has an inclusive denotation and in the second, it has a more restricted denotation.]

Here ends the treatment of instrument. The agent is now going to be dealt with.

101-102. The independence of the agent is accepted for the following reasons: (1) because the agent acquires his capacity before (the operation of the other accessories) and from some other source (2) because he keeps the others subordinate (to himself) (3) because the others act according to his direction (4) because the agent can hold back the others already engaged (5) because no substitute for him is seen (6) because he is present even when the others are not, even though he helps in the accomplishment of the action from a distance.

[The agent has been defined as *svatantra* (independent) in relation to the other accessories. It is the agent who employs the accessories and not vice-versa. It is like this. The agent desires the fruit of the action and sets about collecting the accessories. So he is free or independent from the very beginning. The other accessories are also relatively free in regard to their role but only after the agent enters the scene. In any case they are under the control of the agent. He can restrain any accessory who goes too far. There is always an agent, whether the other accessories are there or not. If there is no agent, there can be no substitute for him or rather if anybody else does the action, he would not be called a substitute as he can do the action on his own, being independent. But if any of the other accessories is not available, they can be replaced.]

It cannot be objected that an inanimate object cannot have these properties and, therefore, cannot become an agent.

103. By means of the properties mentioned above it is the thing which is conveyed by the word that is characterised and not the real thing. When the speaker wishes to convey the properties of the agent, the latter is understood from the words.

[The properties of the agent mentioned above may or may not actually exist in the thing which is the agent in a sentence. But it would be the agent if the words present it as having these properties. In other words, that thing becomes the agent which the speaker presents as having these properties. Therefore, whether a thing is sentient or not, it is the agent really and not merely figuratively, if the words present it as having these properties.]

If independence is a matter of the speaker's intention, the following results.

104. When, on the basis of different fancies (*bud-dhyavasthābhīḥ*) difference is imagined (in one and the same thing) the qualities of being an object or instrument or agent are brought about.

[If whether a thing is independent or not, is a matter of how the speaker presents it, one can easily understand how one and the same thing can be an agent, an object and an instrument, as in the sentence: *hantī ātmānam ātmanā* = 'he kills himself.' It is only because of the speaker's intention that *ātmā* can become the object (*karma*) and the instrument (*karaṇa*), not in reality. Fictitious difference based entirely on the speaker's fancies, is the basis of such expressions.]

It is now shown that when the fact of being the agent is a matter of presentation by words, other things also become clear.

105. Before it is produced, there is no existence. On the basis of the special intention of the speaker, it becomes, without difference from any other existing thing, the agent of the act of being born.

[Once it is grasped that what is called agent is a matter of presentation by words, other things can also be understood. In the sentence *aṅkuro jāyate* = 'the sprout is born', the sprout which is born either exists or does not exist. If it already exists, why should it be born? If it does not exist how can it be the agent of the act of being born? Such doubts arise if the idea of agent is not a matter of presentation by words, but something having outside reality. An answer to such doubts was given on the basis of *upacārasattā* in the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*. But to say that things denoted by words have *upacārasattā* does not mean that they are figurative meanings of words. That is a different conception altogether. In the expression under discussion, due to the speaker's intention, the idea of sprout comes to the mind. By coming to the mind, it acquires a kind of *sattā* (being). The sprout is now *sat*. So the word *aṅkura* is used. When the word *jāyate* is added, what happens is that the sentence so formed says: the sprout which has already acquired *sattā* and so the capacity of being the agent of the act of being born, is actually born, that is, it is actually born in the external sense also. Thus, there is a difference between the being and the fact of being the agent of the sprout; but this is a difference which exists only in the realm of words (*śābdī*) and not in reality. Thus there is no *upacāra* here, even though there is *upacārasattā*.]

106. Or when the cause appears as the effect, it receives the name of the effect and is said to be born as the effect.

[The expression: the sprout is born (*aṅkuro jāyate*) can be explained even without reference to the world of words,

but with reference to the world of reality. In the previous stanzas, the expression was sought to be explained from the point of view of the effect. It was then necessary to refer to what happens in the mind. But it can be explained from the point of view of the cause. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, the cause transforms itself into the effect. So *aṅkuro jāyate* would mean: the cause (the seed), being existent, is the agent of the act of being born, i.e. of attaining the next transformation.]

It is now stated that, from the point of view of the grammarian also, it is the cause which becomes the effect.

107. Like the curling-up of a snake or the closing up of the fingers (into a fist) so does the fact of being born belong to existing things.

[What is called being born is nothing more than the same thing appearing in a different form, just as a snake becomes curled up or the fingers become closed in the shape of a fist. The curled-up snake is not different from the uncurled one nor the closed fingers different from the extended ones. The relation of cause and effect is nothing more than different states of the same thing. The same thing persists in all the states.]

It is now stated that even according to the view that the effect is different from the cause, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* can be explained as an external reality.

108. It is the universal which appears as the particular when the effect which is different from the causes emerges out of them.

[The effect which is different from the cause does not exist as such before its production but it exists in its universal form. It is this universal which, for its own manifestation, sets in motion the accessories. So it is the universal

which already exists that is born as the particular. Thus, as the universal it is the agent and as the particular it is born.]

The author now reaffirms his view that what is called the object (the meaning) is what the word conveys.

109. Both cognition and the word are based on forms existing (in the mind). One does not say: 'it does not exist' without a basis and the non-existent does not really differ from the existent.

[In this stanza, the view that the object (*artha*) is what the word conveys is emphasised. Both cognition and the word are based on whatever form is understood. In the expression '*nāsti*' both the cognition and the word are based on some form or other. Thus they are not different from cognition and the word is based on what exists. In both cases, there is some form or other. There is, really speaking, no difference between *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Whether the thing in question exists outside or not is irrelevant. Thus whether the sprout has an external existence or not, the expression *aṅkura jāyate* is alright because there is some form which figures in the mind.]

110. Cognition and the word relate to objects as experienced. There cannot be any usage of them through any other essence (*tattva*).

Remarks. The text should be *yathābhūteṣu* and not *yathā bhūteṣu*.

[In worldly usage, apart from coming within the range of cognition and the world, objects have no external existence. What is called usage is nothing more than cognition and expression; no cognition exists in which an object does not figure and what figures in it acquires existence and can become the agent of action. In the expression *nāsti*, the external existence of a thing at a particular time and place is denied but it still figures in the mind in a certain form and that is

the agent conveyed by the suffix. Similarly, in the expression *aṅkuro jāyate*, even though the sprout has no external existence, it figures in the mind and as such, it becomes the agent of the action of being born.]

The author now explains the impossibility of birth and destruction according to Monism.

111. Like division of *ākāśa* and movement of shadow, birth and destruction of the One Reality are only fictions of some.

[*Ākāśa* has no division, but divisions are attributed to it on the basis of the objects with which it comes in contact. Shadow is the absence of light and so it has no motion, but motion is attributed to it on the basis of the movement of the object which shuts off the light and causes the shadow. There is no such thing as *abhāva*. There is neither birth nor destruction.]

It is now shown that destruction is only a fiction.

112. Just as the (unreal) absence of *ākāśa* is imagined on the basis of the presence of limited objects, in the same way, the absence of limited bodies is also imagined on the basis of the presence of *ākāśa*.

[What is called destruction is really a fiction. *Ākāśa* is all-pervasive. There is no place where it is not. And yet one creates the fiction that where the limited objects are there is no *ākāśa*. Similarly, there is no such thing as the total destruction of even limited objects like a jar. And yet when they are not visible one understands that there is *ākāśa* where the objects were. When the objects are manifested, one looks upon them as being born. Thus both being born and being destroyed are fictions. Things are neither born nor destroyed. What is called *ākāśa* is not the absence of things. If there is no absence of things, there cannot be birth either, because things are always there.]

Even if birth is real, the expression 'it is born' can be explained.

113. Just as the main action is called by the name of the preliminary acts leading to it, on the basis of their identification, so is the case with the cause and the effect.

[In stanza 106, the expression 'it is born' was explained on the basis of the real identity of cause and effect, according to the *Satkāryavādins*. Now it is being explained on the basis of secondary identity. The root 'pac' means 'to become soft', as rice does when it is cooked. But Devadatta is supposed to cook, not because he becomes soft but because he does actions like putting the vessel on the fire, etc. which are for the purpose of ultimately making the rice soft. In other words, the result and what leads to it are identified. The cause leads to the effect, it is meant for the effect. So the two can be identified, of course, only secondarily. That is what, we do when we say: 'the sprout is born'. The sprout is the effect but its cause the seed, is secondarily identified with it.]

114. When a doubt arises as to whether it is the modification or the original material which is the agent of the act of being born students hold different views on the basis of different indications.

[The cause is what already exists and the effect is what comes to be. So the effect should really be the agent of the act of being born. But when the relation between cause and effect is that of material and its modification, both the cause and the effect can in turn be the agent of the act of being born. There are expressions like *kṣīraṃ dadhi sam-padyate* = milk becomes curds. Here a doubt arises. Is the material 'the main thing (*pradhāna*) or the modification thereof? The main thing is the agent of the act of becoming and the secondary thing is so through the main thing. So

the two are in apposition to each other (*sāmānādhikaranyam*) in the sentence. If the two are presented as quite distinct, the modification becomes the agent of the act of being born as in the sentence: *bījād aṅkuro jāyate*—‘the sprout is born of the seed’, because the material is presented as the starting-point. Those who say that the modification is the agent of the act of being born mean this: being born means attaining one’s own self. That which was not already existent attains its own self. So it is the modification which attains its self. Those who think that the material is the agent of the act of being born say that a modification which does not yet exist cannot look forward to attaining its own self. So it cannot be the agent of the act of being born. What is called being born is the fact of looking forward to being born. As the material is already there, it can look forward to attaining the next stage, the modification. So it is the material which is the agent of the act of being born.]

The author now indicates the respective scope of the two points of view.

115. According to the *vārttika*—*klpi sampadyamāne* (vā. 2. on P. 2.3.13.) the fourth-case affix comes after the word expressive of modification. The (dual) number is based on *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) when the material is a lump of gold.

[According to the *vārttika*—*klpi sampadyamane*, the fourth case-affix comes after the word expressive of modification, as in the sentence: *mūtrāya sampadyate yavāgūḥ*. The modification is the agent of the act of becoming (*sampattikriyā*) because the sentence really means: *yavāguḥ mūtram sampadyate*. Here the material is connected with action through the modification. Where the two are conceived of as quite distinct, one would say: *yavāgvā mūtram jāyate*. Here the material is presented as the source or the starting point (*apādāna*) and so there is the fifth case-affix. Where the two are not thought of as quite distinct, there is the fourth

case-affix. That is the difference in the scope. In the expression: *suvarṇapīṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ*, it is the modification (ear-rings) which is the agent of the act of becoming, as shown by the dual number is *bhavataḥ*.]

Difference of scope is now explained in another way.

116. In the sentence, it is the word 'saṅgha' which is the agent of the action denoted by the suffix 'cvi' but in a complex formation (*vṛtti*) it is the word *brāhmaṇaḥ* which is the agent.

[The expression 'saṅghābhavanti brāhmaṇāḥ' is an illustration of P. 5.4.50. To explain it in a sentence, one would say: *asaṅgho brāhmaṇāḥ saṅgho bhavati*. In the former sentence, the verb is in the plural, showing that *brāhmaṇāḥ* is the agent of the action of becoming *saṅgha* (group, association), that is, the material is the agent. In the explanatory sentence, it is the modification, the *saṅgha*, which is the agent.]

Here is an indication pointed out by the author of the M.Bhā. that the original material can become the agent.

117. In the sentence *atvaṃ tvam sampadyate tvadbhavati*, the person of the verb *tvadbhavati* is not according to the modification *tvam* which is the agent but it is according to the original, that is, *atvam*.

[In *atvaṃ tvam sampadyate tvadbhavati*, it is the modification *tvam* which is the agent and so the verb should really be *bhavasi* and yet it is *bhavati*. In other words, it is according to the original (*prakṛti*) *atvam*.]

The difference in scope and the consequent difference in usage are now explained.

118. What is being born is something which does not give up the previous condition (cause) and is about

to attain the next condition (effect) and is thus something which is a combination of both.

[How to explain this difference in scope and the consequent difference in usage? The fact is that the thing which is born is not something which was totally non-existent. Even while being born, it does not completely abandon the previous condition of being the cause. Thus that state is also the agent. But it is not inactive in that condition. It is about to enter into the next condition. So the next condition is also the agent. Thus what is born has one foot in the previous condition and the other foot in the next condition. It extends from one condition to the other (*pratāyamānarūpam*) and is, therefore, in agreement with the meanings of both the root and the suffix.]

The objection that both would then be always agents is answered as follows;—

119. One of them is more active and the attribute is just understood in the other case. Even though the powers of things are different, they are sometimes combined.

[As the material and the modification are identical, both can be the agents of the act of being born. Sometimes the material is active and sometimes the modification. But it has been shown that sometimes they have different scopes. Both are agents but one of them is presented as being more active and the other less so.]

Why one does not say '*atvaṃ tvaṃ sampadyase tvaūbhavasi*' is now explained.

120. If the person is interchanged, it would convey the opposite meaning, because the accessory would be understood as active (and another modification would have to be postulated as having the fruit).

[We do not say '*atvaṃ tvam sampadyase tvadbhavasi*', because the meaning intended to be conveyed, namely that '*atvam*' is the material and '*tvam*' is the modification would not be understood. Instead, one would understand that '*tva*' is the active material and one would think of some other modification of it.]

This point is now explained.

121. Here, as in the case of a king becoming a servant, one would have to imagine something like: You are becoming something else.

[It would be like the following example. In the sentence '*rājan arājā sampadyase* = 'O king! you are becoming a non-king' it is king who becomes non-king. The king is, therefore, the *prakṛti*, (the original material) and is in apposition to *tvam* which is understood from the verb. The king in the sentence is active and is the agent of the act of becoming non-king. Similarly, if the sentence were '*tvadbhavasi*' *tvam* would become the agent of the act of attaining another state and so the meaning intended would not be conveyed. In order that it may be conveyed, the verb has been put in the first person. The sentence should not mean something different from what is intended. In '*suvarṇapiṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ*' = 'the lump of gold becomes two gold ear-rings', even when one understands that it is the two ear-rings which are the agents of the act of becoming because of the dual suffix in *bhavataḥ* nobody understands the opposite of what is intended. Nobody understands that the ear-rings become gold. Gold cannot be the agent of the action denoted by the root '*bhū*' except through its modification.]

If one who is independent (*svatantra*) is the agent, how can he remain so when he is made to do something by somebody else? This is now explained —

122-123. The agent who is prompted by another is not different from the other independent agents about

whom there is no doubt because (1) he has been chosen as the agent for his capacity to accomplish the action, (2) he engages the other accessories to do the action which they can accomplish, (3) he is prompted by another and so becomes subordinate just because of his independence.

[The agent has been said to be independent and independence has been defined in stanzas 101-102. But when A makes B do something, how does B become the agent? He has no independence. The answer is that B does not lose his independence merely because A makes him do something. A would not make him do it unless A knew his capacity. This capacity makes him retain his independence. Just because of this capacity-independence, he comes under somebody else's orders. Thus there is no contradiction between his independence and his dependence. The one who is ordered retains his independence in the matter of engaging the other accessories of the action in a suitable manner. There he is not under anybody else's order. In this way, he is not different from a person who acts spontaneously.]

124. For some reason or other everybody acts for his own benefit. Following the wish of another is also in order to fulfil one's own purpose.

[It is also possible to hold that nobody loses his independence merely because of his being prompted by another. Everybody acts for his own benefit: the servant who works for his master and the sage who is free from all desires and works for others ultimately act to fulfil their own purposes. In such expressions as *bhikṣā vāsayati* = 'alms make one live (in a particular place), the *bhikṣā* is treated as a sentient thing and an intention is attributed to it.]

The topic of 'agent' has now come to an end, and that of 'hetu' who is nothing more than the agent who prompts another, is now going to be dealt with,

125. It is the agent who, by ordering or requesting and doing things favourable to an action, acquires the name of prompter which is taught in the *śāstra*.

[The agent who prompts another is called *hetu* according to P. 1.4.55. Prompting an inferior to act by giving an order is what is called *preṣaṇa*. Prompting a superior is called *adhyeṣaṇa*. Prompting somebody to act can be attributed even to insentient things like 'alms'. *Hetu*, the prompter must be distinguished from what is called *hetu* in the world. In the world, whatever brings about a substance or a thing or a quality is called *hetu* as in the expressions: *dhanena yaśaḥ* = glory through wealth, *pākena raktaḥ* = red through heat. The word *hetu* is used in the *śāstra*, now in the sense of prompter which is a technical meaning and now in the sense of cause, which is the worldly meaning. In P. 3.1.26; and 7.3.40, the word is used in a technical sense but in P. 2.3.23; 3.2.126; 3.2.20 and in 3.3.156, it is used in the worldly sense.]

The idea is further explained.

126. The imperative (*lot*) is used after roots like *prcch* when the bare object is prompted. When the already active object is prompted, it comes within the scope of the use of the causative affix (*ṇic*).

[The imperative (*lot*) is used when some one who is not yet an agent is sought to be made an agent, as in *kaṭam kuru*. The causative (*ṇic*) is used when someone who is already an agent is sought to be kept in that position, when it is desired that he should not cease to be an agent.]

It is now shown why the one who is prompted is called the agent (*kartā*) and not (*karma*).

127. The agent who becomes the object of the act of prompting is called by his own characteristic (agent) because he retains his independence in regard to his

own minor action and also because of the restriction of the name (*karma*) (to special cases).

[Here a doubt arises: The one who is prompted is sought to be reached by the prompter and so he is *īnsitatama* and should get the name of *karma* according to P. 1.4.49. and not that of *kartā*. This doubt is removed as follows. It has already been pointed out that the one who is prompted does not lose his independence. So he remains the agent and does not become the object (*karma*). Secondly it is only in the case of certain fixed types of roots that what was the agent in the absence of the causative affix (*ṇic*) becomes the object in the presence of *ṇic*. That is the purpose of the *sūtra* P. 1.4.52.]

As the ultimate result to be achieved also prompts the agent in a way, why is it not called the '*hetu*', the agent-prompter? This is now answered.

128. The object (the result) prompts (*preraka*) the action and the prompter prompts the agent. The action consisting of production (*utpatti*) modification (*saṃskāra*) and reaching (*pratipatti*) is for the sake of the fruit (*karma*).

Remark. The second line of the stanza should be: *Karmārthā hi kriyotpattisaṃskārapratipattibhiḥ.*

[The object cannot be called *hetu* on the ground that it prompts the accomplishment of the action on which its own existence depends. Because, according to the *śāstra*, the *hetu* (prompter-agent) prompts, not the action but the agent. The object (*karma*) is the fruit of the action. So the action is done for the fruit thereof. The action in question may be production, modification or reaching. In any case, if the object prompts anything at all, it is the action and not the agent.]

Here ends the treatment of *Hetu*.

Now begins the treatment of *saṃpradāna*.

129. That factor in the act of giving which is sought to be reached by the thing given is called *sampradāna* when he does not prohibit the giver, or requests him or gives his consent.

[The dative case is now being explained. The word for it in Sanskrit is *sampradāna*. It is one of the factors in the act of giving. Giving means relinquishing one's own ownership over something without taking anything in return. The giver intends to reach somebody with his gift and that person is called *sampradāna*. The one who receives does not decline nor does he prohibit the giver from giving. Sometimes the receiver himself makes a previous request for the gift. When the person who receives gets the name of *sampradāna*, the fourth case-affix (*caturthī*) is affixed to the word expressive of it. This suffix cannot be affixed unless the name *sampradāna* is applicable. It cannot come according to the rule 'tādarthyē caturthī' vācyā (cf. vā. 1 on P. 2.3.13), because there is no *tādarthyā* = the fact of being meant for something, in cases of gift. In *upādhyāyā gāṃ dadāti* = he gives the cow to the teacher, the teacher, being a *kāraka* is meant for the action of giving and not vice-versa.]

The main kind of *sampradāna* has thus been explained. The minor kinds are now explained.

130. In the *sūtras* beginning with *rucyarthānām prīyamāṇaḥ* (P. 1.4.33), it is the *śāstra* which gives the name of Recipient (*sampradāna*) to what would otherwise have been *Hetu*, *Karma* or *Śeṣa*.

[But for P. 1.4.33, there would be no fourth case-affix (*caturthī*) after the word *Devadatta* in a sentence like *Devadattāya rocate modakaḥ*, because *Devadatta* is really *Hetu*. How? *Devadatta* prompts the cake which is becoming the object of desire. So the word *Devadatta* should take whatever case-affix the prompter is supposed to take. But the *sūtra* concerned makes him a *sampradāna* and so the word

gets the fourth case-affix. As Devadatta ceases to be *Hetu*, there is no causative affix (*ñic*) and no prompting. So the cake does the action quite independently as the agent. *Rocate* means 'becomes the object of desire'. Similarly in the other *sūtras* that immediately follow P. 1.4.33 which teach the name *sampradāna*, something which would otherwise have been *Hetu* or *Karma* is given that name and so the word gets the fourth case-affix. The *sūtra*: *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam* (P. 1.4.32) teaches the normal natural *sampradāna* whereas the others give the technical name *sampradāna* merely to explain the fourth case-affix.]

131. When difference is meant to be conveyed, each succeeding action becomes the object (*karma*) of the preceding one and that is why the mention of *kriyā* has not been made.

[When there is a transitive verb one can understand that the agent may intend the actions in question for somebody who thus becomes the recipient (*sampradāna*). Can there be a recipient when the root is *akarmaka* (intransitive)? The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has expressed the view that the action itself can become *karma* in the technical sense and whomsoever that action is meant for becomes *sampradāna* as in the sentences *patye śete*, *yuddhāya sannahyate*. Here the actions of *śayana* (lying down) and *sannahana* (getting ready) are respectively meant for the husband and the battle. So the latter become *sampradāna* and the words expressive of them take the fourth case-affix. They have become *sampradāna* by the main *sūtra* itself (P. 1.4.32) without there being any necessity to introduce the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* as had been suggested. See M.Bhā. on P. 1.4.32 and *Kārikas* 16-17.]

132. When, on the other hand, the different actions are looked upon as a unity, then the object itself is connected with action and is called by its own name (*karma*).

[Here it might be said that if action can also be looked upon as *karma* and what it is meant for becomes *sampradāna*, one would have to say *odanāya pacati*, because the action of cooking is meant for the production of cooked rice which thus becomes the *sampradāna* and takes the fourth case-affix. But this is not the correct position. The action of cooking is not thought of as having parts related as *aṅga* and *aṅgin* to one another or as *kriyā* and *kāraka* to one another. It is thought of as a unity and in relation to that the cooked rice is the *karma* and not *sampradāna*. No action becomes *karma* in the technical sense in this case.]

133. Whether the action is to be conveyed as a whole or as having parts depends on its own nature. Therefore, there is no mistake in respect of the object of roots having the meaning of motion.

[Whether an action is to be thought of as a whole or as having parts depends upon worldly usage. The destination of the act of going can be *karma* or *sampradāna* according as the act of going with its previous mutual stages is thought of as a unity or as having parts. That is why both the second and the fourth case-suffixes are taught with verbs expressive of the act of going as in: *grāmaṃ gacchati* or *grāmāya gacchati*.]

134. If both the names (*karma* and *sampradāna*) were optionally possible everywhere, the approval and rejection of the *sūtra* (P. 2.3.12) would not have the same effect.

[If some principle to regulate when the action is to be thought of as a whole and when it is to be thought of as having parts is not adopted, both the names would be possible everywhere. So some regulating principle is needed. In regard to roots expressive of actions involving movement, there are both possibilities. In cases like *srāddhāya nigalkate*, the

action is always thought of as having parts. In cases like *pacaty odanam*, it is always thought of as a unity. In *manasā pāṭaliputraṃ gacchati* and *adhvānaṃ gacchati*, also, it is always thought of as a unity. Both the second and the fourth case-suffixes are optionally added to a word expressive of an object (*karma*) which has not been reached or contacted (*asam-prāpta*). As one is already in contact with the path along which one walks, the word expressive of it like *adhvan* can only take the second case-affix as in *adhvānaṃ gacchati* = he walks along the path.]

The last point is now explained.

135. In the case of the object (of going) which is said to be contacted (*āsthita*), action has two aspects: abandonment of what has already been reached and contact of what has yet to be reached.

[The action of going along a road consists of two parts: Abandoning the spot which has already been reached and the reaching of the spot which has not yet been covered. It is a continuous process of which the road is the object. The road is not thought of as something for which the action is meant. It is thought of as something to be covered by the action of going. So it does not become the *sampradāna*. But when the idea is that one reaches the right road by going along the wrong one, then the word denoting the right road would take both the second and the fourth case-affixes optionally as in *panthānaṃ gacchati*, *pathe gacchati*.]

Here ends the topic of *Sampradāna*.

Now begins the treatment of *apādāna* = starting point.

136. A starting-point is of three kinds: that in relation to which a movement is mentioned, that in relation to which the verb expresses the movement only partly and that in relation to which some movement is required.

[That which is still firm in a case of separation or departure is called *apādāna* = starting point. When something goes off from a starting-point, the latter is stable and that which goes off has movement. In *grāmād āgacchati* = 'he comes from the village', the movement from the starting point is directly expressed. In *valāhakād vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes from the cloud', 'flashes' does not mean 'shines' only, but 'comes out and shines, that is, the action in relation to which the cloud is the starting point is not mentioned but understood. There is a relation of primary and secondary between what is mentioned and what is understood. In *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhya ādhyatarāḥ* = 'the inhabitants of Mathurā are richer than those of Pāṭaliputra', no action or movement is mentioned. But the word '*pāṭaliputrakebhyaḥ*' has the fifth case-affix and so it denotes the starting-point. But a thing can be a starting point only in relation to a separation or departure which is therefore, required here. One has to supply something mentally.]

It is stated that separation or departure is not mere movement.

137. Just as 'revolving' is indeed a kind of going conditioned by conjunction in a particular direction, in the same way, what is called departure is indeed conditioned by the starting point and it inheres in that which moves.

[What is meant by *apāya*? It is not mere movement. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas* what is called revolving is only movement conditioned by conjunction and disjunction in a particular direction. In the same way what is called *apāya* is a kind of abandonment inhering in something which moves and having something which does not move as the starting point. It is called *apāya* in relation to the starting-point. The starting point thus helps in the accomplishment of this kind of movement and so it becomes the *kāraka* (accessory to action) called *apādāna*.]

It is now explained how even that which moves can be a starting-point.

138. Stability (*dhrauvyam*) is not understood from the *sūtra* as the property of a thing. What is meant is stability in relation to the particular movement called separation.

[What is meant by *dhruva* (stable, firm) is not that it is a permanent property of a thing, but only that it is not affected by the movement of that which departs. In the sentence *dhāvato' śvāt patati* = 'he falls from the running horse', even though the horse is presented as moving, it is not affected by the movement of the one who falls. What is called *apāya* (separation, departure) is accomplished by two things: something which is active and something which is inactive. Here the horse is inactive as far as the falling is concerned. Mere inactivity is not enough, it has to be inactivity in relation to the departure of that which departs. Hence in the sentence: *grāmād āgacchati pathā parvatam* = 'from the village he comes along the road to the mountain', though the road and the mountain are inactive, they are not so in regard to the action of coming and so they are not *apādāna*. The village is stationary in regard to the action of coming and so it is *apādāna*.]

139. In regard to the (horse's) action of trotting, Devadatta (the rider) is stationery; in regard to Devadatta's falling, the horse is stationary. That which is affected by the separation has been declared to be active.

[In regard to the horse's action of trotting, Devadatta (the rider) is inactive; in regard to Devadatta's falling, the horse is inactive. In either case, what is inactive or stationary (*dhruva*) is not affected by departure or separation. Not being affected by the separation is given as the reason for being considered stationary.]

How to distinguish between what is stationary and what is not when both have movement is now explained.

140. Even though both the rams are active in regard to the separation cause by the action of both, the two actions of separation are meant to be different.

[In the sentence: *apasarpato meṣān meṣo 'parsarpati'*, both the rams are presented as active in regard to the separation which takes place. But there are two acts of separation and in regard to each of them, the other ram is inactive (*dhruva*) and so becomes *apādāna*.]

Therefore,

141. In regard to the other ram, each one is the starting point; in regard to its own action, each one is the agent.

What happens when the two rams are not presented as starting-points for each other is now explained.

142. If the same action is presented as accomplished by both, then both become agents of the action of departure (separation) if some other starting-point is mentioned.

[In the sentence *meṣāv apasarpataḥ* both the rams are presented as agents of the action of going away. Both would, however, become agents of the action of departure (*apāya*) if some starting point were mentioned as in *parvatād apasarpataḥ* = 'the two move away (depart) from the hill .]

It is now shown that there cannot be any *apāya* unless there is a starting-point.

143. It is understood that unless there is a starting point, there cannot be any departure (*apāya*). This

has been explained in the *Bhāṣya* in regard to the sentence: *vrkṣasya parṇam patati* = 'the leaf of the tree falls'.

[It is explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.4.23 that a movement cannot be called *apāya* except in relation to a starting point. That is why in the sentence *vrkṣasya parṇam patati* = 'the leaf of the tree falls' the action of falling is not *apāya* because the tree is not presented as the starting-point. In the sentence *vrkṣāt parṇam patati* = the leaf falls from the tree, the falling is *apāya* because the tree is here presented as the starting point.]

How one and the same thing becomes a different *kāraka* is now explained.

144. Difference, identity, separation, resting place — these mutually contradictory properties in regard to the cloud are not desired to be conveyed by the speaker at the same time.

[If, according to the *vārttika*: *apādānam uttarāṇi* (vā. 30 on P. 1.4.1.), the *kāraḥ* taught after *apādāna* supersede it, how do we get expressions like *valāhakād vidyotate*, *valāhake vidyotate* and *valāhako vidyotate* where *valāhaka* is *apādāna* also. The answer is that it is a question of how the speaker wants to present it. Light is one of the constituents of a cloud. If the speaker wants to present it as different from the cloud, as something coming out of the cloud which is the starting point, then the fifth case-affix would come after the word *valāhaka*. But it is open to the speaker to present the cloud not as the starting point but as the resting point and say *valāhake vidyotate* = 'it flashes in the cloud'. It is also open to the speaker to present the light as identical with the cloud and say *valāhako vidyotate* = 'the cloud flashes'. These expressions are used only in turn, according to the speaker's intention. So they do not go against the *vārttika* in question.]

It is now going to be shown that the *vārttika* in question applies when both the powers are meant to be conveyed at the same time.

145. In the expression *dhanuṣā vidhyati* = 'he hits with the bow', unless the idea of the arrow going off the bow is meant to be conveyed, the bow cannot be the instrument of the act of shooting. Therefore both the ideas apply at the same time.

[In *dhanuṣā vidhyati*, the name *karāṇa* supersedes that of *apādāna*. Nobody can shoot with a bow unless the bow is at the same time the starting point of the arrow. Or rather, the speaker has to mean that it is the starting point. Thus both the names *karāṇa* and *apādāna* are applicable but, according to the *vārttika*: *apādānam uttarāṇi*, the later name *karāṇa* supersedes the former name *apādāna* and the third case-affix comes after the word *dhanus* and not the fifth. Really speaking, there is no difficulty about two names being applicable at the same time to the same thing, but two suffixes cannot come after the same word at the same time. So one name has to be kept in abeyance.]

It is now stated that the two powers can be looked upon as one.

146. Or rather the power is really one, having two forms which are occasions for the application of two names. The earlier one is superseded by the later one.

[In the previous stanza, it was assumed that the same thing (the bow) had two distinct powers: that of being the starting point and that of being the instrument and that, in the act of shooting, both the powers play a part and so both the names become applicable. With the two names would come two suffixes after the same word which is impossible. So the later name was said to supersede the former and so only one

suffix comes after the word. The difficulty can be solved in another way also; that is, by looking upon the two powers as one, the power of being the starting point being merged in that of being the instrument. In fact, the bow can be the instrument only because it is the starting point for the arrow to go off. The power is one and it does two actions related to each other as primary and secondary: the going-off of the arrow is secondary to the act of hitting.]

147. (The name *apādāna* = starting point) taught in connection with selection (*nirdhāraṇe*), separation (*vibhakte*) and with roots expressive of the ideas of fear, protection etc. (*bhītrādīnām*), is either that in relation to which a movement of separation is mentioned (*upātta*) or that in relation to which some movement is required (*apekṣita*) and it has been done only to help the ignorant.

[The fifth case-affix is taught in P. 2.3.41 and 42 and the name *apādāna* is taught in P. 1.4.25 and 26 and in Vā. 1. on P. 1.4.24. Really speaking, these *sūtras* and the *vārttika* are unnecessary. Without them, the name *apādāna* and consequently, the fifth case-affix would result from the main *sūtra*, namely, P. 1.4.24. In all these cases, there is mental contact followed by mental separation, which is the essence of *apāya*. In some cases, the movement of separation is mentioned, while in some other cases, it is required. In all cases, there is separation of some kind.]

Here ends the treatment of *apādāna*.

Now begins the treatment of *adhikarāṇa* (abode, location).

148. That which helps in the accomplishment of the action by holding it indirectly through the agent or the object is called *adhikarāṇa* (abode) in the Science of Grammar.

[In the world, a thing can be called *adhikaraṇa* (abode, location) in relation to an action, a quality or a substance. In grammar, a thing is so called when it helps in the accomplishment of the action by doing the service called *dhāraṇa* = holding. Action is directly connected with the agent or the object. That which holds these two is called *adhikaraṇa*. In other words, it helps in the accomplishment of the action only indirectly, through the agent or the object. By holding the agent or the object, as in *kaṭe āste* = he sits on the mat, *sthālyāṃ pacati* = he cooks in the pot, a thing is called abode (*adhikaraṇa*).]

149. Contact (*upaśleṣa*) is the same whether the abode be sesame (*tila*), space (*ākāśa*) or mat (*kaṭa*) etc. But the service rendered differs according as the objects are in contact through *saṃyoga* (conjunction) or through *samavāya* (inherence).

[The relation between an abode (*ādhāra*) and what is on it (*ādheya*) is contact (*upaśleṣa*). It is the same in all the three kinds of abodes. Where there is conjunction (*saṃyoga*), the contact is not at all points, as in *kaṭe āste* = he sits on the mat. The sitter is not in contact with the mat at all points. Where there is inherence (*samavāya*), the contact is at all points, as in *tilaṣu tailam* = 'oil in the sesame seeds'. In *khe śakunayaḥ* = 'birds in the sky' and *gurau vasati* = 'he lives with the guru, the abode is said to be *vaiṣayika*. *Ākāśa* has no real parts but only fictional ones. To say that the disciple lives with the *guru* means that he depends upon him. It is in that sense that the *guru* is the abode, The contact between the two is mental.]

What the services are is now explained.

150. Non-destruction, independence in supporting the weight, connection with particular regions, such are the causes of difference.

[The sesame seed renders service to the oil by not itself perishing, a couch renders service by supporting the weight of the person who lies on it, the sky prevents birds from falling (from coming into contact with the lower region). To say that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west expresses the connection of the sun with these two regions.]

What the final abode of all is, is now stated.

151. According to some, it is *ākāśa* (space) which, by postulating regional differences, becomes the support of all things which come into contact with others.

[If all material things have an abode or a support, the latter, being itself material, must have a support. And what is that? It is *ākāśa*. Stars and planets have *ākāśa* as their support. Somethings have earth as their support but earth itself has *ākāśa* as its support. Parts are the support of the whole. In the last resort, atoms are the support of divisible things but *ākāśa* is the support of atoms.]

Some question the very existence of *ākāśa* and so the proof of its existence, known in the world, is now being given.

152. The expression: 'this thing is here' in regard to objects would not be possible on the basis of non-existence. Therefore, it has been declared to be based on *ākāśa*.

[The existence of *ākāśa* is based on the principle that, for the grammarians, what the word conveys is the object. There are expressions like this: *idaṃ nakṣatram atra tiṣṭhati* = this star is here. The word *atra* 'here' must point to something and not to nothing. Whatever it points to is *ākāśa*. We use expressions after perceiving or cognising something. In verbal usage that which has been cognised is what exists. That is why even non-existence (*abhāva*)

becomes a support in expressions like *śātror abhāve sukham* = 'in the absence of the enemy, there is happiness.']

While *ākāśa* is the support of all finished (*siddha*) things, it is now declared that Time is the support of all unfinished things or processes (*sādhya*).

153. It is through Time that actions are divided and it 'is through space that all objects are divided. So much is the differentiation based on Unity.

[Time is responsible for the birth, existence and decay of things. Time is the support of these three processes. Space distinguishes object from one another by allotting to them particular regions. The universe consists of differentiated objects and actions and this differentiation is based upon the unity of Time and Space, which in their turn, being powers of Brahman, are based upon its absolute Unity.]

Under P. 1.4.48, Katyayana says that the 'abode' in relation to the action denoted by the root '*vas*' with the preposition '*upa*' namely 'to fast' cannot become *karma*, as it does when the action is merely to 'reside'. Patañjali points out that this prohibition is unnecessary. It would not have become *karma* in any case. Taking the example *grāme upavasati*, 'he fasts in the village', Patanjali points that the village is the abode, not in relation to the action of fasting, but in relation to the action of residing or staying which is understood here. The sentence means: *grāme 'sau vasan-strirātram upavasati* = 'while staying in the village, he fasts for three nights' (*M.Bhā.* I, p. 332, l. 8). Fasting is always for a definite period the word expressive of which automatically becomes the *karma*. The word expressive of residing is not mentioned but the action is understood and it is in relation to that that the village is the 'abode' (*adikaraṇa*) and takes the seventh case-affix.

What happens when a particular abode is also meant to be conveyed is now stated.

154. Even when fasting takes place in a particular place it still depends upon a period of time, because of the natural power of words.

[Even when a particular place is meant to be associated with the fasting as in the sentence, '*tīrthe upavasati*' = 'he fasts in the holy place', the connection of fasting with the holy place is only indirect. A person has to stay somewhere before fasting. Though in the sentence in question, there is no word expressive of staying it is understood and it is in relation to that that '*tīrtha*' is the abode.]

It is now stated that time, though not mentioned in the sentence under discussion, becomes the *karma*, because of the nature of the act of fasting which is the main thing in the sentence.

155. Though the act of staying is not mentioned, the place is the abode and though a word like 'three nights' is not mentioned, it is declared to be object of the act of fasting.

[The village is unfit to be connected with the act of fasting and so it becomes the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) of the act of staying which is understood even though not mentioned. The means is capable of bringing to the mind the action of which it is the means, even though it is not mentioned. It comes to the mind as the *karma* of the act of fasting. The act of staying is secondary compared to the act of fasting. As the scope of the name *karma* has already been fulfilled it does not affect the name 'abode' of the village in relation to the act of staying. When the root *vas* with the preposition *upa* means a particular kind of staying, then the village can become its *karma* as in *grāmam upavasati* = he dwells in the village.]

Here ends the treatment of 'abode' (*adhikaraṇa*). The meaning of the sixth case-affix is now going to be consider-

ed. How it is an accessory and how it is *śeṣa* (the rest) will be explained.

156. That relation which is different from those called 'accessories' and is preceded by the relation of action and accessory whether the action is mentioned or not, is now explained.

[The relation which is different from, that is, which remains after the six relations beginning with *karma*, is called *śeṣa*=the rest. The *Bhāṣyakāra* has said that when any of the six relations is not meant as such, it become *śeṣa* (*M.Bhā.* I, p. 463, l. 13). By saying that it involves a previous relation of action and accessory, it has been made a kind of accessory. The relation of master and servant in the expression *rājñah puruṣah* = 'the King's man', implies a previous relation of action and accessory, or rather of donor and recipient between the two and that is how this relation also becomes a kind of accessory (*kāraka*). The previous relation of donor and recipient is the cause and the later relation of master and servant is the result. When the previous particular relation is not meant to be conveyed, a very general relation is all that remains and that is what is called *śeṣa*. In this example, no action is mentioned. In *mātuḥ smarati* = 'he remembers his mother', the fact of mother being the object of remembrance is not meant and so the relationship comes under *śeṣa*. That is why there is the sixth case-affix in *mātuḥ* and not the second case-affix. Here, an action is mentioned.]

Why the sixth case-affix is not added to the word '*puruṣa*' also is now explained.

157. Even though it (the *śeṣa* relation) rests on both it brings about a distinction in what are secondary because of their being subordinate to something else. Being expressed there (that is, in what are secondary), it touches what is primary also.

[The relation (of master and servant, in this case) is one though it rests on both and so it is right that the sixth case-affix should be used only on one of the terms. If it were used on both, the relation would be understood twice. If it is to be used only once, it is natural that it should be joined to the word expressive of what is secondary and not to the one expressive of what is primary. What is secondary follows what is primary. The relation brings about a distinction in what is secondary and so it causes a change in the form of the word expressive of it. What is primary retains its original form and comes within the relation. Whatever peculiarity it gets (that is, the fact of belonging to somebody) is due to the sentence and so it cannot affect its form. Hence the sixth case-affix is not added to it.]

From the relation which is the result, one can infer in a general manner that it must have been preceded by the relation of action and accessory. But how to understand which particular action and accessory ?

158. The particular (action which is the) cause of the relation is not understood from the words. The post-positions (*karmapravacanīyas*) relate it to a particular (action).

[In some expressions denoting relation but not mentioning any action, the latter can be understood from the nature of the things related, as in *pituh putraḥ* = 'the father's son', But from the expression *rājñah puruṣaḥ* = 'the king's man' it is not easy to understand the particular action which has brought about the relation of master and servant. When there is *karma-pravacaniya*, the particular action which brought about the relation can be understood. For example, in the sentence *śākalyasya saṁhitām anu prāvarṣat* = 'it rained after the recitation of *Samhitā* by *Sākalya*', there is the relation of cause and effect between the recitation and rain and this relation is due to the action of hearing. The post-position '*anu*' tells us that it is due to this action because this postposition is seen elsewhere associated with the action of hearing as in '*anu*:-

niśāmya. 'Anu' cannot suggest a verb here in the same way as *vi* suggests the verb *vimāya* in *prādeśam viparilikhati*. Here the word *prādeśam* has a case-ending belonging to a *kāraka* and so *vi* can bring a verb expressive of action to the mind. But in *śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat*, the case-ending is not expressive of *kāraka*, but of *śeṣa*. Nor can *anu* directly express the relation of cause and effect, because that is done by the second case-affix which takes the place of the sixth case-affix. The real function of *anu* is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action of hearing.]

Why are P. 2.3.51 and the following *sūtras* given considering that the sixth case-affix can come in all the cases mentioned in these *sūtras* by P. 2.3.50?

159. The sixth case affix is taught when the relation comes under 'the rest' and is qualified by one of the means and when the action is actually mentioned in order to prevent the formation of a compound word.

[In P. 2.3.50 'the rest' is given as the present state of what was a means like *karma* before. That becomes, therefore an adjective qualifying 'the rest'. Even though the sixth case-affix can come by P. 2.3.50, some cases are separately mentioned in P. 2.3.51: in order that the sixth case-affix may actually be used and not elided. In other words, the purpose is to prevent the formation of a compound word where the sixth case-affix would naturally be elided.]

160. The sixth case-affix which is taught in P. 2.3.65 is prohibited when the *kṛt* suffix is *kṛta* according to P. 2.3.69. As the sixth case-affix is because of the relation coming under 'the rest' the formation of the compound is not allowed.

[A word ending in the sixth case-affix according to P. 2.3.65 can enter into a compound with another word connected in

meaning as in 'dharmānusmaraṇam, arthānusmaraṇam and so on. In *mātuḥ smṛtam*, the sixth case-affix comes because the relation is *śeṣa*. It cannot be looked upon as *kāraka-śaṣṭhī*, because it is prohibited by P. 2.3.69. That is why the two words cannot be joined to form a compound word.]

It is now stated that the same thing can be primary and secondary in regard to two different things.

161. When something already characterised by one thing becomes related to still another, it partakes of two properties in different spheres.

[In the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣasya kambalaḥ* = 'the blanket of the king's man', *rājñāḥ* qualifies *puruṣa* which is, therefore, primary in regard to it. It qualifies *kambala* and therefore becomes secondary in regard to it. Thus one and the same thing can be primary and secondary in regard to two different things.]

162. After having attained importance in regard to what is secondary to itself it becomes secondary in regard to something else which is primary, when the word 'saha' is used. When something is connected with its own property, its previous importance in regard to what is secondary to itself is not affected.

The *puruṣa* became first the primary in regard to *rājñāḥ* which expresses that which qualifies it. When next *puruṣa* becomes something which qualifies and, is, therefore, secondary to *kambala*, it does not cease to be primary in regard to *rājñāḥ* because the two spheres are quite different. It is in regard to the same object that a thing cannot be primary and secondary at the same time. The case considered is like the following one: in *devadattasya putraḥ*, *putra* is primary in regard to *devadatta*, but in *putreṇa sahāgataḥ* = 'he comes with the son', the word 'saha' shows that *putra* is secondary in regard to the action of coming according to P. 2.3.19.]

Here ends the treatment of śeṣa (the rest).

The six accessories described in the preceding pages can be expressed by verbal suffixes, those of the primary and secondary derivations and by compounds. When not expressed by any one of these four the case affixes are used to express them. When they are already expressed by one of these four, the first case affix is used after the stem, because a bare stem cannot be used. When a noun is used without any other word following it, the first case affix is used as in *vrkṣaḥ*. Here there is the fiction that the verb 'asti' though absent, is understood and as the verbal suffix in it is expressive of the agent, and as the word *vrkṣa* is in apposition to it, the latter takes the first case affix, according to the principle *tīṣamānādihikaraṇe prathamā*. A noun in apposition to another ending in the first case affix also takes it.

The first case affix has been prescribed while addressing somebody (*sambodhana*). The vocative case is now going to be explained.

163. Merely turning the attention of somebody already there towards oneself has been declared to be the nature of the vocative case (*sambodhana*). It is, indeed, one whose attention has been attracted that is employed in some action.

[Turning the attention of one who is already there in order to prompt him to do something is what is called the vocative and it is a meaning over and above that of the bare stem. It is quite different from relations with action such as *karma*, etc. As it is one whose attention has been invited that is employed to do an action, this inviting of attention helps indirectly (but not directly) in the accomplishment of the action.]

Even when indirectly connected with action, the meaning of the vocative is not part of the meaning of the sentence.

164. (a-b) It is handed down from the ancients that the vocative is not part of the meaning of the sentence.

[The meaning of the word in the vocative case can be understood without reference to the meanings of the other words in the sentence. So even if it is indirectly connected with action, it is the meaning of the individual word and not to the sentence. The idea of *karma*, for instance, presupposes action if it is to become the means but, for that reason, it does not become the sentence meaning. The same thing can be said about the idea of the vocative.]

(c-d) The meanings of the case affixes are analysed out of the meaning of the sentence.

The author now points out an indication from the *śāstra* to show that the meaning of the case affix is different from that of the stem.

165. As the formation of an *avyayībhāva* compound in the meaning of a case affix has been taught, one has to understand that the meaning of the case affix is other than substance and that is expressed by the indeclinable.

[In P. 2.1.6, the formation of an *avyayībhāva* compound in the sense of a case affix is taught and we get forms like *adhistri*. If the case affix conveyed the substance, it would have no place in the compound because the word 'stri' itself conveys substance. From this teaching it also becomes clear that the stem cannot convey the notions of *karma*, etc. According to the above *sūtra*, the indeclinable which expresses the notion of abode enters into a compound with a following word: In stanza 43, it was shown by the method of agreement and difference that the stem and the case affix have different meanings. It is stated here that indications in the *śāstra* also confirms it. The conclusion is that whether one adopts the view that the stem conveys five things (*pañcaka*) or less, the case affix expresses or illuminates a meaning having a fixed power and different from substance.]

From P. 3.2.25 and P. 3.4.21, one understands that substance can be means. How has it then been stated that the

meaning of the case affix, namely the means (*sādhana*) is different from substance. To answer this objection, it is now stated that it is power which is the means.

166. Substance always remains as it is. Even when the actions (with which it is connected) change, the essence of the substance does not change.

[Substance remains the same in all circumstances. One has, therefore, to account for the fact that it appears as different means in the expressions *vrkṣam*, *vrkṣeṇa*, etc. It cannot be maintained that it becomes different kinds of means when it becomes connected with different actions. Nothing changes its nature because of its association with other things.]

Therefore

167. Whatever substance is instrument would not become the object. Otherwise all substance would change into something else.

[The conclusion is that what is called means is the power of a thing and not the thing itself. As the powers are many, the same thing armed with this power or that, becomes the means in the accomplishment of different actions and is therefore, called by different names.]

SECTION 8

ON ACTION

The means or accessory (*sādhana*) has been explained. As it depends upon the end or what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*), the definition of action accepted in the *śāstra*, is now being given.

1. Whenever something, finished or unfinished, is presented as something to be accomplished, it is called 'action', because of its having assumed the form of sequence.

[In connection with the ancient's definition of a root as that which denotes action, the objection is raised that in that case 'as', *bhū* and *vid* should be especially declared to be roots because they do not denote action (M. Bhā, I. p. 255, 1.1). We know that *pac* denotes action because in reply to the question : 'what is he doing?' we can say 'he is cooking' (*pacati*). We cannot give *bhavati* as an answer to the same question. Thus *as*, *bhū* and *vid* would not be expressive of action and they would not be called roots. Moreover all action is known to consist of movements but the meanings of *as*, *bhū*, and *vid* do not consist of movements. Therefore such a definition of action has to be found as will fit in with the meaning of all roots. That is just what the Bhāṣyakāra has done in his statement : *kāraṇāṇāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kriyā* (M. Bhā, I. p. 258, L. 11) = 'Action is the special mode of behaviour of the accessories.' This has been interpreted differently by different scholars. Either all the accessories have the same activity or each has its own. Even if all the accessories have the same activity, it may be identical with the fruit or it may be different from it. All the accessories cannot have the same activity. That of the instrument (*karana*), for instance, cannot be identical with that of the agent (*kartā*), nor that of the abode (*adhikarana*) with that of the

recipient (*sampradāna*). There is no action resting upon many things. Therefore, action is an activity differing with each accessory. To say that the root is what denotes action is to say that the root expresses the activity of every accessory. *Objection* :—The result would be that the verbal suffix (*lakāra*) would express each and every accessory. It is only natural that the suffix which is added to the root should denote the accessory of the activity for which the root stands and it has been stated that the root stands for the activity of all the accessories. *Answer*:—This is not really the case. Pāṇini teaches that the verbal suffixes are added in the sense of the agent and the object only. (P. 3.4.69) Therefore a word ending in a verbal suffix should denote only the activities of these two accessories. Secondly, as a matter of fact, we understand only the activities of the agent and the object from the verbal suffixes and it is only natural that Pāṇini's teaching should follow facts. It is true that according to this, a root would not stand for the activities of any accessory. Agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) are the only two methods which we have for determining what the meaning of the base and what the meaning of the suffix is and these two methods lead us to think that the root does not stand for the activities of all the accessories. Though in a sentence like : *Devadattaḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ śthālyām odanam pacati*, the root does seem to stand for the activities of all the accessories, primarily it stands for those of the agent and the object. Hence they are understood from the verbal suffixes (*la*) at the end of a verb.

Others believe that the statement *kāraṇāṇāṃ pravṛtṭiviśeṣaḥ kriyā* is meant to explain the nature of action and not to explain the meaning of a root. They argue as follows—The root cannot express the activity of the recipient etc. but it does express that of the instrument etc. That is why an instrument can be presented as independent (*svatantra*), as the agent, as in the sentence : *asiś chinatti* but not the recipient (*sampradāna*) or the starting point (*apādāna*). The activities of all the accessories are action but of these only some are expressed by the root and the verbal suffixes are added to the root in order to denote those accessories the activities of which are expressed by the root.

Others, while explaining this definition of action, put all the

emphasis on the word *viśeṣa*. They say that *pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* means *pravṛttinām viśeṣaḥ*. They mean that action is a *viśeṣa*, a peculiarity or rather a distinct result of the activities of the accessories. The softness of the *rice*, after cooking, is the result achieved by the activities of all the accessories. Thus, to them action is the result.

For others still, by *kāraṇāṇām* only the *kartā* is meant. The plural number is used keeping in mind the different agents of the different possible actions. There is a *M. Bhā.* sentence which may be taken as a proof that only the *kartā* is meant. It is this : *Anyathā śuṣkaudane kāraṇāṇi pravartante anyathā māṃśaudane* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 258, l. II) = ‘Agents act in one way when there is only plain rice before them and act quite differently towards rice with meat’. Here there is talk of the agents acting with excitement in the presence of rice with meat and with indifference towards plain rice. Only a sentient being like the agent is capable of excitement or indifference. So *kāraṇāṇi* here means the agents. The *karma*, object may also be meant. In one passage, the *M. Bhā* says that *viklitti* = ‘becoming soft’, is the chief meaning of the root *pac*. This cannot be the activity of the agent. His activity is *vikledanam* = ‘making something soft’ and not becoming soft. The conclusion seems to be that in this passage it is not the meaning of words which is explained but what is called action. Considered apart from words, *viklitti*—‘becoming soft’ may be the real nature of the action called cooking but the root *pac* denotes primarily the activity of the agent, that is, *vikledana* = making something soft. The activity of the object can be expressed by the root when the suffix is added to it in the sense of the object.

Others still explain the whole thing differently. For them, *kriyā* is just activity in general and not any particular activity. Thus it would be found in every accessory. The bringing about of the ultimate result is the common thing found in the activity of every accessory. It is this common thing which is called *pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*. The *viśeṣa* consists in bringing about the ultimate result. This is their common feature. Each does it in its own way and hence gets a special name. If action had been defined as just *pravṛtti*, it would have meant movement because that is the

accepted meaning of the word in the world. By adding the word *viśeṣa*, it now stands for something other than just movement. All *pravṛtti* differs from other *pravṛttis* and that constitutes its distinctiveness (*viśeṣa*). Thus, in the behaviour of every *kāraka*, there can be a distinctiveness. This can be from things of the same kind or from totally different things. When the M. Bhā. speaks about difference in the reaction to plain rice and to rice with meat, it has distinction from things of the same class in mind. The action of eating differs from person to person. Agents act indifferently towards plain rice but enthusiastically towards rice with meat. If acting enthusiastically alone makes something fit to be called action, then eating plain rice could not be called action at all. The lack of enthusiasm in eating plain rice is also a peculiar behaviour and so that is also *kriyā*. Distinction from things belonging to another class is quite clear in such examples as *pacati*, *paṭhati* and so on.

It is clear from all this that *kriyā* is different from *dravya*. All the accessories which are *dravyas* may be present and yet there may be no action. Sometimes, however, the idea of action arises in our mind when the accessories are present. The fact that the idea of action sometimes arises and sometimes not shows that action is something different from the accessories. Somebody might object that even when it does arise, it might be an error. Therefore, some other proof must be given to show that action is different from the accessories. We find that Devadatta is now here and later in Pāṭaliputra. Something is responsible for it. That is action. Reaching Pāṭaliputra is the result and it can't come from substance only. It leads us to postulate the existence of some activity which produces this result. That is action and that is inferable only. It cannot be directly perceived. Some people object to this view that action is something to be inferred. We get the notion that somebody is cooking. From this can we infer the action called cooking? This notion itself may be an error and we can infer nothing from an error. If it is not an error then we are perceiving action directly. It is not a case of inference. One might infer action from its effect, but how can the word express it? The answer to this objection is that in Grammar, we are not dealing with things as they are but as presented by

words. The thing which is fixed as the meaning of the root by the method of agreement and difference cannot be directly perceived. That notion having sequence within it and which is understood from a verb is called action. That which is presented by the word as a process is called action and that which is a finished thing is a substance. Even things that are in the process of formation can be presented by words as finished things. In the sentence *ghaṭaḥ kṛiyate*, the jar is presented as a thing in the process of formation. The jar, before it is produced, goes through many stages, but this process is not understood from the word *ghaṭa*. It is understood from the verb *kṛiyate*. The meaning of a word is that which is understood from it without the help of another word. From the word *ghaṭa* alone, we understand the meaning of being (*sattā*). That is why that meaning has been declared to be the meaning of a stem (*prātipadika*). When a verb is used, sequence is understood and that is why things in a process of formation are said to be the meaning of verbs. From the sentence *ghaṭaḥ kṛiyate*, what we understand is this : The jar which is mentally conceived is being brought about. Thus action is something which is inferred from things.

But some say that even this conception of action does not cover the meaning of roots like *as*. One of the characteristics of action mentioned above was that when all the accessories are present, sometimes the notion of action arises and sometimes it does not. But the idea denoted by the root *as* always arises when the accessories are present. Therefore the meaning of the root *as* is not action. Secondly, the meaning of this root does not admit of degree as the meanings of other roots do. We cannot say *astitarām* as we can say *pacatitarām*. Nor can we give *asti* as an answer to the question : what is he doing? But we can give *pacati* as an answer. 'Being' is the ultimate meaning of a verb also and it does not admit of degree. This objection is answered as follows : Action was defined as *kāraṇāṇāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* = a distinctive mode of behaviour of the accessories. The behaviour of the accessories in the case of *asti* is not the same as in the case of *mṛiyate*. In *asti*, they act with a view to the preservation of the body and in *mṛiyate*, they act for its destruction. Thus there is distinctiveness in the mode of behaviour (*Pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*).

There is also a reason why the notion denoted by the root *as* always arises when the accessories are present and not only sometimes. Being (*Sattā*), brought about by unexcited (*asaṃrabdha*) accessories, always persists. That is why the notion expressed by *as* always arises when the accessories are present. There can also be degree in the meaning of *as* or *vid*. We do say : *vidyate-tarāmayamiha* when somebody is always present. The suffix *tarap* expresses degree. *Asti* can sometimes become the answer to the question : what is he doing ? For instance, in regard to someone who is about to die. As other actions, the action in *as* also produces its result, that of 'not giving up oneself'. From Yāska's treatment of the six *bhāvavikāras*, *bhāva* or *sattā* is the basis of all action. One cannot therefore question whether the meaning of *as* is action or not. Staying (*tiṣṭhati*) is not mentioned as one of the six, but it has all the characteristics of action. For example, one action cancels others. When one hears *tiṣṭhati*, it cancels such actions as growth and decay. Therefore, it is also a distinctive mode of the accessories (*kāraṇāṇaṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*). Secondly, it can be connected with different accessories, another proof that it is action. We can say : *bhūmau tiṣṭhati balena tiṣṭhati* and so on. Similarly, in *upa vasati*, *vinaśyati*, *apakṣīyate* etc., the meanings would come under the definition of action, because they represent a special activity of the accessories having sequence. They are different from the accessories themselves and they are the meanings of roots. Something which is a finished thing cannot be the meaning of a root. Nor is *bhāvanā* the meaning of a root, because there is no such thing apart from *kriyā*. The meaning of the root *kr* is common to the meanings of all the roots. That is why it can be in apposition to all roots. The idea of cooking is understood from both *pacati* and *pāka*, but in one case, it is understood as a thing while, in the other, it is understood as a process. *Pacati* and *pākaṃ karoti* mean this : he causes to soften the rice which softens by itself. *Vikledana* = 'making soft' is the activity of the agent and *viklitti* = 'becoming soft' is that of the object and both are included in the meaning of the root *pac*. Therefore there is no such thing as *bhāvanā*, apart from *kriyā*. *Yajeta* does not mean : *Yāgena svargaṃ bhāvayet* = 'One should bring about heaven through sacrifice.' It means a process by accomplishing which the result comes spontaneously].

The definition of action, given above, is made clear by means of an illustration.

2. In 'it sounds' (*dhvanati*), sound is presented as having inner sequence (*krama*) on the basis of the relation of causality; when there is no more sequence, it is just called 'sound'.

[In the sentence 'the bell rings' (*ghaṇṭā dhvanati*) sound is presented by the verb as an action or a process, the parts of which have temporal sequence. The bell is the cause of the sound and the sound is the object. The bell whose activity leads to the result called sound is said to ring. Or we may look upon it like this : Sound is something which happens in a series like waves and the earlier wave is the cause and the later wave is the effect. When the activity of the bell ceases, there is no question of earlier and later waves. Then we simply say : *ghaṇṭāyā dhvaniḥ* = the sound of the bell. We do not then say : 'the bell rings'. In other words, sound is now presented as a thing and not as a process. In the sentence '*dhvaniṃ karoti*' = 'he makes a sound', if we understand a process, it is due to the presence of the word '*karoti*'. The process is the meaning of the sentence and not of the individual word. A meaning which is understood through the presence of another word is sentence meaning and not word-meaning. A word is authority only in regard to the meaning which it denotes. It has been pointed out again and again that, in Grammar, things as presented by words count and not things as they are.]

Another illustration is now given.

3. In regard to the quality 'white' the verb *śvetate* presents it as having sequence and it means that it shines as something white.

[The verb *śvetate* presents the quality white as a process. The noun *śveta*, on the other hand, presents it as a thing. *Śvetate* is explained in the *kārikā* itself as *śvetatvena prakāśate*.]

Thus action is something which is presented by words as a

process having parts arranged in a sequence. How the idea of a single action arises from parts or moments which cannot co-exist is now explained.

4. What is called action is a collection of parts produced in a sequence and mentally conceived as one and identical with the parts which are subordinate to it.

[The moments or parts come into existence to serve one single purpose and they are unified in one unifying act of cognition. And that is called action. The parts exist for the whole and, therefore, they are identified with it. Action is one and is conveyed by the root. On the basis of its parts, one speaks of its inner sequence. Oneness is attributed to it on the basis of the whole which is not real, because the parts, produced in a sequence, cannot co-exist. Therefore, verbs like *pacati* stand for that collection of parts like *adhiśrayaṇa* = putting the vessel on the fire and so on, conceived by the mind as a unity. The result comes from the whole and not from any particular part, as, otherwise, the other parts would be useless. The result depends upon all the parts, not merely on the one which immediately precedes it. The result is one and, therefore, the parts lead to the idea of one action.]

If the whole is called action, a part cannot be so called. How then can one account for the use of the different tenses when some parts are over and others are yet to come?

5. Such a whole is attributed to each one of the parts. Thus differentiation takes place and difference of tense becomes possible.

[At the very first moment of the act of cooking, the cook has the ultimate result in view. Therefore, the name 'cooking' is applied to the very first moment. That is why the present tense is also used for it. When that moment is over, one can say: 'he cooked' using the past tense. The whole is thus superim-

posed on each part. We know this because the idea of cooking arises in the presence of each part. One can also explain how each part appears as a process. Strictly speaking, it should not so appear. The whole is superimposed on each part and there is no other part to be yet accomplished. A process is something in which some parts are already over and others are not. But if the perception of the whole has already taken place, there cannot be any question of anything else yet to be accomplished. But that is not how it works. The whole, as consisting of parts arranged in a sequence, is superimposed on the parts.]

If the whole is superimposed on each part or moment, as the latter is directly perceptible how is action said to be inferable?

6. The parts which occur in a sequence and are partly existent and partly not so cannot enter into contact with the senses like the eyes whose objects are always the existent.

[On the part which is present at a particular moment before the eyes, the whole is superimposed. Action should then be directly perceptible. And yet the *M. Bhā*, has declared that action is only inferable. That is because the whole which is superimposed on the part has parts arranged in a sequence and as such it is not directly perceptible. And it is that which is called action.]

7. Just as the whole word 'cow' is not perceptible to the senses but, after its parts are perceived, is understood as a whole by the mind.

8. In the same way, after actions are differently (that is, in parts) perceived, they are understood as a unity like the fire-wheel.

[Words like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ* etc. have sounds as their parts and these parts cannot co-exist. They are perceived by the senses

through the parts which exist at particular moments. They are fully perceived at the time of the perception of the last sound with the help of the impressions left in the mind by the perceptions of the previous sounds. Similarly, action which is an aggregate of different moments is directly perceptible as far as particular moments are concerned. The resemblance between the perception of action and that of the word (*sphoṭa*) is only partial. *Sphoṭa* is directly perceptible. It is not inferred at all. Nor is it something which is gradually revealed part by part. Therefore it is better to compare the perception of action to that of the word considered as a collection of sounds and not as the *sphoṭa*. That is why the author has mentioned the torch-wheel (*alātacakra*) as the illustration. The revolving series of torches (*bhrāmyamāṇolmukarājīnām cakrākāratayā*) is wrongly perceived as a wheel and the perception appears to be direct. Similarly, the moments of action appear to be a unity and directly perceptible. The verb expresses action conceived of as directly perceptible. Action may be looked upon as one, even as the meaning of a root and not merely as a thing. The root expresses action as one and the suffixes added to the root express any variation that there may be in it. Where a suffix not expressive of a *kāraka* is added to a root, the latter expresses action as one as in *āsyate bhavadbhiḥ*].

If parts of an action are directly perceptible, action would also become so, because they are also actions. This point is now clarified.

9. Just as pouring water (*udakāsecana*) etc. are parts of the action of cooking, in the same way, pouring water etc. have also parts of their own.

[It is not only main actions which are thus inferable and not directly perceptible. Each moment or part may be looked upon as action in which case it will also be inferable and not directly perceptible. A part of the action of cooking, namely, placing the vessel on the fire, has also parts arranged in a temporal sequence, and as such, it is also inferable only.]

What about the stage beyond which one cannot divide it?

10. The name action cannot be applied to the solitary point reached by extreme sub-division.

[There comes a stage when the part cannot be further sub-divided. It will be atomic in character, it cannot then be called action at all. Such an atomic point may be *pratyakṣa*, 'directly perceptible,' but that will not make action so because that is not action at all. Action is the name of something which has parts arranged in a sequence. The root cannot express something which has no parts. Action is something having parts, a process denoted by verbs. The question is not whether action has actually parts or not but whether the verb presents it as such or not. The answer is that the verb does present action, however short in nature, as something having parts which cannot co-exist. Therefore, it is not directly perceptible. It can only be inferred.]

11. That attains sequence through the earlier and later parts and the non-present (*asad*) action being superimposed upon it, it can also be expressed by the verbs.

[Yāska, the author of the *Nirukta* has also defined what the verb expresses in a similar manner. His statement is: *Pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe vrajati pacati ityupakramaprabhṛtyapavargaparyantam* = 'One expresses Being which has inner sequence, from its beginning till its completion, by means of the verb, as for example, the verbs *vrajati* = he goes, *pacati* = he cooks, (Ni., 1.1.11.). In *pūrvāparībhūta*, YĀSKA has used the suffix *cvi* which implies that something has been transformed into another (*abhātadabhāva*). That is because the whole is superimposed on the part, the part is transformed into the whole, as it were.]

There is the root *as*. It is supposed to express *sattā* = 'being', 'existence'. *Sattā* is conceived of as *nityā* = eternal *akramā* = 'without inner sequence', *asādhyā* = not to be brought about. How then can it be the meaning of a verb?

12. Its form, as connected with Time, is expressed

by the verb *asti*. When it has a completely finished form, it is just said to be *bhāva* Being.

[*Sattā* = 'Being' is presented as a process (*sādhya*) by the verb. When presented by a verb, *sattā* has distinctions of time and that is why we say: *abhūt, asti, bhaviṣyati* etc. A thing, as presented by nouns, has no association with time. When we hear the word *ghaṭa*, we understand something which is not associated with time. It was objected before that *as* does not express action because the word *asti* cannot be an answer to the question: *Kiṃ karoti*? The truth is that once the existence of something has already been ascertained one might ask that question and then the answer *asti* is impossible, not because *asti* does not express action or process. When there is a possibility of Devadatta dying, one can ask the same question and then the answer *asti* in the sense that he is still alive, still exists, is possible. The roots *kṛ, bhū* and *as* denote action in general. Roots like *pac* denote particular actions. They can be used in apposition to *karoti*. Hence we conclude that they denote particular actions. Sometimes, however, in answer to the question *kiṃ karoti*, one answers: *na karoti, āste* = 'he does not do anything, he just exists.' Here there seems to be a contradiction between the meanings of *karoti* and *āste*. How to explain this according to the view that *karoti* denotes action in general and that other verbs denote particular actions. Between the general and the particular, there cannot be any contradiction. This difficulty can be resolved as follows: The question *kiṃ karoti* does not refer to action in general. It refers to a particular action. In the world, by action, one means a particular action, and not action in general. Where there is no particular action, there is no action at all. Where the question relates to any action, general or particular, the answer *āste* or *śete* is admissible. Action does not always involve movement (*parispanḍa*). It has already been defined as *kāraṇāṇaṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ*. This conception of action holds good everywhere. Even in the sentence *parvatas tiṣṭhati*, we understand a process from *tiṣṭhati*. Not all agents behave in the same manner. The mountain is understood as behaving in a particular way in the above sentence, namely that of not giving up its location. Therefore, from a verb we do understand *sattā* as associated with time. This very *sattā* is understood as a thing from a noun. But it might be

objected that both in a noun and in a verb, the root is the same and action as a process is supposed to be the meaning of a root. How is one to explain the difference between a verb and a noun coming from the same root? The difference is this: In a verb, the meaning of the root, namely, the process, is the main thing. But in a noun the meaning of the root is subordinate to that of the suffix. In the sentence *odanasya pākaḥ* = the cooking of rice, *odana* is the accessory (*sādhana*) called *karma* of the action of cooking. (*Sādhana* presupposes *sādhya*. In the word *pāka*, the root *pac* must express the *sādhya* in relation to which *odana* is the *sādhana* called *karma*.)]

If the whole, with inner sequence and superimposed on the part, is action, the latter would become something secondary. This objection is answered as follows :

13. As this is the only established usage in regard to action, this is not secondary usage. Where there is a distinct primary usage, there it is that another can be secondary (in relation to it).

[The word 'cow' primarily denotes a particular kind of animal. When it is applied to a human being having the qualities of a cow, it is said to be used secondarily. As far as action is concerned, the question is whether there is a primary conception of it as distinct from a secondary conception. No such distinction is possible because there is no conception of action in which the parts are contemporaneous and have no sequence. Everywhere, action is the result of the superimposition of sequence of non-contemporaneous parts. There is no other conception of action. That is why a single moment or part, with this sequence superimposed on it, becomes action.]

This sequence can be explained in another way.

14. Each one of the parts, really without sequence appears as many and having sequence because the characteristics (*śakti*) of the following parts are attributed to it.

[Before, it was said that the whole, with inner sequence is superimposed on each part. But the matter can be looked at in another way. The moments, taken by themselves, have no sequence. But each moment is taken as many having sequence because the multiplicity and the sequence of the moments that follow are superimposed upon it.]

Another view is now stated.

15. That moment immediately after which the result is produced has been said to be action primarily: The others are also so called because they are intended to produce that very result (*tādarthyāt*).

[That is action immediately after which the result is seen and which is performed as a means of bringing about the result. Taking the action called cooking as an example, if rice is what is cooked, softening of the grains is the result of the action of cooking and it happens after the separation of the grains (*vicaṭana*). That is, therefore, the action of cooking. It is this which is superimposed on such moments as putting the vessel on the fire. Everything which precedes *vicaṭana* can only lead to the fruit indirectly and is, therefore, not action. They are the means of action and, by superimposition, they are also said to be action. As *vicaṭana* is only one moment without sequence, how can it be called action? It happens this way. As the preceding subordinate moments have sequence and *vicaṭana* is superimposed on them, the latter also acquires sequence. Others think that *vicaṭana* itself appears as the subordinate moments. From words, such moments as putting the vessel on the fire are understood as cooking which is essentially *vicaṭana*. The previous moments are only *vicaṭana* in different forms. This is the essence of the *M. Bhā.* statement : *Atha kaḥ paceḥ pradhānarthāḥ? yāsau taṇḍulānāṃ viklittiḥ* = 'what is the main meaning of the root *pac*? It is the softening of the grains of rice' (*M. Bhā.* II p. 32. l. 24-25). In the expression : *pacyate odanaḥ svayameva* = 'the rice cooks by itself, the root *pac* has this meaning of *vicaṭana* = separation of the grain or *viklittiḥ* = softening of the grains. The root *pac* is sometimes said to be *dvyartha* = having two meanings. The main meaning

would then be *vicaṭana* and the preceding subordinate moments would be the secondary meaning.

What has been said of the root *pac* is meant to apply to all the roots. It was only an illustration.]

Even if sequence is superimposed on 'Being', how does it become *sādhya*, something to be brought about, considering that Being is supposed to be eternal?

16. When the causes are present, the object exists, in the form of cause (*pratyaya*), till it is born. Till then, it exists in the form of others. Being something to be accomplished in its own form, it is conveyed (by the verb).

[When the causes are present, an object is present in the form of cause, until it is born, that is, until it assumes the form of effect. Till then, it exists in the form of other things, that is, its causes. In that form, it is something accomplished (*siddha*) like the agent. In its own form, it is something to be brought about (*sādhya*) and that is expressed by the verb. The state before something has come into existence is expressed by the verb *jāyate*, as will be explained in stanza 28. The state after that is expressed by the verb *asti*. What is called birth is the state of going towards the acquisition of existence. An object engaged in that attains existence and is described by the verb *asti*=it is=it sustains itself. So when a thing depends upon the activity of the accessories, it becomes *sādhya*=something to be brought about.]

17. Once a thing is accomplished, the purpose being fulfilled, there is no more requirement of an accessory. There is, therefore, no use of verbs in such cases.

[In regard to a thing which is already accomplished, verbs cannot be used. It is nouns which express such things.]

18. Thus action which is one and without sequ-

ence is presented as having the property of the parts with sequence and which is meant for it.

[The conclusion is that all action is in the nature of a process. It is really one and without sequence. But the sequence belonging to the moments which are different from it and which exist for it is attributed to it.]

It is now stated that, as all the moments lead to the same result, they are looked upon as one.

19. Therefore, the moment (part) which is one is non-existent and what is present is perceived. It (action) is understood as the soul of the existent and the non-existent.

[Of these moments which have a common purpose, the preceding one is gone and that which is still there is the present one. Action is the common soul or essence of these two moments. The two moments are looked upon as one and that is action which, being one, has really no sequence but the sequence of the moments is attributed to it.]

So far action has been explained from the point of view of those who hold that a word denotes the particular or the substance (*vyaktivādinah*).

Now it is going to be explained from the point of view of those who hold that the word denotes the universal.

20. Others have declared that which inheres in the many moments to be action. Being eternal, it is not *sādhya*=to be brought about, but in its individual aspect, it appears to be *sādhya*.

[*Jātivādin* is one who believes that all words denote the universal. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by a certain uniformity in our cognition. The idea of cooking

persists even when the person who cooks and the thing cooked etc. vary. We must, therefore, admit that the universal called action inheres in the different kinds of actions. It is this universal which is denoted by the root. Like the *sphoṭa*, this universal can be manifested by moments which do not co-exist. What is conveyed here by the word 'moment' is the same as what is meant by *vyakti* = the particular. The universal called action is really eternal but it appears to be *sādhya* = something to be brought about and to have sequence, through its substratum, namely, individual actions, the different moments of an action. If action requires *sādhana* or accessory, it is the *vyakti* aspect of it that requires it and not the *jāti* aspect of it.]

Within the *jātivāda*, another way of looking at it is now stated.

21. It has been declared that the universal which inheres in the last part is action. When its substratum, the *vyakti* is brought about, it is also understood as being brought about.

[The universal inhering in the last part after which the result comes is action. The preceding ones are also action because they exist for it.]

The universal referred to in the two previous stanzas is the lower one. The Grand Universal called *sattā* is also *kriyā*.

22. Action is Being inhering in the agent and the object qualified by their activities or Being inherent in their activities.

[According to some, action is the grand universal or *sattā* = Being, as associated or determined by the activities of the agent and the object. Mutually different objects do condition Being. Action is Being as conditioned by the subject (agent) or the object which are qualified by their activities or Being as conditioned by these activities. Both these alternatives are within the view that action is the Grand Universal called *Sattā*-Being.]

23. Some are of the view that the Being which inheres in the last moment or part is action. The uninterrupted tradition is that Being is the meaning of the root.

[A third alternative within the same view is that the Being which inheres in the moment immediately preceding the fruit is action. That Being is the meaning of the root is the uninterrupted tradition which has come down to us. This was the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi, quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta* (Ni. 1. 2. 8.) and followed by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. Being is the meaning of the noun-stem as well as of the root. It is sometimes called *sattā* and sometimes *bhāva*. It is the meaning of all words and it assumes variety on account of association with limiting conditions. But these limiting conditions are nothing more than developments of *sattā*. This is what is called *sattādvaita*, the view that all words denote *sattā*. See stanza 35 below.]

Now the view of those who follow mental entities is going to be referred to.

24. Others declare that the form which figures in the mind or the universal in it or Being which figures in the mind, superimposed on the objects, is what is called action.

[Those who follow mental entities (Buddhists) give their own interpretation of action. According to them, the form which figures in the mind is action. It is that which is superimposed on things because there takes place perception of identity between what is seen and what is constructed by the mind (*drśyavikalpayorabhedādhyavasāyāt*). Either the individual form is action or the universal which inheres in it. Or the grand universal, Being is action. This is according to the view that the meaning of every word has *upacārasattā* = secondary Being (See *Sambandha Samuddeśa* 39 ff.), the fact of figuring in the mind. That action is nothing more than *sattā* has already been explained in the *Jāti-samuddeśa*. The six transformations of *sattā* mentioned by Yāska are the basis of all action. But the number six is not final].

25. Among the six transformations of Being, two, manifestation and hiding or birth and destruction according to others, are attributed to it for practical purposes.

[According to the *Satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṅkhya*s, what is called the origin of objects is their revelation or manifestation and destruction is nothing more than their hiding. According to the *asatkāryavāda* of the *Vaiśeṣika*s, origin is birth, the coming into being of something new and destruction is its complete dissolution. Among the six transformations of Being, these two are thus differently conceived by different thinkers. They are attributed to Being (*sattā*) which, being eternal, cannot have birth and destruction. It is always of one form and therefore, cannot be manifested or hidden. Origin and destruction of Being are thus fictitious.]

It is now stated that these two include action.

26. These two include all activity as identical with themselves; what is called staying (*sthitih*) is nothing more than birth in a continuous stream of similar moments.

[All action is really birth or death, origin or destruction. All transformation in things is either increase or decrease. Increase and decrease are really nothing more than manifestation and disappearance of some property or other. Manifestation or appearance with some attribute is birth. Something which is about to assume its own form and stands between the previous and the following states is said to be born. A thing which has assumed its form is referred to by the verb *asti*, *Ātmalābha* = assuming one's own form is the second stage of what is called birth (*janma*). The author of the *Nirukta* says: The verb *jāyate* expresses the first stage of the previous condition, (Ni.1.2.) what is called birth is the first stage of existence which precedes change etc. The verb *asti* expresses the certainty of the thing which has come to be. As long as there is a stream of similar moments, the thing is the same and is said to exist. As soon as there is another stream of moments, it is said to change, without losing its iden-

tity. As the author of the *Nirukta* puts it; the verb *vipariṇamate* expresses the idea that something changes without losing its identity (*Nirukta* I.2.). Change may be increase or decrease and so the verbs *varddhate* and *apakṣiyate* respectively are used. Thus all the six states of Being can really come under these two, namely, birth and death or appearance and disappearance. Even the meaning of the root *sthā*=to stay would come under birth. What is called staying or persisting is nothing more than birth in a continuous stream of similar moments. Another proof that the meaning of the root *sthā* is action is that when it is used, it keeps out other verbs.]

It is now stated that birth and destruction are not really different from Being which is the meaning of all roots.

27. Birth is not different from what is born and destruction also is not something really different. Therefore in all transformations of Being, it is *sattā* alone that persists.

[Even these two states of Being are not really different from Being. That which already is cannot really come to be and that which is not cannot come to be and that which is cannot totally disappear. Birth and death are, therefore, only two ways in which Being manifests itself to us. They are not really different from Being. From all this, we can conclude that in all the six transformations of Being, it is Being which persists. It is eternal and when it is expressed by a verb, it assumes sequence and is called action. When it is expressed by a noun, it appears as a thing, an accessory, a means of action.]

28. The state preceding what is already born is called birth, if its causes are meant to be expressed as having sequence.

[A thing which has attained its full and final form is said to have been born. The stage previous to this is called birth. It is a process and is expressed by the word *jāyate*. When this word is used, it is implied that the accessories are active.]

29. Verbs express things in that condition, (that is, as having sequence.) Nouns, on the other hand, operate as though suppressing this sequence.

[The stage called birth which precedes the one called born is the causal stage. It has really no sequence within it but when expressed by a verb like *jāyate*, it assumes sequence. Hence this stage has the characteristic of action. But when this very stage is expressed by a noun like *janma*, it appears as a thing without any sequence within. What is expressed by the noun is identified by us with what is expressed by the verb and that is why it appears to us that the noun suppresses the sequence which we experience in a verb. This is the force of *iva* in *saṃharanta iva kramam*.]

According to some, destruction is the later stage of what is, just as birth is its earlier stage.

30. Its fruit or what is regarded as such or an object that is its opposite is designated by the ancients as something different, its destruction.

[Just as the causal stage was called birth, in the same way, the stage called fruit or effect is called destruction or death. Contact is the effect of movement. Hence, it represents the destruction of that movement. One cognition may be the result of another; hence it is its destruction. Not only the real fruit but also what is regarded as such may be said to be the death or destruction of the cause. The two halves of a jar produced by a blow, represent the death of the jar. The threads which remain out of an old piece of cloth are the fruit of that cloth and hence its destruction. Even disjunction can be looked upon as the death of conjunction, pain as that of pleasure. Thus it is seen that death or destruction is not something non-existent, something negative. It is something positive. A verb expresses it as a process and a noun expresses it as a thing.]

How one thing can be the destruction of another is now explained.

31. Neither the expression that something exists nor that it does not exist is possible unless something is actually cognised. A thing is cognised in terms of something else.

[Like the judgment of existence, that of non-existence is also based on a positive cognition. It is when the result is produced that we say that the previous state has ceased to be. When we cognise destruction, it cannot be mere emptiness. It is cognised. Therefore, there must be something to be cognised.]

But one does ascertain the non-existence of a thing in the dark by means of the sense of touch. This is answered as follows:—

32. One does ascertain, in the dark as in the light, without touching with the hand, the existence or non-existence of objects like a jar.

[It is true that we seem to cognise non-existence when we see nothing in the dark and feel nothing with our hand. But that is not how it happens. When we feel with our hand in the dark and do not touch something, we are guided in doing so by our memory of what we have seen there in the light. Here also, it is through our perception of something positive that we ascertain non-existence.]

Birth and destruction are now explained differently.

33. The all-pervading matter attains subtlety (*saukṣmya*) in some place and time and solidifies at others. Without doing any thing, it manifests itself thus by its own inner power.

[The all-pervading primordial matter (*pradhāna*) attains a subtle state in some place at sometime. It is then imperceptible. This state is called *tirobhāva*=disappearance, hiding and it can be expressed by the noun *nāśa* or by the verb *naśyati*. At another time and in another place, this stuff becomes solidified and perceptible. This is called *āvirbhāva*=manifestation. These two

states of *pradhāna* are due to its constituent called *rajas* which is ever active and is the basis of all action. Thus the six transformations of Being according to the author of the *Nirukta* have been explained.]

Another view is now stated.

34. The manifestation of the All-inclusive principle, as though with a sequence and as though with parts, this has been said to be action by others.

[Brahman which is beyond all diversity and differentiation has all powers within it and can manifest itself in all forms. Under the influence of its *svātantrya-śakti* or *kāla*, it presents itself in a sequence and that is action. Under the influence of *Dikśakti*, it brings about divisions of space. Thus though it is indivisible, it appears to have temporal and spatial divisions. Birth and death are temporal divisions and are the basis of all action. Thus *kriyā* is a *vivarta* of Brahman. In the previous stanza, it was presented as a *pariṇāma* of the *pradhāna*.]

Now, the *sattādvaita* of the author of *Nirukta* is concluded (see stanza 23).

35. Being, due to its own power, attains all forms: it is what is to be brought about, the means of doing so, the fruit and the enjoyer of the fruit.

[It has already been shown in the *Jāṭisamuddeśa* that *sattā*, *mahāsāmanya* or Being is the meaning of all words, because it is the characteristic of everything. It is this Being which manifests itself as things and processes (*siddha* and *sādhya*), expressed by nouns and verbs respectively. It also manifests itself as the things to be experienced and as the experiencers. These things which are manifestations of its powers constitute the whole universe.]

Another view of action, already mentioned in the *sādhana-samuddeśa* (33, 34) is now referred to.

36. Others look upon as action the eternal creative force not existing in anything in particular

which produces the result together with the accessories.

[According to this view, *pravṛtti* is action. It is eternal and does not reside in anything in particular. Together with the powers of the accessories, it brings about the result.]

How something eternal can be something to be brought about is now stated.

37. At first it is something very general, then diversified. When it becomes activity, it appears as something to be brought about.

[In its first stage, this force may be looked upon as *apūva* and is of a very general nature. Later, it assumes variety on account of the activity of the accessories, then becomes a process and is called action. While still in the undiversified state, it sets in motion the powers of the accessories. At this stage, it is called *pravṛtti*. It resides nowhere in particular. When it becomes particularised, it resides in the accessories, becomes a process and gets the name of particular actions like cooking etc. That is why action has been defined as *kāraṇāṇāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ kṛiyā*: a general creative force becoming particularised and residing in the accessories.]

38. It is the source of all the accessories and it is the first among the accessories. Others have declared that all activities are different from it.

[The eternal creative force (*pravṛtti*) is called *prakṛti* because it gives to the accessories their powers. It sets the accessories in motion. It carries them along in its flow. That is why it has been compared to a stream. According to some, it is this very *pravṛtti* which, when associated with particular accessories, becomes particular actions. Others think that particular actions are different from it.]

The verb expresses the accessory, number, tense, person and *upagraha* (aspect) also, why then has it been said to be expressive of action?

39. Where many meanings are possible, there is a relation between them and some are only secondary. One of them is understood as the primary one.

[It is true that a verb expresses not only action, but also accessory, number, time, person and aspect. But they are not all expressed in the same manner. One of them is more important than the others. It is the *aṅgi* (primary) and the others are its *aṅga*. It is action that verbs primarily express because it is that which is *sādhya*, something to be brought about.]

40. Being something to be brought about, verbs express primarily actions, the accessories of which are all finished things, even though the actions are prompted by the ultimate result.

[It is action which a verb primarily expresses because it is that which is to be brought about (*sādhya*). The accessories are all *siddha* (finished things). What is *sādhya* is more important. Of course, the fruit is also something to be brought about but that is expressed by another word altogether and we are now considering the relation of primary and secondary between meanings conveyed by the same word. Even when the verb is in the passive voice, it is action which is understood as the main *sādhya*. No doubt, this action brings about the fruit in reality. But as far as the verb is concerned, it conveys action as the main thing and not the fruit. The *Vedas* also command actions and not the fruit. That is why grammarians look upon action as the main meaning of the sentence. Number and person help action through qualifying the accessories. Time and aspects are directly subordinate to action. Where the verb is impersonally used (*bhāva*), there the importance of action is in regard to number etc. No accessory expressed by the same word exists. Therefore, number cannot be subordinate to any accessory. Action is really undiversified and being *asattva*, it has no number at all.]

If it has no number, how to explain the adding of suffixes like *kṛtvasuc* in the sense of counting action?

41. Because of its oneness and of the possibility of repetition, it is connected with both differentiation and identity. Therefore, numbers are found used with it when the parts (of the group of repetitions) are counted.

[When the agent is the same and the result is the same, the action is one and the same, but it can be repeated. There cannot be repetition if there is absolute difference nor can there be any if there is absolute identity. It is possible only if there is *bhedābheda*. Action becomes associated with number only when it is repeated. The suffix *kṛtvasuc* is expressive of the number of repetitions of all action and not of the number of the action which is, in itself, without any number. The suffixes in a verb express the number of the agent or of the object and not of the action. A word ending in a primary suffix like *ghaṇ* expresses action as a thing and not as a process. A thing is always expressed as associated with number.]

Here a doubt is expressed.

42. The meaning of a word like *pāka* being a thing, how can it require accessories? If its meaning is a process (*sādhyaiva*), there would be no difference between the meanings of verbs and that of words ending in primary suffixes.

[If a word ending in a primary suffix presents action as a thing, how can it become connected with accessories? It is action which requires accessories and not a thing. If a word ending in a primary suffix also presents action as a process then the distinction between nominal and verbal suffixes, pointed out by Patañjali, would become untenable. According to him, one can say *pañcakṛtvah pacati*— 'he cooks five times' but not *pañcakṛtvah pākaḥ* because the suffix *kṛtvasuc* expresses the repetition of action as a process and not as a thing.]

43. If it is argued that the sixth case affix expressive of an accessory is used in connection with a

verb, it must be remembered that, in association with a verb (*lena*) such a case-affix has been prohibited.

44. The meaning of the same word cannot have two contradictory attributes at the same time. If it is *siddha* (a finished thing), how can it be *sādhya* (something to be brought about).

[It cannot be maintained that when the word *pāka* becomes connected with a word expressive of accessory as in *odanasya pākaḥ* it expresses a process (*sādhya*) and when it becomes connected with a verbal element expressive of number, it denotes a thing (*siddha*). The meaning expressed by a word cannot have two contradictory attributes, both coming from the same word.]

It is now pointed out that it is not the same verbal element which expresses both the attributes.

45. That so much of it is a thing and so much of it a process is spoken of only in the Science of Grammar. There is in reality, no such division in the sentence.

[To talk of a word as ending in a primary suffix or in a verbal suffix is itself something artificial. Such a distinction exists in the *śāstra* only and not in the real language where it is the indivisible word (sentence) which is expressive.]

46. Just as Grammar divides a verb into two parts, one expressive of a process (*sādhya*) and the other of a thing (*sādhana*), the same can be done to a word ending in a primary suffix like *ghaṇ*.

[The word *pacati* has two parts, root and suffix. The root expresses action and the suffix expresses the accessory. The same thing can be said of nouns like *pāka*. The position, therefore, is this: The same root can be found in a noun or a verb

and in both it expresses a process. Processes depend upon accessories which are expressed by the case-endings. Suffixes like *ghañ* coming after roots show that the meaning of the root is presented as a thing. Once it is presented as a thing, it becomes susceptible to take gender and number.]

This point is now clarified.

47. The expression of action as a process depends upon the root and its aspect as a thing depends for its expression on suffixes like *ghañ*.

[Thus the distinction between words ending in primary suffixes and those ending in verbal suffixes pointed out by Patañjali holds good (M.Bhā.II.p.57,1-7).]

The author now gives an illustration to show that one and the same word can express two different things.

48. In the word *bandhutā*, the fact of being kinsmen is expressed as something distinct by the element *bandhu* but the kinsmen's state of being a collection is expressed (in terms of identity) by the suffix.

[In the word *bandhutā*, the suffix *tal* expresses the idea of collection (*samūha*) and the stem that of being kinsmen. And yet the collection is not something apart from the kinsmen. It is a collection of kinsmen. The stem and the suffix express the same meaning in terms of distinction and identity respectively.]

49. That in relation to which action is a process, it is not a thing in relation to that, that in relation to which it is a thing, it is not a process in relation to that.

[As action is a process in relation to the accessories, it is not accomplished and is expressed by the root. In relation to the meaning of a primary suffix, it is a thing and not a process. Therefore, there is no association with accessories.]

All illustration of something having two characteristics in relation to two different things is now given.

50. In the sentence: *rājñāḥ putrasya naptā*=a grandson of the king's son, the meaning of the word son is not secondary (*na vyatiricyate*) in regard to that of the word king nor is its importance in any way affected.

[In the sentence *rājñāḥ putrasya naptā*=grandson of the king's son, the meaning of son is secondary in regard to that of grandson but primary in regard to that of king. In the same way, the meaning of the word *pāka* is both *siddha* and *sādhya* in regard to two different words.]

A better example is now given:—

51. In the sentence: 'See! the deer runs' it is quite appropriate that the act of running should be both *sādhya* and *sādhana* in regard to two different things (*viśayabhēdena*).

[In the sentence: *paśya mṛgo dhāvati*, the verbal suffix expresses the notion of agent and in regard to that, the act of running is *sādhya* but in regard to the act of seeing, it is an object (*Karma*), that is, it is *siddha*. It is not the deer which is the object of the action of seeing but the act of running is the object. As *sādhya*, the act of running cannot be *karma*. But as *siddha*, it can become the accessory of another action. When the stem and the suffix express two different ideas, they must be somehow coordinated. The root everywhere expresses an idea which is *sādhya*, a process, something to be brought about. *Kṛtya*-suffixes, like verbal suffixes, naturally express processes. The only difference between them and verbs is that in their case, the accessories are expressed by a different word. Therefore, a word ending in a *kṛtya*-suffix can be associated with a word ending in a suffix expressive of repetition of actions. We can say : *dviḥ śayitavyam bhavatā*= 'you have to lie down twice', *trir bhuktam bhavatā*= 'you have eaten three times', *dvir bhuktvā gataḥ*= 'he went away after eating twice' and so on.]

52. In words ending in verbal suffixes, *kṛtya* suffixes, *kta*, *khal*, primary suffixes forming indeclinables, *niṣṭhā*, *ghañ* etc. the root is expressive of something to be brought about.

[By agreement and difference, we can conclude that the root everywhere expresses a process. This remains the predominant notion when a *tin* suffix is added to the root. The same is true when a *kṛtya* suffix, *kta* and suffixes having the meaning of *khal* are added. So the meaning of the root stands in need of accessories. It is when the association with accessories takes place that we realise the *sādhyaiva* = 'the fact of being a process' of the meaning of roots. When the inflectional suffixes come after a stem, we realise that its meaning is a thing and not a process, because these suffixes denote genders and number and only things can be associated with gender and number.]

53. As a process is something unfinished there cannot be identification in the form, 'it is that' with the meanings of verbs without the word *iva*. Therefore, there cannot be comparison with them.

[The meaning of a verb is a process. It cannot, therefore be identified with another process or thing without the use of the word *iva* as two things can be identified as in the sentence: *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* = 'the boy is a lion'. When the word *iva* is used as in *krandatīva gāyati* = 'he sings as though he screams', it is not identification, but comparison based on difference. Hence the comparison does not relate to the action but to the accessories. In *limpatīva tamo'ṅgāni* = 'the darkness seems to smear the body', 'it is a case of *utprekṣā* and not *upamā*, because the object of comparison is not mentioned.]

Can there be comparison with an action through its accessories?

54. As what are connected with actions are known to be accessories, therefore there can only be superimposition and not comparison.

[Where there appears to be comparison through the accessories, there is superimposition and not comparison. What are connected with actions are their accessories. Otherwise, there would be no relation between them. In the sentence: *parvataś calati* = 'the mountain moves', from the words we understand that the mountain is an accessory (agent) in the action of moving. If that is not possible in reality, the capacity to move is superimposed on the mountain which thus becomes the agent. We do not understand from the sentence that the mountain does something resembling movement. No comparison is understood. It is something like such sentences as *parvataṃ bhinatti* = 'he breaks the mountain' where no comparison is understood. Thus through the accessory also, there cannot be comparison with the meaning of a verb.]

Another reason why there cannot be comparison between two actions is now given.

55. A standard of comparison (*upamāna*) with all qualities complete, is used in regard to the object of comparison where they are found in a lesser degree. All action, on the other hand, is found in a complete form in its substratum.

[A thing becomes a standard of comparison when it has the same qualities as the object of comparison but in a greater degree. All actions, on the other hand, rest completely in their substrata the accessories, they are all equal in this respect and so there is no comparison between them.]

56. The reason why one uses the expression 'it flies' in regard to a swan is found completely in an *āti* (sparrow?) also. Therefore there is no scope for comparison.

[When a swan moves with its wings, one says that it flies. The same is true in the case of an *āti* (sparrow?). The movement of each is complete in its own way. To compare the two movements would be like saying that a cow is like a cow. In the sentence: 'the sparrow flies like a swan', it is the two agents which

are compared and not their actions.]

Can there be comparison between two different kinds of actions?

57. No resemblance is seen in actions of different kinds. If an action is presented as a thing, it cannot be compared with another which is a process.

[The totally different actions like cooking and going cannot be compared because comparison is based on resemblance and there cannot be any between these two. An action, presented as a thing by a noun cannot be compared with an action presented as a process by a verb.]

Something is now going to be said about Being, external and internal, mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

58. Just as the essence of the same object differs according as one says : 'forest' or 'trees' on the basis of unity or difference, so is the case with Being, external and internal.

[The word *bhāva* has been used in the *śāstra* to express the meaning of a root, of primary suffixes like *ghañ* and of verbal suffixes. How do these notions, expressed by the same word, differ from one another? The *bhāva* which is the meaning of a root, is the internal one. It is characterised by unity and it cannot be differentiated by gender and number. The *bhāva* which is conveyed by suffixes like *ghañ* is the external one. It has the aspect of a thing. It can be differentiated by gender and number. The former has time as its attribute and not the latter. It can also be qualified by attributes of the accessory (agent) such as oneself and so on and of the result such as being for oneself and so on. Such is the difference between internal Being and external Being conveyed by the root and the suffix respectively. As to the Being which is conveyed by the verbal suffix in such words as *śayyate*, *sthiyate* it closely follows the meaning of the root and not of suffixes like *ghañ*. The Being which it conveys rests on itself (*svātmāvasthaḥ*) and is not connected with an accessory nor

with the fact of being a mere thing. But the Being conveyed by a root is definitely a process and so the verbal suffix in *śayyate* is not added merely in the sense of the root (*svārthika*), just as the first case-ending added to a stem (*prātipadika*) is not considered to be merely *svārthika*. As it follows the meaning of the root, it has association with time. It is always associated with an agent, so that it is external. Thus external *bhāva* is of two kinds: (1) That which is conveyed by a verbal suffix (2) that which is conveyed by a primary suffix. The *bhāva* expressed by a suffix like *tumun* is neither a thing nor a process. Repetition is not possible in the case of *bhāva* conveyed by a primary suffix, because it is an attribute of a process and not of a thing.]

The author now points out that the gender and number of the word 'bhāve' in P. 3.3.18 are not to be taken seriously.

59. The gender which is found in the general teaching 'bhāve' (in P. 3.3.18) is not meant to be taken seriously as the variations can be inferred.

[The meaning which is mentioned in the word *bhāve* can be expressed by primary suffixes coming at the end of nouns in no matter what gender. Pāṇini has used a word in masculine gender and singular number to teach this point. A noun has to have some gender and some number before it is used in a *sūtra* but it may not always be significant. That is the case in the word *bhāve*.]

60. In the word *bhāve* the gender is not significant as its purpose is only to help in the teaching (*nirdeśe caritārthatvāt*). As comparison is involved in it, the meaning of roots like *pac* is somewhat different from *bhāva* (Being, Action).

[The meaning of a stem (*prātipadika*) is in the nature of a thing and it can only be expressed by a word having some gender or other. At the time of the application of the *sūtra* P.3.3.18., the meaning of the word *bhāve* must be taken shorn of its gender. It also implies comparison, so that it means that

the notion expressed by the suffixes in question added to the different roots is like the notion conveyed by the word *bhāva*, formed from the root *bhū*. It means: Just as *bhāva* is the meaning of *bhū*, so is *pāka* that of *pac* and *tyāga* that of *tyaj* and this is the meaning of the suffix *ghaṇ*.]

Another way of looking at it is now being given.

61. The Being (or Existence) which is included in the meanings of roots like *pac* is all that is taught here (that is in P. 3. 3. 18) and it is not associated with any particular gender.

[It was said before that as all the particulars or individuals are included in the general which is actually taught, the gender and number used in the teaching are not significant. Here it is pointed out that the general persists even in the particulars and so it does not abandon its unity. Otherwise, it would not be the general at all. The general is not associated with a particular gender or number.]

62. The same notion, namely, Being is expressed differently by different words. Sometimes the genders of these words differ as in the case of the forms derived from the root *pac*.

[The notion for which the word *bhāva* stands is of a very general nature. The meaning of all roots, conceived of as a thing inheres in it. It is expressed by suffixes like *ghaṇ* each in its own way. So we get very general words like *bhāva*, *sattā* and so on. More particular words like *pāka*, *tyāga* and so on also express it in a more particularised way. Just as the general notion Being is diversified by particularised notions denoted by words like *pāka*, *tyāga* etc., in the same way, a particular notion is also diversified by the different words which can express it. For example, the notion expressed by the word *pāka* is diversified by the words *paktiḥ* and *pacanam* which are derived from the same root and have the same meaning but have different genders. In spite of these two different kinds of differentiation, the common

element persists in all of them and includes all the particulars within it. But the particular cannot appropriate the whole of the universal for itself. As the *Mahabhāṣya* puts it: *bhavati* includes the whole of *pacati* but *pacati* does not appropriate *bhavati* to itself. (*yaccātra pacater bhavati bhavati na tad bhavateḥ pacatir bhavati*) (*M. Bhā.* II, p. 144, 1.21).]

How the same thing appears in different forms in regard to different things is now explained by an illustration.

63. Just as the same person is a teacher or a maternal uncle in regard to different related persons, so is the case with the notions expressed by the words *pakti* and *bhāva*.

[The same thing can be *sāmānya* (the universal) in regard to one thing and *viśeṣa* (particular) in regard to another thing. In regard to different kinds of cooking, cooking in general is the universal. In regard to *bhāva*, cooking is the particular. Just as the same person is maternal uncle to one and teacher to another.]

SECTION 9

ON TIME

Time has been enumerated after action (section 6.1.). It determines action. Its nature has been declared by others as follows :

1. Some have declared Time to be a substance (*dravya*) one, different from action, eternal, all-pervasive, something which measures things in action.

[The *Vaiśeṣikas* think of Time as an eternal entity, one and all-pervasive. It is different from action and it measures action.]

2. *Diṣṭi*, *prastha*, *suvarṇa* etc. serve to differentiate (measure) concrete objects. Time differentiates action and number differentiates everything.

[*Diṣṭi*, *vitasti* etc. are measurements of length; *prastha* *droṇa* are measurements of volume; *suvarṇa*, *niṣka* and *pala* are measurements of weight. Time is the means of measuring such immaterial things as action. It is Time which measures the course of the sun and we get such expressions as *māsa* (month), *samvatsara* (year) etc. Number measures material as well as immaterial things. We say 'two jars' 'many souls' 'two actions', one *vitasti*, two hands (*hasta*). Number can measure number also. That is why we can say: 'two twenties' 'five fifties' etc.]

3. It is Time, differentiated (though one) which has been declared to be the cause of the origin, existence and destruction of objects which go through these states.

[Time is the cause of the birth, existence and decay of everything, according to its own nature. Some things are born

in Spring, others in autumn, and others in the rainy season. The same thing can be said about existence and death.]

4. Time has been called the wire-puller of the world Machine. It regulates the universe through prevention and permission.

[Time may be likened to the wire-puller (*sūtradhāra*) who pulls the wires of the machine-man, namely, the universe. It is due to Time that there is sequence of things in this universe. Some things appear at a particular time while other things do not appear at that time.]

5. If it does not prevent and if it does not lift the prohibition, there would be confusion in the states of things, being devoid of sequence.

[If Time does not prevent some things from appearing at a particular time, if all things were born at the same time, there would be confusion and the whole edifice of causality would crumble.]

6. Due to association with divisions of other things, it is differentiated in many ways. Nothing is one or differentiated in itself.

[Time is one, but it is differentiated due to association with the different actions of the objects of the universe. The actions of objects are the associates of Time and it assumes distinctions due to this association. All differentiation in objects is due to external factors.]

7. Nothing is one or many, nothing is white or non-white in itself. It is due to association with other things that substance appears in this way or that.

[Pure substance, devoid of any association, cannot enter into worldly transaction. When properties like unity inhere in

it, it is spoken of as one etc. When qualities like white and black inhere in it, it is described as white or black. If universals like cowness inhere in it, it is said to be a cow etc. In the same way, due to association with actions like being born and so on, Time is differentiated and one speaks about birth-time, existence-time, destruction-time and so on.]

8. Divisions in its associates are thought of as its own divisions. Being thus differentiated, Time leads to divisions in conventional measurements (*vyavasthānam*).

[Movements of the Sun, of the planets and the stars are the associates of Time. Due to differentiation in them, different measurements of Time result. Day and night, fortnight, month, season, age, era are the conventional measurements. The interval between the rising and the setting of the sun is a day. Night, fortnight, moment etc. are similarly conventionally defined.]

9. Due to association with particular times, realisation takes place. So it (Time) becomes the cause of the operation of powers.

[It is due to the march of Time that potentialities are realised. The potentialities produce their effects when they are urged on by Time. That is why Time is said to be the *nimitta-kāraṇa* (efficient cause) of all effects.]

10. The regulation of birth or manifestation depends upon the operation of the powers. The sustenance of an object is also regulated because that also depends upon the eternal (Time).

[The powers of the causes, when permitted by Time, either produce or manifest their effects. Once produced, the effect lasts a certain period of time. Sustenance is also regulated. Destruction also depends upon Time.]

11. The object which stays is influenced by others

associated with it. It is either prevented (from producing its effect.) or is hidden or is destroyed.

[While an object is sustained, it is influenced by other objects, some of which develop it while others cause its decay. An object is prevented from producing its effect at some times, sometimes it is hidden and sometimes it is destroyed.]

12. At every stage the activity of Time is discernible. Time is the very soul of the universe. Hence it is identified with activity itself.

[In the well regulated stages of birth, sustenance and destruction, the activity of Time is inevitable. So it runs like a thread right through everything in the universe. Being the cause of all activity, it is sometimes identified with Time itself.]

13. By it (Time), differentiated through its associates, the increase and decrease of all objects (*mūrtinām*) are distinctly observed as transformations.

[Through Time, all objects, animate or inanimate, undergo transformations in the form of increase or decrease, in a certain order. It is association with the actions of objects which differentiates Time which is really one. Eternal things are not affected by Time.]

It is now stated that the name *kāla* (Time) corresponds to its nature.

14. By means of activities similar to the turning of the water-wheel, the eternal and all-pervasive Time turns out (*kalayati*) all the fragments (*kalāḥ*=objects) and thus acquires the name of *kāla* (Time).

[The cyclic activities of Time resemble the turning of the water-wheel which is meant to draw water. That is why the seasons recur in a definite order and all objects emerge from their causes. What is really meant here is that the only true Being is *Parabrahman*. He has infinite powers through which he

produces all kinds of effects. He creates the effects in cycles (*kalayati*) and hence he is called *kāla*.]

15. He himself releases the various activities of the universe which he had previously restrained, as the hunter's string does to the bird-baits.

[Objects are attached to the string of Time, just as bird-baits are attached to the string of the hunter and are controlled by him.]

16. When the powers become mature due to association with a particular time, eternal activity is produced in them due to an inner urge.

17. In it, urged on by the universal, the manifestation of the particular takes place. By some wonderful activity, it is regulated by the powers.

[The world is created for the experience of the creatures. At the time of Dissolution, the seeds of the next creation are already sown. Certain forces leading to the next creation become manifest in the atoms, according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* or in the *prakṛti* according to the *Sāṅkhyas*. When the eternal causes of products thus become endowed with the Powers leading to creation, there takes place in them a certain urge for mutual contact. It is this urge which is called *pravṛtti*. It is eternal action *nityā kriyā*. It is through this urge that the causes become active, enter into contact with one another and produce the effects. When this primitive urge becomes manifest, it is guided by the universals which seek an abode for themselves. Thus it is that particular effects are produced, possessing some universal or other. That is why the universal is said to be the prompter (*prayojaka*) of the primitive urge.]

What happens next is now stated.

18. Then the power called Inherence hides the difference. It brings about identity, as it were, between the objects and their causes.

[Thus the effects or objects are produced and though they are different from their causes, they are unified through Inherence (*samavāya*). That is why some thinkers do not accept that the effect is quite different from the cause.]

19. Further, after the determination of the effect all the prompting universals, manifest themselves in it, like reflections in clear water.

[The prompting universals inhere in the effects at the time of their birth. They appear to be identical with the effect in which they inhere. By *sarvāḥ*, what is meant is that in an object like, say, a jar, it is not only *ghaṭatva* which inheres but also the universals *sattā*, *dravyatva* and *pṛthivītvā*.]

20. Then the qualities, being preceded by their causes and closely following them, become perceptible in the effects and become the cause of the manifestation of their own universals.

[As the qualities are the effects of the substances, their production takes place at the next moment. For one moment, therefore, the effect is devoid of any quality. Once the qualities are produced, they manifest their own universals. Thus all objects are created and all this is due to the power called Time, the essence of which is that it is temporal order.]

21. The eternality of the substrata and that of what inheres in them helps the particulars (the individuals) and thus their continuity results.

[The causes of the individuals, the particulars, are their eternal substrata. As the latter do not perish, the former have continuity. Thus the eternality of causes like atoms helps the particulars by giving them continuity. Otherwise, if their substrata perish, they cannot continue.]

Like its birth, its continuity also depends on others.

22. As the transitory depends upon others for its birth, so does it for its continuity. Otherwise, it

would be born only to perish. That is why it has been declared that, depending upon something else, it continues to exist.

[Just as the effect depends upon its causes for its birth, in the same way, it depends upon them for its continued existence. But for their support, it would perish at once. It is not enough for a thing to be born. It must also continue to exist for some-time if it is at all to fulfil its purpose.]

23. The object which continues to exist becomes capable of fulfilling various purposes with the help of cooperating objects. Without accepting the existence of these objects, things born cannot perform any activity.

[An object which continues to exist is capable of fulfilling some purpose with the help of other cooperating objects. Nothing does anything by itself. It does so only on the basis of the existence of cooperating objects. As it comes into contact with different cooperating objects, it fulfils various purposes and this is what is meant by continuity. The function of Time called 'permission' (*abhyanuñā*) extends up to the continuity of an object.]

The function of Time called 'Prevention' is now going to be explained.

24. The power of Time called 'old age' opposed to its other powers, prevents the capacity of objects to fulfil various purposes. Then arise properties which are opposed to that capacity.

[When objects are no longer able to fulfil their purposes, that is also due to Time. It is due to its other function called 'prevention' (*pratibandha*). By it, the capacities of objects are obstructed. Opposite attributes like dullness in the case of sentient beings, make their appearance.]

25. Those cooperating or prompting objects

which were the causes of continuity now disappear. Hence its essence comes to an end.

[All the helping objects which formerly enabled it to fulfil its purposes now disappear like ungrateful friends and it loses its essential nature. That is, it perishes.]

26. Just as, in some wonderful way, it is the sequenceless, the causeless and the ineffable which is born, the same is true of its destruction.

[It has already been said at the time of the explanation of the doctrine of *vivarta* (*sambandhasamuddeśa*, 81 with Helārāja's commentary) that it is the sequenceless, the causeless and the ineffable which is born. The same is true of destruction also.]

Thus, the birth, continued existence and the decay of objects are due to Time.

Another circumstance which enables us to infer Time is now going to be mentioned.

27. How can two actions, resting on two different things and coming to an end after being initiated be similarly determined without their being connected with a common entity?

[There is another circumstance which enables us to infer the existence of Time. Action is something which is composed of parts arranged in a sequence. All sequence is an attribute of Time. We can say of a piece of cloth or of a jar that it was made slowly. The epithet 'slow' is thus applied to the making of both these things. The productions of these two things are, two different actions and yet we apply the same epithet 'slow' to both of them. The things made are not the same, the makers are not the same and the actions are not the same because they rest on two different things. And yet the epithet 'slow' is applied to both, which shows that there is something which enables us

to apply the same epithet to both. That something is Time. It is in relation to that that actions are slow or quick.]

28. Just as the weight of different objects is measured by the balance or by the hand of experts. so is action measured by Time.

[Time is the means of measuring actions, just as the weight of objects is measured in a balance or in the hand of experts.]

29. It passes (*jahāti*) the actions associated with it just as rice seeds abandon water. Hence it is called *hāyana* (year).

[Time is One. As it passes various actions during a certain period, it is called *hāyana*=that which passes or abandons. (See P. 3.1.148) The rice seed is also called *hāyana* because it abandons the water which was associated with it.]

30. Through its eternal activity consisting of prevention and permission, it is differentiated and it assumes the form of sequence.

[When the powers of the accessories of an action are suspended, there is prevention. The opposite of that is permission. The activity of Time in regard to objects is characterised by these two states. As objects are constantly changing something is always being produced and something else is always perishing. This sequence which really belongs to the objects is attributed to Time. Sequence is primarily a property of actions but it is attributed to something else.]

31. Time which is one becomes good or bad (*sama* or *viṣama*) when it attains excellence or degeneracy due to difference in the agents of the different modes of behaviour.

[When human beings act according to the injunctions of *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, then that period of time attains excellence and

it is called the *Kṛta* age. When human beings indulge in licentious conduct, then that period of time attains degeneracy and it is differentiated because of difference in the behaviour of human beings.]

32. Just as the same individual is called carpenter etc. according to the work which he does, in the same way, due to difference in activity, Time which is One gets the names of the different seasons.

[Because of difference in activity consisting in the production of different kinds of flowers and so on, Time, which is One, is called by different names such as Spring, Summer and so on.]

The author now speaks of other artificial divisions.

33. Of the object which is and which is not, by the superimposition of different attributes, one speaks about conception, execution and completion.

[Before its birth, a thing is not. Once it is conceived as one mentally, different times are attributed to it because of different attributes. Having conceived of a thing, to collect the necessary material for bringing it about is to be in the beginning-time. The actual making of that for which the material has been collected is to be in the execution-time. The finishing of it takes place in the completion-time.]

34. This is the same for a binary etc. as for the Himālaya. The object, as a whole, has neither differentiation nor increase.

[As the whole is indivisible, these different times are the same for all objects. Parts are different from the whole. Magnitude is a quality and is different from the whole. Because of difference in quality, the whole cannot increase or decrease. As the whole remains the same, it cannot bring about any difference in the three times of big or small objects.]

35. Increase is attributed to the whole on account

of the parts which are different from it. Thus one whole is understood as having been made quickly and another whole slowly.

[Because of a larger or a smaller number of parts, a thing is said to be big or small. That, which has a larger number of parts is made more slowly than one which has a smaller number of them. Therefore, the beginning time etc. of these different wholes appear to differ. As the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) hides the difference between the parts and the whole, the latter is named after the attributes of the former. In reality, the three times of the different wholes remain the same.]

36. That which is not has no sequence, it cannot be differentiated. The essence of that which is remains always the same.

[Before a thing was born, it was not. It had no being. It had, therefore, no sequence in it. No distinction could be made within it. And the essence of a thing that is always remains the same.]

Not only the distinction of the seasons, that of the past, present etc. also is due to difference in action.

37. Conditioned by action, Time attains the states of past, future and present, divided into eleven forms.

[Time, conditioned by an action which, after having been initiated, is over, is called the past. When conditioned by actions whose accessories are present and which are expected to be initiated soon, it is called the future. When conditioned by actions, which have been initiated but not finished, it is called the present. These three, when subdivided, become eleven in number.]

38. The past is of five kinds, the future of four kinds and the present of two kinds. Thus there are eleven varieties.

[Past in general, *adyatana*=immediate (lit. 'of today'), *anadyatana*=not immediate, including *parokṣa*=distant, *adyatanānadyatanasamudāya*=combination of the two previous ones and secondary (*gaṇa*) past, that is, future treated as past—these make up the five kinds of past. Future in general, *adyatana*=immediate future, *anadyatana*=not immediate future and *adyatanānadyatanasamudāya*=combination of the two previous kinds, these make up the four kinds of future. Primary present, and secondary present (that is, past and future treated as present, these are the two kinds of present. These divisions of time have been mentioned only to explain the tense distinctions mentioned in the Science of grammar.]

How can action which is past give Time its name ?

39. Objects, after having deposited in Time their particular form determined by Intelligence, after having transferred their powers to it, disappear.

[The objects produced by the action, which is past are preserved in memory. The objects preserved in memory are called past objects, and it is they which give the name 'past' to the time when they were produced. The objects deposit in eternal time the form which they had when they were present. They are then said to be remembered. The very fact that things are remembered is a proof of the existence of Time.]

How then to explain the name future ?

40. The form of objects to come and their reflection in the mind as on a well-polished mirror can be explained only on assuming the existence of Time.

[The fact that we can conceive of objects yet to come is also a proof of Time. Objects yet to come are reflected in Time as in a well-polished mirror. Thus Time is the background or the cause of everything in the universe.]

41. Just as the current of a river tosses about

grass, leaves and creepers, in the same way, Time brings about changes in objects.

[Just as the current of a river displaces some things and puts others back in their place, in the same way, the ever active Time creates objects and brings about changes in the created objects.]

42. Just as the force called 'Air' (*vāyu*) after having entered, as it were (the joints of the body) regulates the function (*gatiḥ*) of all organs (*gatimatām*), in the same way, Time brings about sequence in things.

[Just as the air called *Prāṇa* enters as it were the joints of the body and regulates movements like coming and going, in the same way, Time, by means of its two functions namely, prevention and permission brings about sequence.]

43. Therefore the division of the year into the two courses of the Sun (*ayana*), the fixed movement of the celestial bodies and the origin and destruction of all beings are due to Time.

[The two courses of the Sun are called *Uttarāyana* and *Dakṣiṇāyana*, the northward course lasting six months and the southward course lasting the remaining six months. The creation and destruction of objects, denoted by the two words *sarga* and *pralaya*, are also due to Time.]

44. The transformations of objects following the operation of Time are really what the constellations are. The celestial bodies are only their symbols.

45. Time, the abode of the seasons, is also determined by the noises made by animals and birds, by the condition of the inanimate world and by the changes in light and shade.

[It is determined by various signs. What are called constellations or stars are only symbols of changes in objects, taking place due to Time. The seasons may be looked upon as the abode of Time, because it appears as the seasons. The power called 'Freedom' of the Brahman is really Time and it appears diversified as the different seasons like Spring etc. It is through this Freedom that Time appears diversified as the seasons with their different special features.]

Now the place of Time in Monism is pointed out.

46. This appearance of the Universe which is really without sequence as something with sequence is the work of Time.

[It was said in the section on *Sambandha* [that the universe is a *vivarta*, an unreal manifestation of Brahman which, in reality, is without any sequence. It is due to the power called *Kāla* that the universe appears to have sequence.]

It is now pointed out that other distinctions of Time are also only contingent divisions.

47. Just as the distinction of far (long) and near (short) relates to time, in the same way, that of fast and slow relates to Time.

[It is like one and the same stretch of road appearing as long or short to two different people or one and the same span of time appearing as slow or quick to two different people.]

48. Of this Time which is One, three divisions as it were, are brought about in actual practice by actions, three divisions which the world cannot ignore.

[Just as the Universe is without sequence but appears to have it, in the same way, Time is One but appears to have three divisions, namely, past, present and future.]

49. Time which is One has three powers on account of which the appearance and disappearance of objects takes place.

[These are really three powers of Time and it is due to these three powers that things appear and disappear. If diversity of effects can be explained by diversity of powers of the cause, there is no need to postulate a plurality of causes.]

50. Time hides objects with the help of two of these powers and it is the power called Present which manifests objects.

[Of these three powers, Past and Future hide objects whereas the Present reveals them.]

51. The power called Future does not stand in the way of birth but the power called Past does stand in the way of it.

[The power called Future does not stand in the way of the power called Present which is associated with the birth of objects. What is called Future is something which in time, will become present. But the power called Past does stand in the way of the power called Present. What is past is past. It does not become present whereas it is what was future which, in time, becomes present.]

52. These three paths are like light and shade and they are without sequence. In them objects acquire sequence.

[The three divisions of Time, namely, Past, Future and Present are like three paths. Just as walkers are constantly going on paths, in the same way, objects are seen operating and undergoing transformations on these paths. That is what is stated in the *Vyāsaśāstra* on *Yogasūtra* III.13. Even though these three powers exist in Time at the same time without any sequence, still they operate on objects like light and shade, hiding them or manifesting them according to necessity and thus bring about their sequence. In this respect, they are like the three *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of *Prakṛti* which are always present but operate through coordination.]

53. Of these three, two are like darkness and one like light. According to some, that which is past does come back.

[The Past and the Future hide objects and so they are called 'darkness'. It is the function of darkness to hide, as the *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* 13 says. The Present enables us to see the objects and so it is like light or the *sattva guṇa* of the Sāṅkhyas as the same *Kārikā* declares. *Rajas* which stands for activity is Time itself, in general. In the *Brahmadarśana*, there is no contradiction in looking upon Time which is a power as a transformation of the three *guṇas*.]

54. The qualified (*taddharma*), according to some, becomes the present at the same time. Having become present, it similarly becomes the past also.

[So far, the *dharmī* and the *dharmas* have been assumed to be different. It was pointed out that the *dharmī* is something which persists and that the *dharmas* come and go or follow the three divisions of Time. But it is possible to look upon the two as identical and regard the same *dharmī* as acquiring three different names through its *dharmas*. In other words, the same thing can be looked upon as past, present and future at the same time in relation to this *dharma* or that, which may be past, present or future.]

The past and the present being opposites, how can both of them be present in the same thing ?

55. When its causes are active and functioning, a thing becomes present and when its causes have stopped functioning, it is not visible any more.

[When the causes are all ready and mature and produce their effect, then the object becomes manifest, does its work and is said to be present. When the causes cease to function and the object has also fulfilled its work, it becomes invisible and is said to be past. When the causes of an object are not yet ready

to produce it, it is said to be in the future. Thus one and the same thing acquires different names on the basis of external circumstances according to the presence or absence of purposeful activity. If what does purposeful activity only really exists, how can what is past be said to exist, considering that it cannot perform purposeful activity? The answer is that the fulfilment or purposeful activity is not the test of existence.]

It is now stated that some thinkers accept only two powers of Time and not three.

56. According to some, all-pervasive Time has only two powers or paths by means of which it brings about the emergence or disappearance of objects.

[The invisibility of objects is common to both previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) and destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*). In both cases, it is the same power which brings it about and that power is called prevention (*pratibandha*). The second power is that which makes objects visible and that is called *abhyanujñā* (permission). Those who hold this view do so because they think that it is simpler to postulate two powers instead of three. *Pratibandha* results in the future and the past and *abhyanujñā* results in the present.]

The following *karikā* No.57 should read as follows and not as printed in my edition.

*Kalābhiḥ prthagarthābhiḥ pravibhaktam svabhāvataḥ |
kecid buddhyanusaṃhāralakṣaṇam taṃ pracakṣate ||*

57. Some think that the parts of an action are naturally separated from one another and that Time is their unification by the mind.

[So far Time has been declared to be really One and indivisible but acquiring divisions through its associates of which action is the chief one. In fact, it is from its associates that we get the notion of Time. We cannot see it directly. It is its associates and its effects which we can see. But some people point

out that this postulate called Time may be dispensed with and that everything may be explained with the help of these associates. Time is only a construction of the mind. The different points of an action are united by the mind and this mental unification becomes the cause of such expressions as 'quick' and 'slow'. There is nothing corresponding to quick and slow outside the mind.]

58. Whether it is only something having an existence in the mind or whether it has an existence outside the mind, expression in words is not possible without recourse to the notion of Time.

[Whether Time is only a mental construction or whether it has an existence outside the mind, speech, that is, expression in words is not possible without the help of the notion of Time. Bhartṛhari is not concerned with the determination of Time philosophically. He is only concerned with the notion which is the basis of tense distinctions in the Sanskrit language as in the verbs : *abhūt*, *asti*, *bhaviṣyati*.]

59. According to some, every object has three powers. Through these powers, every object always is or is not.

[Different thinkers explain this notion differently. According to some, all objects being made up of the three *guṇas*, namely, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, have three powers and what is called Time is not different from these powers. Things are said to exist or not to exist as these powers become manifest or do not.]

60. These three powers are really not different from existence. They are also sequence. Existence and non-existence, being not different from these powers, do not differ from each other.

[What is called sequence is nothing more than these three powers of objects. Through these powers, things appear or disappear. Manifestation of objects and their withdrawal,

these are the two functions of these powers. In fact, non-existence is nothing more than non-manifestation. There is really no difference between existence and non-existence. They are only two states of the same thing.]

61. It is the same thing which, through manifestation and non-manifestation, is seen or not seen. The paths are not the same. Nothing is really destroyed.

[Through the power called the Present, there is manifestation, perception and experience. Through the powers called Past and Future, there is hiding, non-perception and absence of experience. These two paths of perception and non-perception remain distinct, without any confusion. The thing which is now seen and now not seen remains the same. It is its attributes which come and go. As a thing is never completely destroyed but only hidden, there is, really speaking, no difference between existence and non-existence.]

62. The doctrine regarding Time differs according as it is looked upon as the power (of causality), the Self, or as a Deity, it is the first to appear in Nescience and it does not exist in true knowledge.

[According to Bhartṛhari, Time is the *Svātantryaśakti* of Brahman. His commentators explain that Time is nothing more than causality. The power called seed allows the emergence of the sprout and prevents the emergence of the stalk. So it is called *kāla*. Similarly the power called 'sprout' allows the emergence of the next stage but not the one next to that. So it is called *kāla* and so on. But this is not correct. Objects have their special causes and they are produced when these special causes are present, otherwise not. So the production of effects certainly depends upon the capacity of the causes. But the effect comes only at particular times and not at other times and so it is different from the causes. The objects which are produced appear in a certain sequence. *Kālaśakti* which is essentially sequence is a condition of all objects. The Lord who manifests

the objects also manifests them in a sequence. So what is called Time is a *śakti* of Brahman. Others think of *kāla* as a Deity, having a form and great power. But this view is in conformity with the view that it is the *svātantryaśakti* of Brahman. Thus the accepted view of the grammarians in regard to Time may be stated as follows: Due to *avidyā*, there is, first of all, appearance of diversity. Diversity is temporal and spatial. The former comes first. Consciousness, at the stage called *paśyanti* is without any sequence. When it becomes associated, with *prāṇavṛtti*, it appears to have sequence due to Time. Brahman is without sequence and is not affected by Time as long as there is true knowledge (*vidyā*). Through *avidyā*, it assumes sequence and appears as many for the *jīvātmā*, objects appear in a sequence due to Time. All diversity is due to *avidyā*. Once *vidyā* dawns, all diversity disappears and Time also disappears.]

How can the conception of Time explained above and meant to account for diversity and sequence in transitory things be adequate to explain difference in eternal things?

63-64. If the Time being one, differences, which appear in short long and protracted vowels are like those in cognitions of quick and slow, how can the increase in the flow of liquid etc. which takes place in the utterance of the short, long and protracted be due to mere attribution through courtesy?

[Articulate words are really eternal but distinctions of Time are attributed to them. Short, long and protracted vowels do not really differ from one another in Time, but temporal distinctions in the suggestive elements are attributed to them, just as there is no distinction based on Time between the two cognitions which find expression in the words: *kṣīpram idaṃ kṛtam*, *ciram idaṃ kṛtam* = 'this was done quickly,' 'this was done slowly.' They differ in their objects only and not in themselves. This is the accepted view. But here a difficulty arises. It is well-known that when a short vowel is repeated, there is only a little flow of liquid from the tube and that when a long vowel is repeated, there is 33½% more flow of liquid and that when a pro-

tracted vowel is repeated, there is another $33\frac{1}{3}\%$ more flow. How is this possible, if there is no real distinction of Time between the three? Greater flow of water means greater lapse of time. If the distinction is wrongly attributed, it cannot explain a real difference in the quantity of water which flows. A wrongly attributed distinction cannot lead to a real difference in activity. Therefore short, long and protracted vowels seem to have real, temporal distinction.]

The above objection is answered as follows:

65,66,67. By increase in the manifesting elements, an increase in the essence of the word is imagined (*pratīyate*) though it is essentially incapable of increase.

Similarly, as articulate words, there is no difference between $1/4$ of a *mātrā* and the collection of Rks consisting of ten parts (*daśataya*), on the basis of their difference in their duration.

The sounds which are found in the interval as a sort of reverberation are the means whereby listeners perceive (distinctions in the speed of utterance.)

[The word has differentiations like short, long etc. and yet it is said to be eternal and, therefore, devoid of differentiation based on Time. The fact is that the suggestive or manifesting elements of the word, namely, the *dhvanis*, have distinctions based on Time. They can be of greater or lesser quantity. As the listener does not cognise the manifested word as distinct from the manifesting elements, distinctions based on Time are attributed to the word also. The primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvani*) heard as identical with the word, presents the latter as having distinctions based on time which really belong to themselves. The suggestive and the suggested, the manifesting and the manifested elements are not separately cognised. It has already been said that the word is most clearly cognised together with the last sound. As the cognition of the word depends on that of the manifesting elements, the properties of the latter are attributed to the former and that explains the difference in the flow of the

water from the tube. In P.1.1.70, there is superimposition of the property of the sound on the word. Difference in speed caused by the secondary sounds makes no difference to the word itself. Not only difference based on time such as short, long etc. but also such distinctions as nasal and non-nasal really belong to the manifesting elements. Even a wrongly attributed difference can explain the difference in the flow of water because the manifesting and the manifested elements are not separately cognised. The analogy of the cognitions 'quickly done' and 'slowly done' does not hold good here because the relation between a cognition and its object is not the same as the relation between the manifesting sounds and the phoneme. The form of the object and that of cognition are distinctly perceived but the manifesting sounds and the phoneme are cognised as one.]

Now the author continues to explain the merely contingent division of Time.

68. Taking this or that particular thing as the limit, the one Time is divided into moment, month, season etc. in order to measure things.

[As was explained above, Time is One and eternal. It has no divisions of its own. But divisions in its associates are attributed to it. Taking this thing or that as the limit, it is divided into moment, month, season and so on.]

69. Moment, era and age are divisions of particular lengths of the one Time, made at the worldly level, by different constructions of the mind.

[Mentally, we unify a certain number of points and give it a particular name such as month, day, year and so on. But this is purely mental.]

70. The flow of water, through the hole of the tube (*nālikā*) by means of prevention and permission, is itself the work of Time.

[According to some, Time is nothing more than these

mental constructions. For some, the flow of water in the machine for measuring Time is itself Time. But there is something which makes some of the water flow and not all at a particular time and that is Time which is, therefore, different from the flow. Time measures the flow.]

71. Whether the hole is big or small the function of Time is not diversified through contact with it. And yet the essence (of Time) follows it.

[Whether the hole through which the water escapes is small or big does not affect the activity of Time, namely, prevention and permission. Time is One and yet it has variations based upon the size of the particular hole through which water passes. If the hole is small, the water takes naturally a longer time to pass through. Prevention and permission are functions of Time but they are conditioned by other factors also. Whether the sprout should come out of the seed or not depends upon Time but not on Time only. Also on the soil manure etc. Similarly, that only a certain amount of water can go through the hole in the jar is determined by Time, but not by Time only. It is also determined by the size of the hole etc. Cause and Time together produce the effect. There is no use, therefore, of trying to eliminate either of them.]

72. It is through the play of Time, having many powers, among the objects that it becomes diversified.

[As objects depend upon Time, the latter plays with them as with toys, manifests them or suppresses them according to its will and in the process, assumes diversity such as present time, past time etc.]

73. By bringing about the growth of the bamboo (in a short time) and that of the palm (very slowly), Time, by association with such diversity, becomes diversified.

[Bamboo attains maturity quickly while the palm tree takes a long time to do so. We can speak about bamboo growth time and palm growth time. In this way Time becomes diversified.]

74. The passing-away of objects does not bring about the passing away of Time. The road is not affected by any difference in the movement of the people who walk on it.

[Time is the substratum on which objects and their conditions play. The latter may come and go but the substratum remains the same. The path remains the same even though walkers and their movements pass away. When we speak about the end of seasons, what we mean is the end of the activities associated with the seasons. The period which is the substratum of these activities remains the same because Time is eternal.]

75. Though Time is not affected by the well-known rising and setting of the celestial bodies, it appears to be so affected.

[Sometimes we speak as if Time is affected by these changes but that is only a way of speaking. We say that the day is over, the night is past, the summer is over and so on, but all these changes do not really affect Time.]

76. Some knowers of Time declare that Time is nothing more than the different movements of the celestial bodies such as the Sun, the planets, the stars, etc.

[Some declare that what is called the day is the course of the Sun beginning from its rise till its setting. From its setting till its rise again is what is called night. These two repeated fifteen times, make up a fortnight (*pakṣa*) when repeated thirty times, they make up a month. The passing of all the *nakṣatras* by the moon constitutes a month. When *Brhaspati* crosses one *rāśi*, it is equal to a year. Similar movements of other celestial

bodies, described in *Jyautiṣa* constitute such divisions as *ṭuga*, *Manvantara*, *Kalpa*, *Mahākālpa*, etc.]

77. An action whose measurement is known, when used for measuring some other action, becomes Time in relation to that action.

[The known movement of any of the celestial bodies taken as the standard for measuring the movements of other objects, becomes Time. Thus Time is a standard of measurement. It helps to measure other things.]

78. The forms of some actions enter into cognition. These forms are unified by some other cognition. In the absence of any other action, this action is called Time.

[Even one whose gaze is turned inward or who is within a closed room and cannot, therefore, watch the course of the Sun or the flow of water, can measure Time. One whose gaze is turned inward cognises some movements like those of his breathing as reflected in cognition. He unifies these cognitions by means of another. That unified cognition is action. Even though nothing external is cognised, this unified cognition becomes Time for him. When many such cognitions take place, through them, he measures outward events as having lasted a long time. When only a few of them take place, he measures outward events as having lasted a short time. When only a few of them take place, he measures outside events as having taken place quickly. It is well-known that Yogis can measure events through the movements of their *Prāṇa*.]

79. In the expression, 'the jar is past' (*bhūto ghaṭaḥ*) it is the existence of the jar which is said to be past. In the expression 'the existence is past' (*bhūtā sattā*) the existence of existence is expressed as past.

[When we say *bhūto ghaṭaḥ*, using a suffix expressive of the past tense, what is really past? Not the jar, because it is a sub-

stance and so it has no connection with time. Actions are *sādhyā*, that is, processes and so they are connected with time. The action called 'existence' or 'being', expressed by the root, is connected with the meaning of the suffix *kta*. The *sattā* exists in the jar. Thus it is indirectly connected with the jar and not directly with substance and time. Even according to the view that Time is different from action, there is connection between time and substance through action. In the sentence *bhūtā sattā*, the *sattā* expressed by the root is in the form of action and the *sattā* expressed by the word *sattā* is in the form of a substance. Therefore, the pastness of the latter is understood through the pastness of the former. Even though *sattā* is eternal, it assumes diversity through its substrata and becomes associated with the three aspects of time through its substrata.]

80. Everything acquires distinction through other things. In itself, nothing has distinction. The existence of mountains etc. is therefore, diversified through other things.

[Everything in the world is measured by other things. Nothing in itself has distinction. All distinction in things is in relation to other things. Even the existence of things like mountains can be spoken of in relation to time. We can say: Mountains existed, exist and will exist. For bringing distinctions in the existence of mountains, we make use of the actions of past, present and future Kings as the basis. The actions of Kings are well-known and so they are used as the basis for diversifying the action of mountains etc.]

81. Well-known actions (like actions of Kings, cooking, cutting etc.) have dissimilar parts. Through association with them, actions having similar parts are diversified.

[Actions like cooking, cutting etc. have dissimilar parts. Therefore, they have distinctions of Time. Putting the vessel on the fire etc. are the dissimilar parts of the action called cooking.

Lifting the axe etc. are the dissimilar parts of the action called cutting. The action of a mountain, expressed by the root *sthā* in *parvatas tiṣṭhati* has no dissimilar parts. Its parts are similar to one another. Because they are similar, it is difficult to have distinctions of time in them, to regard some parts as past and others as present. Therefore, distinctions of time are attributed to them on the basis of the distinctions which are clearly visible in such actions having dissimilar parts as the actions of contemporary kings or the movements of celestial bodies. The *Mahābhāṣya* mentions actions of Kings because they are more famous. Such actions which become the measurements of other actions are here looked upon as *ādhāra*—basis. The action of a mountain expressed by the root *sthā*, though an eternal one and therefore, really free from distinctions of time, seems to have sequence because of its association with other contemporary actions having real sequence. If, from the verb '*tiṣṭhati*' used in connection with a mountain, a meaning involving sequence is somehow understood, that meaning becomes action, because for Grammarians, it is the meaning of a word which is *artha* and nothing which is beyond it.]

82. A combination of various acts like eating appears to be interrupted or stopped by other actions coming in between.

83. Though interrupted, it is not yet finished because the ultimate result is not there. All action appears to be mixed with other actions.

84. All intervening action may also be looked upon as part of the original action, because of resemblance to the other parts.

[Actions like eating consist of many parts arranged in a sequence and these parts seem to be interrupted by totally different actions such as laughing and talking. Up to satisfaction, the action of eating is one and though other actions may come in between the parts of eating, the action of eating taken as a whole

is considered uninterrupted. Only the parts are interrupted and not the whole. The whole seems to be interrupted too because one ignores the parts which are yet to come. Really speaking, the action of eating goes on till one is satisfied. Not only eating, laughing and talking can also be similarly interrupted. Even winking can be interrupted by breathing. Thus all actions seem to be mixed up with and interrupted by others, but in reality they are not, because they go on till the attainment of the fruit. Laughing and talking which come in between the parts of the act of eating must also be looked upon as parts of eating, just as sipping water etc. are so looked upon.]

85. A thing either is or is not. There is no third possibility. Therefore, excepting past and future, there is no middle course.

86. A thing, being free from distinctions cannot be in the nature of a sequence. How can one thing, whether it be existent or non-existent, be in the nature of sequence?

87. As many cannot co-exist, only one is perceived. And remembrance can only be according to perception.

88. If action is regarded as one, everything would be one, consisting of partly existent and partly non-existent elements.

Now follows the answer.

89. When it is perceived in its own form, that is, that which enables it to produce the fruit, that is its present time.

90. When the series of momentary acts is cognised within and is reflected in one act of cognition, that is said to be its one-ness and its present-ness.

[Action has been declared to be a process, a series of moments. The moment that is past is something which has been accomplished. As far as that moment is concerned, action is past. As far as the moment that is coming is concerned, action is still in the future. There cannot be a moment which is both past and future, existent and non-existent at the same time. Therefore action cannot be anything else than past or future. It cannot be present. Therefore, the meaning of a root cannot have present-ness as its attribute. How can a suffix expressive of the present also denote action which is not directly perceptible, but is to be inferred? What is called being present cannot be the same as the fact of being a sequence, a process. That which is can have no sequence and that which is not cannot have it either. And there is no third category. Therefore, there is no such thing as action consisting of sequence, much less what is called present action. Nor would it do to say that a large number of moments, arranged in a sequence, is action and that it would be called present till the production of the ultimate result. Because these moments cannot be simultaneous. Only one of them can be perceived at a time and that cannot have any sequence. Nor can we remember simultaneously a large number of moments perceived separately in a sequence. Because we never perceive the sequence and we cannot, therefore, remember it. We can only remember what we perceive. Nor would it do to look upon many moments as one action. Some of the moments are past, others are yet to come, that is, some are non-existent and others exist. How can one thing be composed of opposite elements? One is thus compelled to take another position, namely, that in the different moments, there is some common feature, which is action. This common feature can only be *nirvṛtti*, the fact or the fitness of being produced. Action would thus become a common feature existing in each moment and not a unity of a series of moments. There would be no *kriyā-vyakti* at all. Each moment would not be action.]

The above objection is answered as follows:

Action is One, a unification of moments. A sequence of moments, all having one purpose, is action. It is one, because it has only one purpose. Actions vary with purposes. Even though some moments are existent and the others are not, action can be said to be present also. The present should be defined as *prārabdhāparisamāptatvam*—‘the fact of having been begun but not yet finished. A sequence of moments, all leading to the same result, if looked upon as One, even before the result is produced, can be said to be present. It is this unity which can produce the result. Every moment in the sequence can be said to be present. The whole thing can also be looked upon as follows: When a series of moments is reflected in one cognition, it appears as one and as being present. There can be a mental unification of things which have been experienced in succession, because the impressions of what was experienced are still fresh. It is only in this way that one can explain the cognition of collections. That what is remembered must have been experienced before is accepted by all. What has been experienced in succession can, however, be remembered simultaneously.)

An objection is now raised to what is taught in P.3.3.139

91. The non-accomplishment of an action is its absolute non-production. Such a thing cannot be past or future.

[The author has so far explained how an action is sometimes spoken of as being ‘present’ in the *śāstra*. In P.3.3.139, non-accomplishment of an action is spoken of in relation to the past or the future. *lṛi* is taught instead of *lin* if there is past or future non-accomplishment of action to be expressed. For example: *suṃṣṭiś ced abhaviṣyat subhikṣam abhaviṣyat*—‘if there had been good rain, there would have been plenty of food’ or ‘if there would be good rain, there would be plenty of food.’ It is implied here that there was no good rain and, therefore, no abundance of food or that there would probably be no good rain and, therefore, no abundance of food either. It is objected here that what never took place is thought of as ‘past’ or that what might not take place at all is thought of as future. This is not logical.]

The objection is answered.

92. Before the happening of the opposite action or after the opposite has taken place, the matter is diversified according to difference in the limit.

[The answer is that their opposites which are positive actions do have reference to the past and the future and so these are also thought of as referring to the same. *Yadi kamalakam āhvāṣyaṇ na śakaṭaṃ paryābhaviṣyat*—‘if Kamalaka could be called, the cart would not be upset’. Somebody says this, knowing that the calling of Kamalaka and the cart not being upset will not be possible. Kamalaka cannot be called because he has gone elsewhere and the cart cannot but be upset because it is overloaded. The upsetting of the cart can take place because Kamalaka is not called; he cannot be called because he has gone elsewhere. If he is called, the cart will not be upset. In this situation, the calling is in the future. So its opposite, the not-calling is also thought of as being in the future.]

Now something is going to be said about P.3.4.1 which seems to teach a verbal suffix for expressing a tense, which, normally, is not its own.

93. When the particular circumstance (in which a suffix is taught) is absent, its use would not be correct. Therefore, the *sūtra* in question makes it expressive of another point of time also in the sentence *bhāvy āsīt*.

94. If a suffix is correct only when it expresses the particular point of time for which it is taught, how can it express another? When the suffixes are incapable of expressing other points of time, how can a single meaning with parts related by the relation of qualifier and qualified be understood from the sentence?

(Certain suffixes are taught as expressive of some points of

time. Sometimes, words ending in these suffixes are associated with words ending in suffixes expressive of other points of time. For instance, *gomān āsīt*. In *gomān*, the suffix *matuḥ* expresses the present time, the word *āsīt* expresses past time. How can the two words come together ? Pāṇini gives the answer to this question in the *sūtra*—*dhātusambandhe pratyayāḥ* (P.3.4.1.)—‘Suffixes express points of time other than their own when they are connected with (the meaning of) the roots with which they are associated.’ The author of the *vārttikas* does not think this *sūtra* necessary. According to him, suffixes can express other points of time when they enter into a sentence and become related as *viśeṣaṇa*=qualifiers to other suffixes expressive of other times. By writing this *sūtra*, Pāṇini has made matters rather difficult.]

95. The idea that which was future is no longer so would not be understood if (according to the *sūtra*) the suffix in *bhāvī* expresses the same point of time as in *āsīt*. Only the absolute past would be understood.

[On account of this *sūtra*, *bhāvī* also would express the past. The idea that what was future is no longer so would not be conveyed. That is conveyed only through the relation of qualifier and qualified, coming out of the sentence.]

96. Before (entering into a sentence), a suffix expresses the particular time for which it is taught. It continues to do so when it enters into relation with another word as a qualifier. The particular time which is the basis of the suffix is its inner circumstance. It will always express it.

[This does not mean that a suffix gives up its meaning when it enters into a sentence. Without ceasing to express its own time it follows the suffix of the verb by expressing the time of the latter. Its original tense is its basic, its inner circumstance. The suffix never gives it up. It is the original tense which is understood as going through a modification.]

97. The meaning of the individual word is already qualified (by those of other words). That is how it is taught. Meaning being eternal, it would not be right to believe that the unqualified word becomes qualified later.

[Grammar explains the word as it is actually used and it is the sentence which is actually used in daily transactions. Therefore, the sentence has to be explained. When the individual words are explained by grammar, the meaning which is taken as the basis of the explanation is one which is obtained by analysis of the meaning of the sentence. But it is a meaning which is fit to enter into relation with the meanings of other words in the sentence. This way of explaining the individual word is called *vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam*—‘explanation which keeps in view the use to which the word will be put in the sentence.’ In this explanation the meaning of every word is already potentially mixed or connected with the meanings of the other words in the sentence. If the word is explained without any reference to its connection with the meanings of other words, then its meaning becomes modified when it actually enters into the sentence and that affects the eternality of the relation between the word and the meaning.]

98. That which is taught as expressive of a simple tense would not be correct if made to express a complex one. Therefore the *sūtra* teaches the correctness of the suffix when it expresses a different tense.

[In the word *bhāvi*, the suffix *ṇini* is taught in the sense of the future. It cannot, therefore, express the future qualified by the past. P.3.4.1. makes this possible. That is why we can have sentences like *bhāvy āsīt*. Here the suffix in *bhāvi* expresses the future as qualified by the past.]

But why not say that the suffix in *āsīt* expresses the past as qualified by the future?

99. The idea expressed by the verb is the main one because it is a process. That which it calls forth is subordinate and follows its tense.

[Because, in a sentence, the meaning of the verb is more important than that of the noun. It is the former which is the *viśeṣya*—the qualified and the latter which is the *viśeṣaṇa*. Thus, in the sentence in question, the word *bhāvī*, without ceasing to express its own original meaning follows the meaning of the verb. The subordinate word was already capable of expressing the new meaning. That power became manifest only when it came into contact with the other word in the sentence.]

100. The form of the cognition or the power of the word is transferred to the future time which is the opposite. Therefore, there is no contradiction.

[Words express a meaning according to their *svabhāva*—‘their inner nature’ and no rule can change it. If a suffix, according to its *svabhāva*, expresses the past, it cannot express the future by a mere rule. But when a word enters into a sentence, its meaning is modified according to that of the other words in the sentence. What happens in a sentence like *agniṣṭomayājī asya putro bhavītā*=‘his son will become a performer of *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice’ is that our cognition relating to past time is superimposed on the future or the power of the words to convey their meaning is transferred to the future. The sentence would then mean: ‘the son who will be born, will, when he grows up, become fit to be called by the name : *agniṣṭomayājī*=a performer of *agniṣṭoma*. Thus there would be no contradiction.]

101. The two cognitions : ‘This is past’, and ‘that is future’, themselves present, assume the opposite forms of their objects without giving up their own form.

[The two cognitions: ‘this is past’ and ‘that is future’ are both present but their content is opposed to the present and yet it figures in them. In the same way, a word expressive of one

time can be coordinated with another time when it enters into a sentence as in *agniṣṭomayājī asya putro janitā*. What is superimposed on another does not lose its own form.]

102. The residual trace of the present or the resolution to begin, this is what is called 'nearness to the present'. It is mentioned separately in the *śāstra*.

[The author now explains what is meant by *varṭamānasāmīpya* = 'nearness to the present' in P.3.3.131. The residual traces in the mind of what is just finished or the resolution to start something is what is called 'nearness to the present'. The 'present' itself is the fact of something, having been begun but not yet finished. When there is only a residual trace or a mere resolution there is no bodily activity. Therefore, it is like the past or the future. The suffix expressive of the present can come only by special teaching and that is done in the *sūtra* : P.3.3.131.]

103. Even though hope is present, it is called future in the *Mahābhāṣya* for the purpose of grammar because of its future object.

[Another mental thing is hope (*āśaṃsā*). While it is there, it is present, though its object is in the future. The desire expressed by the suffix *san* in *cikīrṣati* is present though its object is in the future. The word is in the present tense because *san* is the more important element in the word. The hope is not expressed by the suffix. It expresses the object of hope.]

104. In the word *cikīrṣati*, 'desire' follows its own time. Even though the meaning of the base relates to the future, desire is not expressed by the future tense.

[The desire expressed by the suffix *san* in *cikīrṣati* is in the present though its object, namely, the act of doing is in the future. The word is in the present tense because *san* is the more important element in the word and desire is expressed by *san*.]

105. Just the opposite happens in the case of hope because it depends on its object. The words themselves impose a property of the speaker on the meaning of words.

[P.3.3.132 teaches the use of *laḥ* or *luṇ* instead of the future tense when hope is expressed. In the examples of the *sūtra*, hope is not expressed by the suffix. The suffix expresses the object of hope.]

106. When the meaning of *niṣpad* is the contact of water, plant and seed, this being only a part of the whole process, the future tense is prohibited.

[Another case of the use of a suffix to express a point of time other than its own is found in the sentence—*devaś ced vṣṭaḥ sampannāḥ śālayaḥ*=‘if it has rained, the grains are there.’ The grains have yet to grow but the past tense is used in the sense of the future. It is justified in many ways. Production of grain is nothing more than the contact of water, plant, and seed and that has taken place once the rain has fallen. The cause itself is looked upon as the effect and as the cause is already there, the past tense is used.]

107. When *niṣpad* has its real meaning of production of fruit, then it is attributed to the special properties (brought about by contact of water etc.) and the past tense is used (because these properties are already there.)

[If *niṣpad* is used in its full meaning, even then the past tense can be justified. The contact of water etc. produces some special properties in the causes, making them fit to produce the result. The result is attributed to, that is, superimposed on these special properties which being already there, the past tense is used.]

108. The function of the cause in the production

of the fruit is superimposed on the fruit. Therefore the latter is understood as having the former's time.

[Another way of justifying the past tense is this. Instead of the cause being looked upon as the effect, the cause and the effect are looked upon as one, just to bring out the great efficiency of the causes. So the time of the cause is used instead of that of the effect.]

109. Everyone has his own idea of the cause of production and the production of the fruit depends upon that of the cause.

[Every one has his own idea of what the cause is and everybody wants to emphasise what he considers to be the cause. Somebody thinks that the production of the grain depends only upon the contact between the seed and water. Another thinks that it depends upon sunshine etc. which take place later. Whatever it might be, it is past and, therefore, the fruit is also thought of as past. All this presupposes some kind of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the cause on the effect.]

110. When it is meant to be conveyed that the production of the result does not depend upon any external cause, it is declared to be already produced, just to exclude the necessity of other causes.

[It is usual in the world, when the inner essential cause is present, to disregard the need for external cause and to talk of the effect which is yet to be as though it is already there. Thus according to the speaker's intention, all the three tenses are used.]

111. As the idea of the cause differs, the past tense is used in its primary meaning. So are the future and the present tenses, according as this or that aspect of the cause is considered.

The author now says something about *vā.5* on P. 3.3.133.

112. The Being of things is differentiated according to sense-contact. It is due to other factors that the same thing is spoken of differently.

118. The mere existence of a thing is cognised by the mind. Any difference due to the contact of the senses is not then meant to be conveyed.

114. Or, due to association with masculinity and femininity, nothing remains the same. Past and future are, therefore, different (from such variations).

[The above three stanzas relate to a point which has been raised in the following *vārttika*—*astyarthānāṃ bhavanīy arthe sarva-vibhaktayaḥ kartur vīdyamānatvāt*. (*vā.* 5 on P.3.3.133, *M.Bhā* II. p.160, 1.10) = “all the tense-suffixes should be taught in the sense of the present after roots expressive of existence, because the agent is present.” The indication of the cause in ‘because the agent is present’ is to show that by ‘existence’ what is meant is the existence of the object at the time of the use of the word and as understood from the word and not real existence outside. In the expressions, *kūpo* ’*bhūt*, *abhavat*, *babhūva*, *bhaviṣyati*, *bhavitā*, the well which is the agent is present at the time of their use. By “being present” the fact of figuring in the mind now is meant.

This extension by the *vārttika* of the use of all the tense-affixes has been rejected on the ground that the use of all of them would in any case be possible and so there is no need to teach its extension. Each suffix is, however, used to express its own time and not to express the present. A proof of it is that they have no alternatives. If all of them have been used to express the present, it should be possible to use them as alternatives. But that cannot be done. Nor does one come across any misuse of them. Nobody says *kūpo bhaviṣyati* instead of *kūpo* ’*bhūt*.

What is meant here is this: It has already been said that everything enters into usage on the basis of connected attribut-

es. The existence of the well becomes the basis of verbal usage only after it is perceived. Perception depends upon contact between the senses and the object. When contact between the sense of vision and the well is going to take place, then its existence is in the future. When it has already taken place, then it is past. When it is actually taking place, then it is present. In this way, the use of verbal suffixes, expressive of future, past and present are explained. When the contact between the sense and the object is distant, in the past, then special past tenses like *lau* are used. When the contact is distant in the future, then the special future is used.

Objection, Just as the past and the future suffixes do not express the present, in the same way, the suffix of the present would not express the past and the future.

Answer. Differences like the past and the future, based on the presence or the absence of sense-contact may not be meant to be expressed and yet one may grasp mentally the existence of the well and one may say *kūpo 'sti* in a general way, by ignoring distinctions.

In any case, why bother about contingent variations of existence? There are the permanent and certain variations of it. Change consisting of increase and decrease are constantly taking place in everything. Increase is masculinity and decrease in femininity. Everything has these two processes always. So everything is always associated with this past, present and future. The past present and future, based on the presence and absence of sense contact, is different from this.]

SECTION 10:

ON PERSON

With Being as Process as expressed by a verb, Time, Person Aspect and Number are also conveyed. Therefore, after dealing with Time, something is going to be said about Person.

1. The fact of being co-inherent with the ego-sense or being different from that, are attributes of the agent or of the object. The first and second person suffixes are the special morphemes which give expression to them.

[One of the characteristics of action or process as expressed by a verb is that it is associated with certain notions. Time is one of them and it has been dealt with in the previous chapter. Person is another notion so associated. There are three persons, the First, Second and the Third or the Best, the Medium and the First, according to Sanskrit terminology. The First and the Second Person, as notions, are properties of the agent or the object. The First and the Second person suffixes are the special morphemes which give expression to these notions. The First person, as a notion, means the fact of the action co-existing with the ego-sense in the Self. It is a property of the agent or the object as expressed by the verbal suffix and it is understood from both kinds of suffixes : *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. From the words *pace* and *pacāmi*, we understand that the speaker is the person who cooks and this is due to the presence of the first person suffixes. Thus, the fact of the act of cooking being associated with the speaker himself is the notion of the first person and the suffix is the morpheme which expresses this notion. The notion of the second person is explained as *paratvam*, to distinguish it from the first person which is *pratyaktā*. *Paratvam* means the fact of being different from the speaker. It is also *caitanya*, conscious Self. The second person as a notion can also be a property of

the agent or the object as in *pacasi*, *pacyase*. The second person suffix is its special expression. *Pratyaktā*, the fact of being co-inherent with the ego-sense, and *parabhāva*, the fact of being different from that are both possible only in sentient beings. normally.]

But we sometimes find the first and second person suffixes even when the agent of the action is something insentient as in the sentence: O! Stones!, listen! (*śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*) How to explain this?

2. Whether sentiency be real or attributed, it is understood from these. The third person suffix cannot be expressive as far as the sentiency part is concerned.

[The answer is that sentiency as associated with the ego or with the other (*para*) may be real or attributed and the suffixes in question can express both. The fact is that we are not here considering whether any particular agent has sentiency or not. We are here concerned only with notions as presented by words. In *śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*, the words present stones as sentient. The Third person suffix cannot even express unreal or attributed sentiency. From the word *pacati*, we understand the agent of the action of cooking, but whether the agent is sentient or not cannot be understood from the Third person suffix 'ti'. Sometimes, the agent of an action which is put in the Third person is a sentient Being but that fact cannot be understood from the Third person suffix. That must be understood from some other word in the sentence. In *āsyate twayā*, the person who sits is a sentient Being but that cannot be understood from *āsyate*. It is understood from *twayā*.]

3. Even when roots having the meaning of knowledge as *budh*, *jñā* and *cit* are associated with the Third person suffix, the latter cannot express sentiency.

[In words like *jānāti*, we do understand that the agent is a conscious Being. That is again not because of the Third person suffix. The meaning of the root itself can only be the attribute

of a sentient Being. When the root itself does not mean something which is the property of a sentient Being, the Third person suffix can do nothing as in *kūlam patati*.]

4. According to some, wherever there is the second person suffix, the idea of the vocative is understood. The nominative case (*prathamā*) coming after *yusmad* has always the meaning of the vocative.

[It was said above that the Second person suffix expresses something sentient, different from that sentient thing which has the ego-sense. It does something more than that, according to some. It always draws the attention of the person spoken to, even when no command is expressed. This is the effect of the nominative case coming after *yusmad* when the verb is in the Second person as in *tvaṃ pacasi*.]

5. Attention is never drawn in this world with the predicative portion of a sentence as in *svāhā indraśatrur vardhasva* 'Hail! as Indraśatru prosper !' or in *rājā bhava*=Become King!

[Wherever, however, the word ending in the nominative case is part of the predicative portion of a sentence, it cannot express the idea of the vocative as in *svāhā indraśatrur vardhasva* and *rājā bhava*. Here *indraśatruḥ* and *rājā*, though ending in the nominative case, belong to the predicative portion of the sentence. Therefore, they cannot express the vocative idea. Drawing the attention of something which is already there is the vocative idea. The predicative portion of a sentence, on the other hand, is something which is not known to the hearer and, therefore, not taken for granted by him. Therefore, in these two sentences, though there is command, there is no *sambodhana*, the vocative idea.]

6. If the word *yusmad*, ending in the nominative case, does not come after another word then its meaning being something settled, it becomes vocative and its first syllable invariably gets *udātta* accent.

7. Meaning being eternal, there is no harm in changing the relation of what is important and what is secondary or the personal suffixes of what is presented in the *śāstra*.

[Thus the meanings of the suffixes expressive of Person are fixed. But this must not lead to any misunderstanding. In teaching the suffix *thak* after words expressive of means of gambling, Pāṇini uses the Third Person suffix: *tena dīvyati* (P.4.4.2). This does not mean that the word so formed can be associated only with the third person. We can also say: *āksiko'smi* = 'I play with dice' just as we can say *āksiko'sti* = 'he plays with dice.' The fact is that the different meanings in which Pāṇini teaches the different suffixes are not the eternal meanings which, according to the *śāstra*, are the real meanings of words, but the abstracted meanings (*apoddhārthaḥ*). These abstracted meanings have to be presented in some garb or other in the *śāstra*. That is what Pāṇini has done but it must not be taken seriously. They are valid not only for the particular garb presented but for all garbs. Words and meanings are eternal and the *śāstra* has to teach both. It must take something as the basis of teaching. It takes a meaning which is nearest to the real meaning as the basis of exposition.]

8. If the *śāstra* were to create words, meaning would be as given in the *śāstra*. But in it, there is only exposition on the basis of something general.

9. Just as the settled things the horse and the seat, in the sentences 'the one who sits on a horse' and 'the one who sits on a seat' are only meant to be indications, so is the case with the abstracted meanings used for teaching.

[But that must not be taken too seriously. It is something like this: Somebody asks "who among these is Devadatta?" He is told: 'the one who is sitting on a horse' or 'the one who is sitting on a seat.' The fact of sitting on a horse or on a chair is only used here as a means of pointing out who Devadatta is. That must not be taken as part of Devadatta.]

SECTION 11

ON NUMBER

Now number is going to be considered.

1. Anything which is a thing (*sattva*) is said to have number. In the world, distinctions such as unity and diversity are based on number.

[Things are characterised by difference and number expresses this difference. The number one expresses their unity or identity and the other numbers express their diversity. According to the *saṃsargavādins* (the *Vaiśeṣikas*), things are said to be distinct if there is separation between them and they are said to be one, two and so on, on the basis of number. Even in complex formations, the meaning of the secondary word, being a thing is cognised as something having number, as distinct from the meaning of an indeclinable which has no number. That number is called *abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā* = 'the number one in general,' which will be explained later in the section devoted to *vṛtti* (complex formation)].

2. Let it be a property different from the things where it resides or let it be part of their essence. Number (*saṃkhyā*) is so called because it is the cause of the presentation of difference.

[According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, number is a quality residing in substance. Some people argue that when a thing is by itself it is one and when it is with others, we talk about them as two, three and so on. It is a question of whether a thing is in company or not. Number is nothing different from things themselves. This is not right. Our cognitions differ in the two cases. It is not the same thing to perceive a thing as being in company or to perceive it as one of two or more objects. Numbers like hundred

etc. exist in several things together. They are *vyāsajyavṛtti* (inhering in more than one) and they are perceived by *apekṣābuddhi*. So argue the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Others maintain that number is not different from where it is found. They say that number can never be perceived apart from the things where it is found. Things are perceived as qualified by number and this can never be if number were absolutely different from its abode. But grammarians are not concerned with what things really are. They are concerned with the notions which help in the explanation of the forms of words. The question now is : what is the nature of the meaning which numerals present ? From these numerals, we understand some property which helps us to distinguish things. Things can never be talked about except through their properties. Number is one such property. It helps us to speak about things (*samcaṣṭe*). Hence it is called *saṃkhyā*.]

If it is something which exists in a substance, how is it that we sometimes speak about qualities etc. through it ?

3. It inheres in that which is to be differentiated. Sometimes, it is found elsewhere and brings about differences in things as well as in itself.

[It really belongs to substance, but language sometimes presents it as existing in other things such as qualities, universals and non-existence. That is why we can speak about hundreds, twenty-four qualities, two universals and four non-existences. But number is only attributed to these things. It really belongs to substances. Language deals not only with real things but also with attributed things. As far as language is concerned, numerals present distinctions in qualities etc. and that is all that we are concerned with.]

4. Just as the same words (*para*) and (*apara*) are used in regard to distinctions of priority and posteriority (in qualities etc.) in the same way, number which is the cause of distinction with qualities also.

How numbers, while inhering in substances, help to differentiate qualities etc. is explained by means of an analogy.

[It is with number as with the notions of prior and posterior. Through association with *dik*, things are talked of as 'prior' or 'posterior' or as 'far' or 'near', Priority and posteriority are thus two qualities in connection with qualities also. But that is a secondary usage. Similarly, distinctions of number in qualities, universals etc. are secondary distinctions.]

5. Just as independence which is a property of substance is attributed to quality which is not independent, in the same way the property of being differentiated which belongs to substance is attributed to quality which is not so.

[Elsewhere also one sees that the properties of the substance are attributed to the qualities which reside in them. When we say *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*= 'white cloth' language presents cloth as the main thing and white as a quality residing in it. This also corresponds to fact. But when we say *paṭasya śuklaḥ*= 'the white of the cloth', language does not present white as a subordinate thing. It presents it as an independent thing. But independence is really a property of substances and not of qualities. Similarly, when we say *paṭasya rūpam ekaṃ, dve, bahūni* etc. we are differentiating in language a quality by a number. To be differentiated by number is really a property of substance.]

6. Following the *āgama*, the ordinary man, by separating quality by a process of abstraction, presents it as having a property different from its own for instructing others.

[In this, the ordinary man is following in the footsteps of the expert *Vaiśeṣika* who was the first to attribute the properties of a substance to a quality by the process of abstraction.]

7. The word which conveys as being independent of all things whose nature is determined by extraneous things is removed from its own function.

[Words express things only in terms of some property which

exists in them and not distinctly. This is as true of substances as of qualities. Things do not enter into the field of communication in their own nature. When colour is presented as something independent as in *paṭasya śuklaḥ*, it is presented as being served by number etc. which exist in it, just as substance would be. In other words, a word is not directly expressive of anything. It is expressive of it only in terms of some property which exists in it. When a thing is called 'cow', the word describes it in terms of the universal *gotva* which exists in it. Everywhere the word refers to what is pointed out by something extraneous. In the case of all words, there is a little falling off from its own capacity to express an object directly.]

8. Just as there is no cognition without an object in the same way, there is no object which is unconnected (with its attributes.)

[It is like cognition which can be described only with reference to the object which figures in it. To talk about something as separate when it is always found united to something else is a practice common to the ordinary man and the expert.]

9. When, following tradition, the ordinary man speaks about something as separate when it is really not so, it is a usage similar to what is found in the *śāstra*.

[Universality and particularity are always found in other things. They are never found in isolation and yet the *śāstra* sometimes talks about them as though they were independent.]

10. Nor is it extraordinary to attribute properties to what has been abstracted by the mind. The existence or non-existence of the property attributed is really immaterial.

[Once that is done, other characteristics of independence naturally follow. Whether these characteristics really exist or not is immaterial.]

11. That is how universal in universal, particular in a particular, number in a number and gender in gender are admissible.

[There is nothing impossible in thinking of another universal in the different universals brought to the mind by perception or by words. The different universals brought to the mind become things (*dravya*) as it were. This applies also to the different particularities. We can think of a common feature in all of them, because they also produce within us a uniformity of cognition and make up apply the same word to all of them. Number can also be thought of as a thing, in which case, it can also have a number. That is why we can say *śatam*, *śate*, *śatāni*. Gender can also be thought of as a thing when it is conveyed by a word and it can then take another gender. That is why we can say *pauṃsnam*, *pumān*, *pumstā*.]

12. That is why those who believe that everything inheres in a substance (*saṃsargavādināḥ*) declare that number inheres in substance and that it brings about identity and difference in things which are beyond both.

[As it is due to the number inhering in a substance that one can speak about numeral distinction in qualities also, the followers of Kaṇāda believe that all attributes and properties inhere in substances. That is why they are called *saṃsargavādināḥ*. Number helps to introduce distinction in things which are beyond all distinction and identity.]

13. When, through inherence, something appears to have the form of another, it is only an identification through circumstance.

[How is this possible ? It is like substance appearing in the form of quality through the relation called inherence, even though it is really different from it. Things are really mixed up in actual life. But each one is perceived by its own *pramāṇa* and

each has its own function to perform. Therefore, there is confusion.]

14. Just as purposeful activity of the elements or of the three *guṇas* which are always found mixed up, is quite distinct in each case, so is it cognised in the case of all objects.

[The elements are all found together but each has its own function. The three *guṇas* are all mixed up but each has its own function. In the same way, the objects are all mixed up, but each has its own function.]

Now something is going to be said about the nature of number.

15. Unity is the source of duality etc. because all distinctions are preceded by it. Without it, there is no possibility of the other numbers coming into existence.

[The author now raises the question whether duality etc. are the source or different from unity or one-ness. The doctrine is that one-ness or unity is the source of duality etc. All distinctions are preceded by one-ness. Without it, the other numbers cannot come into existence.]

16. The two unities, together with *apekṣābuddhi*, are the source of duality or the two unities (without it) are the cause of it.

[This stanza gives two views about the origin of the numbers from two onwards. The first view, that of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, is as follows. When two things are seen, we see a unity in each of them. We also cognise the common feature of these two unities by means of *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*, that is, the eye is in contact (*saṃyukta*) with the two things, unity inheres in each of them (*samaveta*) and the common feature inheres (*samavāya*) in each of the two entities. The two unities are thus cognised as qualified

by their common feature. Thus two unities, depending upon this cognition, produce the duality which inheres in the two things which are their substratum. The two things are the intimate material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the duality. The two unities are its non-intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) because unless the two unities are cognised, the cognition of duality cannot take place. Therefore, through agreement and difference, the related cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) must also be looked upon as a cause. It cannot be the intimate cause because only substance can be so. As there is no proximity or contact, it cannot be the non-intimate cause either. So it must be looked upon as the efficient cause. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the process is as follows: First of all, duality in general is cognised, that is, it is cognised as an attribute of the two things and lastly, the two things are cognised as qualified by it. According to them, unless the qualifier is cognised, one cannot cognise anything as qualified. Some think that there is no need to bring in this related knowledge in the middle. They argue that the function of the two unities is to cause the cognition of duality. So, without depending upon the related knowledge, they produce duality. Helārāja here points out that he has spoken about this matter in his commentary on the first *Kāṇḍa*. That is not now available. It is possible that he has done so in his commentary on *Kārikā* No. 87. of that *Kāṇḍā*.]

17. (Another view is) that duality is a collection of two unities related to each other. But if duality is nothing more than two unities, there should be dual number whenever duality is spoken of.

[Others again believe that duality is really not something different from the unities. The forest is really not different from the trees. Two is only a name for the collection of two units. Three is a name of a collection of three units. But if duality is not a separate entity, but stands for two unities, one cannot account for the dual number in *dvyekayor divacanaikavacane* (P. 1.4.22) because there are altogether three units here and the plural is called for. Therefore, duality must be looked upon as a new unit produced by the two unities. This applies to trinity etc. up to ten. But, if duality is a new unit, a unit, being one,

why even use the dual or the plural in connection with duality and the higher units? This is answered in the next stanza.]

18. Even though a collection is one, difference is brought about by its constituent parts. It is due to differences in the *āśraya* (constituents) that there is a difference in the *āśrayi* (the new unit which is created).

[The answer is that even though a new unit is formed, the unities which created the new unit are kept in mind and the dual and the plural are used on account of them.]

But numerals up to ten express number only, *Viṃśati*, on the other hand, expresses not only number but also what is numbered. The author now says something about such words.

19. In *Viṃśati* etc. the number is a collection of numbers measuring the things to be measured and it differentiates another collection of things.

[They are also derived from the unities with the help of *apekṣābuddhi*. But they denote number as well as the thing numbered. We can say *gavāṃ viṃśatiḥ* where *viṃśati* = 'twenty' stands for number only or *viṃśatir gāvaḥ* where twenty stands for the cattle which are numbered. If, in the word *viṃśati*, the suffix is deemed to have been added in the sense of *svārtha*, there would be two disadvantages: (1) it would not be possible to form the compound *viṃśatigavām*, because *viṃśati* would have the meaning of the *prakṛti*, that is, pure number, two tens, (2) the word *viṃśati* cannot have the singular number because the meaning of the *prakṛti* is two things. The second defect is removed if the suffix is considered to have been added in the sense of the *pariṇāmin* but not the first defect. Secondly, we cannot have the expression *viṃśako gosamghaḥ* unless a special rule is made saying that *dvun* is added in *svārtha*, because *viṃśati* already stands for *saṃgha*. Thirdly, the sixth case affix as in *gavāṃ viṃśatiḥ*, would have to be taught because *viṃśati* really means so many cattle

and not their collection. And yet the expression is quite correct. Thus derivation becomes difficult in the case of the word *viṃśatiḥ*. Nor would it do to say that the word has no derivation. It has one. According to the *Mahābhāṣya*, the suffix in *viṃśati* is added in the sense of *saṃgha* or *samudāya*. This does not make it necessary to say that *ḍvun* is added in the sense of *svārtha* because the suffix *stip* is taught in the sense of a collection of numbers, while *ḍvun* would mean a collection of cattle. *Viṃśako gosamghaḥ* would mean a collection of cattle of the size of a collection of two decades. There is really no difference here between a collection of cattle and a collection of decades. Words present them as though they were different. That is a characteristic of words. Thus in *viṃśatiḥ*, the suffix is added in the sense of collection and the word stands for number or *dharma* and it can be used in a double manner.]

20. In *ekaviṃśati* which is a single number, there is only an artificial separation of two parts looking like two other numbers, because there is no cognition of parts.

[Words like *ekaviṃśati* are in a similar position. The word is not a compound of two words, each expressive of number. It has really no parts. It is an indivisible word, expressive of number and it is a *dvandva* compound. If it is looked upon as number made up of two other numbers, there would be certain disadvantages. There are certain grammatical operations to be performed on a numeral and they cannot be performed on a word which is only a compound of two numerals.]

21. Grammatical operations to be performed on a numeral are taught because the word is not a mere collection of numerals. If it were only that, they could not be performed, just as grammatical operations to be performed on a word expressive of *svāṅga* etc. cannot be performed on words which are merely collections of words expressive of *svāṅga*.

[These grammatical operations are taught in P. 5. 2. 46 ; 5. 2. 56 ; 5. 4. 17 ; 5. 2. 47 ; 5. 1. 22 ; 2. 2. 25 and so on. Just as a collection of *svāṅga* is not *svāṅga* nor a collection of *janapada* a *janapada* in the same way, a collection of numerals is not a numeral.]

22. A numeral which enters into relation with another which is subordinate to the thing to be numbered has, as its *saṃkhyeya* either the repetition of the latter numeral or what the latter numeral stands for.

[Here a question arises : There is such thing as a compound word made up of numerals. Here the parts are numerals and the whole is a numeral, What is the difference between such words as *dviḍaśāḥ* and *ekaviṃśatiḥ*? Words like *dviḍaśāḥ* are peculiar because, in them, the first numeral qualifies not another numeral but its repetition and the things measured by that numeral. Thus, it is not composed of two numerals at all. The numeral *daśa* does not deserve to be compounded with *dvi* because it is dependent upon what it stands for. *Dviḍaśāḥ* is not a compound of *dvau* and *daśa*, but of *dviḥ* and *daśa*. The thing to be numbered in this case is *Kriyābhyāvr̥tti* repetition of an act and not a numeral nor the things numbered.]

23. The analysis *dvau daśa* is not possible because neither the number nor the numbered can be two. Number cannot be two because there is only one ten and the numbered cannot be two because there are ten of them.

24. Therefore, it is decades which are counted here by the compound *dviḍaśāḥ*. Or it is the repetition of the decade which is counted here.

The author now says why the suffix '*taṃ*' is not added to the word *bahu*.

25. There is no number which is expressed by the word *saṃkhyā*, just as the word *rūpa* does not denote

any particular colour. It is the common name for the different colours like white etc.

26. Number (*saṃkhyā*) is so called because it stands for the universal in the different numbers. *Rūpa* is so called because it stands for the universal found in the different colours.

[One cannot say *bahutayī saṃkhyā* by adding the suffix *tayap* to the word *bahu*. The suffix is taught in P. 5. 2. 42 in the sense of the whole having as many parts as are denoted by the numeral to which it is added. Thus *pañcatayam* means a whole having five parts. The word *bahutayī* cannot be formed because the word *saṃkhyā* does not denote a whole having many parts. It is only a name. It is not a numeral, it does not denote any particular number. It only expresses the general idea of number. It is like the word *rūpa* which does not denote any particular colour but stands for the general idea of colour.]

Another point relating to number is now going to be stated.

27. In *ekam* the number which is the meaning of the stem is not expressed by the case-ending. The case-ending expresses the one-ness of the object which has the number expressed by the stem.

[Even when *Karma* and other *Kāraṅkas* are the meanings of the case-endings, their number must also be taken as the occasion to use a particular case-ending. The meaning of the word *Karmaṇi* in P. 2. 3. 2 is : 'In the sense of the number which inheres in the *Karma*' or in the sense of the *Karma* qualified by a particular number. Thus the case-endings are added in the sense of the numbers inhering in *Karma* etc. not already expressed. How can the case-ending be added to express something already expressed ? The answer is that when the case-ending is added to a numeral, it does not express the number which is the meaning of the stem itself at it has already been expressed by the stem. The case-ending expresses another number, namely, that of the thing which is qualified by the number of the stem.]

The above explanation assumes that from the stem one number is understood and another from the case-ending. But does one really understand two numbers from the same word ?

28. One does see accumulation of one and a collection (or identity) of two. Therefore, there is another number, apart from the cause of application (that is, the meaning) of the stem which particularises it.

[This question is answered as follows :—Accumulation and identity do take place. It is by accumulation that numbers from two onwards are produced. It is because accumulation and identity can take place that there is, in addition to the number denoted by the stem in *ekam*, another number expressed by the case-ending. The latter particularises what is conveyed generally by the stem. From the stem *eka*, 'one-ness' in general common to what is *pracita* and *apacita* is understood. In *ekasca ekasca*, once the meaning of the single word is understood, accumulation is understood through the force of *ca*.]

29. The one-ness though the same is not understood by the word (the stem) when the suffix is not heard. With the suffix, it is expressed.

[The expression of a meaning by the word is something natural. The stem expresses its meaning together with the suffix which comes after it. This fact of expressing the meaning together exists everywhere. In a compound word, the suffix is elided but the elision is expressive of the meaning of what is elided. Words develop a peculiar power when they are combined in compounds. Even after the elision of something, the meaning continues to be expressed by what remains. Even after the elision of the vocative affix, what remains expresses the meaning of the vocative.]

30. If a case-ending expressive of some other number could come after, then the positive and

negative arguments could be applied. That being not possible, the meaning of the stem is not clearly defined.

[In expressions like *ṛkṣaḥ*, *ṛkṣau*, *ṛkṣāḥ*, both the stem and the case-ending can be found without each other and so the positive and negative reasoning can be applied to determine the meaning of each according to the principle laid down in Vāk. III sã. 43. Here that is not possible because only the singular suffix comes after *eka*, only the dual after *dvi* and only the plural after *bahu*. Therefore, the meaning of the stem cannot be clearly determined. So it cannot qualify or particularise the object having number (*saṃkhyeya*). So the number that is understood comes from the stem and the case-ending taken together and that qualifies the object having number. In a compound word like *rājapuruṣa*, the meaning of the secondary term is understood, from the same stem, as mixed up with that of the main term and as, in that way, the meaning of the case-ending coming after the secondary term is also understood, the case-ending is elided. Thus, in the earlier explanation, it was said that the meaning of the case-ending confirms that of the stem. In the present explanation, on the other hand, it is stated that the number which is understood is that of the stem and the case-ending taken together and qualifies or particularises the object numbered.]

Another explanation is now given.

31. In *ekaḥ*, the one-ness denoted by the stem is the qualifier of the pure substance. The meaning of the stem with its qualifier is specified by the meaning of the suffix.

[The stem in *ekaḥ* denotes the one-ness which has become the qualifier of the pure substance already understood mentally. The word *ekaḥ* denotes substance qualified by the number one and not mere number also like the word *viṃśatiḥ*. That is why the *M. Bhā.* speaks about *ubhayavacana* (I, p. 441, l. 10.) = expressive of both, the qualifier and what is qualified. It does not,

like the word *śukla*, denote quality only. The qualified substance denoted by the stem is further qualified, that is, specified by the number one denoted by the suffix. It tells us that it is qualified by the number one and not by anything else. Others explain the compound '*śuddhadravyaviśeṣaṇam* as a *samāhāra-dvandva*, so that it means that the stem denotes both the *śuddha*, the pure number and the *dravyaviśeṣaṇa*, the number that qualifies the substance.]

32. Because of the use of *dyekayoḥ* (in P. 1. 4. 22.) words like *eka* can denote pure number also. It is on the basis of worldly usage (*prasiddhyā*) that they are said to denote what is counted.

Remark. In this *Kārikā* the word *prasiddhā* in my edition should be changed into *prasiddhyā*, as I have done in the translation.

[As the stem with the case-ending denotes what is numbered and as the pure stem cannot be used, how can one say that words like *eka* denote pure number? It is like this: In P. 1.4.22. the dual number *dyekayoḥ* is used. It is all right because duality and unity, abstracted from the substance, are meant here. Otherwise, what are counted, the substances, would be more important and as two and one make three, the plural number would have to be used. Worldly usage tells us that up to ten, numerals denote primarily what is counted (*saṃkheya*), not pure number. In the world, it is the word ending in the case-affix which is used and such a word denotes number as secondary to the meaning of the stem. It denotes primarily what is counted. The *śāstra* speaks about a numeral denoting pure number but that is only by a process of abstraction (*apoddhārabuddhyā*).]

SECTION 12

ON ASPECT (UPGRAHA)

In order to consider 'Aspect', one of the meanings of a verb, its nature is going to be expounded.

1. That difference in meaning which is understood from the *ātmanepada* substitute of *la* (verbal suffix) or the other substitute (*parasmaipada*) is called Aspect (*upagraha*).

[The term *upagraha* has come down from earlier grammarians. It stands for a certain peculiarity in the action or the means such as the fact of being meant for the agent or otherwise and is expressed by the *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* suffixes.]

The same idea is now further clarified.

2. Sometimes, it is nothing more than the 'means' itself and sometimes it is a qualification of it. By 'means' the object (*karma*) etc. are meant and articulate utterers are the qualification.

[In expressions like *pacyate*, *gamyate*, it is the 'means' called *karma* expressed by the *ātmanepada* suffix which is the *upagraha*. By 'etc.', agent and action (*bhāva*) are meant. The agent can be expressed by both the substitutes of *la*, the *ātmanepada* and the *parasmaipada* suffixes. Action (*bhāva*), on the other hand, can be conveyed only by the *ātmanepada*, as in *āsyate* and *śasyate*. In these two examples, the *bhāva* or action conveyed by the suffix is looked upon as a means because it is external (*bhāva*) being conveyed by the suffix and it makes clear that the internal action conveyed by the root remains within itself as it is not connected with another means conveyed by the same word. When the

speakers are articulate, it qualifies their utterance which is the meaning of the root, as in *sampravādante brāhmaṇāḥ*, but ultimately, it qualifies the utterer also.]

3. The substitutes of *la* express a difference in action on the basis of difference in aim such as livelihood etc. This difference in action is sometimes expressed by some special word in the sentence.

[The action expressed by a root is sometimes differentiated on the basis of the aim (*viśaya*) in doing it and this difference is expressed by different substitutes of *la* such as *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. When the action is done by someone as a means of livelihood, it is the *parasmaipada* which expresses it, as in *pacanti, yajanti*. Here the main fruit of the action does not go to agents, their only reward being their wages or fees. That the *Yajamāna* does something in order to attain the main fruit is understood from the *ātmanepada* as in *yajate*. Sometimes this idea is understood from some special word in the sentence like *sva*. The *ātmanepada* then becomes optional according to P. 1.3.77. One can say *svaṃ yajñam yajate* or *svaṃ yajñam yajati*.]

4. A special action denoted by the root or a peculiarity in the action denoted by it is sometimes called *upagraha*. *Gandhana* (hinting, indication) etc. are special actions whereas reciprocity is a peculiarity.

[Hinting, indication etc. mentioned in P. 1.3.32 are really special actions expressed by the root but can be understood only when the *ātmanepada* is added to it and hence they are called *upagraha*. For example, *utkurute* 'he gives a hint.' Reciprocity is a peculiarity in the action and that is also called *upagraha* when expressed by the *ātmanepada* as in *vyatīpacante* = 'they cook for each other'.]

5. In the performance of the action, some have made a distinction between one's own purpose and another's purpose. Whether it is real or not it depends upon the speaker's intention.

[To act for one's own benefit is normal for man. When one acts for somebody else's benefit, the root takes *parasmaipada* and not *ātmanepada*. The main fruit may go to somebody else and the secondary fruit such as wages may come to the agent. When it is intended to be conveyed that the main fruit goes to the agent, then *ātmanepada* is added to the root as in *yajate* when it is meant to be conveyed that the agent acts in order that the main fruit may go to one who prompts him to act, then it is the *parasmaipada* which is added to the root.]

6. According to some, when the result of the action comes to the agent, *ātmanepada* would alternate with *ñic* (the causative suffix). According to others, it would not any more than the base of *ñic* would alternate with *ñic*.

[Some hold the view that the meaning of the causative suffix is that of somebody prompting another to act which involves making arrangements (*saṃvidhāna*) for him to act. Making arrangements for an action to be done is also the meaning of the *ātmanepada*. In this way, *ñic* and *ātmanepada* become alternative ways of expressing the same idea. One can say *yajate* and *yājayati*, *pacate* or *pācayati*. Really speaking they only look like alternatives. There is a difference between the two. The idea of making arrangements is understood from the *ātmanepada* as well as the idea that the fruit of the action goes to the agent. But the idea of somebody prompting another to act is not understood from it. What is directly understood from the word (*śābdī pratītiḥ*) differs in the two cases. *Yajate* means that somebody, desirous of the main fruit and being independent, causes the sacrifice to be performed. He makes arrangements for it. That he prompts another to do something is not understood from it. From *Yājayati*, on the other hand, one understands directly that one prompts another to do something. Indirectly, the idea of making arrangements is also understood. Unless one emphasises what is directly understood from words, there would be no difference between the two. As there is a difference they are not alternate ways of saying the same thing.]

7. There are expressions used by men who know such as *Krīṇīṣva*, *vapate*, *dhatte*, *cinoti*, *cinute*. In these, the meaning of *ṇic* is understood (that is, inferred.)

[How the illusion arises that the *ātmanepada* and the causative are alternate ways of saying the same thing is now explained. Kadrū tells Vinatā who has been enslaved: *ātmānaṃ krīṇīṣva* = 'buy yourself'. Vinatā, not being able to do so by herself, tells her sons: *Krīṇīta māṃ*: 'purchase me'. Here Kadrū prompts Vinatā to do something. So there is prompting (*praiṣa*) and yet the *ātmanepada* is used in *Krīṇīṣva*. So the illusion arises that *ṇic* and *ātmanepada* have the same scope. But it is only an illusion because the idea that Vinatā has to make her sons purchase her freedom (*Krāpaya*) is understood not from the word used but from the context. Similarly, the expression *Keśaśmaśru Vapate* = 'he shaves his head and beard' is a cause of illusion because 'he shaves' means that he prompts the barber to shave. So there is prompting and yet the *ātmanepada* is used. But here also, really speaking, the *ātmanepada* comes because the result of the shaving goes to the person shaved, namely, the agent of the verb *vapate*. It is from the context or from the nature of things that one understands that one gets the barber to do the shaving. So the scope of the two is not the same.]

8. Sometimes, from the root *pac*, we understand the idea of making arrangements, just as one understands other acts like putting the pot on the fire etc. from it.

[It has been said that the meaning of the root *pac* is the softening of the material to be cooked. How then can the *ātmanepada*, the meaning of which is to make arrangements, come after the root *pac*? The *M. Bhā.* has said that the function of one who makes arrangements can be expressed by the root as in *pacate devadattaḥ* = Devadatta makes arrangements for the cooking. *Pacati devadattaḥ*, on the other hand, means that Devadatta performs various acts like lighting the fire, placing the pot on it and so on in connection with cooking. When the activity of the prompter is meant to be expressed, one has to use the causative

suffix *ṇic* and say *pācayati devadattaḥ* = 'Devadatta prompts somebody to cook'. Making arrangements may involve prompting, but the verb does not directly express it, unless *ṇic* is used.]

9. The mention in the *sūtra* (P. 1.3.72.) of the fruit coming to the agent implies a difference in the action, because it is only when the action is accompanied by the making of arrangements by the agent that the latter enjoys the fruit.

[In P.1.3.72 the *ātmanepada* is taught after a root the meaning of which involves the idea of the agent making arrangements for the performance of the action. It is only when he makes such arrangements that he enjoys the fruit of the action.]

10. Just as the sight of stars stands for a particular point of time, in the same way, by the mention of the fruit of the action, a difference in action is implied.

[In the sentence *nakṣatram dr̥ṣṭvā vācam visrjet* = 'one should speak after seeing the stars', the seeing of stars stands for a point of time, namely, when the evening is over. Sometimes, on account of the sky being covered with cloud, the stars cannot be seen. But the point of time can be ascertained in some other way and then one can speak. In the same way, the *ātmanepada* comes when the agent makes arrangements apart from the enjoyment of the fruit.]

11. Some roots have not got the capacity to convey a meaning which is susceptible of arrangements being made for it. Others have been marked with the *svārīta* accent or *ñ* indicators.

[P. 1.3.72 has been declared unnecessary in the *M. Bhā.* Why then does the *ātmanepada* suffix not come after other roots also like *yā*? The reason is that the meaning of words is fixed. Those roots the meanings of which are capable of arrangements

being made for them are marked with the *svarita* accent or with *ñ* in the *Dhātupāṭha*.

12. Indicatory letters (*anubandhas*) are indicative of facts and they have been added only to aid memory. Even roots which have the same meaning have not the same properties.

[If that is the case, why has P. 1.3.72 been declared to be unnecessary? The position is this. Even though all roots are, generally speaking, expressive of action, still there is difference between them, because such is the nature of words. Two roots may be looked upon as synonyms and yet the meaning of one may be susceptible of *saṃvidhāna* while the meaning of the other may not be so. For example, *yā* and *ñīñ* have both been declared to mean *prāpaṇa* in the *Dhātupāṭha*. But there is a difference between the two. *Yā* means 'reaching' whereas *ñīñ* means 'causing to reach' and so the latter is susceptible to *saṃvidhāna* which fact is indicated by the letter *ñ*, attached to it. The addition of indicatory letters is only for those who cannot understand everything from usage. For those who can do so (*prayogadarśin*) no indicatory letter is needed and for them, P. 1. 3.72 has been declared to be unnecessary.]

13. Even though *dṛś* and *īkṣi* have the same meaning, they are not the same when preceded by *prati*. Those roots which are associated with the meaning of *ñic* are not equal in meaning to *pac* etc. expressive of *saṃvidhāna*.

[Even though the meanings of the roots *dṛśi* and *īkṣi*, as given in the *Dhātupāṭha* are the same, when the preposition *prati* is prefixed to them, they do not mean the same thing. *Pratipaśyati* means 'he sees' whereas *pratikṣate* means 'he waits'. Similarly, *pratirakṣati* and *pratipālayati* do not mean the same thing even though *rakṣati* and *pālayati* are synonyms. That the meaning of all roots can be combined with that of *ñic* does not mean that they are all susceptible of *saṃvidhāna*.]

14. The root which takes on the meaning of *umbh* has the capacity of being associated with the meaning of *ñic*. Therefore, the powers of words are fixed.

[It is not that roots which have not *svārīta* or *ñ* as indicatory elements cannot be associated with *saṃvidhāna*. Even when so associated, they are not capable of expressing it. In *udumbhāṃcakāra*, the root *kṛ* has been added to the root *umbh* ending in *ām* in order that the root may become expressive. The root *kṛ* expresses the meaning of *umbh*. When it thus expresses a particular action, it conveys the idea of *saṃvidhāna* or making arrangements, implied in the meaning of the causative. That is why it has been taught with the indicatory letter *ñ*. Powers of words are fixed. Even though *umbh* and *kṛñ* have here the same meaning, the former cannot express *saṃvidhāna* while the latter can, *Umbh* is also associated with the idea of *saṃvidhāna* but that is brought out only when the root *kṛñ* is joined to it.]

15. And when the *ātmanepada* is due to come after *kṛñ* when it is to be used after *umbh*, the word *pūrvavat* (from the *sūtra* “*purvavat sanaḥ*” (P. 1.3.62) with its *svārīta* accent is used (to prevent it).

[How does one know that the meaning of the root *kṛñ* here includes *saṃvidhāna*, considering that the *ātmanepada* suffix is not visible here. P. 1.3.63 tells us that the root *kṛñ*, used after another root, takes *ātmanepada* even if the fruit of the action does not go to the agent, provided that the other root is otherwise eligible for it. When the fruit goes to the agent, the root takes *ātmanepada* according to P. 1.3.72.]

16. Even though action is one it is diversified by the number of the substratum of the means when it is expressed by a verb but not by the gender of the means.

[The author now shows by an example that, even when a root expresses a meaning capable of being qualified by that of the suffix *ñic*, it is not necessarily susceptible to *saṃvidhāna*. The

verb expresses action which is a process and that is one and is not diversified by number. But it can be diversified by the number of the means such as the agent and the object, also expressed by the same verb. In *pacanti* and *pacyante*, the action of cooking is diversified by the plural number of the agent and the object respectively. One understands that the cooking is done by many or that many things are cooked. While it is diversified by the number of the means, it is not diversified by their gender. Such is the nature of the capacity of words to convey their meaning. One cannot argue about it. The verb expresses action as qualified by the number of the substrata of the means which is a power and not by the number of the power only. That is why the word *āśraya* (substratum) has been used after *sādhana*.]

17. Therefore, even when a meaning is there, the power of a word to express it is obstructed. This (restriction) is explained in the *śāstra* (this is P. 1.3.72.).

[As expression of meaning by words is dependent upon variation in the power of words, roots like *yā* are not capable in fact of conveying the means of *saṃvidhāna*, or making arrangements, though theoretically, they can do so. This idea is implied in P. 1.3.72.]

18. That fruit for the accomplishment of which actions like cooking are begun is their main fruit and not profit etc.

[The author here explains the distinction between the main fruit and the incidental fruit of an action mentioned in the *M. Bhā* on P. 1.3.72. When the fruit of the action goes to the agent, it implies making of arrangements on his part. That is why the *ātmanepada* suffix is added to a root expressive of the idea of making arrangements. That fruit to attain which arrangements are made and the material collected is the main fruit, as for example, heaven, in the case of the performance of a sacrificial rite. The honorarium or the wages that may be paid to agents employed by the one who makes the arrangements is only

a secondary fruit. The one who makes arrangements may himself not do much but he gives many directions and as he has the main fruit in mind, it is he who sets the action in motion.]

19. Where master and servant do a work jointly, their function being different, the root would not be able to express them.

[According to the view that the *ātmanepada* comes after a root expressive of *saṃvidhāna*, what would happen when the root is to express the actions of both the master who makes the arrangements and the servant who actually does the work? This doubt has been raised in the *M. Bhā.* The master and the servant may jointly do an action but the function of each would be different and a root would be incapable of expressing both of them at the same time. The master makes the arrangements, that is, he collects the materials and the servant does the actual work. The master's function requires that the *ātmanepada* suffix should come after the root whereas the servant's function requires that the *parasmaipada* suffix should be added to it. But both cannot be added at the same time.]

20. When the root *pac*='to cook' stands for making arrangements, it would take the *ātmanepada* and when it stands for bringing about an improvement (*saṃskāra*) in the thing to be cooked, it would take the *parasmaipada*.

[A root may be able to express two different ideas but the verb formed from it cannot take the suffixes expressive of both of them at the same time.]

21. On account of the presence of the master, his property is attributed to the servant also. Just as, due to proximity, *plakṣatā*=the tact of being a *plakṣa* tree is attributed to the *nyagrodha* tree.

[The question is whether to use the *ātmanepada* or the *parasmaipada* after the root '*pac*'='to cook' when both the agents,

master and servant, are expressed by the same noun in the form of the *dvandva* compound : *svāmidāsau*. According to grammatical tradition, the *dvandva*-compound is taught in the sense of *yugapad-adhikaraṇa-vacana*tā = 'the fact of each term of the compound expressing the group in which the parts are manifest. So the term *dāsa* also expresses the idea of *saṃvidhāna* which is the meaning of the term *svāmī*. Thus both the terms express *saṃvidhāna* and so the *ātmanepada* is added to the root and we get the expression *svāmidāsau pacete* = 'the master and servant cook (together)'. It is like what happens in the compound *plakṣa-nyagrodhau*, the *plakṣa* and *nyagrodha* trees. As they are both intended to be talked about at the same time, one is imposed on the other. The compound expresses the collection in which the parts also figure and so the dual number is added to the compound.]

22. It is like giving the name *puroḍāśa* to *dhānāḥ* etc. or giving the name *chatrin* = "umbrella-bearer" to somebody due to association with one.

[Elsewhere also, due to proximity or association, things get the name of others. For example, in the morning libation (*prātaḥsavana*) five oblations are offered, namely *puroḍāśa* = 'sacrificial cake', *dhānaḥ* = "fried rice or barley", *karambha* = 'gruel,' *parivāpa* = 'coagulated milk' and *payasya* = 'curds.' They are called the five *puroḍāśas* because of association with the first one which is *puroḍāśa*. Similarly, because of association with umbrella bearers, others are also so called. In the present case, due to association, the quality of the master is attributed to the servant and so the compound takes the *ātmanepada*.]

23. Some think that the particular function of each which was understood before is really not meant to be expressed. Thus it comes within the scope of *śeṣa*.

[Others think that the *parasmaipada* should be added here to the root and they argue as follows : Here the particular function of the master or of the servant is not meant to be expressed.

The root *pac* expresses the action of cooking in general and so comes within the scope of *śeṣa* in P. 1.3.78 and takes the *parasmaipada* and we get the expression : *śvāmidāsau pacataḥ*.

24. Where the managing owner (*pratividhātā*) cultivates his field with five ploughs, the *ātmanepada* should come after the root *kṛṣ*. Why is this not given as an example in the *Mahābhāṣya* ?

[There is the expression : *pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati* = "he cultivates with five ploughs". This can be said only of the owner of the land who makes arrangements for ploughing and not of the labourer who cannot plough with five ploughs at the same time. In other words, the root here expresses *saṃvidhāna*. Why did *M. Bhā.* not give this as a case for adding the *ātmanepada* suffix ?]

25. If it is considered to be a case of *śeṣa* because the idea of *saṃvidhāna* (making arrangements) is only understood, there would be no case of possible option (*prāptavibhāṣā*) setting aside *ātmanepada* alternatively in P.1.3.77.

[Somebody might try to answer this question by saying that the labourer cannot plough with five ploughs at the same time and so it is understood that only the master can cultivate with five ploughs as he can make arrangement therefor. Thus there is no need to add the *ātmanepada* suffix here and so it comes within the scope of *śeṣa* and takes *parasmaipada*. But this would create difficulty elsewhere. Therefore, how can the *ātmanepada* be prevented ?]

26. Some think that the root *kṛṣ* denotes pure management or making arrangements. But then the root *yaj* also would be in the same position and would not take *ātmanepada*.

[Those who believe that the *ātmanepada* and the causative have the same scope hold that the root *kṛṣ* means only making

arrangements for cultivation and so the *ātmanepada* is not added to the root as the causative is. It has been stated in the *M. Bhā.* that the root *kṛṣ* stands for many things and not for ploughing only. The *ātmanepada* comes after the root *kṛṣ* when it stands for a meaning qualified by the making of arrangements and not for making arrangements only. It is true that the root means to plough, but it really expresses making arrangements for ploughing. If it is so then the root *yaj* also would be like the root *kṛṣ* and would not take *ātmanepada*. The root *yaj* does not mean only the throwing of the oblation into the fire but for the relinquishing of ownership also (*tyāga*) as explained in the *M. Bhā* on P. 3.1.26. Therefore, there would be no *ātmanepada* after it.]

Why the *ātmanepada* does not come after the root *kṛṣ* is now explained.

27. Here the difference in meaning is understood through the neighbouring word (*upapada*). The *parasmaipada* comes as an alternative. Therefore there is no *ātmanepada*.

[In *pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati*, one understands that the root *kṛṣ* means making arrangements because of the neighbouring words (*upapada*) *pañcachir halaiḥ*. Therefore though the *ātmanepada* is due to be added (*prāpta*) according to P. 1.3.77, it is not added because the *sūtra* says that it is optionally not added. Therefore the *Parasmaipada* is added and it is correct.]

ON GENDER (LIṄGA)

So far the meanings expressed by verbs have been considered. Among them, number and the means are common to nouns. Action, time, person and aspect are expressed by verbs only. Gender is an additional notion expressed by nouns. Its different definitions are now stated.

1-2. Those who know the truth concerning gender have set forth seven views concerning it : (1) that it is the relation of a thing with sex signs such as breast and hair, (2) that it is the sex-signs themselves characterised by that relation, (3) that it is the universal manifested by the sex-signs, (4) that it is the three conditions of the three *guṇas* (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), (5) that it is the three *guṇas* themselves in these conditions, (6) that it is an attribute created in objects by words, (7) that it is an attribute of the words themselves.

[Of the above seven views, the first two identify the sex signs with gender. This view is mentioned in the *M. Bhā* on P. 4.1.3. These two views cannot explain the gender of words denoting inanimate things like *khaṭvā* = 'bed', as they have no signs of sex. Therefore, the other views are given. The third view says that gender is a universal manifested by the signs of sex. Even inanimate things have some signs which manifest the universal of gender. But if inanimate things have some signs, the first two views would have covered them too. The view that gender is a universal can explain better the fact that the same thing can be referred to by three different words, having three different genders. For example : *arthaḥ*, *vyaktiḥ*, *vastu*. The

universals are everywhere and many universals can exist in the same thing. But if gender is nothing more than sex signs, mutually contradictory sex-signs cannot exist in the same thing and the above three words for the same thing cannot be explained. The Bhāṣyakara's view is the fourth one, namely, that the three conditions, development, decay and neutrality of the three *guṇas* *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* constitute gender. Everything is composed of three *guṇas* which are always going through these three states. A speech community may choose to express one particular condition of a thing through a word or all the three conditions through separate words for the same thing. For example : *taṭaḥ taṭī taṭam*. The fifth view that the three *guṇas* in these conditions constitute gender is only a variation of the above view. Others hold the sixth view that gender is an attribute imposed on things by words because we see the same thing referred to by three different words having three different genders as in *arthaḥ*, *vyaktiḥ*, *vastu*. Finally, there is the seventh view that gender is only a property of words because we see the same thing expressed by the same word in three different genders. It is not a property of words like accent because it is understood as something external whereas accent is understood as something intimately connected with words. It is just a *śabdānvākhyānamittam* = 'a circumstance for the derivation of forms'.]

3. Seven different ways in which gender is conveyed by words have been described and they are associated with words as alternatives or as restrictions.

[Words have their own special capacity to convey meanings and gender is understood as attributes of these meanings. That is done in seven ways. Even though the genders are nothing more than the conditions of the three *guṇas* which are everywhere, still no confusion takes place because of the regulation of the power of the words which manifest gender. Of the seven ways, four give alternatives and the remaining three are restrictions : (1) Some words are masculine or neuter : *śaṅkhaḥ*, *padmaḥ*, *śaṅkham*, *padmam*, (2) Others are feminine or neuter : *bhāgadheyī*, *bhāgadeyam*, *bheṣajī*, *bheṣajam*, (3) Others are masculine or feminine,

iṣuḥ, *aśaniḥ*, (4) Others have all the three *taṭaḥ*, *taṭi*, *taam*, (5) Some are masculine only : *vrkṣaḥ*, *prakāśaḥ*, (6) Others are feminine only *khaṭvā*, *strī* and (7) Others are neuter only : *dadhi*, *vanam*.]

4. According to some, these are three universals, co-existing in things, without contradiction, with the universals cow-ness, buffalo-ness etc. which are exclusive of one another.

[The universals masculinity, femininity and neuter can co-exist with the universals cow-ness etc. in the same thing. But these latter cannot co-exist in the same thing. About a cow, we can get the cognition that it is a cow as well as a female but not that it is also a buffalo.]

5. In regard to a female elephant and a mare, we have the cognition that it is feminine. So they look upon it as a universal inhering in a substance etc.

[Even in objects belonging to totally different classes such as a female elephant and a mare, we have the same cognition of femininity. So we conclude that universals like femininity can co-exist in the same object with other universals like elephant-ness etc. For grammarians, the object is what the words convey and from words, different objects belonging to different classes are cognised as having sex-gender (*liṅga*). Therefore, one concludes that the universal of gender exists in objects belonging to all categories such as substance, quality, action, generality and so on. An object, conveyed by a word having a fixed gender, is understood as having the universal of that gender. Conveyed by another word having another gender the same object is understood as having the universal of that other gender. Mere 'Being' is understood as being masculine from the word *bhāva*, as feminine from the word *sattā* and as neuter from the word *sāmānya*. Even a universal like *gotva* (cow-ness) is presented by the words *bhāva*, *jāti* and *sāmānya* as qualified by three different genders. So everywhere the universal of gender is regulated by

the power of words. When words express things as a substance, they always do so as qualified by gender which is an attribute of it. Even a particular sex-gender can be presented by words as having the other sex-genders as we can see in the expressions : *strītvam*, *strītā*, *strībhāvaḥ*.]

6. When the sentence dissolving the compound is intended to be made, the gender of the subordinate word is only the attribute of the word and belongs only to the word.

[A noun expresses a thing (*sattva*) and when it enters into a compound as the secondary word and it is intended to analyse the compound, the secondary word is put in some gender or other. But that gender must not be taken seriously. It is there only because a noun must have some gender or other. In the compound *kukkuṭāṇḍam kukkuṭasya aṇḍam*, should one understand *kukkuṭasya* as the result of the masculinisation (*pumvadbhāva*) of *kukkuṭyāḥ*=‘of the hen’ or was it masculine from the beginning? Kātyāyana on P. 6. 3. 42 teaches masculinisation. But the *M. Bhā* is of the view that there is no need for it because it was never feminine. It is not the intention of the word to say that the egg is from a hen, the female. Its only intention is to exclude other birds as the source of the egg and for that the masculine form is just as effective. The secondary word which comes first in the compound does not convey the notion of femininity but only that of a particular class of bird. From the context and from the nature of things, one would, of course, understand that the egg is from the hen.]

7. Even where the sex is clearly understood by the mind, it is possible to have all the genders like femininity. It is the word having different genders which bring about this state of things.

[Even in regard to external objects whose sex is understood by the mind, it is possible to have the cognition of the other genders. This is due to words having different genders that present these objects. For example, objects like femininity are

presented by words like *strītuam*, *strītā* and *strībhāvaḥ* as having all the three genders. That is how any gender can have the other genders.]

8. Just as a cognition in which water figures takes place in mirages even though there is no water there, through the former impression which is favourable to the perception of water.

9. In the same way, distinctions of gender (*liṅga*) are understood from the words *tāraka* etc. even though the things which they denote have no distinction of sex as from words denoting things having distinction of sex.

[Mirages or illusory appearances of water in a desert are well-known. They make deer and other such innocent animals thirsty. They are nothing more than shimmering rays of the sun which produce the illusion of water. As the illusion is produced by the thirst for water, it is called (*mṛga*) *tṛṣṇā*. In the same way, even though the stars have no sex, the words *tāraka*, *nakṣatram* etc. present them as having *liṅga*, just as words like *gauḥ* present other objects which really have sex. In the former case, water really experienced elsewhere, is projected on to the desert and in the latter case, *liṅga* really experienced elsewhere, is attributed to the stars. Words can express valid and invalid cognitions equally well. To see water in a mirage is the effect of the remembrance of the previous experience of water elsewhere. When the word *khaṭvā* presents that object as having femininity, there is no help from memory. The word itself creates the illusion.]

10. Because one can see signs of sex like breasts in living things, one cannot therefore, assume the existence of the universal of sex in objects which have no such signs because it is never manifested by them.

[One can see in living things signs like breasts etc. which manifest the sex which exists in them. In inanimate things, we see no such signs at any time. So nothing manifests sex in them at any time. So one cannot infer its existence in them. To infer something one must have some proof. One can infer that the sun moves when one sees it occupying another point of space. One may not see an object hidden by a piece of cloth but one does see it when the cloth is removed. That is not the case with *liṅga* in objects like *khaṭvā*. But the word *khaṭvā* has the power of presenting it as having *liṅga*.]

11. To put forward the existence of something and to declare that it can never be seen would destroy one's certainty in the non-existence of anything.

[To declare that *liṅga* exists in objects like a bed (*khaṭvā*) and to say that it can never be perceived because of the absence of manifesting signs would amount to saying that the non-perception ever of what can be perceived is not a proof of its non-existence. One would then be led to believe in the existence of even a hare's horn. To assume the existence of something which is never seen though it can be seen is against all common sense.]

12. The feminine gender of a word, not preceded by the observation of sex signs in the object, cannot lead to the inference of the sex. If it has already been observed, inference (from the word) would serve no purpose.

[It would not do to say that we infer the female sex of *khaṭvā* by seeing its effect namely, the feminine gender of the word. The gender of the word can only be an indication of what has already been established by other evidence. The gender of the word cannot be the cause of the sex of an object, because gender itself is the effect of sex. To infer the sex of an object not otherwise proved, from the gender of its word would result in the defect called *anyonyāśraya*='mutual dependence'. All this only shows that sex does not correspond to gender. Gram-

marians have, therefore, to understand gender differently, as the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has done, by saying—*Samstyānaprasavau liṅgamāstheyau* (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 197, l. 27.)

The feminine gender is *saṁstyāna* which Helārāja explains as follows :—*saṁstyānaṁ saṁhananaṁ pratilayastirobhāvo 'pacayo rūpādīnāṁ sattvādīmayānāṁ guṇānāṁ strī*. Similarly, the masculine gender is : *prasavaḥ pravṛttir āvirbhāvo guṇānāṁ śāstre pumān*. Lastly, the neuter gender is : *ubhayadharmasāmānyarūpā tu sthītir napuṁsakam arthād uktam bhavati*. (Helārāja on Līṅ. 12.) The definitions are based on the following notions. All things are combinations of the five qualities *śabda*, *rasa*, *rūpa*, *sparsa* and *gandha* which again are made up of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Everything has, therefore, the properties of these qualities and their properties are : *prakāśaḥ*, *prasavaḥ*, *āvirbhāvaḥ* for *sattva*, *pravṛttiḥ*, *kriyā* for *rajas* and *varaṇam*, *tirobhāva*, *sthītiḥ* for *tamas*. These three properties are the three genders. All the time qualities *rūpa* etc. are constantly changing. But these changes are not perceptible to all. We see only their final result. Patañjali himself has declared that nothing remains as it is even for a moment. Everything is constantly changing like boiling water. Everything is constantly appearing and disappearing (*āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*) and these are the main characteristics of the two main genders.]

13. Manifestation, disappearance and continuity are eternal properties found in all things and they are what is called gender.

[As objects are constantly changing these properties are always there and that is why they are said to be eternal.]

(4. Of the qualities *śabda* etc. which constitute the essence of everything, in each one are found the qualities *sattva* etc.

[All objects in the world consist of the qualities *śabda* etc. At least three of them are everywhere. *Rasa* and *gandha* are not found everywhere (*M. Bhā* II, p. 198, l. 5.). The properties of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* can be found in each one of these five *guṇas*.

The properties of *sattva* are: *prakāśaḥ*=light, *prasavaḥ*=birth, coming into being, appearance, *āvirbhāvaḥ*=manifestation. The properties of *rajas* are: *pravṛttiḥ*=Activity, *kriyā*=Action. The properties of *tamas* are: *varaṇam*=hiding, covering, *tirobhāvaḥ*=disappearance, *sthitiḥ*=‘standing still’. It is these properties which constitute gender.]

One can understand that objects which consist of combinations of *rūpa* etc. should undergo the effects of these three properties. But any one of the five qualities, taken by itself, cannot have the other four in it and yet the word expressive of any one of them, say, *rūpa* has also gender. How can these three properties operate when there is only one of them ?

15. Of the different varieties of colour like white etc., something, at every moment, is destroyed and something else comes into being.

[The above doubt is answered as follows : colour is constantly assuming different forms because the three principles *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* exist in it also. So in this process something comes into being and something else is destroyed all the time. *Āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*, the basis of the masculine and the feminine genders are therefore, present. But this can be seen only by the initiated and not by ordinary people. From the result which ultimately becomes perceptible, one can infer that subtle changes had been taking place. The colour which a ripe fruit ultimately develops is an example. What is true of colour is also true of the other qualities like taste, sound and so on.]

It is now stated that the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* is also of this view.

16. The ever-changing character of all things like boiling water has been described in the *Bhāṣya* itself.

[The *M. Bhā* says—*Neha kaścit svasminnātmani muhūrta-maḥyavatiṣṭhate vardhate yāvad anena vardhitavyam apāyena vā yujyate.* (*M. Bhā* II, p. 198, 1.8.) “Nothing stays as it is in

this world even for a moment. It goes on developing as much as it can or it begins to decay.”

Here the ever-changing character of all things like boiling water is described. Thus, manifestation and disappearance are very all-pervading principles and so the masculine and the feminine are everywhere.]

If so, what is the scope of *sthiti*, the basis of the neuter ?

17. What is called *s·hiti* (rest) is the uniform character of change or the similarity of change or the non-finality of appearance and disappearance.

[What is called *sthiti* = ‘rest’, the basis of the neuter, is understood in three ways : (1) when there is a stream of development, there is increase at every moment and when the increases of many moments are looked upon as one whole, there is what is called *sthiti*. Similarly the decreases of many moments are looked upon as one and that is also *sthiti*. (2) Increase and decrease or development and decay are both changes. Change, then, is the common point in both and this common point is looked upon as *sthiti*. (3) When something disappears, something else comes at once in its place. Thus disappearance is never final. The non-finality of disappearance (*tirobhāvāparyavasānam*) is the third view.]

18. Or what is called *sthiti* is that thing by virtue of which the *guṇas* are recognised as *guṇas* and it is the common name of the other two genders.

[Here a fourth way of looking at *sthiti* or the neuter is mentioned. It is that thing by virtue of which we perceive the *guṇas*, even when they are constantly changing in their identity. The cause of this perception of identity is *sthiti*, the neuter gender. It is the universal of which the other two genders are the variations. Looked at in this way, the neuter is a common gender which includes the other two within itself. That is why one can use it when one is not sure about the gender in a certain situation or when one does not want to convey either of the other two.]

If the properties of the *guṇas* constitute gender, how to choose a particular one considering that all the three are everywhere ?

19. While all the genders are present everywhere only one of them is applied, in any particular case, for the correct formation of the word.

[All the three *guṇas* exist in everything with all their three properties but they cannot be perceived by us ordinary mortals. Only the words can give us a knowledge of them. Each word conveys to us one of these three properties according to its gender. If it is a masculine word, it conveys manifestation, if feminine, it conveys disappearance and if neuter, it conveys rest (*sthiti*). The fixed power of words regulates what gender should be conveyed. This restriction or regulation is what is called *vivakṣā* by Patañjali (*M. Bhā* II. p. 198, 1.10.) It is the *vivakṣā* (intention) of the speech community and not of the individual.]

20. Just as, in the case of words like *takṣan* (carpenter) only one of the many existing properties is the cause of its application, the same is the case with genders.

[It is not only in regard to gender that words express only one among the many properties which exist, according to the will or intention of the speech-community. A potter makes other things than pots. And yet his name expresses only one of his many activities. Carpenter cuts, chisels, planes and performs other activities but the name of the trade expresses only one of these activities, that of chiselling. In the same way, a word denotes only one of the three genders, all of which exist in everything. The power of a word is fixed.]

21. Cultured people who can see the truth and who know the words and meanings adopt whatever gender leads to merit (*dharma*).

[It has been stated in the *M. Bhā* that it is from usage in

the world that we can understand the fixed gender of words. By 'world', it is cultured people who are meant here. The ability to see the truth of things is the mark of cultured people. They are able to point out the particular gender in an object which is capable of leading to spiritual merit, so that the word for that object may express that gender. It is only when the word has got that gender that its use can lead to spiritual merit. Therefore when the *M. Bhā.* speaks about *vivakṣā*, it does not mean the desire or will of an individual speaker. It refers to this choice of the cultured as to which particular gender should be adopted in order to secure spiritual merit. That is why the author of the *M. Bhā.* has declared that it is not the business of the *śāstra* to teach the gender of words.]

22. Just as words with particular accents are correct for the expression of particular things, in the same way, a word with a particular gender which is already settled (by the usage of the cultured) is correct in a particular case.

[The same is true of accent also. A word with a particular accent is correct for the expression of a particular object. The same word, with a different accent, is correct for the expression of another thing. In the same way, a word with one gender is correct for expressing one thing and with another gender for expressing another thing. The word *ardha* when neuter, means exactly half and it means a part (not necessarily half) when it is in the masculine gender.]

The *śāstra* teaches accent and the *M. Bhā.* has not declared it improper. Why then does it consider the teaching of gender improper ?

23. When correct and incorrect usages are seen in the world, the *śāstra* intervenes and not when no incorrect usage is seen in the world.

[In the world, one hears expressions like *akṣīṇi me darśanīyāni* 'my eyes are beautiful' in which the plural number is used even though there are only two eyes, calling for the use of the dual

number. That is why the *śāstra* says : *bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (P. 1. 4. 21) the plural number should be used when there are many (that is, three or more.) Where no wrong usage is seen and yet the *śāstra* intervenes, there the *M. Bhā* declares it unnecessary. That is why P. 1.4.80 and 2.2.30 have been declared unnecessary by Vā. 2 on P. 2.2.30 as follows :

na vāniṣṭādarśanāt = "the *sūtra* need not have been given at all, because no usage contrary to it is seen."

It is for the same reason that the *M. Bhā* has declared that gender need not be taught.]

24. According to differences in limiting conditions, a particular property of the *guṇas* becomes the cause of correctness and the object of *vivakṣā* (the will of the cultured.)

[The properties of the qualities *śabda* etc. consisting of *sattva* etc. constitute gender. The subtle qualities *sattva* etc. of Primordial Matter (*pradhāna*) do not directly enter into worldly usage. That is why the *M. Bhā* has declared the manifestation etc. of colour etc. which are their transformations to be gender. It is something which exists in the object (*vastu*) and it becomes the basis of the formation of words. In other words, gender is a property of things to start with. This seems to go against two *vārttikas* on P. 4.1.92. According to them, gender seems to be a property of words. They state that different words or the same word with slight sound changes denote the same thing but have different genders. This shows that gender is a property of words and not of things because here the thing is the same but the different words expressive of them have different genders. But this is only apparently so. What the *vārttikas* mean is that genders are properties of things and a word with a particular gender expresses one of them.]

25. Snow (*hima*) and forest (*araṇya*) when associated with magnitude have feminine gender. A house qualified by smallness, has masculine gender.

[Snow and forest, associated with magnitude, have *saṁstyāna*, the principle of the feminine inhering in them. A big heap of snow is called *himānī* and a big forest is called *aranyānī*. A house usually expressed by the feminine word *kuṭī*, is changed into the masculine word *kuṭīra* when smallness is intended to be conveyed. A change in a part of the word results in the change of the gender of the whole word.]

26. When the meaning is different, the words are also different, but they are considered to be one for the sake of convenience and they are given as means of comprehension.

[Strictly speaking, it is not the word *hima* which becomes *himānī* when magnitude has to be expressed. They are two quite different words, meaning two quite different things. To treat one as a modification of the other is only a way of presenting facts for the sake of convenience (*lāghavārtham*)

27. According to some, birth is *prasava*, death is *saṁstyāna* and the existence of things in their own form is *sthiti*.

[So far, gender was explained on the basis of the *Sāṅkhya* conception of the three principles *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Now it is explained according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* and others. For them what is called *prasava* is production or birth, the coming into being of new parts, whereas for the *Sāṅkhyas*, it was just manifestation (*āvirbhāva*). What is called *Samstyānam* is the decay of parts, destruction without a trace and that is the feminine gender. Before it was said to be disappearance or hiding (*tirobhāva*). The own nature of eternal and transitory things is *sthiti* and that is the neuter gender. In the former view, one spoke of manifestation and disappearance in the case of eternal things like consciousness and *ākāśa* when they are in association with transitory things like body etc. A similar explanation has to be adopted in this view also. As for transitory things, the fact of their being recognised as the same things in the midst of change shows that something persists that is the basis of the neuter gender.]

28. The required sign, like the universal etc. is actually seen in some things. Elsewhere, it is superimposed as though it were seen and is nothing more than part of the correctness of the word.

[In the case of some living beings, beasts, etc, the cause of the cognition of the feminine principles, actually inheres in them. Just as the universal is found inhering in them, in the same way, beasts etc., which manifest gender are also found inhering in them. Due to this habit of seeing gender in some things, it is imagined in others from the nouns expressive of them such as *tārakā*, *puṣya*, *nakṣatra*. On inanimate objects, gender understood from the words is superimposed. It is nothing more than what helps in the formation of words, it is not real.]

29. Just as even where singularity is well-established, words expressive of plurality produce the cognition of plurality, such is the case with gender.

[The point mentioned in the previous verse is now explained by means of an illustration. Gender is like number in some cases. Water is one, but the word *āpaḥ* brings to us a cognition in which plurality figures. The words *dārāḥ*, *sikatāḥ*, *grhāḥ*, are examples of words which cause the cognition of plurality even when the objects in question may be only one. In the same way, the words *tārakā*, *nakṣatram* cause the cognition of a gender which does not exist in the corresponding object.]

30. In the expressions *idam* (*vastu*), *iyam* (*vyaktiḥ*) *ayam* (*arthah*), gender is only a factor in the formation of words. As this is seen in the case of words expressive of a mere thing the principle is extended to all words.

[As words having three different genders are applied to a mere thing irrespective of the presence of any external factors, it is concluded that gender is nothing more than an element in the formation of words. Nothing corresponding to them is seen in the outside world. It is merely something which gives a word

a particular form. It is something derived by grammarians from words only and it is meant to explain the formation of words. It is not only here that something which does not exist outside is seen to be a factor in the formation of words. We say *rāhoḥ śiraḥ* 'the head of Rāhu'. The words present *rāhu* and *śiraḥ* as two different things because that is the function of the sixth case-ending in *rāhoḥ*. And yet outside there is no difference between *rāhu* and *śiras*. In this seventh view of gender, it is everywhere something derived from words themselves and used by grammarians to explain the formation of these words. In the previous or sixth view, the gender of some words is based on something corresponding to it, existing in outside reality and the distinctions thus observed in some cases are imposed upon all words. The words *kaiścit* in the stanza shows that according to Bhartṛhari, this last view is held by those who are not able to understand the true doctrine, namely, that gender is a property of things and that they represent the condition of the three *guṇas-sattva, rajas* and *tamas*.]

31. That which is a cause of the determination of other things need not itself become an object of cognition. Senses etc. are themselves not perceived but they are the cause of the demarcation of other things.

[In this last view, the chief point is: that which is itself not observed can be a factor in determining the form of other things. The senses themselves are not perceived. Nevertheless, they help in determining the form of objects. A cause, even if not seen, determines the effect. Therefore there is no harm in accepting the view that gender, even if not perceptible, can become a factor in the formation of words. In compound words like *rājapuruṣa, nilotpalam*, some relation or other is supposed to be the basis of their formation, even though that relation is not perceptible. According to the view that the word conveys the individual, even though the universal is not cognised, it does determine its substratum, so that from a word like *gauḥ* a particular individual is understood. In the same way, even an unperceived gender in the outside world, can determine the form of

a word. Thus many possible views regarding gender have been expounded. But the doctrine accepted among grammarians is, as has been explained in the *Vārttikonmeṣa*—a lost work of Helārāja—is that it represents a condition or state of the *guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.]

This brings to a close the consideration of the notions which determine the inner form of the word.

SECTION 14

ON COMPLEX FORMATION

[After a consideration of the meanings expressed by the simple uncompound word, the author proceeds to consider the meanings expressed by complex formations (*vyrtti*). They are of five kinds : primary derivatives (*kydanta*), secondary derivatives (*taddhitānta*), compound words (*samāsa*), retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) and nominal verbs (*nāmadhātu*). Of these the consideration of secondary derivatives in which the two constituents are in apposition to each other is taken up first.

1. It is only a word with all its meanings complete that can be associated with suffixes expressive of contempt, praise or degree, because it is one of the meanings *svārtha* etc. which forms the basis of contempt etc.

[The observations made in this and the following *kārikās* relate to the secondary derivative taught in P. 5.3.74. A word, first of all, denotes its *svārtha* which is either *jāti*=the universal, or *guṇa*=a quality, or *kriyā*=an action, *sambandha*=a relation, or *svarūpa*=its own form. Then it denotes the object in which any one of them exists as a *viśeṣaṇa*. Anything looked upon as a thing, as a *viśeṣya* is called *dravya* (*idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśayogyam*.) The word which denotes a thing as qualified by one of the above things also expresses gender, number and case-relation, *liṅga*, *vacana* and *kāraka*. It is only when a word expresses these five things that it fully comes into its own. It is only afterwards that the word expresses contempt or praise or degree associated with one of its five meanings and, for that, it takes on the suffix *ka*. This suffix can come after the word *kutsita* itself as will be shown. In *devadattaka*, the *jāti* expressed by the word *devadatta* is regarded with contempt. In *idam ekakam eva śatam*, it is the number one in *eka* which is regarded with contempt. Thus the

suffix *ka(n)* denotes the idea of contempt as associated with one of the meanings of the word. That is why it is only when the word is complete in meaning that the suffix *ka* is added in order to express contempt as associated with one of its meanings. See M. Bhā on P. 5.3.74 and the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa thereon.]

If *ka* or *kan* is added when contempt or sympathy is to be expressed, how to explain the addition of the suffix to stems which themselves express contempt or sympathy, as in the word *kutsitaka*, *anukampitaka* ?

2. The word *kutsitaka*, (in P.5.3.74) stands for the meaning of a stem like Devadatta when held in contempt. The suffix *ka* is also taught in order to express the contempt relating to the idea of contempt denoted by the word *kutsita* itself.

[The suffix *ka* can also be added to the word *kutsita* itself even though the stem itself denotes contempt. In that case, the suffix would convey the idea of contempt associated with the meaning of *kutsita* itself. To say that somebody is wrongly held in contempt one could say that he is *kutsitaka*. Here one has to make a distinction between the idea of 'contemptible' which is the meaning of the stem itself and its being held in contempt for some reason or other, as when somebody is wrongly held in contempt. The latter is called *bāhyā kutsā*=external contempt.]

Another example of a suffix expressing an idea similar to that of the stem is now given.

3. The word *prakṛṣṭa* (excellent) expresses the excellence of qualities like white. When a higher degree in what is excellent is to be expressed, a suffix like *tarap* is taught. (P.5.3.57.)

[What is particularly white(*śukla*) is called *śuklatara*=whiter or *prakṛṣṭaḥ śuklaḥ*=particularly white. Here the same idea is expressed either through the suffix '*tarap*' or the word *prakṛṣṭa*. Both are not used at the same time. But when excellence among

the excellent is to be expressed, the suffix 'tarap' has to be added to the word *prakṛṣṭa* itself and then we would get the form *prakṛṣṭatara*. Another example is the word *jyeṣṭhatama* where a suffix of degree is added to a word already ending in such a suffix.]

What is meant by contempt of the contempt is now explained.

4. Somebody may be held in contempt because he is contemptible or he may be wrongly held in contempt. The suffix *ka* specifies what is conveyed by its own word (that is, the stem).

[From the generic meaning conveyed by the word *kutsita*, nothing specific is understood. One does not know whether somebody is held in contempt because of his misdeeds or whether, even though good, he is wrongly accused of misdeed by his enemy. Once the suffix is added, something specific is understood. From the word *kutsitaka*, one understands that his being held in contempt is itself contemptible, because he is not guilty. Guilt has been attributed to him by his enemy. To hold an innocent man in contempt is itself contemptible. Or, it might be looked upon differently. The word *kutsita* only means contemptible in general and not for any particular offence. When the particular offence is known, the suffix *ka* is added. In whichever way one understands it, one must make a distinction between the contempt expressed by the stem and that expressed by the suffix *ka*.]

It is now stated that the suffix expresses the same idea of contempt as the stem and not a different one.

5. (From the word *kutsita*, it is not understood that the contempt relates to the present time, because there is no difference in the form of the word. Something can be praiseworthy while being contemptible and something else can be despicable while being praiseworthy.

[Others do not see here two kinds of contempt. Anything is

susceptible to both approval and contempt. The word *kutsita* presents a thing as object of contempt but from the word one does not understand whether the contempt is related to the present time. Besides there are other possible variations also. Even as an object of contempt, a thing may be praised, leading to the use of an expression like *kutsitarūpa* which ends in the suffix *rūpaḥ* expressive of praise (P. 5.3.66.). We can have expressions like *vr̥ṣalarūpa* and *dasyurūpa* where a suffix denoting praise is added to a stem denoting something to be disapproved. Similarly what is praiseworthy may be held in contempt, leading to the expression *praśastaka* which expresses disapproval of the praise as being incomplete or unjustifiable. Because of these possible variations, one does not understand from the bare word *kutsita* that the contempt is related to the present time. [That is why the suffix *ka* is added.]

Thus something has been said about secondary derivatives in which the two constituents, stem and suffix, are in apposition to each other (*samānādhikaraṇataddhitavṛtti*).]

Now something is going to be said about words ending in case-suffixes and which are in apposition to each other.

6. The relation of qualifier and qualified arises between the meanings of fully-formed words. The meaning of the stem is not thereby affected.

[The question here is this. In the sentence *vīraḥ puruṣaḥ*, how to account for the nominative case-ending after the stem *vīra* ? The word *vīraḥ* is the *viśeṣaṇa* in this sentence and *viśeṣaṇatva* is not one of the circumstances under which the *prathamā* is added to a stem according to P. 2.3.46. It is added to the stem *vīra* in the sense of the stem itself (*prātipadikārtha*), without taking into consideration the fact that it qualifies the other word *puruṣaḥ* in the sentence. The fact of being a qualifier is not part of the meaning of the stem *vīra*. The fact that there is the relation of qualifier and qualified between the meanings of the two words arises only when the two words form a sentence. The *prathamā* is not added because of that.]

Something is now going to be said about the qualifier or the secondary word and the qualified or the primary word.

7. The qualified (*viśeṣya*) is what is not known and the qualifier is what is known. All things which serve others are secondary (*śeṣa*) because they exist for others.

[The very words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* tell us that the former is what differentiates and the latter is the differentiated. This stanza speaks about the distinction between the primary and the secondary. What is primary and what is secondary (*pradhāna* and *guṇa*) can be settled by various considerations. When the connection of a thing in its general form with action is known, something must be done to specify the particular form in which it is connected with action. That is what the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) does. Thus, the word which is a *viśeṣaṇa* brings new information. What is already known, the general form of a thing is the *viśeṣya* or the *pradhāna* (primary) and the new thing is the *viśeṣaṇa* or *guṇa* (secondary). A substance, a thing (*dravya*) can enter into relation with action independently. A quality can do so only through a substance. A quality is, therefore, secondary compared to substance. Once the basis of the relation of primary and secondary is understood, we can tell which is *upasarjana* in a compound of words ending in the same case-endings or in different case-endings.]

There is, however, a difference between where the two words have the same case-endings and where they have different case-endings. That is now pointed out.

8. The two words expressive of the secondary and the primary have necessarily different case-endings. Where they have the same case-endings, both express substance.

[Where the two words have different case-endings, the relation of primary and secondary is directly expressed by the words. For instance, in *paṭasya śuklaḥ*, the two words express sub-

stance and quality respectively and their relation of primary and secondary is directly expressed by the words. The secondary word *paṭasya* expresses its meaning as something which serves that of the primary word *śuklaḥ* and so it takes the sixth case-ending which is expressive of what is secondary. The primary word, on the other hand, expresses its own meaning and does not serve something else and so takes the nominative case-ending. Thus, where the case-endings are different, each one has a fixed function. Where both the words have the same case-ending as in *Virāḥ puruṣaḥ*, both the words express substance (*dravya*). Each expresses its own meaning, irrespective of the other. If we ultimately understand that the two meanings, stand towards each other in the relation of primary and secondary, it is through implication. It is not *śābda*, directly expressed by the words, because both the words express substance.]

It is now stated that even if both the words denote substance and have the same case-ending, there can be relation between the two.

9. The word *kṛṣṇa*='black' denotes something with undetermined universal and the word *tila*='sesame' denotes something the colour of which is undetermined.

[Even when both the words having the same case-ending denote substance, they can be related. Taking *kṛṣṇāḥ tilāḥ*=black sesame seeds as the example, we find that the first word denotes substance through quality but it does not say what universal exists in that substance. The second word, on the other hand, also denotes substance but through a universal, but it does not say with which colour that universal co-exists in the substance. Thus the meanings of both the words require something else for their completion.]

10. As the generic meanings are mutually unconnected, the two words really denote the particular. But they cannot bring the particular to the mind (of the hearer) because of their common form.

[As long as the meanings of the two words require something else for their completion, they may be said to be of a generic nature. It is of the nature of substance. As they do not serve each other, there is no relation between them. But as the words together form one sentence, they become connected and then they denote the particular : the word *kṛṣṇa* denotes 'black' sesame and the word *tila* denotes sesame having black colour. In the mind of the speaker, the meanings of the two words were already connected. As for the hearer, when he hears the two words, he also connects them together and understands that *kṛṣṇa* means the colour black as co-existing with the universal *tilatva*=sesame-ness and that *tila* means the universal *tilatva* as co-existing with the quality blackness. The two meanings specify each other. They convey to the mind of the hearer a connection which already existed in the mind of the speaker.]

11. Thus the two words (at first incapable) of conveying the particular (ultimately) bring about differentiation and remove all doubt.

[When the two words come together in the same sentence, they specify each other's meaning and dispel the requirement and the sense of incompleteness which was felt before. The word *kṛṣṇa* now conveys the colour black but also the universal sesame-ness with which it co-exists and the word *tila* not only conveys the universal sesameness but also the colour black with which it coexists. In this way the meanings of the two words become related. See *M.bhā* on P.2.1.57.]

The relation between the two words is *sāmānādhikaranyā* = the appositional relation. Something is now being said to elucidate it.

12. A thing, differentiated by its association with a quality, appears as one thing and because of its association with a universal, appears as a second thing as it were.

13. Because of connection with different attributes, an object appears to be like them and in this

way it appears to be more than one because of its different forms.

14. Where the two different forms are merged is a third condition of the object and it is the substratum of the other two conditions.

[The application of two words each having its own meaning to the same object is called *sāmānādhikarṇya*. It does not mean the fact of two words having the same meaning (*śabdayoḥ samānābhidheyatvam*) because they cannot then be related as qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*) because that presupposes difference. Nor can it be defined as fact of a quality and a universal differentiating the same thing, because being engaged in that, they cannot be related to each other. Each word brings a new specification in regard to the object and so seems to convey a new thing. The word *kṛṣṇa* conveys something characterised by the colour black and the word *tila* conveys something characterised by the universal *tilatva* and this appears to be a new thing. It is really the same thing with a new specification. The two things with two different attributes conveyed by the two words merge into a third thing which becomes the substratum of the two attributes.]

15. Through the intellect, one thing is divided into many and what is divided is unified. Conditions are differentiated through the intellect. It is that which creates things.

[Words express things as they figure in our cognition. Our cognition presents what is within as external. The two words *kṛṣṇāḥ* and *tilāḥ*, before they form a compound, convey two things having two different attributes. When they enter into a compound, the difference is obliterated and the compound conveys a thing having two attributes in an integrated manner. This kind of relationship is what is called *sāmānādhikarṇya* = appositional relation].

Kātyāyana is also of the opinion that it is the intellect which presents things as one or as many.

16. Even if there is only a part of a thing, to look upon it as fulfilling the condition (*vyapadeśivad ekasmin*), to look upon one thing as many through the intellect, in this way, a thing can be spoken of through fictional divisions.

[While explaining the *sūtra* : *ādyantavadekasmin* (P. 1.1.21.) = a grammatical operation taught in regard to the initial or the final phoneme of something will be applied even if it consists of one phoneme only, Kātyāyana suggests that the *sūtra* should be worded as *vyapadeśivad ekasmin*=One should treat a single (phoneme) as though it fulfilled the condition prescribed (namely, that it should be the initial or final.) To look upon an isolated phoneme which has nothing before it and nothing after it is an act of the intellect but that is often done in the Science of Grammar. For example, P. 6.1.1. teaches the reduplication of the first syllable (*prathama ekāc*) of a root. A group of sounds containing one vowel is *ekāc*. If, in a unit, there is only a vowel and no other sound, that is also looked upon as *ekāc* and its reduplication would take place when the *liṭ* suffix follows.]

17. When a stone etc. previously seen again and again as associated with various operations, is cognised in connection with a particular operation, this cognition is qualified by the previous cognitions.

[A grindstone, associated with various actions in the past is presented in the expression *idaṃ śilāputrakasya śarīram* as associated with a particular action or state. It is the same grindstone but it is now presented as something different. This is also an act of the mind.]

It is now stated that in a similar manner the root *i(ṇ)* is looked upon as *ekāc*=having one vowel.

18. Sometimes, something (a root) is said to be *ekāc*=having one vowel on the basis of identity and difference after having ascertained that roots can assume many forms because of diversity of usage.

[The word *ekāc* in P. 6.1.1. is understood as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. It means : (a root) having one vowel. But if a root consists of just one vowel, like the root *i* (ṇ)=to go, it cannot be called *ekāc*=‘having one vowel’, because it would be difficult to think of the *anyapadārtha* as distinct from the meaning of the constituent elements, the chief feature of a *bahuvrīhi* compound. But one sees the following forms, all derived from that root, actually used : *eti*=‘he goes’, *ayanam*=‘going’ *itaḥ*=‘they two go’, *etā*=‘one who goes’, *etavyam*=‘one must go’ and so on. In regard to these various forms, the root *i* (ṇ) is *ekāc*, because it is the one root vowel common to all these forms. That provides the *anyapadārtha*. In this way, the root gets reduplication according to P. 6.1.1. See *Kaiyaṭa Pradīpa* on this *sūtra*.]

Or it may be looked upon as follows—

19. By the method of agreement and difference it is thought of as meaningful. Apart from the meaning of the root, it is just looked upon as a single phoneme (*ekāc*).

[The root *i* (ṇ) can be seen in the different forms derived from it and the common meaning which runs through these forms may be said to be its meaning. That meaning is not understood if the other things like the suffix remain the same but another root comes in. Looking upon the meaning and the root as a group, one can say that a root consisting of one vowel and nothing more is *ekāc*, that is, it is a group of which a meaning and a single vowel are the two constituents. Being the only vowel, it is called the first by courtesy.]

It is now stated that appositional relation (*sāmānādhikaranyā*) can also be based on difference created by the mind.

20. Therefore, the tradition which has come down from the ancients is that (in such cases) there are three substances, figuring separately in the mind in the relation of *āśraya* and *āśrayin* (abode and that which rests on it.)

[What is called *sāmānādhikarāṇya* is based upon such a difference seen by the mind. In one indivisible thing (here *kṛṣṇāḥ tilāḥ* = black sesame seeds), the mind sees three things, one characterised by quality (the colour black), a second by the universal (*tilatva*) and a third in which the first two merge. The third becomes the *āśraya*, the substratum of the first two. That is how *sāmānādhikarāṇya* and *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* become possible.]

21. According to some, the appositional relation is between words and so is that of the qualifier and the qualified and that of the name and the named.

[So far, the appositional relation has been considered in connection with meanings. The two words in question may also be in apposition to each other. As the two words, meaning two different things, ultimately point to the same thing as possessing the two attributes in question, it is they which are *sāmānādhikarāṇa* towards each other. Similarly, the relation of the qualifier and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) would also be between words. In the present instance, the word *tila* denotes something qualified by its own meaning. It just brings the universal to the mind and no other attribute. Thus, it is something to be qualified. Thirdly, the relation called *saṃjñā-saṃjñī-bhāva* (the relation of the name and the named) would also be between words. Wherever in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, the word *Vṛddhi* is found, it conveys the sounds *āl* and *aic* by superimposing its own form on them. That is what is called *so'yaṃ ityabhisambandhaḥ*, a process of identification on account of which the two words end in the same case-ending. One of the words is the name and the other is the named.]

The appositional relation between meanings is now explained differently.

22. According to some who hold that the word conveys substance (individual), the universal and the quality, inhering in the same thing, are found in an integrated manner in the sesame seeds.

[It can be shown in another way that the appositional relation is between meanings. The two words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* unite to form one word and to convey one meaning. This is possible only if the two meanings, conveyed by the two words, stand towards each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. That does exist here, because the universal and quality co-exist in the same substance. That very thing, characterised by the universal denoted by the word *tila* and requiring completion, is further characterised by the word *kṛṣṇa*. The quality conveyed by it is the *viśeṣaṇa*. The word *kṛṣṇa* conveys more than quality. It conveys the substance also through quality. If it conveyed quality only, there would be no compound out of these two words. We would get the expression *tilasya kṛṣṇaḥ* and no compound would be possible. No compound can be formed with a word which denotes pure quality. Previously, the *viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya-bhāva* relation was explained according to the view that a word denotes substance. The same thing is now explained according to the view that the word denotes the universal. The two words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* do not convey quality and universal without a substratum. Nor can they stand towards each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. Their main purpose is to delimit the substance in which they inhere. They do not directly enter into relation with each other. It is only through the substance in which they inhere that they become related by the *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva* relation.]

It is now stated that where substance is not expressed, but only quality is expressed, there, even though the substance is implied, there is no relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*, there cannot be a compound of words in apposition.

23. Even though the meanings of the words *rūpa*=‘colour’, *rasa*=‘taste’, have a substratum, it is not

directly expressed. So they form a *dvandva* compound.

[Where words do not denote substance but denote pure quality, they cannot form a compound of words in apposition. No doubt the substance in which the quality inheres is understood by implication, but the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* cannot be there. Hence there cannot be a compound of such words. For example, there cannot be a *samānādhikaraṇasamāsa* = "a compound in which the constituent words are in apposition to each other," of the word *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha* because these words denote pure quality. They can only form a *dvandva* compound.]

It is now explained why a word which denotes substance through the universal is important as compared with a word which denotes substance through quality.

24. A word like *kṛṣṇa*, denoting substance (through quality) requires something for its completion. That does not exist in a word like *tila* because the basis for its application is always present.

[It might be said that the words *kṛṣṇa* and *tila* denote substance through something else, that is, quality and universal respectively. In both, the difference between quality and universal on the one hand, and the substance on the other is obliterated through *samavāya*. Both quality and universal enter into relation with action through substance. How is one to decide which is *viśeṣaṇa* and which is *viśeṣya*? If one cannot decide that, one cannot say which is *upasarjana* and so there would be doubt as to which word to put first in the compound. The M. Bhā. has declared that *dravya* = 'substance' is the important thing (*pradhāna*). But one has still to explain why a word which denotes substance through universal is *pradhāna*, but not a word which denotes substance through quality. The word *kṛṣṇa* denotes substance through the identification of *guṇa* and *guṇin*. A quality cannot directly enter into relation with action. It does so through substance. It is substance which is the substratum of all power. Therefore, quality depends upon substance for entering into relation with action. The relation between quality and subs-

tance is not invariable and compulsory. A quality can be presented by a word as apart from substance. It comes and goes. That is why the suffix *matuṣ* and the sixth case-ending are used for expressing a quality. The universal, on the other hand, is always associated with substance. Substance cannot be unless the universal inheres in it. Words like *tila* which denote substance through the universal do not depend upon anything else for entering into relation with action. Substance, with universal always inhering in it enters into direct relation with action. That is why it is the *viśeṣya* and *pradhāna* and quality is the *viśeṣaṇa*. Thus the two words expressive of these two things, stand towards each other in the sense of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*.]

25. Thus, substance characterised by the universal, being near to action, substance in which quality inheres has the attribute of quality and it serves to differentiate.

[As the word *tila* conveys substance characterised by the universal, it is that which is directly connected with action. The word *kṛṣṇa*, on the other hand, conveys substance characterised by quality, which has a subordinate character, being only indirectly connected with action. It is, therefore, only a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). In sentences like *nīlotpalam paśyati* = 'he sees the blue lotus', *svādu phalam āsvādayati* = 'he enjoys the sweet fruit', *surabhi kusumam ā jighrati* = 'he smells the fragrant flower', colour etc. are not directly connected with action like seeing. It is the substance (lotus etc.), qualified by its attributes, conveyed by the words themselves as being the object (*karma*) of the action which one understands as being connected with the action. Even in a sentence like *utpalasya rūpam paśyati* = 'he sees the colour of the lotus', it is through substance that the quality (colour) becomes connected with action, by means of *saṃyuktasamavāya* = conjunction-cum-inherence. That is, the eye is in conjunction with the lotus in which its colour inheres (*samavāya*). From the verbal point of view, in this sentence, the word *rūpa* presents colour as a thing, as a substance, something which can be referred to by a pronoun (*idaṃ taditi sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyaṃ*)]

It is now going to be said that even if a word does not convey substance through quality, it can become a qualifier.

26. Some are of the opinion that in complex formations (*vyttiṣu*) (even substance—denoting) words convey quality only, as in the case of words like *ajāśva* where it is so because of the relation of conventional words with other such words.

[It has so far been shown how words like *kṛṣṇa* which denote substance through quality become qualifiers. Some hold that they can become so in a compound even if they do not denote substance. In a sentence, the word *kṛṣṇa* may denote substance through quality. But in a compound, it denotes pure quality, because the word *tila* has already conveyed the substance through the universal. There is no need now for the word *kṛṣṇa* also to denote substance. So it expresses quality only and this qualifies the substance conveyed by the word *tila*. From the word, as a whole, a substance qualified by a quality is understood. The quality is the qualifier. It is like the compound *rājapuruṣa* where, even though the sixth-case-ending is absent, the meaning of the first term *rājā* qualifies that of the second. In other compounds also one can see sometimes substance-words denoting quality. For example, in the expression *ajāśvo devadattaḥ*, if the two terms of the compound *ajāśva* are understood in their conventional sense (*rūḍhi*), they would mean two different kinds of animals (substance) and there would be no connection between them. Therefore *ajā* is understood as denoting pure quality, 'something which has no birth' and then there would be connection between the two words. In the same way, in the compound *kṛṣṇatila*, the term *kṛṣṇa* is taken as denoting pure quality.]

It is now shown in another way that the word *kṛṣṇa*, expressive of colour is a qualifier.

27. Or one can say that the substance *tila* is first understood and to that the word ending in *matuḥ* is joined. The relation (which is the meaning of

matuṣ) is merged in the compound. Because of this (relation understood from the compound) it is the quality which differentiates (*viśeṣaṇam*.)

[First, the meaning of the word *tila*, characterised by the universal is understood in a general way. Then the word *kṛṣṇa* comes in to bring some differentiation to it. The *matuṣ* suffix at the end of the word is elided by vā. 3 on P. 5.2.94. But the relation which is the meaning of this *matuṣ* becomes part of the meaning of the compound. In this way, the term *kṛṣṇa* becomes *viśeṣana*. It is not that the word *kṛṣṇa* denotes substance through quality and that the word *tila*, through the universal, brings a specification to it. Because the universal is nearer to the substance than quality.]

Thus complex formations in which the constituents are in apposition to each other have been considered.

The *vṛttis* called *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa* are now to be considered.

28. When there takes place a cognition of the whole permeated by the parts, it is called 'the desire to express together' and it exists in the *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa*.

[When things are conceived together in order to be connected with an action and are expressed together for that purpose, we get the formations called *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa*. Here there is a grouping of things but the group is not different from the constituents of the group. In the cognition of the group which results, the parts also figure. That is why the dual and the plural number also occur in these formations. In other compounds, the meaning of one of the constituents is the important one and it is qualified by that of the other. That is not the case here. The meaning of the compound is the group in which the parts also figure, because the cognition is of that nature. Where the group is totally different from the parts, there is a separate word altogether for it. For instance, *vanam* = 'forest', *yātham* =

‘herd’. That is not the case in *dvandva*. Here there takes place *sahavivakṣā*=the desire to give simultaneous expression to many things. So there is the cognition of a group in which the parts figure.]

The desire to give expression to many things at the same time is common to *itaretarayogadvandva* and the *samāhāradvandva*. Their difference is now pointed out.

29. A *dvandva* of mutual conjunction (*itaretarayoga*) takes place of words which convey the group (*samūha*) in which the parts figure. And this group is contained in each member of the group.

[The desire to give expression to many things exists in the *itaretarayogadvandva*=‘*dvandva* compound of mutual conjunction’ as well as in the *samāhāradvandva*=*dvandva* ‘of the group’. What then is the difference? Where there is a cognition of unity in which plurality also figures, there are two possibilities : either the unity is more important or the plurality is. In the *itaretaradvandva*, the plurality is more important and in the *samāhāradvandva* the unity or the *saṅgha* is more important. Another feature of the former is that the group is expressed by each constituent of the compound. And yet the other constituents are not useless. This importance of the parts in this kind of *dvandva* is made known by the words themselves.]

An illustration of this principle of the whole being manifested by each part is now given.

30. Just as the whole set of activities exists like the Universal in each part like the placing of the vessel on the fire (*adhiśrayaṇam*), so is the case with the constituents of *dvandva* compound.

[It is not only here that the whole appears in each part. This is true of action also. The action called ‘cooking’ which is the name of a series of little acts is felt to be present in each act in that series. The whole is superimposed on the parts. It is

a kind of *adhyāsa*. When somebody is just lighting the fire, we say : 'he is cooking'. It is like the universal (*jāti*) which is present in each individual. Similarly, the group which is the meaning of the whole compound is expressed by each constituent of it.]

An illustration is now given.

31. The expressions *śaunḍa*, *ardharca*, *puroḍāśa*, *chattrin* as well as "those *Viṣṇumitras*" are illustrations of words denoting different associates also.

[In P. 2.1.40, the word '*śaunḍaiḥ*' is used in the plural number and so is the word '*ardharcāḥ*' in P. 2.4.31. That is because these words stand not only for themselves but also for the other words included in the groups of which they are the first words. These other words are identified with them, so to speak. Similarly, the word *puroḍāśāḥ*='sacrificial offerings' are put in the plural because the offering stands for itself as well as for the associated materials like *karambha*, *parivāpa* and so on. Similarly, the words *chattriṇaḥ* in the expression *chattriṇo yānti*='the umbrella bearers are going' stands also for those who do not carry umbrellas but are going with them. The same thing applies to the word *viṣṇumitrāḥ* in *te viṣṇumitrāḥ*'. It stands for the associates also. In the same way, the dual and the plural numbers in the *dvandva* and *ekaśeṣa* words, where each constituent denotes more than one object. They are connected with the same action or quality and so assume the form of one another (*paraspara-rūpāpatteḥ*)]

This is now further explained.

32. In the same way, (in *dvandvas*) words which denote one thing express other things also. The two objects by means of which one constituent (of a *dvandva*) becomes polysemic are the very ones by which the other constituent also becomes polysemic

[In a *dvandva* compound like *dhavakhadirau*, each constituent assumes the form of the other and denotes its meaning in addi-

tion to expressing its own meaning. The total number of things denoted by the two words remains two, even though each word denotes both of them. That is why the plural number is not used. This fact of each constituent denoting both the objects which are really the meaning of the compound as a whole is what is called *Yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā*=the fact of each constituent denoting at the same time the group of two things which is the meaning of the compound as a whole. This is really the view of Kātyāyana who expresses it as follows in his 2 ṇḍ *vārttika* on P. 2.2.29. '*siddham tu Yugapadadhikaraṇe dvandvavacanāt*'="but it is alright because the *dvandva* compound has been taught when each constituent denotes both at the same time."

Kātyāyana has adopted this interpretation in order to explain the dual and the plural numbers in a *dvandva* compound. It has also been stated that it is only in a *dvandva* compound that a word can denote the meaning of its associated word. The same word in a sentence cannot do so. It is only in a compound that there is a close association between two words which lend each other their strength and together convey the same thing like two labourers lifting a load together. But Patañjali has declared this *Yugapadadhikaraṇatā* to be difficult to understand and difficult to prove.]

Why Patañjali has done so is now stated

33. Therefore, the group (expressed by the compound as a whole) being quite different, such a meaning (of each constituent) is not known in the world nor is it seen in the *śāstra* by the method of agreement and difference.

[The meaning attributed by Kātyāyana to each constituent in a *dvandva* compound is not known in the world nor can one obtain it for the purpose of the *śāstra* by means of analysis based on the method of agreement and difference. In the compound *plakṣanyagrodhau*, the two things come to the mind from the compound as a whole and not from each of the constituents, words do not always have their etymological meaning. Nobody would

call the *nyagrodha* tree *plakṣa* merely because it has also the property called *prakṣaraṇa*=oozing milk or resin. Meanings are conventional. From each one of the two words in the compound, only one meaning is understood, namely, its own. The two ideas come from the compound as a whole. Where both the words are actually used as in a *dvandva*, it is simpler to assume that the two ideas come from their respective words and that the group is understood from the compound as a whole. In *ekaśeṣa*, where only one of the words is used, it is different. All the objects must be understood from that one word. The dual and plural numbers are used after the whole compound and not after the second constituent only. Just to explain the dual and the plural, it is not necessary to assume that each word denotes both things. In fact, only the compound as a whole can denote the two things. The compound is really indivisible, but divisions are postulated for the sake of explanation. These divisions look like other independent words in the language and, therefore, can only have meanings similar to those independent words. In the process of division, the words may depend upon one another and yet each word can convey its meaning only. On account of this mutual dependence, the group results. The group cannot be understood from any single word. It is true that the words in a *dvandva* do not stand toward each other in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* but that does not mean that they cannot be united. They are all connected with action and they get united because they are dependent upon action. Because of the mutual connection of the constituents, the group becomes qualified by duality or plurality and the dual or plural number comes after the compound.]

34. Therefore, this simultaneous expression of both by each (*Yugapadvācitā*) has been declared to be difficult to understand and difficult to prove in the *Bhāṣya* but it has been adopted for practical purposes.

[For the reasons given above, the idea that each constituent of a *dvandva* conveys the meanings of the others also has been

declared in the *Bhāṣya* to be difficult to understand and difficult to explain to others. But it has been accepted for practical purposes.]

The reason for this acceptance is now stated.

35. When there is a desire to express both at the same time (*tasyām*), the compound word is used keeping the group (*samudāya*) in mind. Therefore, in the analytic statement, it is presented as expressive of both.

[We have to explain such compound words as *plakṣanyagrodhau dhava khadirapalāsālī*. It is done by analysing it into parts. The parts must be shown to have as much meaning as the group. Each constituent like *plakṣa* is not confined to the conveying of its meaning only. As it was used keeping the group in mind, it is already connected with the other constituent. So each constituent conveys its meaning as connected with that of the other constituent. That is why the analytic sentence (*apoddhāravākya*) would take the form : “*plakṣau ca nyagrodhau ca iti plakṣanyagrodhau*. The meaning of words depends upon the speaker's intention and here the intention of the speaker from the very beginning is to convey both at the same time. Really speaking, the compound is indivisible and as such it conveys the whole meaning together. In the sentence used in the world each word does not convey more than its own meaning. A *dvandva* is not like other compounds. In the other compounds like *taṭpuruṣa*, the secondary word is connected with the verb expressive of action through the primary word. Not so in a *dvandva* where both the words are of equal importance. There one has to accept that each constituent expresses the meaning of the whole. In that way, they would become mutually connected and the whole would convey the group in which the parts also figure (*udbhūtābhedaśya samudāyasyābhidhānāt*) and that would explain the use of the dual and plural suffixes after the compound. It is well known that the expressive power of words is not the same in a sentence and in a compound. A word may not be able to express the meaning of

another in a sentence but it can do so in a compound. It is this difference which is pointed out in the *vārttika*.

Tadviṣayaṃ ca (vā. 12 on P. 2.2.29.) which says that it is in a *dvandva* that one sees one constituent conveying its own meaning as well as that of the other. Thus it has been shown that this *Yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā* exists in a *dvandva* and in the *ekaśeṣa*.

36. Some characteristics are restricted to the sentence, others to the compound while others still are common to both. But they have been mentioned without distinction in connection with semantic connection.

[Many grammatical operations take place when there is semantic connection (*sāmarthya*) between words. Some characteristics are found in a sentence where the semantic connection between words is *vyapekṣā*=mutual interdependence. Others are found in a complex formation (*ṛtī*) like a compound word when the semantic connection is called *ekārthibhāva*=‘integration of meaning.’ Others are found in both. But they have not been shown separately in the *śāstra*. One *sūtra*, namely P. 2.1.1. covers all of them and they have to be distinguished according to the circumstances.]

An illustration is now given.

37. A word like *śyāmā* in a compound involving comparison is given as an illustration of a word which in a sentence (*bhede*) stands for a universal property as it stands for the particular in a compound.

[P. 2.1.55 runs as follows “*upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*=“words expressive of the standard of comparison are compounded with words expressive of the common property,” *Śastrīśyāmā*=‘dark like a dagger’ is given as the example. It has been objected that the word *śyāmā* here refers either to the standard

of comparison, the dagger or to the object of comparison (*upameya*) say, a person like Devadatta. Both are particular objects. How can it then be said to be *sāmānyavacana*, expressive of a common property? To this, the answer given is that before entering the compound, that is, in a sentence like *śastrīva śyāmā*, it was expressive of a common property. As the *Bhāṣya* puts it:—

Prāg abhisambandhād yaḥ sāmānyavacanaḥ = 'What was expressive of the common property before the joining of the two words'.

Before the formation of the compound, that is, in the sentence, the word *śyāmā* stands for *śyāmatva* = 'darkness', the common property found in both the standard and the object of comparison.]

Another illustration is now given.

38. Standing for the meaning of another word (*anyapadārtha* which takes place in a *bahuvrīhi* compound) is impossible in a sentence. Similarly words which form the constituents of a *dvandva* cannot express the meaning of 'ca' in a sentence.

[When two or more words combine to form a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the latter expresses the meaning of a word which is not part of the compound. In the sentence which analyses this compound, the same words cannot do that, because that other word itself is present in it. Similarly, *dvandva* compound expresses the meaning of *ca* which is not part of the compound. But its constituents in the analytic sentence cannot do that because the word *ca* itself is present in it.]

39. In a sentence *niḥ* etc. cannot express the idea of 'going out' etc. nor can the words *gaura* and *khara* etc. denote objects having a particular universal before they enter into a compound.

[The compound *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* means 'one who has gone out of kauśāmbī. It means that here *niḥ* means 'one who has gone out' (*niṣkrāntaḥ*). But in a sentence it cannot do that. There

one has to say *niṣkrāntaḥ kauśāmbyaḥ*. The words *gaurakhara* = 'a wild monkey', *kṛṣṇasarpa* = 'a black cobra' can denote these animals having a particular universal only as long as they are compounds and not when they are separate words in a sentence. *gaurāḥ kharāḥ* cannot mean *gaurakhara*.]

40. (That is why it has been said by the Bhāṣyakāra that) as the idea of play and means of livelihood cannot be understood from the sentence, the use of the word *nityam* = 'compulsorily' (in P. 2. 2. 17) is not right, just as it is not right (in P. 3. 1. 23.) where the suffix *yañ* is taught as expressive of crookedness in walking.

[The Bhāṣyakāra points out on some occasions that the meaning which a compound word or other complex formation (*vyūṭi*) can convey cannot be conveyed by the same words in a sentence. That is why he considers unnecessary the word *nityam* = 'compulsorily', 'always' in P. 3.1.23. The formation with the suffix *yañ* is essential if the particular meaning is to be understood. *Kuṣīlaṃ krāmati* cannot mean what *carikramyate* means, nor can *lolupyate* mean the same thing as *garhītaṃ lumpati*. The word *dantalekhakaḥ* = 'tooth-artist, can denote a trade but not the sentence *dantasya lekhaḥ*. The word *nityam* in P. 2.2.17 is therefore unnecessary because only the compound can denote a play or a means of livelihood.]

41. As the relation between words expressive of selection on merit (*nirdhāraṇa*) etc. is only interdependence (*vyapekṣā*), there is no purpose in prohibiting the formation of a compound in such cases.

[In *gavāṃ kṛṣṇā sampannakṣīratamā* "among cows, the black is the best milk-giver", the black cow is picked out as the best on merits. There is, therefore, *nirdhāraṇa* = selection on merit. P. 2.2. 10 prohibits the compounding of a word ending in the sixth case-affix (*ṣaṣṭhī*) added in the sense of *nirdhāraṇa*. One cannot

say *gokṛṣṇā saṃpannakṣīratamā*. It is here pointed out that the prohibition is unnecessary, because the compound cannot convey the idea of selection. Only the sentence can do it.]

It is now stated that the *śāstra* only states the natural variety in the power of words.

42. By prescriptions and prohibitions, only the natural interdependence of meanings (*bheda*) and integration of meanings are pointed out. It is like the teaching that a *dvandva* denotes the group (*saṅgha*) when it takes the singular number.

[When P. 2.4.2. says that a *dvandva* compound made up of words expressive of limbs of living beings or of musicians or of the personnel of an army stands for the group, it is only stating what the word does naturally. Similarly, when P. 2.4.14 says that a *dvandva* of words denoting curds, milk etc. does not stand for the group, that is also a statement of a fact of the language. Where the rule says that the compound denotes the group or its parts optionally, that is also the statement of a natural fact. No prescription can give to a word a power which it has not.]

43. Semantic connection (*sāmarthya*) is mentioned in a general way (in the *śāstra*) but students who know usage have made a distinction within it for a compound and for a sentence according to what is seen in the world.

[P. 2.1.1. says that rules relating to finished words apply when there is semantic connection. Scholars who know usage and the natural power of words have decided that this semantic connection is of the nature of interdependence (*vyapekṣā*) in a sentence and of integration (*ekārthibhāva*) in complex formations like a compound. That is why this rule applies even in connection with the change of *s* into *ṣ* as there can be *vyapekṣā* there.]

How is this distinction made within what is stated in a general manner?

44. The elision (of the case-endings, is not improper considering that this meaning is not there. That is why the name 'compound' is taught when there is integration of meaning.

[Compounding has been thought of as taking place in two ways : (1) by the giving up of its meaning by the secondary word (*jahatsvārthā vṛtti*) (2) by its not doing so. In the first way, the meaning of the secondary word is not there at all. In the second way, even if the secondary word does not give up its meaning, it is mixed up with that of the primary word and so has no separate existence and so no relation based on difference is possible. Nor is any particular number understood from it. It is, therefore, natural that the case-ending should be considered to have disappeared because of that. That is why integration of meaning is supposed to take place in a compound. In a sentence, on the other hand, where each word exists separately, a particular number is understood and so the case-ending is retained. It is seen that the sentence and the compound have each its own scope. They are not exactly alternate ways of saying the same thing. That is why giving option between the two has been declared to be improper.]

45. Others think that option based on delimitation of scope within semantic connection in general has been given as follows : — the sentence to be used where there is interdependence and the compound elsewhere (that is, in integration of meaning.)

[Others think that Pāṇini himself allows option. He teaches the use of the sentence where the relation between the words is interdependence of meaning and of the compound where the relation is integration of meaning. In giving this option, he follows the natural power of words. Kātyāyana, on the other hand, does not think it necessary to give any option as the sentence

and the compound are two different things and would naturally be used on different occasions.]

46. Even if secondary words like *rājan* are looked upon as identical with words like *rājan* (occurring in a sentence) because of similarity of sounds, still while it is part of a compound it can have no connection with a qualifier (outside the compound) as it would then be incapable of conveying the intended meaning.

[One consequence of the fact that in a compound integration of meaning takes place is as follows—If we take the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*, the two words *rājan* and *puruṣa* seem to be the same as in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. But there is a difference. We can say *ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*—‘the prosperous king’s man’ but we cannot say *ṛddhasya rājapuruṣaḥ*. The secondary word in a compound cannot be qualified by a word outside the compound, because the secondary word is linked to the primary word of the compound (*puruṣa*). It is not independent. That is not the case in a sentence. There the word *rājan* is independent. The word *rāja* in the compound looks like the other word and we identify them. But they are not the same. That is why the secondary word in the compound cannot be qualified by a word outside the compound. If it does, the intended meaning would not be conveyed.]

It is now stated that where the intended meaning is conveyed, the secondary word can be connected with an outside qualifier.

47. A related word, when used, always requires some other idea for its completion. Even when it enters a compound, this requirement, like its own meaning, is not lost.

[Where the intended meaning would be conveyed, the

secondary word can be connected with a qualifier outside the compound. For example, if it is a *sambandhiśabd* = 'a related word', that is, a word always expressive of an idea requiring another idea for its completion, it can have a *viśeṣaṇa* = qualifier. There is the compound *gurukulam* = 'the Guru's institution'. Here 'guru' is the secondary word. Now the idea of *guru* is a relative idea. Nobody is a *guru* except in relation to somebody else who is a *śiṣya* = disciple. The meaning of the word *guru* requires the idea of disciple for its completion. The two ideas are always related, even when the word enters into a compound like *gurukulam*. Therefore, a qualifier which is not a part of the compound can be used in connection with it. We can say *devadattasya gurukulam* = 'Devadatta's *guru's* institution'. The intended meaning would be conveyed.]

48. Even if the qualifiers are connected with the compound as a whole like *gurukula*, it is only after being connected with the secondary parts of it that they are connected with the whole.

[Some argue that in such cases, the qualifier is connected with the meaning of the whole compound and not with that of the secondary word. Even then, it becomes connected with the meaning of the whole only indirectly. It is first connected with the meaning of the secondary word. Thus, ultimately, there is no difference in meaning in the two ways of explaining the compound.]

How can there be a difference between the sentence and the compound, considering that the latter comes in place of the former ?

49. Many methods are adopted in order to make the ignorant understand. Being different sets of words, the sentence and the compound are quite different from each other.

[Compounds like *rājapuruṣa* denote a whole, a qualified whole. They are really indivisible. But they are artificially divided for the purposes of grammar. These divisions are like the drawing of an animal. It helps us to understand the real animal. But the drawing is, after all, different from the real object. To identify the two is really a mistake. Similarly the sentence which explains the meaning of a compound is really different from a compound. The relation between its words is *vyapekṣā* whereas in a compound, it is *ekārthibhāva*. Where the meaning is different, the word is also different, in spite of resemblance in the sounds of the words. Even this resemblance is reduced when ends of compounds undergo change (*samāsānta*).]

If case-endings, seen in a sentence are elided in a compound, why is the elision of words like *yukta* also not taught ?

50. In the case of compounds like *goratha*, words like *yukta* are not seen in the sentence nor in the compound. That is why its elision is not taught in the *śāstra*.

[In a compound, the elision of case-endings is taught in P. 2.4.71 so that we may obtain the correct form. The case-endings actually exist in the sentence. Only the elision of those things are taught which actually existed in the sentence before the compound was formed. *Goratha* is not a compound derived from the sentence *goyukto rathaḥ*. It is formed out of *gavāṃ rathaḥ*, in which the word *yukta* does not exist. There can, therefore, be no question of its elision being taught. The sixth case-ending stands for the relation of *vāhya*=‘what is to be drawn’ and *vāhana*=‘that which draws’ between *go* and *ratha* which is not possible unless some such action as is denoted by the root *yuj* is understood by us. But the *śāstra* does not teach the elision of all that is understood. If it did, there would be no end to what would have to be taught.]

In connection with the compounds *goratha*, *dadhyodana* and *dadhighaṭa*, one does see the sentences *goyukto rathaḥ*, *dadhyupasikta odanah*, and *dadhipūrṇo ghaṭaḥ* actually used. Similarly, in con-

nection with the compound *prapaṇa*, one does see the sentence *pragataṇa* or *prapaṭitaṇa* actually used. Therefore, the *śāstra* should have taught the elision of the elements *yukta*, *upasikta*, *pūrṇa*, *gata* etc. This objection is answered as follows—

51. Sometimes in a sentence *yukta* etc. are used and so is the word *gata* used in connection with the compounds *prapaṇa* and *prapaṭāśa*. That is because they are quite different words altogether.

[Sentences are of two kinds : (1) those which are used in the world, (2) those that are used in the *śāstra* to explain the grammatical process (*prakriyāvākyam*). These latter are not used in the world. They are like drawings of animals. In these latter kind of sentences, words like *yukta* are not found. They are found in the sentences actually used in the world. These sentences used in the world are alternative ways of saying what the compounds say. They are like synonyms. They may also vary from speaker to speaker. Grammar cannot teach the elision of what is found in such sentences.]

Others look at it differently.

52. Others, by identifying the means (with the end, that is, what is to be explained) think that in both the compound and the sentence, there is the relation of qualifier and the qualified and that they have a common basis.

[The compound is really indivisible. As it is difficult to grammatically explain the indivisible, it is analysed into sentences resembling those used in the world. The ignorant think that compounds and such analytic sentences have the same meaning. For instance, in the sentence *nīlam utpalam* = 'a blue lotus', there is the relation of apposition (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) between *nīla* and *utpala*. They are also related as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya*. Therefore they argue that the same holds good for the

compound *nīlotpalam*. The same thing can be said about the sentence *rājāḥ puruṣaḥ* and the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. In both, there is a relation different from apposition between the two words and they also stand as *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* to each other. In other words, according to these scholars, there is *vyapekṣā* = 'interdependence of meaning' in both the sentence and the compound. They hold that words are effects (*kārya*) and so, even in a compound, the relation between words is *vyapekṣā*, because the compound is taught as an alternative to the sentence. It must therefore, have the same meaning. It is true that in a compound the elision of the case-ending is taught but that does not mean that its sense is absent. The stem itself can express it according to the view that the stem can denote five things, namely, *jāti*, *dravya*, *saṃkhyā*, *liṅga* and *kāraka*. Thus the sentence and the compound are synonymous. There is no such thing as *ekārthabhāva* = "integration of meaning", that would bring about a difference in a compound. Everywhere, *vyapekṣā* is the relation.]

The above view is now refuted.

53. Just as the word *vykṣa* conveys a single particular meaning, in the same way compounds like *nīlotpala* are without divisions.

[It has been shown before that a word like *vykṣa* has no parts really and that its meaning is also indivisible. Similarly, compounds like *rājapuruṣa*, *nīlotpala* have no parts and they denote a single meaning, cognised by a single act of cognition. Parts in a compound are just postulations and they form sentences not far removed from the compound in meaning. In a sentence, the meanings of the different words remain separate. Hence the case-endings connecting them are necessary. Not so in compounds where the meanings merge into each other and become one and so their mutual relation disappears and so do the case-endings which express it. Nor is any particular number understood. What is understood is *abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā* = "the undifferentiated singular number". (See Bhartṛhari p. 384 ff.). As the meaning of the secondary word is mixed up with that of the primary words, the former cannot be connected with a qualifier outside

the compound. In a *dvandva*, if the word *ca* is not used it is because the group is more important than the constituents severally. That, in a compound, integration of meaning takes place is the finally accepted view.]

It is now stated that, in some cases, there is not even the usual resemblance between the complex formations and the corresponding sentence.

54. Nor is there any resemblance in the case of *śrotriya* and *kṣetriya* as one finds in the case of *Vāsiṣṭha* and *Gārgya*. As there is no similarity of form, one sees difference in the world.

[In order to explain the complex *taddhita* formation *vāsiṣṭha* and *Gārgya* one postulates stems *Vasiṣṭha* and *Garga* and the suffixes *aṇ* and *yaṇ* (P. 4.1.114 and 4.1.105) respectively which do resemble, the *taddhita* derivatives. But what about *Śrotriya*? According to P.5.2. 84, it is supposed to be formed from the stem *chandas* by the addition of the suffix *ghaṇ*, in the sense of the sentence *chando'adhite*. Here there is no resemblance at all between the derived word and the corresponding sentence. The same is true of *kṣetriya* formed according to P. 5.2.92.)

55. In a compound, sometimes there is no difference as there is in the case of the compound *saptaparṇa*. The distinction between purely conventional words and others is made only for the sake of explanation

[The compound *saptaparṇa* is usually analysed as : *parvaṇi parvaṇi sapta parṇāṇy asya* = 'that which has seven leaves at every joint.' The word *parvan* is not found in the compound at all, though the repetition of it in the analytic sentence shows that it is an important element in the meaning. It is because of this that such a compound is said to be a *rūḍhi*, a mere conventional word whereas compounds like *rājapuruṣa* are said to be *yaugika* words, that is words having meaningful parts. The conclusion from

all this is that compounds are indivisible units. They are artificially analysed into parts for the sake of explanation. They are quite different from the corresponding sentences.]

It is now stated why in a *bahuvrīhi* comprising more than two constituents, intermediate compounding of two constituents does not take place.

56. Neither compounding by the general rule (that is, *sup supā*) nor the one taught by the special rule (P. 2. 1. 57) would operate because of the word *bahulam* (in P. 2. 1. 57.)

57. If in the case of the compound *susūkṣmajaṭā-keśa*, intermediate compounding takes place first, its accent, would set aside (the *bahuvrīhi*) accent, having been caused by internal circumstances (*antaraṅgatvāt*).

[In a *bahuvrīhi* compound, it is possible to have more than two words. There are as many as four in *susūkṣmajaṭākeśa* = one having hair made up of very thin tresses'. It might be asked whether, before the *bahuvrīhi* is made up, intermediate compounding according to P. 2.1.4. or 2.1.57 takes place of two constituents at a time? The answer given is that it does not. Because, if it does, it would have the accent on the final syllable and that would conflict with the *bahuvrīhi* accent taught in P. 6.2.1. which is the desired one.]

Why not say that intermediate compounding does not take place because of the general option given in P. 2.1.11.? Why attribute it to the force of *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57.?

58. If a compound is made of all the constituents, there cannot be option as far as compounding of parts is concerned. The reserved scope of the general option given in P. 2. 1. 11. is the sentence (*bheda*).

[The intermediate compounding does not take place because of the word *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57 and not because of P. 2.1.11. The latter rule only means that where integration of meaning is meant, there compounding is compulsory and where interdependence of meaning is meant, there would be no compounding. In a *bahuvrīhi* which is made in the sense of an outside word, the constituents are necessarily connected with one another and integration would result and so compounding should take place, including intermediate compounding. But the latter is made optional by the word *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57. Intermediate compounding does take place in the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compounds : *pañcagavadhana* and *vāktvacapriya*.]

59. As integration of meaning is not the scope of the general option, if it does not apply there, it does not become scopeless. When integration of meaning (*abheda*) is meant, then differentiation would be completely excluded.

[The option not to have compounding allowed by P. 2.1.11 is restricted to where there is interdependence of meaning. That is its scope. If it is not applied where there is integration of meaning, it does not become scopeless. To detach two words out of the four to be made up into a *bahuvrīhi* implies differentiation. But all differentiation is excluded where integration is meant. That is why intermediate compounding done by detaching two words is set aside by the word *bahulam*. It is the *bahuvrīhi* accent taught in P. 6.2.1. which is desired here.]

It is now stated that where there is no conflict between the accent of the intermediate compound and that of the final one, the former would take place.

60. In the compounding of three words as in *mahākāṣṭhasrītaḥ*, there is no difference because the substitution of the final of the constituent by *ā* is not prohibited.

[When the three words *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ* are made into a compound, we get the form *mahākaṣṭaśritaḥ* as follows—*mahat* and *kaṣṭam* will be compounded first according to P. 2.1.61. The final of *mahat* will be replaced by 'ā' according to P. 6.3.46. We get *mahākaṣṭam* with the accent as marked according to P. 6.1.223. Then *mahākaṣṭam* is compounded with *śrita* by P. 2.1.24. We get *mahākaṣṭaśrita*, with the accent remaining the same according to P. 6.2.47. Thus, when there is no conflict in accent, intermediate compounding is allowed. See Dr. S. D. Joshi-Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya—Samarthāhnika*. p. 23.]

Sometimes, however, there is conflict in accent.

61. In *mahāraṇyātīta* formed out of three words, there is difference in accent, because the accent of the intermediate compound, being occasioned by internal factors, sets aside the accent of the final compound.

[In compounding the three words *mahad aranyam atītaḥ*, we begin, with the intermediate compound *mahāraṇyam* which will get the accent on the final syllable by P. 6.1.223. Then we make the three-word compound *mahāraṇyātīta* which should get its accent on the final *ta* by P. 6.2.144. But the accent of the intermediate compound will prevail because it is *antaraṅga* and that is not desired.]

62. As the *saṭiṣiṣṭa* accent is stronger, it will come in the final two-word compound. Therefore here the three words are not simultaneously made into a single compound.

[First *mahad* and *aranyam* are compounded into *mahāraṇyam* by P. 2.1.61. and it would have the accent on the final syllable by P. 6.1.223. Then *mahāraṇyam* and *atīta* are compounded by P. 2.1.24. and we would get *mahāraṇyātīta* with the accent on the final *ta* by P. 6.2.144. As this accent comes in when the previous

accent is already there, it is said to be *saśiṣṭa* which is considered to be stronger. On this point, see the *Siddhāntakaumudī* on P. 6.1.158. Thus there is conflict between the accent of the middle word and that of the final word in this three-word compound and so it is not formed.]

63. According to those who hold that if *kaṣṭa* is connected with what follows, it would cease to be 'exalted' (*pūjyamāna*), there would be no relation of qualifier and qualified either according to them.

[In regard to the three words *mahat kaṣṭam śrītaḥ*, if the word *kaṣṭa* is linked with the word *śrīta* which follows, it would have no connection with the word *mahat* which precedes, nor could it be called *pūjyamāna* = 'exalted', a condition for compounding *mahat* and *kaṣṭam* according to P.2.1.61. If there is no connection between the two words, there cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified either.]

The subject of difference between the sentence and the compound is further considered.

64. Even if a qualifier of the primary or the secondary object is mentioned in the sentence, it is never so in the compound, because they are totally different expressions.

[In the sentence *ṛddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the prosperous king's man', a qualifier of the secondary word *rājñāḥ* is mentioned. But not so in the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. This can be explained only according to the view that the sentence and the compound are totally different expressions. If the compound is held to be derived from the sentence, the properties of the latter should be seen in the former. Similarly, in a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the *anyapadārtha*, the meaning of the outside word is included only in a very general way whereas in a sentence like *citrā gāvo yaśya*

Devadattasya, it is specified by the word *Devadatta* which cannot form part of the compound *citraṅgulī*.]

In view of the previous statement that the secondary word in a compound cannot be connected with a qualifier outside it, the expression *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam* is now going to be considered.

65. Even though the connection with a particular action is conveyed by the words *kṛta* etc. (in a sentence), in the compound, it is another word *kṛta* which is found, not connected in meaning with any particular object.

[The expression *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam* is explained by the sentence *kṛtaḥ pūrvam kṛto'neṇa* = "a mat has been made by him previously". In this sentence, the fact that the *kaṭa* is the grammatical object (*karma*) of the action of making is conveyed by the suffix *kta* in *kṛtaḥ* and that is why there is no second case-ending expressive of *karma* after the word *kaṭa*. In the compound *kṛtapūrvī*, the meaning of *kṛta* is mixed up with that of the main word *pūrvī* and so loses its independence and is not in apposition with *kaṭam*.]

66. The word ending in the suffix *kta* being thus intransitive, it expresses mere action. Therefore, the agent who is already connected with action (in *kṛta-pūrvī*) becomes further connected with the object of action (like *kaṭam*)

[In the sentence, the word *kṛta* is connected with a particular object but that object cannot enter into the compound *kṛta-pūrvī*. So here *kṛta* has no connection with a particular object. That is why it is said to be intransitive (*akarmaka*) and therefore, expressive of mere action (*bhāvābhidhāyi*). If at all, it expresses the object in a very general way. A verb which expresses the object in a general way is also *akarmaka* as in the sentence : *Dikṣito na*

dadāti. Here *dadāti* is *akarmaka*. In *kṛtapūrvī*, the agent expressed by the *taddhita* suffix is qualified by mere action. Such an agent can be connected with an object conveyed by a word outside the compound, in the present case by the word *kaṣam*

67. Just as the action expressed by the word *gata* and the like is indistinct (*avigrahā*) and is connected with an object like *grāma* so is the case in *kṛtapūrvī* and the like.

[In *kṛtapūrvī*, the action of making is understood as one with the agent and not as distinct from it and yet it becomes connected with an object expressed by an outside word. It is as in the sentence : *grāmaṃ gato devadattaḥ* = "Devadatta has gone to the village". In *gataḥ*, the suffix expresses the agent and the action of going is not understood as distinct from it. It is, therefore, *avigrahā* = indistinct, having no separate form. And yet it is connected with the object expressed by another word in the sentence namely, *grāmam*. That is what happens in *kṛtapūrvī kaṣam*. Everywhere action is understood as connected with some accessory or other and it is expressed by the stem or the root to which is added the suffix which expresses the accessory as in *gataḥ* or *gacchati*.]

How to explain the fact that expressions like *muṇḍayati*, *sūtrayati* can be connected with an outside word expressive of an object ?

68. *Muṇḍi*, *sūtri* etc. appear to have parts which are really non-existent. They are divided into parts which are fictitious. They are roots like *kutṭi*, *carci*.

[*Muṇḍayati*, *sūtrayati* etc. are not in the same position as *kṛtapūrvī*. They express special actions and can, therefore, be connected with their respective objects like *māṇavaka* or *vyākaraṇa* directly in sentences like : *māṇavakaṃ muṇḍayati* = 'he shaves the student's head', *vyākaraṇam sūtrayati* = 'he writes grammar in *sūtra* form'. To explain *muṇḍayati* as *muṇḍam karoti*, that is, to

divide it into parts is only a technical means of explaining it. In reality, it has no parts. Therefore, the objection that *munda* does not express action at all and, therefore, how can it be connected with an external word expressive of an object like *māṇavaka* does not hold good. It is *mundaḥ* which is directly connected with *māṇavaka* and not *munda* which is fictitious.]

69. In the word *putrīyati*, there is no part like *putra*. It expresses a special desire which relates to a son even though the word *putra* is not to be understood as a part of it.

[In other complex formations also, artificial divisions are made. There is no word *putra* in *putrīyati* though it is analysed as : *putram ātmāna icchati*. The word merely expresses a particular desire, the desire for a son.]

Why is *putrīyati* not connected with another word in the sentence expressive of a particular object ?

70. It is like the root *dhāri* having *prāṇa* as the object in the verb *jīvati*. Really speaking, there is no *dhāri* in it nor *prāṇa*. The word *jīvati* expresses a particular action.

[Even though the word *putrīyati* expresses the desire for a son, it is not connected in the sentence with a word standing for a particular son. It is like the word *jīvati* which is not connected in the sentence with a *karma*. It is usually explained as *prāṇān dhārayati* but this is only an explanation. It has no parts like *dhāri* or *prāṇa*. The whole word expresses the action of living.]

71. Similarly, from the word *putrīyati* that is, in (*putrīya*) a particular action is understood without the help of parts like *iṣi* and *putra*. For the purpose

of grammatical derivation, meaningful parts similar to independent words are postulated.

[To explain *putriyati* by bringing in the root *i* and its object *putra* is only for the sake of grammatical derivation. They do not exist.]

72. By the use of the suffix *kyac* expressive of another idea, the idea in question would be set aside. Therefore, even though the suffix *kyac* expressive of desire has an object, it is used only in a sentence.

An illustration is now given.

73. The word formed with the suffix *ṭañ* (P. 3.1.23.) being reserved for the well-known idea of disapproval of the action, such a word is not used to express repetition, because the form would be the same (and so there might be misunderstanding).

[The expressions *lolupyate*, *caṅkramyate* *jaṅgamyate*, formed with *ṭañ* (P. 3. 1. 23 and 24) express the idea of disapproval of conduct or crookedness of the gait. That is why, even though the same suffix is taught in the sense of the repetition of the action, it is not used in that sense as there is a possibility of misunderstanding. To express the idea of repetition, the sentence is used; *punaḥ punaḥ krāmati* and not the complex formation (*vṛtti*) *caṅkramyate*.]

74. In whatever way words are divided into apparent parts according to one's choice, so they are grammatically derived. The *śāstra* is really far from the reality.

[The division of words is only for the sake of grammatical derivation. The word is really indivisible. There are different ways of splitting the same word. There is no fixity about it. Different systems of grammar may do it differently. The result is that the Science of Grammar is very far from the reality.]

75. It is after seeing the persistence of some common meaning that the word is abstracted from the sentence, the root from the word, and a part from the root as in the case of *muṇḍi*.

[It is the sentence which is stable because it is the indivisible sentence which is expressive. From the particularised sentence-meaning, generalised meanings are abstracted and the verbal elements expressive of them are called 'words' and they are grammatically derived. The indivisible sentence cannot be so derived. The abstracted word, with its general meaning, is the same in all the sentences and it can, therefore, be grammatically derived. But the general meaning is abstracted from the particularised sentence-meaning and not that the latter emerges when the general meanings come together. Both the individual word and its meaning are fictions. The word is also artificially divided into parts like root, stem, suffix etc. The process has to stop at the phoneme. The division of the phoneme would not have even a practical value.]

76. As far as the correct form is concerned, there is no diversity in usage. It is the method of grammatical derivation which is not fixed. One should not look upon as real the means of derivation adopted for the benefit of students.

[Even though methods of grammatical derivation may differ, the correct word remains the same. There is no variation there. The divisions made for explanation disappear after the work is done and the indivisible word is understood. The divisions represent *avidyā* and they are only a means to an end which is *vidyā*. Everywhere *avidyā* is the means to *vidyā*. What is described in the *sāstra* is *avidyā*.]

77. *Ḍayati* in *Dittha* is similar to *pacati* in *pācaka*. Both *ḍayati* and *paci* are unknown in the world.

[In the matter of the fictitiousness of the parts, there is no difference between *Yadyecchā śabda* = 'arbitrary words' like *Ḍittha* and those based on reason like *pācaka*. It is from the whole word that the meaning is understood in the world. Deriving *Ḍittha* from the root *ḍayati* which is meaningless is the same process as deriving *pācaka* from the root *pac* which has a meaning.]

78. The cultured infer stem and suffix from the word and the word from them and from the indicatory letters (*anubandha*), accent etc. The *śāstra* is not meant for them.

[From the indivisible, divisions are fictitiously made by the cultured in order to teach the ignorant. It is the cultured who are the authority in the matter of words. They see the truth and accept as correct whatever leads to merit and accordingly split words into stems and suffixes. From them, the students understand the whole word. Words like *Ḍittha* are taught as wholes directly (*pratyakṣakalpana*). Stems and suffixes are inferred. In the case of words like *pacati*, stems and suffixes are taught and the whole has to be formed (inferred) from them. Thus words are taught in two ways : Through *nipātana* and *vidhi*. As for the cultured (*śiṣṭas*) whose knowledge is without any limitation and who are evolutes from *pratibhā* = pure knowledge, they see the truth of everything and do not depend upon the teaching of others. The very fact that they do not depend upon these artificial divisions for understanding the indivisible whole shows that these divisions are unreal. From their use of the correct forms taught in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, we know that they are cultured.]

79. One who relies entirely on *śāstra* incurs sin when doubts arise in the understanding of *sāstra*. The *sāstra* is the eye of those who do not see the correct words used by the cultured.

[The *śāstra* contains words like *bahulam*, *anyatarasyām*, *ekeṣām*

etc. and so the exact scope of some rules is not clearly understood. In such cases, if one does not see how the cultured use the correct words but relies entirely on *śāstra* one is likely to use incorrect words and incur sin. Merit and demerit depend upon use. One must, therefore, be guided by the usage of the cultured. One can infer who the cultured are by seeing them use correct words even without studying the *śāstra*. By watching their use of words, one can remove doubts which arise when one studies the *śāstra*.]

If *śāstra* is the eye of those who cannot see the usage of the cultured, why is it sometimes declared unnecessary ?

80. As there is the possibility of another meaning being understood, the order of words in *rājadanta*, *āhitāgni* etc. and *rājāśva* etc. is not altered.

[Even though the *śāstra* is the eye, it is sometimes discarded as unnecessary when, even without it, the right form would be used, as otherwise, some other meaning could be conveyed. For example, if one says *dantarāja* instead of *rājadanta*, some other meaning would be conveyed. So one is bound to say *rājadanta*. Where no wrong use is ever heard, there is no use in having *śāstra*. Where the same meaning would be understood no matter what the order of the constituents is, there also there is no need to have *śāstra*, as, for example, in *āhitāgni*. *Agnyāhita* would mean the same thing.]

If *śāstra* is unnecessary where incorrect use of a word does not take place, why is elision of the suffix taught in *gargāḥ* ?

81. In the case of words like *gargāḥ* which, without the suffix (expressive of progeny, *apatya*) convey a meaning in addition to that of the stem, the elision is taught so that their correctness may be understood.

[The words *gargāḥ*, *vatsāḥ* have no *apatya* suffix at the end and yet express the meaning of *apatya*. The grammatical tradition is that, a bare stem, without a suffix, is incorrect and should

not be used. The *sūtra* P. 2. 4. 64. teaches elision of the *apatya* suffix *yañ* and *añ* in the plural in order that such words may not be considered incorrect.]

82. If it is said that because of the relation of identity words like *babhru* would be used without the suffix, then elision should be considered as meant for restriction to progeny.

[The teaching of the elision of the suffix expressive of descendants in *gargāḥ* etc. can be explained in another way. The elision is taught in order that the meaning of progeny may be understood and not some other meaning like 'disciples'. If the ancestor and the progeny are identified (*so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ*), then the word *gargāḥ*, even without the suffix, can denote progeny but it can denote disciples also. In order that it may denote progeny only, the elision of the suffix expressive of it is taught.]

83. Even if there is the relation of identity, without an element expressive of gender, a word like *praṣṭha* would not necessarily convey the idea of wife.

[According to P. 4. 1. 48, the word *praṣṭhī* is formed in the sense of 'wife of *praṣṭha*' = 'leader about to go forth'. Merely by the relation of identity, the word *praṣṭha* cannot be applied to a woman connected with *praṣṭha*. Because of the word *ākhyāyām*, the feminine suffix can be added to the word *praṣṭha* expressive of the man. If we first add a *taddhita* suffix in the sense of 'belonging to' (*tasyedam*. P. 4. 3. 120) to get the meaning of wife, we would get *prāṣṭha* and to that the feminine suffix cannot be added because *prāṣṭha* is never applied to 'the leader about to go forth,' and so the condition mentioned in *ākhyāyām* is not fulfilled. And so the suffix is added to *praṣṭha* and we get *praṣṭhī* which can mean only wife because it is she who normally makes the necessary arrangements when the husband is about to go forth on some business.]

84. Once the relation of measure and measured

is accepted, there would be incorrectness in words like *prastha* if a *taddhita* suffix is not added (by P. 5.1.57).

85. Optionally, the *taddhita* suffix would be added by *Yogavibhāga*-splitting of the rule or there would be a sentence. But the first case-ending is taught when the stem denotes measure as an additional idea (in P. 2.3.46).

[We have the expression *prastho vr̥hiḥ* = “paddy measuring one *prastha*”. The word *prastha* stands for a measure and here it means ‘paddy measuring one *prastha*’. Even if one assumes the relation of identity here, the relation of measure and measured would not necessarily be understood. Relations like proximity are also possible. In order that the relation of measure and measured may be understood, either a *taddhita* suffix would have to be added by P. 5. 1. 57 in which case we would get the form *prāsthika* or a whole sentence would have to be used : *prasthaḥ parimāṇam eṣaṃ vr̥hiṇām*. By especially mentioning *parimāṇa* = ‘measure’ in P. 2. 3. 46., we have been told that the first case-ending expresses that idea. The *taddhita* suffix is not wanted. The first case-ending would do.]

86. That is an indication that the extra-meaning (that is, the relation of measure and measured) is correct. The word thus expressive of the extra-meaning is connected with words ending in all the other case-endings.

[The fact that the first case-ending is taught in the sense of measure is an indication that the extra meaning, namely, the relation of measure and measured is to be expressed. This extra meaning is an inner meaning and the first case-ending expresses it. But it is superseded by the other case-endings when the action denoted by the sentence brings in the *kāraka* relation like *karma*. That is why we say : *prasthaṃ pacati*, *prasthena kṛitam* etc.]

Why is the elision of the *matuḥ* suffix taught after words expressive of quality ?

87. As expressions in which the two are presented separately are available, there is elision of *matuḥ* in a word like *śuklaḥ* in order that there may be no incorrectness. Words like *śukla* are correct like *bidāḥ* and similar words.

[Words sometimes express the qualified and the qualifier as separate things as in *paṭasya śuklaḥ* = 'The white (colour) of the cloth.' Here the two words have different case-endings. But in *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ* = 'white cloth', they have the same case-ending because the object and its quality are not presented as separate things. But then, the *matuḥ* suffix should have come after the word *śukla* (by P. 5. 2. 94) to indicate that the colour belongs to the object. Otherwise, the word could be considered incorrect. In order that it may not be so considered, the elision of the *matuḥ* is taught. Though the suffix is not there, the word is still a *vṛtti*, a complex formation because it denotes a thing as qualified by a quality. It is like the word *gargāḥ* which means the descendants of *garga* even though the *apatya* suffix *yañ* has been elided. It is not because of the relation of identity between the quality and the qualified that the word *śukla* is correct, but because elision of *matuḥ* has been taught.]

The author now resumes consideration of the relation of the qualifier and the qualified in a *vṛtti* (complex formation or integration of meaning).

88. Some declare that integration of meaning (*vṛtti*) takes place when after the (cognition of the) qualifier, it is added on to the qualified and then it disappears.

[To the objection that, as, in a *vṛtti*, there is integration of meaning, how can there be the relation of qualifier and qualified which presupposes difference, some give the following

answer. If both the *viśeṣaṇa* and the *viśeṣya* are understood in one act of cognition, they cannot have anything to do with each other and so there cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified. But they cannot be grasped in one verbal cognition because the two words came in a sequence and so the two meanings also must be understood in a sequence. So the qualifier is understood first and it is added to the qualified which is grasped next. After that, when the two are unified, the qualifier as such does not exist. After qualifying the *viśeṣya*, it disappears. So all that remains is the qualified *viśeṣya* and that is understood from the compound.]

89. The previous cognition of the *nimitta* (*viśeṣaṇa*) does not affect the *nimittin* (*viśeṣya*) nor is the cognition of the latter coloured by that of the *nimitta*.

90. Nor are the two connected by remembrance caused by the knowledge of the latter accompanied by the impression of the former.

[This explanation is not satisfactory. The previous cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* does not affect the *viśeṣya* because the latter does not then exist. When the *viśeṣya* is grasped, it is not grasped as qualified by the *viśeṣaṇa* which had disappeared without qualifying the *viśeṣaṇa*. Each one has been grasped in its own form and not as *viśeṣaṇa* or *viśeṣya*. Therefore this relation of qualifier and qualified has not been grasped. Nor can one argue that the cognition of the *viśeṣya* is coloured by the impression of the cognition of the *viśeṣaṇa* and that the impression produces a remembrance which brings about the relation of qualifier and qualified. Remembrance only follows previous experience and it cannot unite the two by the relation of qualifier and qualified. Nor does one get over the difficulty by saying that the relation is brought about by an inner power of the experiencer, because, in that case, it would be the creation of the experiencer and not real.]

91. If it is all the work of the mind, it is useless to postulate the existence of the external object.

Therefore, either is either no service or the object perceived is not such.

[If the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* is the work of the mind of the experiencer, why not say that everything is really the mind appearing as external? Why postulate the existence of the external object? Why say that the relation of qualifier and qualified is something which exists in the external object?]

92. Because everything is mixed up the cognition also takes place as something combined (*anusyūteva*.) Those who explain analyse it and present it differentiated.

93. In something the essence of which is indivisible, by resorting to separate cognition (that is, analysis) one sees divisions as it were between the qualifier and the qualified.

[After having shown that the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot be explained on the basis of separate cognitions of the two, the author now sets forth his own view based on the idea that the two are grasped in one cognition. Cognitions take place according to the nature of objects. Objects are combined unities and so are cognitions. The object, as qualified by universal, quality etc. enters into cognition as one. It is not that objects are first cognised separately and then combined. Our cognition is one and is intertwined with all the elements like the universal, quality etc. In reality, objects are not combinations of separately existing elements. The two things, substance and quality, in a thing like a blue lotus appear in one single cognition and there is no relation of qualifier and qualified between them based on difference. But one cannot communicate such complex indivisible unities to others. So at the time of communication, the complex unity is analysed into its elements and they are communicated separately. The listeners also understand them in that way. The relation of qualifier and qualified does exist in the external object and it is analysed separately for the purpose of communication. The elements analysed such as subs-

tance, quality, universal, the relation of inherence are all real. By the method of analysis, the complex unity is communicated. In this analysis, the relation of qualifier and qualified also comes out. The analysis and communication take place in sentences, but the impressions of the sentence-stage persist and so the relation of qualifier and qualified is understood in the *vytti* also. Really speaking, the *vytti* itself is indivisible. Thus, there is difference between the sentence and the *vytti*.]

The author now explains another view mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*.

94. Some, while explaining complex formations for the benefit of the ignorant, declare that the conveying of the meaning of another, involves both abandonment (*tyāga*) of one's own meaning and addition (*abhyuccaya*) to the meaning of the primary word.

[Some look upon the compound word (*vytti*) as made out of the sentence which is eternal. The compound is thus an effect and the effect may have properties which the cause did not have. In this case, the extra property is *parārthābhidhānam* = "the conveying of the meaning of another word." The secondary word (*upasarjana*) in the compound expresses the meaning of the primary word. In *rājāpuruṣaḥ*, *rāja* expresses the meaning of *puruṣa*. Some think that it gives up its own meaning before expressing the meaning of another, just as a carpenter, engaged to do some royal business, gives up his own work. Others think that it does not give up its own meaning and yet expresses an additional meaning. Thus there are two possibilities: *jāhatsvārthā vyttiḥ* = compounding by giving up one's meaning and *ajāhatsvārthā vyttiḥ* = compounding by not giving up one's own meaning. The meaning of *rājā* qualifies that of *puruṣa*. Thus both the meanings do come in the compound. This does not, however, bring in the dual number because the compound expresses one integrated meaning and not two separate meanings. In a compound, the secondary word gives up its own meaning only after having qualified the meaning of the main word. In other words, in *parārthābhidhāna*, there are both *tyāga* and *abhyuccaya*.]

95. The meaning of the secondary word is understood because its traces persist or that part which is opposed to the meaning of the main word is abandoned. Some also declare the secondary word to have a double meaning.

[About the role of the secondary word in a compound there are several views. Some say that some trace of its meaning is left even if it is abandoned, just as the changed colour of an object due to heat persists even after the heat has been removed. Another view is that only that part of the meaning of the secondary word disappears which is opposed to the meaning of the main word. So much for *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*. Some hold that the secondary word keeps its meaning and also expresses that of the main word. It qualifies with its meaning the meaning of the main word. Thus it is *dvārtha*. There are also those who hold that the secondary word completely gives up its meaning and that the meaning of the main word alone is understood from the compound. Thus the main word and the compound become synonyms.]

In what sense there is *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* is now explained.

96. The splitting-up is only a means, the compound is one whole. Difference and connection can be understood either as alternatives or together.

[Even though a qualified meaning is understood from a compound as from a sentence, still there is *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ*. The meaning of the secondary word abandons its primary character and becomes a mere qualifier of the meaning of the main word. But the compound does express one qualified meaning and the compound is also one single word. While explaining it, it is split up into parts but that is only a means to an end. The meaning of the sentence, namely, difference and connection, are found in the compound also either as alternatives or together in the relation of primary and secondary.]

97. Those who explain complex formations in order to instruct the ignorant adopt different and variable methods of explanation.

[Those who think that the sentence and the compound have the same meaning consider that the secondary word does not give up its meaning (*ajahatsvārthā*). Those who think that they have different meanings adopt the *jahatsvārthā* view. As means of explaining indivisible words will always differ according to taste, difference of opinion is natural.]

Now something is going to be said about the number of the secondary word in a compound.

98. In a sentence, the suffixes are either expressive or indicative of different numbers. But in a compound where a part resembles them, differentiation in number disappears.

[According to the view that the meaning of the stem is the triad (*trika*), namely, *jāti*, *vyakti* and *liṅga*, the suffix is expressive (*vācaka*) of number. According to the view that the stem denotes five things (*pañcaka*), namely, *jāti*, *vyakti*, *liṅga*, *saṃkhyā* and *kāraka*, the suffix is only indicative of number. In sentences like *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* and *rājñāṃ puruṣaḥ*, the case-ending of the first word expresses a particular number. In the compounds corresponding to these sentences, the first constituent would correspond to the first word in the sentences. It should therefore, have the same case-ending. But the elision of the case-endings of the constituents is taught by P. 2. 4. 71. As to the particular number denoted by the case-ending which is elided, what happens is that the meaning of the secondary constituent *rājan* gets mixed up with that of the primary constituent *puruṣa* and so the particular number disappears and with it the particular case-ending expressive of it. Thus the meaning of the compound is not the same as that of the corresponding sentence. They only resemble each other. In a sentence, a particular number is understood whereas in a compound, it is not.]

Thus some hold the view that the secondary constituent does not express a particular number. Others hold a different view.

99. In such cases, the undifferentiated singular number, a totally different thing, arises. It is a combination of all numbers but without any inner differentiation.

[The secondary constituent of a compound expresses *sattva* = substance (something concrete) and so it must have a number. But no particular number is understood from it. So one infers that it expresses number in general, from which, according to necessity, any required number can be understood. This is what is called *abhedaikatvasaṁkhyā* = the undifferentiated singular number.]

100. That number is said to be like honey in which the flavours of different plants have been deposited and exist in an undifferentiated form.

[It is like the flavour of honey which is an undifferentiated combination of the flavours of many flowers. The properties of the honey depend upon the properties of the flowers whose flavours have made it up. As any required number can be understood from the secondary constituent of a compound, one infers that all numbers exist in an undifferentiated state in *abhedaikatvasaṁkhyā*. It is really not a number at all. One cannot count anything with it. But it is called *saṁkhyā*, because a particular number, according to need, can be understood from it.]

Another way of looking at it is as follows—

101. It is the essence of number (*saṁkhyātmā*) because it excludes all particular numbers. It exists by the operation of the universal aspect and by ignoring the particular aspect.

[Just as the singular number excludes duality and plurality

and duality excludes plurality etc. in the same way the *abhedaikatva* excludes all particulars like singularity. Thus it has the common property of all number and so it is called *saṃkhyā*. Depending on circumstances, one can understand a particular number from it. Before it was looked upon as an amalgam of all particulars. Now it is looked upon as having the common property of all numbers, namely, the exclusion of other numbers (*bhedāpoha*). In other words it is looked upon as a kind of universal.]

It might be said that it cannot be a universal. Universals like 'cow-ness' (*gotva*) are postulated on the basis of their effect, namely, uniformity of cognition. But *abhedaikatva* cannot have any effect, because all grammatical operations take place on particular numbers. So how can one postulate the existence of *abhedaikatva*? This objection is answered as follows—

102. Just as an object is cognised (from a distance) as having some undifferentiated colour, its particular colour like white being not cognised.

103. In the same way, when a particular number is not meant to be conveyed through the secondary constituent, if anything connected with it is revealed, it is taken as the basis by the *śāstra* for the teaching of a form.

[Even if, from a distance, we cannot see the exact colour of an object, we know that it has some colour. In the same way, we know that the meaning of the secondary constituent, being *sattva*, must have some number, though we do not know which particular one. This is the effect of *abhedaikatva*. When any circumstance in connection with it is revealed, it is made use of by the *śāstra* to teach a particular form. As for instance, the substitution of *yuṣmad* and *asmad* by *tavaka* and *mamaka* is made use of by the *śāstra* to derive the forms *tāvakīna* and *māmakīna* in the singular by P. 4.3.3.]

104. Through the words whose powers are restricted even though meaning has many powers, that part (that is, the meaning of the first constituent) is understood as meaning in general.

[The meaning of the secondary constituent of a compound being in the nature of *sattva*, it is potentially capable of being associated with all numbers but it is not actually linked with any particular number. Words have a limited scope and do not always denote all their possible meanings.]

105. It is fit to be called undifferentiated and so it is midway between the property of indeclinables and of words having different case-endings.

[Indeclinables express a meaning which is not of the nature of *sattva* and has, therefore, no gender and number. Words having different case-endings express a meaning having a particular gender and number. Such is the nature of these two kinds of words. The secondary constituent of a compound comes midway between the two. It expresses undifferentiated number. Here is where a sentence and a compound differ.]

106. Undifferentiated singular number, being there, 'becoming like one' (*ekavadbhāva*) is not taught in connection with compounds with unelided case-endings (*alukṣamāsa*). Even with another particular number (the plural) it (the undifferentiated singular) exists in compounds like *goṣucara*.

[It is because the secondary constituent conveys undifferentiated number that 'becoming like one' (*ekavadbhāva*) is not taught in connection with compounds having unelided case-endings. The plural number which one sees in compounds like *goṣucara*, *varṣāsuja* and *apsuyoni* is not the one which expresses the plurality of individuals. It expresses the singular number of the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58.]

107. As the dual number does not express the universal, it does not exist in the compound. If the *sūtra* teaching plural number to express the universal is discarded, then, in words like *goṣucara*, it would denote the plurality of individuals.

[The dual number has not been taught in the sense of the universal but the plural number has been. Therefore, duality is never conveyed by the compound which also shows that the secondary constituent conveys undifferentiated number. If P. 1. 2. 58 is discarded, then in expressions like *brāhmaṇāḥ namaskartavyāḥ*, the plural number would convey the plurality of the individuals.]

It is now stated, that this is not correct.

108. By adopting differentiation of number (in *goṣucara*), there would be connection with all particular numbers. Nor is the view that it expresses plurality of individuals adopted (in the *M. Bhā.*) on P. 1. 2. 58.

109. (If the word denotes the universal) all individuals can be understood from it and retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) is set aside. Otherwise, if P. 1. 2. 58. is discarded, one would understand plurality of individuals (in a compound like *goṣucara* which is wrong).

[This view is not correct. To say that the plural number in *goṣucara* denotes plurality of individuals would amount to accepting that particular numbers are conveyed by the 'secondary constituent in a compound. The name *goṣucara* would become applicable to the insect called *indrogopa* even if it is found only in one or two cows. So this plural number does not denote plurality of individuals, but the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58. In the *M. Bhā.*, the view that the plural number expresses plurality of individuals has not been adopted. Otherwise, *ekaśeṣa*

would have become necessary. As it is, it has been set aside. But not P. 1. 2. 58. If this had been set aside, the plural cannot be used for expressing the universal because it would denote plurality of individuals and in *goṣucara* that is what one would have to understand which is against facts. The conclusion is that in *goṣucara* the plural expresses the universal according to P. 1. 2. 58 and not undifferentiated number though this is also recognised.]

110. If the secondary constituent conveys the undifferentiated singular number, one cannot get the form *godau grāmaḥ* according to the extension of gender and number (*yuktavadbhāva*) of the stem *varaṇa* etc. (P. 4. 2. 82.) to the meaning of the elided *taddhita* suffix (taught in P. 1. 2. 51.).

[If the meaning of the secondary constituent is considered to include the undifferentiated singular number, a difficulty would arise where the gender and number of the stem are extended to the meaning of the *taddhita* suffix which is elided. For example, P. 4. 2. 82 says that the *taddhita* suffix expressive of a *cāturarthika* meaning except that of country of residence is elided after *varaṇa* etc. and P. 1. 2. 51. extends the gender and number of the stem to the meaning of the elided suffix. How can the number be extended if the secondary word in the *ṽrtti* is to convey *abhedaikatva*? If it cannot be extended, we cannot get the form *godau grāmaḥ*. Here in *godau*, *goda* is the secondary constituent of the *taddhita* *ṽrtti*. Before it entered the *ṽrtti*, its number was the dual and it has been extended. That is why we get the form *godau* as a *taddhita* derivative.]

111. If the view is that the gender and number of the word before it enters into the *ṽrtti* are extended, then the sixth case-ending also would be extended. But as, in a *ṽrtti*, particular numbers are abandoned, anything based on difference (like the sixth case-ending) cannot come in.

[If it is maintained that it is the gender and number of the word before it entered into the *ṽrtti* which are extended,

then the sixth case-ending also would have to be extended because it also expresses number. But the *M. Bhā.* has declared that it is number in general which is extended and not a particular number. Secondly, the sixth case-ending is based on difference and in a *ṽṛtti*, the meanings of the constituents become one and so there is no difference. Hence there cannot be any question of the sixth case-ending coming in. Really speaking, it is the gender and number of word after it has entered into the *ṽṛtti* which are extended and not what there was before.]

If that is so, the undifferentiated singular would come in as that is what the secondary constituent has after the word has entered the *ṽṛtti* and the form *godau grāmaḥ* would not be realised. So the original objection still stands. This is now answered.

112. Some declare that the undifferentiated number which comes into being in a *ṽṛtti*, when the different numbers are there, is a different kind of number which includes all of them (*upagrāhi*).

[According to some, the undifferentiated singular (*abhedai-kaṭva*) includes within itself all the particular numbers, it is an amalgamation of all of them and that is what comes into being in a *ṽṛtti*.]

As it includes all the numbers, forms like *godau grāmaḥ* become possible.

113. Sometimes it functions through the particular numbers, its parts, and sometimes its own form, irrespective of differentiation, becomes the basis of use.

[As it includes all the particular numbers within itself, sometimes, that is, when there is occasion for a particular number to be conveyed, it functions through it. Sometimes, however, it functions in an undifferentiated form.¹

An illustration is now given.

114. *Dāsyāḥpatiḥ* is a clear case and there is also the form *godau*. Thus diversity of function of this number (*abhedaikatva*) is established.

[The following are illustrations. In *dāsyāḥpatiḥ* which is a compound, the secondary constituent has the singular number. It is a clear case of *abhedaikatva* functioning in its own form. Abuse of the husband is understood because of association with *dāsi*. It is immaterial, therefore, in what case-ending that word is used. In *godau grāmaḥ*, proximity to *two godas* is meant and, therefore, the word is in the dual number and not in the singular due to *yuktavadbhāva* (extension of the gender and number of the qualified to the qualifier by P. 1.2.51.) The dual number which is included in *abhedaikatva* comes out in this case. Elsewhere also we see how a number is included in another, though, speaking generally, a number cannot have another number. In the question *kati bhavataḥ putrāḥ* = 'how many sons have you?', the word *kati* which is a word expressive of number includes all numbers. That is why, the answer to this question can be any number. In the same way, all particular numbers are included in *abhedaikatva*.]

If the secondary constituent expresses its meaning as qualified by the undifferentiated singular, how do we understand duality in words like *dviputra* = 'the son of two'?

115. In compounds like *dviputra*, the external differentiation such as *two* etc. expressed by the case-ending disappears but the reason for using the stem (in the sense of two) remains, being its own meaning.

[How is the number two understood from the secondary constituent in *dviputraḥ*, a compound formed in the sense of *dvayoḥ putraḥ* = 'the son of two'. The dual number expressed by the case-ending in *dvayoḥ* disappears when the word enters into

the compound but not the idea of two expressed by the stem. Even according to the *jahatsvārthā* view, the meaning of the secondary constituent does not disappear completely.]

116. The word *dvi* expresses the meaning of the whole to which duality, its own meaning is subordinate because of the identification of the parts and the whole (*so'yaṁ ityabhisambandhaḥ*). The word *ubha* is not in the same position.

[Even though the meaning of the secondary constituent *dvi* continues, it is subordinate to that of the main word and so *abhedaikatva* also comes into being. The word *ubha* does not behave in the same way. Its meaning would not become subordinate to that of the primary word and that is why it does not enter into a compound. Though *ubha* also means the same thing as *dvi*, it does not behave in the same manner. Such is the nature of words.]

117. The word *ubhaya*, similar in meaning to it, is always used in complex formations (*vr̥tti*). That is why in P. 5. 2. 44 (*ubhādudātto nityam*), the word *nitya* is used.

[As the word *ubha* cannot enter into a compound, the word *ubhaya*, having a similar meaning, is always used in a *vr̥tti* as in *ubhayaputraḥ*, *ubhayathā*, *ubhayataḥ* and so on. *Ubhaya* can express the meaning of the whole with its own meaning subordinate to it. *Ubha* expresses duality with emphasis on differentiation whereas *ubhaya* expresses it with emphasis on the whole.]

118. When *āp* or *ka* follows, there is no subordination to the meaning of another and so no identification takes place. Therefore the word *ubha*, with the suffix added in the meaning of the stem itself and resting on differentiation is used.

[The word *ubha* is used only when *lāp* and the suffix of the dual or the suffix *ka* are used. Seevā. 8 and 9 on P. 1.1.27. The feminine suffix and *ka* are added to a stem in its own meaning (*svārthe*). So there is no question of the meaning of the stem becoming subordinate to that of the suffix and so *abheda* does not come to be. In such a case, the word which stands for *bheda* can be used and we get the forms *ubhe* and *ubhaka*. When the suffix has its own meaning or when the primary word of the compound follows, the meaning of the secondary constituent becomes subordinate to that of the primary word, so *ubha* cannot be used. *Ubhaya* is used instead.]

119. Even according to the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine gender, there is, as a result of the nature of words, a reversal of the relation of qualifier and qualified. As there is no subordination of the meaning of *ubha* to something else, differentiation (which is part of its meaning) does not disappear.

[Even if one takes the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine gender and not that it is added to the stem in the latter's own meaning which includes the feminine gender one has to accept that there is a reversal here of the ordinary relation of qualifier and qualified as seen in words like *Gārgya* where the meaning of the stem is the qualifier and that of the suffix is the qualified. Here it is the meaning of the suffix which is the qualifier because a word in the feminine gender denotes a substance as qualified by the feminine gender which is the meaning of the suffix. Here again, the reversal is due to *śabdaśakti*.]

120. Therefore *ubhaya* is found elsewhere than when the suffix of the dual and the feminine suffix follow, except when the suffix *tayap* follows. There is no *ubha* when the second constituent of a compound follows.

[Thus the word *ubha* is used when both the feminine suffix and the suffix of the dual number follow. When some other suffix or the second constituent of a compound follows, there is *ubhaya*. Of course, for the formation of *ubhaya* itself, *tayap* is added to *ubha* according to P. 5.2.44.]

A doubt is now raised in regard to the compound *Kumāryagāram* which is answered as follows.

121. (In *Kumāryagāram*), the name *pragrhya* would not come through the continuance of the effect of a suffix even after it is elided (*pratyayalakṣaṇa*, taught in P. 1. 1. 62.). There is no compound here of a word ending in the dual.

[If one wants to make a compound word of *kumāryoḥ agāram*, the sixth case-ending in the dual would be elided and one would get *Kumārī+agāram*. Here by P. 1.1.62 the word *Kumārī* would be looked upon as ending in the dual and so P.1.1.11. would apply and the final *ī* cannot be joined with the initial *a* and so we would not get the required form. To this objection, the answer is that P. 1.1.62 does not apply in the case of the name *pragrhya* (see Vā. 4 and 5 on P.1.1.11 and the M. Bhā. thereon.) In any case, as the secondary constituent of a compound has *abhedaikatva*, it does not end in the dual at all. So nothing prevents the joining of the final *ī* with the initial *a* and the formation of the compound.]

Some objections are now raised against the idea of *abhedaikatva*.

122. The optional elision of *yañ* etc in the singular and the dual numbers (taught in P. 2. 4. 64) would be inexplicable and, as there is no differentiation (according to *abhedaikatva*), the forms *yauṣmāka* and *tāvaka* could not be formed.

[*Abhedaikatva* goes against the *vārttika* no. 1. on P. 2.4.64. according to which in a *tatpuruṣa* compound where the first constituent formed with the suffix *yañ* ends in the singular or dual number, the *yañ* is optionally elided, giving the alternative forms *gargakulam* and *gārgyakulam*. If there is *abhedaikatva*, how does Kātyāyana speak about the compounding of a word ending in the singular. Similarly, P.4.3.3. teaches the substitutes *taṇaka* and *mamaka* in the singular number for *yusmad* and *asmad* which means that *yusmāka* and *asmāka* in *yauṣmākīṇaḥ* and *āsmākīṇaḥ*, or *yauṣmākaḥ* and *āsmākaḥ* stand for two and more than two and that goes against *abhedaikatva*.]

123. In *gārgyatara* and *gargatarāḥ* one sees differentiation and it is on that basis that in regard to *yusmatpitā* and *tvatpitā*, substitutes are regulated.

[Moreover, P. 2.4.64 teaches the elision of the *apatya* suffix *yañ* and *añ* in the plural. That means that where there is no elision, the singular and the dual numbers would be understood as in *gārgyatara* and the plural must be understood in *gargatarāḥ* where *yañ* has been elided. If a particular number is understood, how can there be *abhedaikatva*. Similarly, when followed by a suffix or the second constituent of a compound, *tva* and *ma* take the place of *yusma* and *asma* of *yusmad* and *asmad* in the singular. Thus we get *tvadiya* and *madiya*, *tvattaraḥ*, *mattaraḥ*, *tvatputraḥ* and *matputraḥ*. In the dual and plural, we have *yusmadīya*, *asmadīya* etc. All this means that in these words, the first element expresses a particular number and not *abhedaikatva*.]

The above objections are answered as follows—

124. The conditioning number which exists in the meaning of the stem is understood either from the substitutes or from the name without the help of the case-ending.

[The Unity based on the absence of differentiation which

is brought about when a word enters into a complex formation (*vyrtti*) includes all particular numbers. Where a favourable circumstance exists, there a particular number is understood. In *Kumāryagāram*, the application of the name *pragrhya* is the circumstance which enables one to understand the particular number two. Similarly in *tāvaka* and *tvatpitā*, the fact that the substitutes are taught when a particular number, the singular, is to be expressed is the favourable circumstance. In *yusmatpitā*, the dual or the plural number would be understood from the context. Similarly in *gārgyakula*.]

125. In the words *śaurpika* and *māsajāta*, the measure is differentiated on the basis of the conditioning number.

[In *śaurpika* (formed by P. 5.1.26 and 37.) and *māsajāta* (formed by P. 2.2.5.) if a particular number included in *abhed-aiikatva* is not understood, the meaning meant to be conveyed, namely, the particular price to be paid for the purchase in the case of *śaurpika* and the period of time which has elapsed after birth in the case of *māsajāta* would not be conveyed. So one does understand that one *śūrpa* is the price and that one month has elapsed after birth.]

126. Without differentiation (specification) of the number, the desired determination of what has age or what is bought would not take place and the use of the words expressive of measure would be useless.

[The exact determination of what is bought and what is born would be impossible without the understanding of the number one. The very use of the words expressive of measure (*śūrpa* and *māsa*) would be useless. Unless the measure is specified, what is measured would not be specified either. Therefore, in these two words the meaning of the secondary constituent is understood as qualified by the number one.]

127. The suffix *śas* is taught after words like *prastha* because they denote the singular number of the individual and have, therefore, that property but it does not come after words like *ghaṭa* because they express the unity (of the universal).

According to P.5.4.53, the suffix *śas* is taught after a word expressive of something qualified by the particular number one and not by number one in general which belongs to the universal. Words expressive of measure are of this type. They express their meaning (a particular measure) as qualified by the number one. So we get forms like *prasthaśaḥ*, *khārīśaḥ*. Words expressive of the universal are not usually expressive of the particular number one but of the one-ness of the universal. Where, however, they do express the singular number of the individual, there the suffix *śas* can be added to them as in—

Yo vā imāṃ vācaṃ varnaśaḥ padaśaḥ akṣvraśo vā vidādhāti, sa ārtvijīno bhavati = “he who utters every phoneme, every word and every syllable of this speech correctly becomes fit to be an officiating priest (or to have an officiating priest) (M. Bhā. I. p. 3. l. 12.)

Though *varṇa* denotes the universal, yet here the singular number of the individual qualifies it. Hence the suffix *śaḥ* has been added.]

128. Where the verbal element (expressive of a particular number) is heard, there it is understood as distinct and where it is not heard, there that particular number does not exist.

[According to the other view also, namely, that *abhedaikatva* means one-ness in which particular numbers are completely obliterated, the apparent contradiction can be explained. Where, in a sentence, the verbal element expressive of a particular number is actually heard, there the particular number is understood as

distinct from the others. Where, as in a *vytti*, it is not heard, it is because that particular number does not exist.]

129. The not-coming-into being of a suffix is its not being heard at all and the operation based upon its existence comes into being through *śāstra* (P. 1. 1. 62.). What is seen in the sentence is totally absent in complex formations.

[In a *vytti*, the meaning of the case-ending does not exist and so it does not come to be. This not coming into being at all is called *adarśana*=not being seen or heard. In order that the grammatical operation based on its existence may take place, P.1.1.62. is given. But the substitutes (*tavaka* and *mamaka*) and the name *pragrhya* can come only in the presence of the suffix (*kaṁ* and *aṁ* and the dual case-ending) and as it does not exist in the *vytti*, it is shown in the technical analysis. In the *vytti*, there is no case-ending, because its meaning is not there and not because it has been destroyed (*pradhvaṁsābhāva*).]

If the case-endings do not come to be at all, how can operations depending upon their existence take place even by P.1.1.62. ?

130. In order to determine the scope of the name 'elision, (*lopa*), it has been defined as the non-perception of what would otherwise come to be. But an element expressive of a particular number is actually heard (in the analytical sentence, *prakriyāvākya*.)

[The case-ending is heard in the sentences actually used in life, but as its meaning does not exist in the *vytti*, the case-ending does not come to be. If it does not come to be at all, how is it *prasakta*, something that is due to come to be? It is the non-perception of what is due to come to be which is called elision (*prasaktasyādarśanam lopah*). The very fact that elision (*luk*) is

taught (P. 2. 4. 71.) shows that it was due. That it was due is shown in the analytical sentence which is similar to what is actually used in life and is the source (*prakṛti*) of the complex formation. In this analytical sentence, the case-endings are actually present and they stand for particular numbers and they are elided by P. 2. 4. 71. In spite of the elision, the effect of the case-ending can be seen in the compound which is formed. One effect of the case-ending is the understanding of a particular number from the complex formation and that is what happens in *tāvaka*, *kumāryagāra* etc. Thus it has been shown that even according to the view that in *abhedaikatva*, particular numbers are not merged but completely disappear, a particular number is sometimes understood from the *vr̥tti* through its own expressive element.]

But this view is defective.

131. Where there is absence of elision or where something having a positive form (as the substitute *tavaka*) is taught, there the particular condition mentioned would be absent and, therefore, the form of the *vr̥tti* would be incorrect.

[If the elision is of case-ending seen in the analytical sentence, the dual and the plural case-endings should also be seen where there is no elision by P. 6. 3. 2. but only the singular number is correct. One-ness is understood from the compound *stokānmuk-taḥ*. Similarly, when the substitute *tavaka* is taught (P. 4. 3. 3.), there also the singular number is understood. But if the secondary constituent in a *vr̥tti* stands for one-ness in which all differentiation is obliterated (*bhedāpohalakṣaṇābhedaikatva*), then the singular number as distinct from the dual and the plural would have to be abandoned and then *tāvakīna* would be incorrect.]

132. The understanding of a particular number in a sentence has been explained as the difference between a sentence and a *vr̥tti*. But the difference is not always like that.

[The correct position is this. There is infinite variety in the use of words and rules cannot cover all of it. So some general rules are made. Thus *ekārthībhāva* is shown as the particular feature of a *vytti*, as distinct from a sentence. One-ness in general is understood from a *vytti* while a particular number is understood from a sentence. But it is not that a particular number is never understood from a *vytti*. In *śaurpika* and *māsajāta*, it is understood. The *vaiśeṣika* definition of *dravya* does not apply to *ākāśa* but it is enough to distinguish it from *guṇa*. Similarly, even if sometimes a particular number is understood from *vytti*, it is different from a sentence where it is always understood. So the general definition of *vytti* is not affected. Like the particular number, sometimes a particular gender is also not understood from a *vytti* as in *kukkuṭāṇḍam*.]

133. As the universal is the cause of the exclusion (of other universals), the meaning of the main word is not qualified by gender in compounds like *mṛgadugdha* but this is not the case in *gārgīputra*.

[In *kukkuṭāṇḍa*, *chāgamāṃsa* etc. the secondary constituent is chiefly expressive of the universal (*jāti*) which is meant to qualify the meaning of the main word by the exclusion of other universals. So gender is unimportant. Thus words like *kukkuṭi* get their masculine form according to P. 6. 3. 42. But in *gārgīputra*, *chāgalīmūtra* etc., the intention is not to exclude other universals and so the secondary constituent has the feminine form].

134. When, due to association with undifferentiated gender and number, there is the possibility of the form *śuklaṃ paṭāḥ* being used, a rule has been made (P. 1.2.52.) in order that the correct gender and number may come to be.

[When the formation of a word does not take into account the other words in the sentence (*padāvadhikam anvākhyānam*), the word *śukla* gets the form *śuklam*, the neuter being the common

gender and the singular the common number. When the word enters into a sentence and becomes the adjective of a word like *paṭāḥ*, it would not give up its neuter gender and singular number already acquired due to inner factors (*antaraṅga*). Thus one would get the expression *śuklaṃ paṭāḥ*, which is wrong. Therefore, P. 1.2.52 says that the adjective gets the gender and number of the word which it qualifies.]

135. In the *sūtra* concerned (P. 1.2.52.) by the word *viśeṣaṇa*, a word expressive of quality which exists for something else and is a secondary constituent in a *vṛtti* is meant.

[In P. 1. 2. 52 by *viśeṣaṇa*, that which is dependent on something else is meant. It is a quality which is meant here and quality rests on a substance and is, therefore, dependent. The *matuṣ* suffix is elided after a word expressive of quality but it stands in a *general manner* for that which has the quality. When it is associated with a word expressive of a particular object having that quality, it becomes its adjective.]

136. The words being separated from one another, in sentences, particular genders and numbers are heard. Even though that is so, a *vṛtti* being in the nature of absence of differentiation, it does not exist as expressive of them, that is, the particulars.

[If the view that the formation of a word takes into account the other words in a sentence is adopted, then we would get *śuklo guṇo'sya paṭasya* where the word *śukla* has a particular gender and number. For bringing that about P. 1. 2. 52 is not necessary. But this view is not correct. The word *śukla* in this sentence is different from the word *śuklaḥ* in *śuklaḥ paṭāḥ* where the *matuṣ* suffix has been elided. It is a *vṛtti* whereas the former word *śukla* is not. What can happen in a sentence cannot happen in a *vṛtti*. In a *vṛtti*, the word *śukla* is of a very general

nature and cannot have the gender and number of the word with which it might become associated in a sentence. For that, special provision has to be made and that has been done in P. 1. 2. 52.]

137. As, from the form of the word, it is understood that its formation has the general as the basis. Therefore, the gender and number of the general would result.

138. And so the word with its gender and number would be connected with the word expressive of substance and the two words would have different genders and numbers.

[It might be said that, as the particular has to be expressed, it would become the basis of the formation of the word even if it is found in an external word. The fact is that only that becomes the basis of the formation of a word which is actually understood from the word and from a complex formation (*ṛtti*) it is gender and number in general which are understood and they would be the basis of the word-formation. Once the word is formed, gender and number in general cannot be given up.]

139. Therefore, the gender and number of the coming external word expressive of the substratum are prescribed for the words expressive of quality by the *sūtra* (P. 1.2.52.)

[The other word in the sentence, expressive of substance, is *bahiraṅga* and it cannot be the basis for the formation of the word in question. To achieve that, a special provision has to be made and that has been done in P. 1. 2. 52.]

140. Even if some particular is meant, it is not understood because of absence of difference in form

and, therefore, no operation based on particularisation can take place.

[Even though some particularisation may be intended, the *vyrtti* being common to all particulars, there is no specification and therefore, an unspecified particular cannot be the basis of word-formation.]

141. The general is as good as a particular because it differs from the particulars. When absence of differentiation is resorted to, it keeps out the particulars.

[Nor would a particular be understood merely because the general implies the particular. The general would keep the particulars out as a particular would keep the other particulars out. The general, when especially meant to be conveyed becomes as good as a *viśeṣa* and keeps the particulars out. See M. Bhā. I. p. 422. l. 5.]

142. Whatever is actually adopted keeps other things out. Differentiation or the absence of it is not thought of in connection with the general.

[The fact is that it is right to speak about the general as differentiation or absence of differentiation. Whatever is adopted will naturally keep other things out. Just as a word like *gauḥ* formed on the basis of its real meaning, is applied to a *vāhika* by attributing *gotva* to the latter, in the same way, words like *śukla*, formed on the basis of something general, are connected in the sentence with other words expressive of the particular and then there might be difference of gender and number which is undesirable. To prevent this, P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

143. The analysis of that meaning which is helpful (in understanding the meaning of the sentence)

results in something general. It is based on its cause and it is understood as having its own characteristic.

[All this discussion has taken the general meaning of the individual word as the basis. But the meaning of a word is not like an external object which has a persistent form. What is this general meaning then? The fact is that it is the indivisible sentence expressive of a particularised meaning which is expressive. When, for practical purposes, it is analysed into words, then the meaning of these words is found to be of a general nature and it helps in the understanding of meaning of the sentence. It is based on its own cause, namely, mutual requirement and it is understood with its own characteristic, that is, absence of differentiation.]

144. The divisions which are abstracted being not fully particularised are called by the name of the general on the basis of the causes (of the analysis).

[As the analysed words are parts of a sentence expressive of a particularised meaning, this meaning must also be the particular. How can it be the general? The fact is that individual words cannot denote the real particular. When abstracted from the sentence a word is not connected with any other particular word and so it cannot denote the real particular and so its meaning is said to be the general. As the individual word denotes the universal of quality or action, so, in a sense, it denotes the differentiated thing, but it is called the general, because it is not fully particularised through connection with the meaning of other words in the sentence. In that sense, it is not real but only a means of understanding the meaning of the sentence.]

145. When the gender and number of a word are declared to be natural, then the correct form (of a word) is determined considering the other words which are to be used in a sentence.

[So far P. 1. 2. 52 has been explained and justified. But Pāṇini himself has declared it to be unnecessary (P. 1. 2. 53). In other words, he has declared it to be natural that adjectives should take the gender and number of the word which they qualify. A word gets its gender and number in view of the other word in the sentence with which it is going to be connected. This is the essence of the *vākyāvadhiḥ* *anvākyānam*. The formation of a word takes into account the other words in the sentence and no distinction is made between *antaraṅga* and *bahiraṅga* factors, because from the very beginning the speaker knows with what other word a word is going to be connected and forms it accordingly.]

146. The use of quality words with those expressive of their substratum is variable. The universal, on the other hand, is always associated with the object which is its substratum.

[The elision of the suffix *matuḥ* after words expressive of a quality is taught but not after words expressive of a universal because an object is never without the universal whereas its association with a quality is subject to variation.]

147. The word *gauḥ* does not denote the fact of being a cow (*gotva*) of *śābaleya* separately but the word *śukla* used as an adjective of *bāhuleya* does denote it separately.

[Even though the universal and quality both inhere, in the same object, they are differently expressed by words. The word *gauḥ* expresses the universal (*gotva*) as identical with the object. If it has to be expressed as something distinct from the object, the abstract suffix will have to be used as in *śābaleyasya gotvam*, but a quality can be expressed as something distinct without the use of the abstract suffix. That is why the elision of the *matuḥ* suffix is taught when it is intended to express quality and the object in apposition to each other, as in *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*.]

148. Thus when there is difference, the suffix *matuṣ* would be heard. That is why elision is taught. There is no elision after words like *rasa*.

[Strictly speaking where quality is expressed as distinct, there should be *matuṣ* which is generally used where there is difference as in *gomān devadattaḥ*. But the form without *matuṣ* is the correct one and so its elision has been taught. Otherwise, in *paśasya śuklaḥ*, there would be *matuṣ*. After words like *rasa*, there is no elision.]

149. As a word like *rasa* does not denote that which has *rasa* without change of form merely through the relation of identity, like the word *śukla* no elision is taught after it.

[If it is held that in *śuklaḥ paśaḥ* the first word, though ordinarily expressive of a quality, here expresses an object, the teaching of the elision would be unnecessary because the purpose of the elision is that a quality-word, without changing its form should denote an object in which the quality exists. If the elision is taught, it is in order that the same form may be used even when the word expresses quality as distinct from the objects as in *paśasya śuklaḥ*. Words like *rasa* cannot, without the suffix *matuṣ*, denote that which has *rasa*.]

150. When a word is superimposed on or identified with another, it sometimes retains its gender and number as in the case of *mañca* but that is not the case in *praṣṭha* and the like.

[Even though P. 1. 2. 52. has been declared to be unnecessary, it has some use. When the name of one is superimposed on another, there are two possibilities : (1) it retains its own gender and number, (2) it takes the gender and number of the word on which it is superimposed. In the sentence *mañcān yuvatīḥ paśya,*

the word *mañca* is superimposed on what is on it, namely, the girls (*yuvatīḥ*) but it retains its gender. Similarly, in *girīn saritaḥ syandamānāḥ paśya*, the rivers are identified with the hills from which they flow but the word *girīn* retains its gender. When *praṣṭha* is identified with his wife, in other words, when the word *praṣṭha* is used in the sense of *praṣṭha's* wife, it does not keep its gender. In *khalatikam vanāni*, the word *khalatikam*, though in apposition to *vanāni*, keeps its number. In *viṃśatiḥ brāhmaṇāḥ*, *viṃśatiḥ* keeps both its gender and number.]

151. When, through the relation of identity the masculine word (*praṣṭha*) is expressive of the wife (of the *praṣṭha*), the fact that it gives up its gender is indicated by the fact that a feminine suffix is taught by the *śāstra* (P. 4.1.48.).

[When the word *praṣṭha*, by identification or superimposition, is used for the wife, then it gives up its gender. That is what is taught in P. 4. 1. 48. The force of the word *ākhyāyām* in that *sūtra* is that there should be a relation of identity (*abhedasaṃbandha*) and not *bhedasaṃbandha*, that is, the wife should be looked upon as *praṣṭha* and not merely as the wife of *praṣṭha* which is based on difference.]

152. The *sūtra* “*viśeṣaṇānām cājāteḥ*” = “qualifying words also, except those expressive of a universal (take the gender and number of the word whose *taddhita* suffix has been elided) establishes that the word expressive of what rests on a substratum has the gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum.

[Only words like *praṣṭha* do this and not others. When *mañca* is superimposed on *mañcastha*, it does not give up its gender. Similarly, when words like *śukla* stand for what has the quality of white, they may retain their gender and number and we would

get the form *śuklaṃ paṭaḥ*. In order that this may not happen, the *sūtra* P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

153. The idea that, as the quality is found in the substratum, the properties of the words expressive of the distinguishing qualities should be found in the word expressive of the substratum is set aside (by P. 1.2.52.).

[When a word expressive of a *nimitta* such as quality is used to express what has quality, its gender and number may also come with it. In order that this may not happen, P. 1. 2. 52. is given.]

154. The use of the gender and number of the *nimitta* (the basis of the application of a word to an object) in expression like *godau grāmaḥ*, naturally current in the world, is made known by the *śāstra* (P. 1.2.51.).

[Where there is the relation of identity between the *nimitta* and the *nimitti*, should the gender and number of the former prevail or those of the latter? In *śuklāḥ paṭāḥ*, the latter prevails, in *pañcālāḥ janapadaḥ*, the former prevails. As the country where the *kṣattriyas* called *pañcālāḥ* live is called *pañcālāḥ*, the *kṣattriyās* are the *nimitta* for the application of the word to the country and as the *kṣattriyas* have the masculine gender and the plural number, the word *pañcālāḥ*, even when it means the country, has the same gender and number. This variation is due to the natural variation in the power of words. The *śāstra* only makes it known. It does not create it. According to P. 1. 2. 52, though ordinarily, the gender and number of the *nimitti* prevail, in some special cases, those of the *nimitta* prevail.]

155. In *harītakī* etc., it is the gender (of the *nimitta*), in *khalatika* etc., it is the number (of the *nimitta*) which prevail. As to the adjectives of the word in which

there is *lup* of the suffix *kan* taught when the word formed with it is intended to denote a human being, it is the gender and number of what is intended to be conveyed (*abhidheya*) which prevail.

[It is because gender and number are natural and only made known by *śāstra* that there is so much variation. In *harī-takyāḥ phalāni*, the gender of the *nimitta* prevails and the number of the *nimittī*. In *khalatikam* (the name of a hill) *vanāni*, the number of the *nimitta* prevails and the gender of the *nimitta*. When the word *cañcā* (effigy) is applied to a human being because of resemblance, there is *lup* of the suffix *kan* and its adjectives take the gender and number of the *nimittī*, namely, *manuṣya* and so we get the expression *cañcā abhīrūpaḥ, svākṛtiḥ darśanīyaḥ*.]

156. When the word expressive of the universal is used and the adjective is connected with it, then it would take the properties (gender and number) of the word expressive of the universal.

[According to P. 1.2. 52, where the qualification is sought to be made through a word expressive of the universal, the adjectives take the gender and number of that word as in *varaṇā nagaram ramyopavanam śvacchodakam sugandhikusumam*.]

157. When the qualifying word, different from the word expressive of the universal, is used keeping in view the word in which the *lup* has taken place, it is formed according to the properties of the latter, because its meaning is the primary one.

[When, however, the qualifying word is used in apposition to the word in which the elision (*lup*) of the *taddhita* suffix has taken place, it takes the gender and number of the latter as in *pañcālā priyātithayaḥ spaṣṭābhīdhānāḥ vinitaveśāḥ bahvannāḥ janapadaḥ*. Here, though the word expressive of the universal, namely,

janapada, has been used, the adjectives have been used with *pañcālāḥ* and so they are in the masculine gender and plural number.

Why Pāṇini framed I. 2. 52 and himself discarded it in I. 2. 52 has been interpreted in several ways by grammarians.]

158. In compounds with the negative particle, *bahuvrīhi*, *dvandva*, feminine formations and words expressive of degree, special genders and numbers are now to be considered according to the *Bhāṣya*.

[Cases where the *sūtra* in question is useful according to the *Bhāṣya* and the *vārttikas* are now going to be considered. In these cases, the gender and number which would result because of the presence of their *nimitta* are set aside in favour of the gender and number of the substratum.]

Following the reverse order and also because not much has to be said about it, the author first says something about words expressive of degree, taught in P. 5. 3. 55.

159. If the suffixes *tamaḥ* etc. are added to a word ending in the sixth or second case-affix, expressive of what is inferior, then they would be expressive of what surpasses and then there would be discrepancy in gender as compared with that of the stem.

[P. 5. 3. 55 teaches the suffixes *tamaḥ* and *iṣṭhan* when the idea of something surpassing another has to be expressed. There is much discussion among grammarians as to how the word *atiśāyane* in the *sūtra* is to be interpreted, that is whether it expresses the agent (*kartā*), the instrument (*karana*) or the bare action (*bhāva*). If it is interpreted to mean that these two suffixes are added to words expressive of what is lesser in degree and having the second or the sixth case-ending, then the word *atiśāyane* would qualify the meaning of the suffix and then the

meanings of the stem and suffix being different from each other could have different genders.]

An illustration is now given.

160. When the superior is *kālī*, the suffix *tarap* would be added to the word *kāla* having the second case-ending ; when the superior is *kāla*, the suffix *tarap* would be added to the word *kālī* having the second case-ending, when the one who surpasses is *gārgya*, the suffix would be added to *gargāḥ*.

161. When those who surpass are the *gargāḥ*, the suffix would be added to *gārgyaḥ* and all this is not desired. If *tarap* is added in the meaning of the stem itself (*svār:ha*) there would be *ñip* (in *kumāritarā*) because the meaning of the stem would not be over and above (that of degree).

[When the suffix *tarap* is added in the sense of *kālam atīsete kālī*, we would get *kālataṛā* whereas it should be *kālitarā*. When it is added in the sense of *kālīm atīsete kālaḥ*, we would get *kālitarāḥ* whereas it should be *kālataṛaḥ*. In these illustrations we see difference in gender between the stem and the suffix when *atīśāyane* is interpreted as qualifying the meaning of the suffix (*pratya-yārtha viśeṣaṇapakṣa*). Difference of number also would result. From *gargān atīsete gārgyaḥ*, we would get *gargataṛa* whereas it should be *gārgyatataṛa*. *gārgyam atīserate gargāḥ* would yield *gārgyatataṛaḥ* whereas it should be *gargatarāḥ*. All this is the result of the view that the meaning of the stem qualifies that of the suffix. Hence the *M. Bhā.* has adopted the view that it is the meaning of the stem which is qualified, not by the meaning of the suffix, but within itself. In other words the suffix is added in the meaning of the stem itself (*svārthe*) which is that of the agent. So we would get *kālitarā* from *kālī atīsete* and *kālataṛaḥ* from *kālaḥ atīsete*. In this way, there would be no discrepancy of gender between the stem and the word formed. (See *M. Bhā.* II p. 414,

1. 20). Similarly, if we form *gargyatara* from *gārgyaḥatiśete*, and *gargatarāḥ* from *gargā atiśerate*, there would not be any discrepancy in number either.

But there would be one difficulty here. *Kumārī atiśete* might yield *kumāritarī* (*ñīp*) whereas it should be *kumārītarā*. If *tarap* is added in the sense of the stem itself (*svārtha*), the meaning of the stem *kumārī* being the feminine conditioned by childhood (*vayasi prathame*), which is not apart from degree, the *ñīp* would be added again to express degree. It might be said that the *tarap* expresses degree in what is conveyed by the stem, namely, the feminine conditioned by childhood and, therefore, there is no need to add *ñīp* again to express degree. But in that way *ṭāp* also would become unnecessary. It might be said that *ṭāp* would come in the sense of the stem itself (*svārtha*) which is the feminine conditioned by childhood and having degree. But *ñīp* has been taught setting aside *ṭāp* and so that would come which is not desired.]

Thus a difficulty has been pointed out in the view that the suffix *tarap* is added in the sense of the stem itself. How the *Bhāṣya* meets this difficulty is now explained.

162. The suffix (*tarap*) is taught after a word ending in the sixth case-ending in the sense of an attribute causing degree and residing in its substratum or in the sense of an action inhering in what is superior.

[Before the word *atiśāyane* was taken in the sense of the agent. Now it is going to be interpreted in the sense of *karaṇa* and *bhāva*. If it is taken in the sense of *karaṇa*, it would mean a quality by means of which the object surpasses others. Through the quality which inheres in the object, a difference between the two is brought about. Thus, the stem which denotes the substratum takes the sixth case-ending and the suffix denotes the quality. *Śuklatara* would mean : 'having a quality which brings degree in the white which inheres in the object.' If the word *atiśāyane* is taken in the sense of *bhāva*, that is, *kriyā*, the *śuklatara* would mean *śuklasyātiśavanam śuklataraḥ*. Whether the meaning of the suffix is *guṇa* or

kriyā, it is different from that of the stem, from that of *kumārī* in *kumāritarā*. The meaning of the stem qualifies the meaning of the suffix, that is, it becomes secondary and so there cannot be *nīp*.]

163. By the relation of identity (*so'yam ityabhisambandhaḥ*), the object (*dravya*) expressed by the stem is the substratum of the two (quality or action) and they are understood as one.

[In *śuklataraḥ*, the *guṇa* or action expressed by *tarāḥ* according to the previous stanza resides in the substratum expressed by the stem *śukla* and there is the relation of identity between the two. The use of the sixth case-ending indicative of difference was only for the sake of *prakriyā*. Really speaking, they are part of the meaning of the stem which refers to the particular substratum denoted by a word like *paṭa* found in the same sentence. Therefore, *śuklatara* would take the gender and number of the word *paṭa*]

164. Because of absence of differentiation in form, the bare object (*dravya*) is understood (from *śukla* and *śuklatara*) as requiring particularisation. And it is connected with different particulars as its substrata.

[The word *śukla* denotes substance to which quality is subordinate and *śuklatara* denotes the same thing with a higher degree of the quality. Neither the one nor the other denotes the particular substratum but that is required. It is expressed by another word in the sentence and that supplies the particular substratum.]

165. Whatever gender and number are found in the different particular substrata, with these the undifferentiated substance is ultimately connected.

[The undifferentiated substance which is expressed by the

quality-word (like *śukla* or *śuklatara*) takes on the gender and number of the particular substratum with which the latter is connected by P. 1. 2. 52.]

The above statement applies when the meaning of the suffix is quality. What follows applies when the meaning of the suffix is action.

166. The substratum in which action inheres determines the gender and number. Therefore the *Bhāṣya* has declared that the root *śī* is *kartṛsthabhāv ka* = 'the result of whose action is found in the agent'.

[If the meaning of the suffix (*tarap*) is taken to be action, then, as both agent and object (*kartā* and *karma*) are the substrata of an action the word *śuklatara* should take the dual suffix. Though normally intransitive, the root *śī* becomes transitive (*sakarmaka*) when united with a preposition and so it has an object too, not merely an agent. But this is not the right view. The root *śī* is really intransitive here because transitive verbs are either *karmasthabhāvaka* like *pac* or *karmasthakriya* like *bhid* but *śī* is *kartṛsthabhāvaka*. The meaning of *śī* here is to surpass and it inheres in the agent which is its substratum which is only one. So there will be only the singular number. It does not inhere in the object.]

167. If a mere occasion (*nimitta*) is looked upon as the substratum, then gender and number based upon the *karma* would come in.

[If by substratum, a mere occasion is also meant, then the *karma* is also the occasion of the act of surpassing. Nobody can surpass if there is nothing to be surpassed. Therefore, here the dual number, based upon both the agent and the object, would have to be used. That is the basis of the objection referred to in the *Bhāṣya*.]

So far, extension of gender and number taught in P. 1.2.51.

has been considered and in connection with that, the *Bhāṣya* on P. 5. 3. 55 has also been considered. Now in the same connection and following again the reverse order of the topics enumerated in stanza 158, the *vārttikas* and the *Bhāṣya* on P. 4. 1. 3. are going to be considered.

168. In the *śāstra*, the idea of the feminine analysed out of the whole word as a means of word derivation, is associated, according to one's wish, with the stem or with the suffix.

[The sentence and its meaning are the real units of speech. By abstraction, the word and its meaning are separated. They are also analysed into stem and suffix and their meanings and according to circumstances, the idea of the feminine is ascribed either to the stem itself as in *samī*, *dṛṣad* etc., or to the suffix as in *gaūrī*, *kiśorī*.]

169. The word *strī*, being a quality-word (*guṇa-śabda*) is like the word white (*śīta*) etc. It is either expressive of the quality only or it expresses the substratum in which the feminine (*saṁstyāna*) inheres.

[In regard to the interpretation of P. 4. 1. 3, there are three views, mentioned by Helārāja and by Kaiyaṭa in his explanation of the *Vārttikas* and the *Bhāṣya* on P. 4. 1. 3. They may be briefly stated as follows :—(1) If the word *strī* in the *sūtra* denotes only the attribute called feminine, then the *sūtra* would mean that the suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are to be added to a stem expressive of substance when the idea of the feminine is to be expressed. This is called the *pratyayārthapakṣa*—“the view that it is the suffix which expresses the feminine. But if the word *strī* in the *sūtra* stands for the substance associated with the feminine quality, then there are two possibilities : (2) The suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are to be added to a stem standing in apposition to the word *strī* and expressive of a substance merely associated with the feminine quality. This is called the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*. (3) The

suffixes are added to a stem expressive of a substance *qualified* by the feminine quality. This is called the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*. According to this last view, the suffixes are added in the sense of the stem itself (*svārthe*).]

170. If the meaning of the stem is substance and the meaning of the word *strī* is something having the feminine quality (*saṁstyāna*), then the latter would be merely associated with the substance.

[If the meaning of the word *striyām* in P. 4. 1. 3 is that the feminine suffix is to be added to a stem which is in apposition to the word *strī*, then the idea of the feminine would be the *upalakṣaṇa*, that is, an additional and extraneous feature of the substance which is the meaning of the stem and not an essential feature.]

171. The suffix would then come after a stem of which femininity is not accepted as the expressed meaning but which is in apposition to a word of which femininity is an extraneous meaning.

[The result would be that the suffix would be added to a stem which is in apposition to a word where femininity is *upalakṣaṇa* and *bahiraṅga*.]

172. When the word *bhūta* etc. and the numerals called *ṣaṭ* are in apposition to a word like *brāhmaṇī* which includes femininity (*stritva*) they would take the feminine suffix at the end.

[According to this view (that is, the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*) when we have the expression *kumāraḥ strī* where *kumāraḥ* is in apposition to *strī*, the feminine suffix would come after *kumāra* and we would get *kumārī*. But in *bhūtam brāhmaṇī*, the word *bhūta*

is in apposition to the *strī* which is in *brāhmaṇī* and so it would become *bhūta* which is wrong in this particular sense. Similarly in *ṣaḍ brāhmaṇyaḥ*, *ṣaḍ* is in apposition to *brāhmaṇyaḥ* which expresses *strīva* and so it would get the feminine suffix which is wrong.]

173. It is the main things associated with femininity which cause the addition of the suffixes. Therefore, even when there is apposition, the suffixes *ṭāp* etc. would have to be added.

[In this view, it is not the direct expression of the feminine by the stem which is the cause of the feminine suffix but the main things having femininity are the occasion for it. The feminine is here subordinate to the substance and as such a feminine is understood. When the stem in question is in apposition to another word, the suffixes would have to be added and that is not desired.]

After having shown the defects of the *strīsamānādhikaraṇapakṣa*, the *prakṛtyartha viśeṣaṇapakṣa* is going to be considered.

174. If the word *strī* (in P. 4. 1. 3.) denotes the bare idea of femininity and it is part of the meaning of the stem, then the suffixes would be added in the sense of the stem itself.

[If the word *strī* means femininity only and it is part of the meaning of the stem as its qualifier, then the suffixes would be added to the stem expressive of the feminine. As no other meaning has been indicated for the suffixes, they would be added in the sense of the stem itself.]

175. The stems never denote the feminine quality only. They are, therefore, taken as standing for substance in which the feminine inheres.

[Even if the word *strī* in P. 4. 1. 3. stands for femininity only, as no stem can denote that only, one understands that the suffix is added to a stem which expresses substance as qualified by femininity.]

176. The suffixes *ṭāp* etc. are added to words where the feminine is required and useful as part of the expressed meaning but that is not what is meant to be expressed by the words *bhūtam* etc.

[Those words where femininity is also an expressed meaning and useful as such take the feminine suffixes. That is not the case with the word *bhūtam* in *bhūtaṃ brāhmaṇī*. Here the word *bhūtam* does not express the feminine which is only its *upalakṣaṇa*, something associated with it because of its being in apposition with the word *brāhmaṇī* which expresses substance as qualified by the feminine. So there is no *ṭāp* after the word *brāhmaṇī*.]

177. If bare femininity is taken as the meaning of the suffix, then the dual (and the plural) and the presence of more than one feminine suffix (in some words) cannot be explained.

[If bare femininity (*saṃstyāna*) is the meaning of the suffix, the dual and the plural endings in words like *kumāryau*, *kumāryaḥ* cannot be explained, because femininity is one and the singular number would do. Nor can one explain the presence of two feminine suffixes in words like *gārgyāyaṇī*, *kāriṣagandhyā* and *kālītārā*. In *gārgyāyaṇī*, there is *ṣpha* first by P. 4. 1. 17 and then *nīp* by P. 4. 1. 41 ; in *kāriṣagandhyā*, there is first *ṣyaṇ* after *karīṣa-gandhiḥ* by P. 4. 1. 78 and then *cāp* by P. 4. 1. 74. ; in *kālītārā*, there is first *nīṣ* after *kāla* by P. 4. 1. 42 and to the word *kālī* thus formed, *tarap* is added in the sense of higher degree and after *tarap* come *ṭāp* by P. 4. 1. 4.]

178. If the femininity (conveyed by the suffix) is a universal, then (that being the main meaning) the

differentiation found elsewhere (that is, in the individuals) is not meant to be conveyed. Therefore, the one universal is qualified by the multiple individuals.

[It might be said that femininity is a universal which presupposes a substratum and even though the suffix expresses the universal, the word takes a number according to the number of the substrata. But this is not right. It is the universal which is the meaning of the suffix and that being the main thing, the word should have the number of the universal, that is, the singular number.]

It is now stated that even by adopting the view that gender is the condition of the *guṇas*, the difficulty would not be overcome.

179. If femininity means the merging or dissolution of the qualities (*mātrāṇām*), its extent (*parimāṇam*) does not exist (that is, cannot be determined). One would always have the form *kumāryaḥ* because there can be infinite differentiation in *kumārī*.

[It might be said that, according to the view that gender is the condition of the *guṇas* the number of a word would depend upon the condition of the *guṇas*. But the difficulty is that in this view what is called femininity is the merging or dissolution of the qualities *rūpa*, *rasa* etc. and that number depends upon the changing condition. But it is impossible to determine the extent of the changes even in one thing and one would be compelled to have always the plural everywhere, because in what is constantly changing, there are always many changes. If, by ignoring all this multiplicity of changes, one looks upon the whole thing as one, then this view would not be different from that of the universal and there would always be the singular number. Thus *kumāryau*, *kumāryaḥ* would be inexplicable. Nor could a word like *kumārī* be in apposition to a word expressive of *dravya* or be connected with

a verb, because the feminine suffix would be expressive of a mere attribute, namely, femininity.]

The *vārttika* given in answer to this objection (Vā. 6, M. Bhā. II, p. 200, l. 1.) is now going to be explained.

180. Just as, through the universal, number and collection, actions are performed on the substance which is associated with them, even though their identity is understood.

181. In the same way, as one sees from things their identity with their attributes the relation of apposition and connection with the verb become explicable.

[In the expression *gaur duhyatām, brāhmaṇaśataṃ bhojyatām, pañcapūli samānīyatām*, though the verb is connected with a word expressive of the universal, a number and collection, the action denoted by the verb is done on the substance through these which are actually expressed by their words. They and their substrata, though different, are looked upon as one. In the same way, as objects and their attributes are looked upon as one, there can be the relation of apposition between a feminine word and a word expressive of substance and it can also be connected with a verb.]

182. If the relation of apposition is explained on the basis of the elision of the *matup* suffix, there would be elision of the feminine suffix also according to P. 1. 2. 49. Where elision occurs, its meaning is included in something else.

[If the relation of apposition is sought to be explained by bringing in the elision of the *matup* suffix taught in Vā. 3. on P. 5. 2. 94 (M. Bhā. II, p. 394, l. 7.) after words expressive of v

quality (*guṇa*) and femininity is looked upon as a *guṇa*, then there would be elision of the feminine suffix also according to P. 1. 2. 49. But the fact is that there is no place here for the *matuṣ* suffix at all. The word *kumārī* denotes substance as qualified by or as identical with *strīva*. Even where elision of the *matuṣ* takes place as in *śukla*, the purpose is to show that the word denotes a substance (the meaning of the elided suffix) qualified by its own meaning and in that sense it becomes *upalakṣaṇa*, something included in something else.]

183. According to some, the feminine suffix *ṭāp* etc. are taught after words expressive of substances which are free from any difference and which have femininity, because they are understood as one.

[The relation of apposition is explained by others differently while still holding the *pratyayārthapakṣa* that is, the view that it is the suffix which expresses femininity. The feminine suffix expresses substance having femininity in general and the stem denotes a particular substance and the two become one without any contradiction. We do not understand two different substances, one from the stem and the other from the suffix. We separate them mentally for the purpose of *prakriyā* = grammatical derivation but they are really one.]

184. The substance in general, having become particularised, is connected with actions and through the particulars (denoted by the stem) it exists as parts.

[The substance in general conveyed by the suffix, is like the universal but is really not so, because the particularisation is done by the other element of the word, namely, the stem, and so one wouldn't rest on the substance in general conveyed by the suffix. Therefore, the word can be connected with the verb and there can be the relation of apposition. The fact is that the word, as a whole, conveys a particular substance. The division into stem-meaning and suffix-meaning is unreal.]

Thus it has been shown that, in the view that the feminine is the meaning of the suffix, the word gets its number from the number of the substratum of the feminine. An objection is now stated.

185. In *śukla* etc. the substance which is the substratum is expressed as the main thing. Here, on the other hand, it is femininity which is the object of the expressive power being the meaning of the suffix.

[Somebody might object that femininity is expressed by the suffix and that is, therefore, the main meaning of the word. The meaning of the stem can only be subordinate to it, that is, qualify it. Therefore, the word should have the gender and number of the meaning of the suffix.]

186. By the relation of identity, femininity is attached to its substratum. Or one might say that the relation of primary and secondary is reversed here due to the natural power of words.

[But this objection is not valid. The importance of the meaning of the suffix is only assumed in the process of grammatical derivation. In reality, femininity is subordinate to substance. The suffixes in a verb express the *sādhana* = accessory to action, but that is not the primary meaning of a verb. It is action which is so. Secondly, a kind of identity between the meanings of the two takes place and the suffix expresses the individual substance to which femininity is subordinate.]

187. Or one might understand that substance in general, being dependent on something else, is taught as a quality. It is a characteristic of the individuals, the basis of the cognition of their identity.

[Substance in general having femininity is conveyed by the

suffix and that is what is meant by *viśeṣaṇa* in P. 1. 2. 52. As it requires and is dependent upon the particular or individual substance conveyed by the stem, it has become a *guṇa*, something dependent on something else. The general and the particular, denoted by the suffix and the stem respectively, are really one. What is called *sāmānya* is that characteristic of the individual which causes the cognition of their identity.]

As the individual qualified by femininity is one, how can the two be looked upon as standing in the relation of the substratum and what exists on it? This is now explained.

188-189. That condition (the combination of the general and the particular) when divisions are made in the word and the individulas are looked upon as the substrata even when they are taken in isolation, takes the gender and number of the individuals after they are understood as feminine.

[The combination of the general and the particular gets the gender and number of the particular individuals. By the method of analysis, the word is divided into stem and suffix. Its meaning is also divided into parts which are ascribed to the parts of the word. The stem denotes the individuals and the suffix denotes femininity as qualifying substance in general. The former are looked upon as the substrata and as feminine and the word gets its gender and number accordingly. Thus how the word gets different genders and numbers considering that the femininity is one has been explained (see verse 177.). As to how a word sometimes gets two feminine suffixes, there is no difficulty in explaining it. If the feminine suffix is only indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive (*vācaka*), there is no difficulty in explaining it. It is well known in the world that sometimes more than one lamp is required to illuminate an object. So it is not surprising that sometimes two *dyotaka* suffixes are used to illuminate the feminine. See also *vā.* 8 M. Bhā. II. p. 208, l. 7.]

After having said something about gender and number of

words expressive of degree and of feminine formations, something is now going to be said, again following the reverse order of the topics, about gender and number in *dvandva* compounds.

190. The words which are going to make up a *dvandva* compound denote an undifferentiated meaning without the help of the word *ca* because of non-differentiation in form.

[The *dvandva* compound has been taught in P. 2. 2. 29 in the sense of *ca* = and. Now *ca* is only a particle and it has no gender, and number because it does not denote substance. So a compound formed in the sense of *ca* should also have no gender and number. And yet, the *dvandva* compound has gender and number. How this happens is now being considered.]

191. Words whose power has not been specified are restricted to the conveying of alternation, negation or accumulation by some indicatory word (*dyotaka*).

[In a sentence the expressive power of words which are to form a *dvandva* compound is not determined without the use of words like *ca* because there would remain a doubt. The use of *vā* would restrict this meaning to alternation, of *na* to negation and of *ca* to accumulation.]

192. In a compound, the word *ca* disappears because of its special form. Though there is difference in meaning, it is referred to as the meaning of *ca* because of resemblance.

[In a sentence, the word *ca* is used and so it denotes collection based on difference. In a *dvandva* compound, there is no *ca* and so it denotes collection in which difference is not manifest (*anudbhūta*). In both, the different things connected require one another for the purpose of action and that is all

that is meant by *cārtha*. The things meant by words are different from one another but on the basis of some slight resemblance they are regarded as one and used as the basis for the derivation of words.]

193. The meaning of *ca* is non-substance (*asattva*) and if that is resorted to, the *dvandva* compound would have the same attribute (as *ca*), because, in the case of *ca* etc., the attribute is the result of the meaning.

[The natural meaning of words matters and not necessarily what is mentioned in the *śāstra*. Otherwise, the *dvandva* compound which is taught in the sense of *ca* which is non-substance, would also become an indeclinable (*avyaya*) and get no gender and number like *ca* etc. That *ca* etc. have no gender and number is due to the nature of their meaning and if the *dvandva* is formed in the meaning of *ca*, it would also have no gender and number. Even if a *dvandva* is not called an *avyaya*, it would still have no gender and number if its meaning is that of *ca*, that is, *asattva*.]

194. The meaning of *ca* is conveyed differently somehow by words; *ca* etc., are indicative of it (*dyotaka*) whereas a *dvandva* compound of words having that meaning is expressive of it.

[Due to difference in the power of words, the word *samuccaya* denotes the meaning of *ca* as having gender and number even though *ca* has no gender and number. Similarly, the *dvandva* compound, supposed to be formed in the sense of *ca*, expresses a meaning conditioned by collection whereas *ca* etc. being dependent upon the meaning of the other words in the sentence, only indicate it. That one has no gender and number whereas the other has got it is due to the former being only indicative and the latter being expressive.]

195. It is something real and concrete (*sat*) which is conveyed (by the words *cārthe* in P. 2.2.29), as otherwise, *ca* etc. being merely indicative, the meaning of the words *vikalpa* etc. would not be conveyed in a different manner by them.

[*Vā* and other such words denote in another way the meaning denoted by words like *vikalpa*, *samuccaya* and *pratiṣedha*. This would be possible only if *cārtha* in P. 2.2.29 stands for something which is real and concrete (*sattvabhūta*). A *Dvandva* compound and *ca* have the same meaning but they do not convey it in the same way.]

196. Keeping in view the nature of words, gender has been declared to be natural. Words express the same meaning in different ways.

[The same thing is conveyed by words having different genders : *kāśyam*, *kraśimā*, and *kṛśatā*, three words in three different genders but having the same stem convey the same meaning. Similarly, *dvaidham* (P. 5. 3. 49.) has no gender and number but when the suffix *ḍa* is added to it, we can have *dvaidhāṇi*. The word now expresses the same thing in a different way.]

197. Meanings are elaborated out of the word, it is that which creates meanings. And there is no other means of inferring the speaker's intention than the word.

[It would not be right to attribute this variety in the way in which words express the same thing to the speaker's intention because, in the world, it is from the words that we infer the speaker's intention. *Āpaḥ* presents water as having plurality and *udaka* presents the same thing as a whole, having the singular number. *Dārāḥ* presents the idea of a wife with the masculine gender and plural number and the word *bhāryā* presents the same

thing as feminine and singular. All this is due to the natural power of words.]

Others hold a different view as follows—

198. The meaning of a *dvandva* compound may be the objects collected with collection as subordinate to them or it may be the collection with the collected objects as subordinate to it.

199. When the collected objects constitute the main meaning (of a *dvandva* compound) then its gender and number are natural. When the collection is the main meaning, it is the *śāstra* which prescribes both.

[When the collected objects which are concrete things constitute the main meaning of a *dvandva*, then the gender and number of the word are natural, that is, not laid down by the *śāstra*. When it is considered that the *śāstra* prescribes the meaning and that meaning is the collection, then gender and number are also laid down by the *śāstra*, namely, P. 1.2.52. This rule becomes applicable because it lays down the gender and number of a *viśeṣaṇa* and even where the collection is the main thing, the collected are looked upon as a kind of *viśeṣaṇa*.]

Some think that even when the collected objects constitute the main meaning, the *śāstra* lays down the law.

200. Others think (that *śāstra* is useful even when the collected constitute the main meaning as otherwise) their gender and number would not prevail because the word would follow the *nimitta* (the collection).

[The *nimitta*, that is, the collection overpowers and hides the collected whose gender and number do not, therefore, prevail. So the *śāstra* says that they should be followed.]

It is now stated that this is not the right view.

201. If the idea of collection were the basis (*nimitta*) (for the formation of a *dvandva*) it would be right to follow it. But by the method of agreement and difference, the meaning of *ca* is the basis of the formation of a *dvandva*.

[The meaning of a *dvandva* is what has been determined by the method of agreement and difference and that is the meaning of *ca* as stated in P. 2.2.29. The meaning of *ca* is a collection of objects all equally connected with action and susceptible of being an accessory to action. It is a mistake to think of *samuccaya* as the basis for the formation of a *dvandva*.]

202. Whether the objects collected are the basis (*nimitta*) for the formation of the *dvandva* compound or whether the meaning of *ca* (collection, *samuccaya*) is absent, gender and number in a *dvandva* are due to the natural power of words.

[The real position is this. If the 'collected' are the basis for the formation of *dvandva*, it is natural that their gender and number should prevail. It is a mistake to think of a collection at all in connection with a *dvandva*. The mistake arises because, in grammar, some meaning or other is taken as the basis for word-formation on the strength of some resemblance or other. Really speaking, the meaning of a *dvandva* is, by its very nature, substance (*sattvabhūta*.)]

203. Being only indicative (*dyotaka*) of the meaning of another word, a particle is not endowed with gender and number. A *dvandva*, on the other hand, is expressive of concrete substance.

[Even though the external object remains the same, the

meanings of words expressive of it differ according to difference in their expressive power. As a *dvandva* expresses substance(*sattva*) the meaning of *ca* which is *asattva* is said to disappear in it. This is an instance of the difference between what is expressive (*vācaka*) and what is only indicative (*dyotaka*) and it has already been pointed out (See verses 194 and 195.)

204. If the supposed basis (*nimitta*) is followed, the attribute of the substances would be disregarded (*anapekṣaṇāt*) and it would not be possible to connect them with action primarily or secondarily.

[There is another reason why a *dvandva* should be considered to denote the objects collected rather than the collection. If it stood for the collection primarily, the collected would be overshadowed and their power would not be clearly grasped and so they cannot enter into relation with action either primarily or secondarily. The collection itself being *asattva*, cannot enter into relation with action. To be connected with action as its *karaṇa* or *sampradāna* etc. is to be connected secondarily; to be connected as *karma* is to be connected primarily.]

205. There is no word-meaning which is independent and unconnected with action. (If the meaning of a *dvandva* were so), its inclusion would be useless.

[There is no word-meaning which is quite independent and isolated and not connected with action at all. If the meaning of the *dvandva* is overshadowed by the *nimitta* (collection) and, therefore, unconnected with action, its inclusion among expressive words and its derivation by grammar would be quite useless.]

206. A word (like *samuccita*) expressive of that which has collection (as its attribute) does not

follow the basis (*nimitta*). And, therefore, its meaning is endowed with its own properties.

[An analogy is now given. It is not only the *dvandva* which does not follow the *nimitta*. The word *samuccita* is known to be expressive of a meaning of which *samuccaya* is the *upādhi* or *nimitta* (basis of formation) and yet it does not follow it as far as gender and number are concerned. A *dvandva* should do it still less, because it is an error to look upon *samuccaya* as its *nimitta*. One can say that the word *śukla* follows the *nimitta* because from it we understand the *nimittin* (a white object) hidden by the *nimitta*, the white colour. In *samuccita*, on the other hand, something which is merely qualified by an external *nimitta* is understood. That is the force of the suffix *matup* in *samuccayavataḥ*. As the word *samuccita* does not follow the *nimitta* which is different from and external to it, it has the gender and number of its own meaning. This is what happens in *dvandva* also.]

207. A *dvandva* has no external substratum. Its two particular constituents are actually mentioned in it and they are the substratum of the collection and so it is formed according to their properties.

[The gender and number of a *dvandva* do not depend upon those of an outside word but on those of its constituents. When they have different genders, the compound takes the gender of the last constituent according to P. 2.4.26.]

208. The group which has two parts which appear to be different from each other takes on the properties of the parts.

[When one wants to speak of two or more things together without ignoring their difference one forms a *dvandva* compound. It gets its gender and number according to the parts. Though the compound is one word, the meanings of the parts are not to be ignored. In words like *vanam*, *yūtham* which denote a whole (forest, herd), the parts are completely ignored and the words

get the gender and number of the whole and not of the parts. A *dvandva* is in a different position.]

209. The meaning of a *dvandva* has a double character, consisting of difference and identity. It takes on the gender and number of the parts on which it rests.

[This whole or group has a double character. It is understood as identical with the parts and in that sense, it is differentiated (*bhinnaḥ*). It is also the object of a single cognition and in that sense, it is *abhinna*, one and undifferentiated. What is conveyed by each word distinctly is the substratum and the whole takes the gender and number of the parts conveyed by the constituent words.]

Following the reverse order of the topics mentioned in verse 158, the use of the extension of gender and number taught in P. 1.2.51 and 1.2.53. for a *bahuvrīhi* compound is now going to be considered.

210. Just as the word *caitra* is not repeated if it has already been used to express its meaning in the same way, no word would be used in apposition to a *bahuvrīhi*.

[A *bahuvrīhi* compound is made in the sense of another word which is not part of the compound. That would mean, so it might be said, that the other word cannot be used in apposition to the *bahuvrīhi* which has already conveyed its meaning. But this is not so. The compound refers to the meaning of the other word only in a general way. The other word has to be used in apposition to it in order to particularise it.]

211. Just as the word *gauḥ* does not denote any particular cow such as a white one, in the same way,

from a *bahuvrīhi* (like *citraguḥ*) one only understands that somebody is connected with the cows as owner.

[From a *bahuvrīhi* like *citraguḥ* the particular person who is the owner of the cows is not understood, just as from the word *gauḥ* we do not understand whether it is white or black. To understand that, one has to use some such word as *śuklaḥ* or *kṛṣṇaḥ* with it. Similarly, to understand the particular owner from a *bahuvrīhi* one has to use some such word as *Caitraḥ* or *Maitraḥ* in apposition to *citraguḥ*.]

212. As in the case of the words *vajrapāṇi* and *tryakṣa*, no particular person connected as owner with the motley coloured cows is well-known.

[Where the particular object is well-known, there a word expressive of it need not be used in apposition to the compound. For example, after the words *vajrapāṇiḥ* and *tryakṣaḥ*, it is not necessary to use the words *Śakraḥ* and *Śivaḥ* respectively in apposition to them, because they would be understood even otherwise.]

213. Even though, being a different kind of expression, the particulars are mentioned in a sentence the compound is a different formation altogether and it expresses the generic idea.

[It has already been shown that the compound and the sentence are different from each other in form as well as in meaning. The sentence can express the particular but not the compound which can only denote the general and so requires a word in apposition to it to denote the particular.]

Though the *bahuvrīhi* expresses only the general, it still fulfils some purpose.

214. The *bahuvrīhi* excludes one who has no cows and one who has no motley-coloured cows

because of difference in form but because of identity of form, it does not denote the particular individuals who own motley-coloured cows.

[It is not that the *bahavrihi* compound is totally incapable of particularising. There is, at least, some negative particularisation. *Citragu*, for instance, excludes one who has no cows and one whose cows are not motley coloured. For complete particularisation, a word denoting one individual has to be used in apposition to it. Even if a general word is used in apposition to it, as in *Citragu tat Citragu Kiñcit, Citragu sarvam*, that would also particularise because it would exclude other particularisations.]

215. Just as, once the word *citragu* has been used, another word having the same meaning is not used, in the same way, if the general were also in the same position, a word expressive of it would not be used.

[This stanza answers the question: how can words like *tat, kiñcit, sarva* etc be like words expressive of the particular? Once the word *Citragu* has been used another word having the same meaning is not used, because it is not required. If a general meaning such as what is conveyed by words like *sarva* were also not required, it would not be used. But it is sometimes required and so a word like *tat* is used.]

216. General words like *sarva* are also expressive of the particular and exclude other words expressive of the particular, just as words expressive of the particular exclude words denoting the general and other words expressive of the particular.

[When words like *sarva* and *viśva* are used, even though they express a general meaning, they exclude words expressive of the particular. Thus they also perform the function of exclusion and become, in a sense, words expressive of the particular.]

The *bahuvrīhi* has been taught in the meaning of a word not included in it (*anyapadārthe*). That meaning is a combination of the meaning of a stem and of a suffix. If the compound is formed in this combined meaning, how the use of a word expressive of the particular in apposition to it is necessary has been explained so far. But the *Bhāṣya* has also put forward the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed in the meaning of the case-ending of the word not included in the compound. The use of a word in apposition to it even according to this view is now stated to be necessary.

217. As the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of the case-ending, the latter is not used in apposition to it. As it does not express the particular individual, a word expressive of it is used in apposition to it.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of the case-ending, it means that it stands for some relation or other. The particular relation is indicated by the word which comes at the end of the sentence which analyses the meaning of a *bahuvrīhi*. For example, the sentence *citrā gāvo'sya* corresponding to the compound *Citraguḥ*. It is the sixth case-ending which is found in the last word of this sentence. This word ending in the sixth case-affix expresses primarily the relation (of owner and owned), the meaning of the case-ending to which the meaning of the stem is subordinate. This is the *anyapadārtha* to denote which the compound is formed. We obtain this by following the power called *abhidhā* of words.]

If the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of a case-ending, that is, some relation, it being *asattva*, how to explain the gender and number of the compound? This difficulty is now stated.

218. If it is maintained that the *bahuvrīhi* is in apposition to the external word expressive of *sattva* by the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix (as in the case of

words like *śukla*, there would be regressus ad infinitum because the *matuṣ* also expresses relation.

[To say that the *bahuvrīhi* expresses the meaning of a case-ending is to say that it expresses a relation, It has been taught in the sense of *matuṣ* (See M. Bhā. I. p. 424, l. 17-18,) which also expresses a relation. Unless the compound denotes the related, it cannot take its gender and number. If it is held that the *matuṣ* expresses the related (*sambandhin*) then the *bahuvrīhi* also would do the same and then the view that it expresses the meaning of a case-ending would have to be given up.]

In *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*, *śuklaḥ* means not merely the quality white but a 'white object' because the suffix *matuṣ* is supposed to have been elided there. We cannot say the same thing about *citraḡuḥ* because the *matuṣ* suffix is not added to it at all, as the compound itself denotes the meaning of *matuṣ*.]

If the *bahuvrīhi* is said to be formed in the sense of a case-ending and if *matuṣ* is added to it, another difficulty would arise which is now stated.

219. The other relation would become the related (*sambandhin*) of the first relation. Moreover, if the meaning of the case-ending is predominant, it would not be possible to connect it with an action.

[If the *bahuvrīhi*, formed in the sense of a case-ending, denotes a relation and the *matuṣ* which is added to it also denotes a relation, then the latter relation would be determined or qualified by the former and would thus cease to be a relation at all, but become the related (*sambandhin*). A *sambandhin* is just what is determined by something else. Moreover, if the meaning of the case-ending (say, the sixth-case ending) is predominant, how can it be connected with action as in the sentence *citraḡur ānīyatām*. A relation, being *asattva*, is not susceptible to become the *Kāraka* of an action.]

It is now stated that expressions like *tataḥ paśya*, *tatra paśya* cannot be given as examples where a word which denotes the meaning of a case-ending predominantly is connected with action.

220. In expressions like *tataḥ* and *tatra*, actions like seeing do not bring out the agent, object etc. because in them, it is the meaning of their own case-ending which is predominant.

[In expressions like *tataḥ* and *tatra* it is the notion of starting-point (*apādāna*) or that of location (*adhikaraṇa*) which is predominant and it is they which are manifested by actions like seeing and not the notions of agent and object. In other words, the action of seeing is connected, not with a bare relation, but with a concrete substance.]

221. Where the relation is expressed as the predominant meaning, how can it be included in the meaning (of the stem) ? How can the meaning of the stem be of such a nature ?

[If the meaning of the case-ending is the main one, we would get the expression: *citragur devadattasya*. It would not do to say that the meaning of the sixth case-ending has been included in that of the stem and so the first case-ending should come after the stem. It is only when the relation is subordinate to the related that it becomes part of the meaning of the stem. For instance, in *rājāpuruṣa*, the relation for which the word *rājān* stands is subordinate to the meaning of the word *puruṣa* which is predominant. So that relation becomes part of the meaning of the stem *rājāpuruṣa*. That is not the case in *citraguḥ*.]

How a *bahuvrīhi* becomes connected with a verb expressive of action is now stated.

222. As in the case of actions relating to the universal, number, and collection, an action which cannot be performed on a relation could be performed on what is connected with it.

[In the expressions, *gām ālabheta*, *brāhmaṇānām śatam ānaya*, and *pañcapūli badhyatām*, the action which is enjoined on the universal, number and collection respectively by the words used cannot be performed on them. So it is performed on the substance which is invariably associated with it. In the same way, the action enjoined in the sentence *citrāgur āniyatām*, namely, that of 'bringing' is done on the 'related' (*sambandhin*) which is always invariably associated with the relation on which action cannot be performed.]

223. Because of relation of identity, the gender and number of the words expressive of the particular substrata would result because of teaching to that effect (P. 1.2.52.) as in the case of words like *śukla*.

[There is the relation of identity between the relation and the related. Therefore even if the *bahuvrīhi* is taught only in the sense of a relation which is the meaning of the case-ending, it denotes the related also because of the nature of the power of words and according to P. 1. 2. 52, it would get the gender and number of the word expressive of the related.]

224. If the relation is meant to be expressed as distinct (from the related) or if the related in general is expressed, the whole of the meaning of the other word with its gender and number would not be expressed.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* denotes relation, the meaning of the case-ending, as distinct from the related, then it would not get the

gender and number of the latter and so the whole meaning of the other word would not be expressed. If, through the relation of identity, it denotes the related, it can do so in a general way and then it would get only the common gender, the neuter and the common number, the singular. The gender and number of the particular related would not result and so again the whole meaning of the other word would not be expressed. So it is better to abandon the *vibhakyarthābhīdhānapakṣa* = the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed in order to convey the meaning of a case-ending and to adopt the *dravyābhīdhānapakṣa* = the view that the compound expresses the individual substance.]

How this is so is now explained.

225. A (*bahuvrīhi*) compound is not seen to be correct if expressive of the meaning of a case-ending only. It is correct if it is expressive of the whole meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*). That is why the word *artha* has been used (in P. 2. 2 24.)

[A *bahuvrīhi* is never formed in the sense of a case-ending only. In the meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*), the notion of substance is the predominant element. That is why the word *artha* is used in P. 2.2.24. As the word *pada* qualifies the word *artha* in this *sūtra*, the whole meaning of the *pada*, neither more (that is, not sentence-meaning) nor less (that is, not the meaning of the case-ending only) is meant. Therefore, *anyapadārtha* means : *liṅgasamkhyāvat padārthabhūtaṃ dravyam* = substance having gender and number and constituting the meaning of the whole word. Hence, the use of a word expressive of the related in apposition to the compound is justified.]

226. When the *bahuvrīhi* denotes substance through the relation of identity, then it is declared to be correct with the gender and number of the substance.

[According to the view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of the case-ending, even though it may denote substance in general with which the relation, its main meaning, has been identified, it would get the gender and number of the individual substance only through P. 1.2.52. But according to the other view, that the compound is formed in the whole meaning of the other word, the gender and number of the latter would result naturally. There would be no need for P. 1.2.52.]

227. Just as the sixth case-ending is not used (in a *bahuvrīhi*) because of its meaning (relation) being part of the meaning of the compound, in the same way, suffixes expressive of gender and number also would not be heard.

[This is a reference to an objection mentioned in the M. Bhā. I. p.422, l. 27-28. that if the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the whole meaning of the external word with its gender and number, one would not add suffixes expressive of them to it as the compound itself expresses them. Thus one would not get the required form.]

228. A *bahuvrīhi* would thus be similar to an indeclinable (*avyaya*), being devoid of the completeness (*saṃskāra*) which results from the presence of suffixes expressive of gender and number.

[If no suffix expressive of gender and number is added to a *bahuvrīhi* on the ground that these two notions are already included in its meaning, it would be like an indeclinable which is also devoid of gender and number.]

229. Moreover, words like *caitra* would be heard without any case-ending because of their connection with what is actually used (without case-ending). The connection (of what is devoid of case-ending) would be with what is devoid of case-ending.

[If the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of substance in general and has no gender and case-affix, it would be used in apposition to a word like *Caitra* expressive of a particular substance, but also devoid of gender and number. Thus we would not get the desired form.]

The difficulty thus pointed out in the view that the *bahuvrīhi* denotes the whole meaning of the other word is answered as follows—

230. Even if number is already expressed (by the compound itself) it does not give up its nature. If the meaning of the sixth case-ending is already expressed, then it has become part of the (*bahuvrīhi*) stem-meaning.

[As far as the suffix expressive of gender (like *īāp*) is concerned, it can be added to a *bahuvrīhi* as it can be added to other stems, even if its meaning is included in that of the *bahuvrīhi*, because it has already been stated that the feminine suffix is only indicative (*dyotaka*) of the notion of the feminine already included in the meaning of the stem. It does not bring anything new. As to case-endings expressive of number, the present stanza answers the objection. Even if number is already expressed by the *bahuvrīhi*-stem itself, case-endings expressive of number would be added to it. It is like the words *ekaḥ*, *dvau*, *bahavaḥ*. In all these words, the stem itself expresses number and yet a case-ending has been added to them. When the compound expresses the *Kāraka* relations also, its number would qualify them and so a case-ending like the second one would have to be added to express that number which qualifies the *Kāraka* relation as in *citragum ānaya*. Even the first case-ending may have to be added sometimes in order that the bare-stem (*kevala prakṛtiḥ*) may not be used. Here the *bahuvrīhi* is not like an indeclinable, because the elision of the feminine suffix and the case-endings after the latter is specially prescribed by P. 2.4.82. The sixth case-ending, however, cannot be added because it has become merged in the meaning of the *bahuvrīhi* stem itself.]

It is now stated that others have stated another view on this matter.

231. "The view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of the case-ending was not put forward in order to justify the use of a word in apposition to it but as another fact (*vaṣṭvantaram*) (regarding the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*)" so some declare.

[It has so far been stated that if the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the meaning of another word, there would be no point in using that word in apposition to it. So it was proposed that it is formed only in the sense of a case-ending. How, in that case, it can be used in apposition to the word expressive of another object and how it can be connected with a verb was also explained. But in the end, it was concluded that, in view of the use of the word *artha* in P. 2. 2. 24, the *bahuvrīhi* must be deemed to be formed in the sense of the *whole* meaning of the other word. But here it is stated that some do not accept this position. According to them, the *vibhaktiyarthābhidhānapakṣa* has not been put forward, just by the way to meet an objection but as a legitimate way of explaining the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*. From the way Patañjali says *etaccātra yuktam, atra hi sarvapaścāt padam vartate*. (M. Bhā. I. p. 422, l. 8-9.) he seems to look upon this as a better view. But the ultimate conclusion is in favour of the view that the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the *whole* sense of the other word. In this view, it gets its gender and number naturally, whereas in the other view it gets them by P. 1. 2. 52.]

232. It is the relations determined by the constituent terms which form the basis (of the formation of the *bahuvrīhi*) or it is the related, determined by the relations, which form the basis.

[In the *vibhaktiyarthābhidhānapakṣa*, it is the relations, determined by the related conveyed by the constituent terms, that

form the basis of the *bahuvrīhi*. Though relation is one, it is spoken of as many, because of the great variety that is found in these compounds. In the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*, it is the related, determined by the relations, which form the basis of the *bahuvrīhi*.]

Those who uphold the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa* put forward the analogy of the *matvartha* formations as follows—

233. Some hold that the possessive (*matvartha*) suffixes come after the word *daṇḍa* qualified by the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) and after the word *viśāṇa*, qualified by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) in the sense of one who has the one or the other (*tadvati*) and that is what happens in the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

[Those who hold the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa* point out that the *bahuvrīhi* is like a word formed with a possessive suffix (*matvarthīya*). In *daṇḍin* and *viśāṇin*, for instance, formed by P. 5.2.115., the suffix *ini* is added to the words *daṇḍa* and *viśāṇa* in the sense of that which has *daṇḍa* by the relation of *saṃyoga* and that which has *viśāṇa* by the relation of *samavāya*. In other words, a substance qualified by a relation is the basis of the formations *daṇḍin* and *viśāṇin*. Similarly, the related, that is, the meanings of the constituent terms, qualified by some relation to the meaning of the external word, are the basis of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.]

The other view is as follows—

234. Others, on the other hand, consider that it is the relation, different with the different related, that is the basis (of the *matvartha* formation.) Similarly, it is the meaning of the case-ending (that is, a relation) which is expressed by the compound.

[Others think that, in a *matvartha* formation, it is some relation, or other, depending on the relatum conveyed by the stem, which is the basis. In fact, from the words *daṇḍin* and *viśāṇin*, we understand something in which both the relatum and the relation figure. Similarly, the *bahuvrīhi* compound conveys a relation, the meaning of a case-ending, as determined by some particular relatum.]

The two views are conclusively stated as follows—

235. The relation, determined by the relata which are subordinate to it, is an occasion for its formation and is important because it is the meaning of the other word. Or it may be looked upon as the expressed meaning as it is referred to right at the end.

[The *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of another word which is not its constituent. The relation is only an occasion for its formation. Once it is formed, it expresses the related. This is the first view. The other view is that the relation is the main thing and that the compound expresses that. The relation is determined by the relata conveyed by the constituent words. It is that which is referred to at the end of the analytic sentence. See, M. Bhā. I. p. 422, l. 9.]

An objection is now anticipated and answered.

236. Even though, in the sentence, it is seen that the owner is subordinated (*vyatirekaḥ*) the *bahuvrīhi* compound is desired only when his predominance is meant to be conveyed.

[It might be objected that in the *bahuvrīhi* compound *citraguḥ*, it is the idea of the motley-coloured cows, qualified by their owner, which is the main meaning and not the related qualified by the relation nor the relation qualified by the related. But this is not

right. In the sentence *citrā gāvo yasya*, the motley-coloured cows, qualified by the separately expressed and subordinate owner, may be the predominant meaning. But the compound and the sentence are two different things and so their meanings are also different. In the sentence, the meaning of *yasya*, that is, the owner, is subordinate but in a compound, that is the main meaning.]

237. When the owner (*tadvān*) is presented as the qualifier of the cows in the form “his they are” (*asyaitāḥ*), in that sense the compound is not taught.

[When the sentence is “his are the motley-coloured cows” (*asyaitāḥ citrā gāvaḥ*) ‘his’ comes as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the cows, as something subordinate. Such a sentence does not express the full meaning of the compound.]

Which sentence then is more in accordance with the compound is now shown.

238. When the cognition is in the form: “the owner of those cows” (*tāsāṃ svāmī gavām*), then the relation with the cows becomes the basis of the formation of the compound.

[When one wants to know: “Who is the owner of the motley-coloured cows?”, such cows become a means of understanding a particular owner. The meaning of the constituent words is connected with the meaning of the outside word and that connection becomes the basis of the formation of the compound. Thus one gets a sentence like this: *citrā gāvo yasya so’yaṃ citraguḥ*, in which the meaning of the outside word is the main one.]

239. If, in order to prevent the compound from becoming a mere conventional word, the relation is resorted to as the basis, as the basis would produce

its effect (*anuvīdhāyivāt*), the compound would have its properties.

[If the relation is resorted to as the basis of the compound which denotes the relata through the relation, then the meaning of the compound would have the properties of the relation. Relation not being substance and so devoid of gender and number, the meaning of the compound would also be devoid of gender and number. Unless the relation is brought in to explain the compound, the latter would become a mere conventional word with no meaningful parts. But one does see meaningful parts in *citrāgu*.]

An illustration is now given.

240. Just as in the word *nānācitrāḥ* = "different motley-coloured objects", the word *nānā* = 'different, varied', would retain the basis of its formation, even though now used to denote objects which are different (or such varied), such would be the case of the *bahuvrīhi* compound.

[An example is now given. The word *nanā*, formed by P. 4. 2.27. from the negative particle *nañ* by adding the suffix *nañ* in the sense of separation, not being together (*asahārthe*) is an indeclinable. If, on that basis, it is applied to an object, even then it would retain its character of denoting *asattva*, non-substance. Such is the case with the *bahuvrīhi* compound. From a thing in which the *nimitta* exists, a cognition similar to the *nimitta* would arise. The pure *nimittin* would not figure in the cognition and so grammatical operations would not be according to that but according to the *nimitta*.]

241. If the relata are the basis of the formation, the property of individual substance is not interfered with. It is having no gender at all which is opposed to having gender.

[According to the view that the relation is the basis of the formation and that the expressed meaning is the relatum susceptible to take gender and number, there would be need for the extension of gender and number by P. 1.2.52. In this view, even if the basis of the formation (*nimitta*) persists, it would do no harm to the property of substance, namely, susceptibility to gender and number, because the *nimitta* also is so susceptible. Even though the gender and number of the *nimitta* in *citraṅguḥ* (feminine and plural) are different from those of the meaning of the other word *Devadattaḥ* (masculine and singular), the former would not eclipse the latter. So the latter would have its own gender and number. If bare relation were the basis of formation, it would convey the relatum without giving up its own form. So the relatum would be eclipsed by the relation and would not get its own gender and number. To have no gender at all is opposed to having a gender and not having a different gender.]

242. The meaning of the other word with its gender and number, is equal in properties to the basis of formation. Being a substance, it is near to it and so it does not conflict with its properties.

[When the relatum is the basis of formation and is also the meaning of the constituent words which are also in the nature of substance and is the expressed meaning, its properties are not eclipsed and so its gender and number naturally result.]

If, in the *vibhaktiyartha* view also, the compound conveys the relatum through the relation of identity, what is the difference between that and the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*? This is now answered.

243. Substance is presented in two ways: (1) as conditioned by the relation which is the meaning of the case-ending, (2) in a pure form. The properties of the pure substance would not result if it is eclipsed by the properties of something else.

[In the *vibhaktiyartha* view substance, identified with the relation conveyed by the sixth case-affix, is the expressed meaning. In the *padārthābhīdhānapakṣa*, the pure unconditioned substance is the expressed meaning. These two different views result because of the two different ways in which substance is presented. The gender and number of pure substance do not result if it is conditioned by the relation. Therefore, their extension has to be provided for by P. 1. 2. 52. When pure substance becomes qualified substance, it is said to be *sadravyaḥ*. Though relation is the predominant meaning at the word level, at the meaning level, substance is predominant.]

244. In the earlier part of the text (of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 24.) where pure substance is mentioned, this distinction is not meant to be conveyed. But it is pointed out in the later (second) part.

[In the earlier part of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 24. where pure substance is stated to be the meaning of the *bahuvrīhi* and the difficulty regarding the use of a word in apposition to it is raised and answered, this view, namely, that substance is conditioned by relation is not mentioned. But in the later part, it is mentioned. Even here, substance is declared to be the meaning, though conditioned by the relation. If substance is not conveyed, gender and number would not exist at all and where is the question of their extension by P. 1. 2. 52. ? All that is meant is that relation is the predominant meaning.]

If relation is the predominant meaning and it hides the substance, how has it been stated that the whole meaning of the word including substance, gender and number, is conveyed? (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 422, l. 27.) This is now explained.

245. Substance is mentioned here as qualifying gender and number. They rest on substance and not on anything else.

[Even though gender and number usually qualify substance, here substance should be understood as qualifying gender and number. Gender and number here are not connected with something else like quality, They inhere in substance. Though, in this view, relation is the expressed meaning, the expression *sadravyaḥ* (including substance) is used in order that gender and number may also result. Relation being expressed here as identical with the meaning of the other word susceptible to gender and number, the two are equal to each other in their attributes. Both are in the nature of substance. They are not distant from each other as when bare relation is the basis of formation. The relatum which is the expressed meaning would have its own gender and number. In some complex formations, the resulting form has the property of the *nimitta* and not of the *nimittin* as one would expect. For instance, in *harītakyaḥ phalāni* = the fruits of the *harītakī* tree (the yellow Myrobalan). Here *harītakyaḥ* stands for the fruits and so should have the neuter gender to agree with *phalāni* but by P. 4. 4. 167 and 1. 2. 51 it retains the feminine gender which it had when it was the name of the tree.]

246. The compound conveys substance in general determined by the relation qualified by the relata and is followed by a word expressive of individual substance.

[According to the *vibhakyarthābhīdhānapakṣa*, the *bahuvrīhi* is expressive of the relatum, namely, substance in general, determined by the relation qualified by the relata which are the meanings of the constituent words. By saying 'substance in general', it is shown that in this view also, the use of words expressive of individual substance in apposition to the *bahuvrīhi* is necessary and justified.]

247. Not being beyond gender and number, the properties of a substance, and being in apposition to what expresses the particular, it (the *bahuvrīhi*) takes

on the gender and number of the particular relatum which is going to be connected with it.

[As the *bahuvrihi* conveys substance in general, it is susceptible to gender and number, properties of substance. But it is not capable of taking on any particular gender and number belonging to an individual substance : Therefore, by P. 1. 2. 52. it takes on the gender and number of the individual substance conveyed by the word used in apposition to it.]

Here ends the consideration of the *bahuvrihi* compound.

Now the extension of gender and number to negative compounds is going to be considered.

248. Even though the methods of the *śāstra* may differ, that does not make any difference to the worldly meaning of the negative compound and that is why three alternative views in regard to it are discussed (in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.2.6.)

[Now begins a consideration of the extension of gender and number to negative compounds. The *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 2. 6 discusses whether, in negative compounds, the meaning of first term is the main one or that of the second term or that of an outside word. Whatever may be the answer, it makes no difference to the meaning of a compound like *abrāhmaṇaḥ*. If it is formed in the sense of an outside word, then the second constituent, namely, *brāhmaṇa* would stand, not for the universal *brāhmaṇatva* but for an individual. If the meaning of the negative particle is the main one, it being non-existence, it cannot be connected with action and so one would understand from the compound something resembling a *brāhmaṇa*. If the meaning of the second term is the main one, one would understand from the compound somebody like a *kṣattriya* mistaken for a *brāhmaṇa*. Whichever way we take it, the ultimate meaning is the same.]

249. Even though it (the compound) is a different word, consideration proceeds on the basis of its identification (with the analytic sentence). In compounds like *abrāhmaṇa*, one does not see the use of the negative particle *na*.

[In the course of the grammatical derivation of a compound, it is assumed to be identical in meaning with the sentence which analyses it (*vigrahavākya*). In the sentence, one sees *na* and the *a* of the compound is identified with this *na*. So one sees the meaning of the sentence in the compound. Whatever inner distinction one sees in the meaning of a compound is based on the identification between the compound and the analytic sentence. As we understand the idea of non-existence or negation from the compound, we conclude that the *a* in it corresponds to the *na* of the sentence. In *adhika* and *āpanaya* also there is *a* but the idea of negation is not understood from it. Of course, in reality, the word *abrāhmaṇa* is indivisible.]

250. Before entering into the compound the negative particle indicates (*dyotyate*) the non-existence of things which had naturally ceased to be but which had not been noticed because of identity of form.

[In the sentence *na* stands for negation or non-existence. Negation is never self-sufficient, because it is always negation of something. A thing which actually exists cannot disappear merely by the use of *na*. *Na* can only make known the non-existence or disappearance of something due to other reasons. A word can denote something which does not exist because it has already been established that the meaning of a word is *śabdārtha* and not *vastvārtha*. The negative particle makes known the meaning of the word associated with it. That is why it is said to be *dyotaka*, indicative.]

251. There is no compounding of the negative particle which, in the sentence stage, is connected with the action denoted by the verb and which inheres in agents like *brāhmaṇa*.

(If the negative particle has no self-sufficient meaning, how can it be the main meaning as one of the three views envisages? If it has and if it is connected with that of the other constituent in the compound, the latter would lose its own nature and cannot be the main meaning. If the meanings of the two constituents are not connected, the meaning of the other word, determined by the connected meanings of the constituent words, cannot become the main meaning either. Thus all the three views seem to be incompatible. If the negative particle negates the action relating to the meaning of the second constituent, there cannot be a compound at all. The action which is negated is either expressed by a separate word or it is conveyed by the compound as a whole. The former is the case in sentences like *brāhmaṇo na bhuikte*. The action of eating, denoted by the verb exists in the *brāhmaṇa* and it is with that that the *na* is connected and not with the word *brāhmaṇa*. So, in this sense, there cannot be the compound *abrāhmaṇo bhuikte*. Therefore the question as to which is the main one cannot arise at all. But there can be a compound in the sense of *brāhmaṇo nāsti*. We can say *abrāhmaṇaḥ* because the connection of *na*, though outwardly with *asti*, is with *brāhmaṇaḥ* also, because *sattā* the meaning of *asti*, is inherent in the meaning of every word.]

252. If the action denoted by words like *pācaka* is connected with the negative particle, existence not being mentioned there, the three views cannot arise.

[Where there is connection between the negative particle and an action to be indicated by the second constituent, there can be a compound. We can say *apācakaḥ* in the sense of *na pācakaḥ*. Here, the action of cooking is subordinate to the idea

of agent in the word *pācaka*. The negative particle is connected with that subordinate action as something to be negated. The word *brāhmaṇa* as the second term does not convey even a subordinate action and so the negative particle is not connected with it and the three views cannot arise. All this difficulty arises because of adopting the view that in a compound the negative particle is indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive. Therefore one must adopt the view that in a compound, the negative particle is expressive (*vācaka*) and not merely indicative (*dyotaka*). As the negative particle denotes non-existence in general it can become connected with the second constituent expressive of a particular non-existence in any one of three ways according to the intention of the speaker. So in this interpretation, the three views can arise. In order that the three views may arise, it is necessary that it should have its own independent meaning and not that it merely indicates the meaning of something else.]

253. If everywhere it is with existence that connection (of the negative particle) is admitted, then, in the compound *asan* : another existence would have to be postulated.

[If everywhere the negative particle is considered to be connected with existence which is present in the meanings of all words and not with actions which come and go, then even in compounds like *asan*, one would have to postulate another existence than the one conveyed by *sat* for *na* to be connected with. But nobody understands two *sattās* from *asan*, but only one which is negated.]

254. In the negative compound ending in *ktvā* or *tumun*, no relation of qualifier and qualified with the negative particle expressive of non-existence is seen.

Though the text of this *kārikā* in my edition, as in other

editions has *nañā sattābhidhāyinā*, Helārāja had *nañāsattābhidhāyinā*. The translation is based on Helārāja's text.

[In the expressions *akṛtvā*, *akartum* the meaning which is conveyed as the main one is similar to that conveyed by a verb in the sense that it is a process and, therefore, susceptible of being connected with the suffix *kṛtvā*, expressive of repetition of action (P. 5.4.17.). There cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified between such a meaning of the root *kṛ* and the negative particle expressive of non-existence (*asattābhidhāyinā*). Between the negative particle which denies existence and the meaning of the root *kṛ*, there cannot be any relation because negation can be connected only with what is to be negated. The meaning of the root *kṛ* is not in the nature of existence, being in the nature of a process. So it is not something to be negated. So how can it be connected with the negative particle? Therefore, if the negative particle is taken to mean non-existence, both these expressions would be inexplicable. The fact is that here, the negative particle expresses mere negation. Thus, in *asan*, it negates existence which is the meaning of *san* and so there is no question of postulating another existence to be connected with it. In *akṛtvā*, it negates the action denoted by *kṛ* and so the two can be connected. But in *abrāhmaṇa*, the connection between the negative particle and *brāhmaṇa* is inexplicable because existence is part of the meaning of *brāhmaṇa* and what exists cannot be negated. *Objection.* In *asan* and *akṛtvā* also, the meanings of *san* and *kṛtvā* are of a positive nature (*bhāvātmakaḥ*). How can they be negated? If that is so, one would have to assume that the negative particle, even in a compound, is only indicative (*dyotaka*) of what has disappeared by its own nature, as it is in a sentence. Here also, there are two possibilities : (i) either the negative particle should be understood as revealing an object which is the substratum of a particular action and which has disappeared by its own nature or (2) as revealing an object which is the substratum of action in general. In the first alternative, there cannot be a compound at all because of the absence of semantic connection. Even if there is connection the three views cannot arise. In the second alternative, as the negative particle indica-

tive of existence in general is connected only with action in general conveyed by the second term, there would be regresses ad infinitum (*anavasthā*). As there is no connection with a particular action in this view, the negative particle is not indicative (*dyotaka*) at all. Therefore, it should be looked upon as expressive (*vācaka*). In that way, the negative particle has an independent meaning which can be the primary or the secondary one according to circumstances and so the three views can arise and their consideration would naturally result.]

How, according to the view that the negative particle denotes non-existence in general, there is no need to postulate another existence and it can be connected with *kṛtvā* etc., is now going to be explained.

255. The negative particle relates to (that is, expresses) the negation of the substratum in general of the action(of existence). Therefore it is connected with particular substrata like *brāhmaṇa*.

[As the negative particle is here thought of as expressive of non-existence, the action in question here is that of existence. The negation which is the meaning of the particle is the negation of existence. Being intransitive, its accessory is the power of the agent. This power must have a substratum before it can become the agent. So a substratum in general is understood. The negative particle is expressive of that. What is meant is this : In a compound, the negative particle is expressive of the substratum in general, coloured by non-existence, of the action of existence. So the meaning of *nañ* amounts to *nāsti* = 'it does not exist.' What particular substratum does not exist is made known by the word with which the particle is connected. Thus in a compound like *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle conveys the non-existence of the substratum in general of the action of non-existence and the word *brāhmaṇa* conveys the particular substratum. The meanings of the two constituents of the compound stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified towards each other. The non-existent in general is combined with a particular non-

existent. Of the two meanings combined, which is the qualifier and which the qualified is a matter of the speaker's intention. When the idea of non-existence is the qualified and that of *brāhmaṇa* the qualifier, the former element, that is, the negative particle becomes the dominant one and there results *pūrvapadārthaprādhānya*. If the compound means *asan brāhmaṇaḥ*, the meaning of the second constituent is the qualified and that of the former the qualifier and so *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* results. In both of these, the meaning of the compound is confined to those of the constituent words. But if the meanings of the constituent words refer to the meaning of an outside word, that is one in whom the fact of being a *brāhmaṇa* is non-existent, somebody like a *kṣattriya*, then *anyapadārthaprādhānya* results. In this way, the three views are possible in the case of *apācaka* also. As the particle stands for negation of existence in general, we can have forms like *akṛtvā*, *akartum* where the root *kṛ* stands for a particular action in which existence (*sattā*) inheres. Thus, by adopting the view that *nañ* is expressive (*vācaka*) of non-existence in general, everything can be explained.]

How the negative particle which is indicative in a sentence becomes expressive in a compound is now explained by means of an analogy.

256. Just as *niḥ* etc. combine, in a compound, on the basis of meanings in the form of one who has gone etc. with substrata in the form of accessories (*sādhana*), such is the process in a negative compound.

[The compound *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* is formed in the sense of *niṣkrāntaḥ Kauśāmbiḥ* = 'one who has come out of the city of Kauśāmbī. Here *niṣkrāntaḥ* expresses an action together with its agent. Such a word combines, in a compound, with a word like *Kauśāmbī*, which denotes the starting point (*apādāna*) of the action of coming out. It is *niḥ*, having the meaning *niṣkrāntaḥ* which actually combines with *Kauśāmbī* by P. 2. 2. 18, vā 4. Its meaning is the same as that of *niṣkrāntaḥ*.

In a compound *niḥ* does not denote mere *asattva*. If it were so, it could not combine with *Kauśāmbī* whose meaning is in the nature of *sattva*. So it denotes a substance to which the action of coming out is subordinate. In other words, primarily it denotes the agent of the action of coming out, though outside the compound, theoretically, it is supposed to convey *asattva*=non-substance. In the same way, in a negative compound, the negative particle is deemed to be expressive of non-existence in general as otherwise its connection with the meaning of the second constituent would remain inexplicable.]

257. Therefore, as the negative particle stands for non-existence in general, the relation of qualifier and qualified with *brāhmaṇa*. *kṣattriya* etc. is understood as in the case of *kubja* and *khañja*.

[As the negative particle stands for non-existence in general, the three views become possible, because it can be combined with words expressive of a particular non-existence like *brāhmaṇa* and the relation of qualifier and qualified between the two will depend upon the speaker's intention as in the case of the words *Kubja* and *Khañja* which can be compounded into *Kubja-Khañja*=‘hump-backed and lame’ or into *Khañja-Kubja*=‘lame and hump-backed’, according to one's wish, the relation of qualifier and qualified being different each time.]

258. Thus, there being option, the non-existence may be the main meaning and the others secondary or it may be that the others represent the main meaning.

[The relation of qualifier and qualified which implies the idea of primary and secondary, is a matter of the speaker's intention. So in *abrāhmaṇa*, all the three views are possible. When non-existence in general (*asatsāmānyam*) is meant to be the main meaning, then there is predominance of the meaning of

the first word, because that is the meaning of the negative particle. When the meanings of the second constituents are meant to be the main ones, then there is predominance of the meaning of the second constituent. Lastly, when the meanings of the two words refer to the meaning of an outside word, there is predominance of the meaning of the outside word (*anyapadārthaprādhānya*). In a sentence, the negative particle has no independent meaning. It is not expressive but only indicative. Therefore there is no option as far as the relation of qualifier and qualified is concerned and so the three views cannot arise. They can arise only when there is no fixity in the relation of qualifier and qualified, That is not the case in a sentence and that is why the negative particle has no gender and number in a sentence. It is not so in a compound where the negative particle is expressive of *sattva* = substance.]

Of the three views which can arise the predominance of the meaning of the second constituent is mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* first. It is now going to be considered.

259. The words *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣattriya* and the like, considered as the main ones, are used from the very beginning to denote a particular (non-existence) though they have the same form when they denote something positive.

[According to *uttarapadārthaprādhānya*, in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle is the qualifier and *brāhmaṇa* is the qualified. But how is this possible considering that *nañ* stands for non-existence and *brāhmaṇa* for something which has a positive existence. The fact is that *brāhmaṇa* here means someone in whom *brāhmaṇatva* does not exist. The word has the same form even when it means someone in whom *brāhmaṇatva* exists. The non-existence of *brāhmaṇatva*, already present in the meaning of the word, is made manifest by the negative particle. It means non-existence in general whereas the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for a particular non-existence. There can be the

relation of qualifier and qualified between the general and the particular.]

260. Just as words like '*gaura*' = 'fair' bring about specification, in the same way the negative particle expressive of non-existence makes manifest the unmanifested identity.

[An illustration is now given to show how the negative particle can be the qualifier. When we say *gaurāḥ brāhmaṇaḥ* = the fair *brāhmaṇa*, the word *gaurāḥ* makes explicit what was implicit. That is, any *brāhmaṇa* can be potentially *gaurāḥ* and the adjective *gaurāḥ* specifies that the *brāhmaṇa* in question is so. Similarly, non-existence, like other qualities, is implicit in all objects and the negative particle brings it out, specifies the object. So it becomes a qualifier.]

261. Just as, in order to justify the use of a word expressive of existence, a thing having secondary existence is postulated, in the same way, in order to explain the use of the negative particle expressive of non-existence, an indefinable thing is postulated.

[It does look odd that the negative particle should be considered to be qualifier, considering that it negates the very existence of what is denoted by the word with which it is connected. Ordinarily, adjectives bring out peculiarities present in an existent object. By negating the very existence of the object, the very use of the word seems to become unjustified. The position is this: From an uttered word, one understands a meaning, an object which is common to both existence and non-existence. The external object is not like that. That is based on existence only. If the object denoted by the word were also like that, the use of *san* in *san brāhmaṇa* would be inexplicable, because the external object is always associated with existence and there would be no point in saying *san*. But we do say *san brāhmaṇaḥ*. because the object conveyed by the

word can be associated with both existence and non-existence and *san* specifies which one is meant in a particular case. What is conveyed by a word has secondary existence (*upacārasattā*) and so it can be associated with both existence and non-existence. What has *mukhyasattā* is associated with existence only. The intellect conceives of a thing irrespective of its external existence or non-existence and such a thing is capable of being qualified by conforming or opposite attributes. A unified object like lotus is mentally divided into substance and attribute and we say *nīlam utpalam* by using two separate words. There is no such thing in the world as a bare lotus without colour which would later become associated with blue colour. Substance and colour are always found together. In *abrāhmaṇa*, secondary existence was wrongly thought of as primary existence and that is, therefore, negated.]

How something similar to what is negated is understood from a negative compound is now explained.

262. An idea based on some other Existence is first applied (by mistake) to *kṣattriya* and the like and (when the negative particle is used) it takes away the Existence based on one universal from something else to which it was wrongly applied.

[The negative compound is used when something is first mistaken for something else, and later, the mistake is discovered. The initial mistake and its later removal can be seen in expressions like *abrāhmaṇo' yaṁ kṣattriyaḥ*. Here the negative particle removes the idea of *brāhmaṇa* wrongly applied to a *kṣattriya* and says : this is not a *brāhmaṇa*, he was wrongly so understood, he is similar to a *brāhmaṇa*. Similar to a *brāhmaṇa* is necessarily the meaning of 'not a *abrāhmaṇa*. It cannot mean something totally different from a *brāhmaṇa* but that would not explain how the mistake took place.]

But how to explain the negative compound *abhāvaḥ*? Here nothing similar to the meaning of the second constituent word is understood. Its negation is understood.

263. When, in the compound, *abhāvaḥ* negation of Existence is intended, negation cannot be brought about except on the basis of something positive (*sopākhya*).

[In order to delimit the object of negation, something positive is conceived by the mind and the word *bhāva* is used. That it is non-existent cannot be understood from that word only because the form of the word is the same in both cases. In order that it may be understood, the negative particle is used. What is *nirupākhya*=indefinable, non-existent was wrongly thought of as definable and existent. To remove the error the negative particle is used.]

The whole thing is now explained in another way.

264. Words which stand for many attributes and denote their collection are sometimes normally (*svabhāvataḥ*) applied in the same form, to a part of them.

[So far the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa* was explained on the basis of *upacārasattā*. According to that, the negative compound amounts to this : the idea of *brāhmaṇa* is first mentally conceived (*upacārasattā*) and to deny the actual existence of *brāhmaṇatva* in a *kṣattriya* and others, the word *brāhmaṇa* is used in association with a negative particle.

It can be explained in another way. The negative particle in the compound reveals the non-existence of those qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* which are naturally absent in a *kṣattriya*. The existence of the other qualities is implied. In other words the negative particle reveals that in *abrāhmaṇa*, the word *brāhmaṇa* stands only for part of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* because the negative particle reveals the absence of the other part. The word *brāhmaṇa* is applied to one who is so in the full sense of the word as well as to one who has only some of the qualities of a

brāhmaṇa. But as the form of the word is the same in both cases, one does not see the difference. The negative particle helps us to see it.]

If the negative particle denotes the absence of the qualities not conveyed by the second constituent word, how does it become connected with it at all in order to form the compound?

265. Due to a part of it being done, the whole is said to be 'done' or 'not done'. Such is the process in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*.

[Here an analogy is given. When only a part of something is done, it is said to be both 'done' and 'not done' (*kṛtākṛta*). The quality of the part, that is, the fact of being done or not done, is attributed to the whole. The process is the same in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*.]

266. It might be said that, in this way, the same person would be both *brāhmaṇa* and *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound in question is really not different from *kṛtākṛta* considering that in it the word 'done' is applied to what is not done.

[One might object that, according to this view, contradiction would result, because by identifying the existent part of the qualities with the totality, the name *brāhmaṇa* would be applied to somebody and by identifying the non-existent part with the totality, the same person would be called *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound *abrāhmaṇa* can be explained on the analogy of *kṛtākṛta*. When something is not done but all the materials are present and there is a reasonable chance of its being done, one applies the word 'done' to it figuratively. Similarly, seeing some qualities similar to those of a *brāhmaṇa* in a *kṣattriya*, one identifies them with the totality of qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* and applies the name to him. Then the negative particle reveals that it is only figurative usage. Thus the compound is like *kṛtākṛta*.]

267. The negative particle, used as shown in the analysis by the *śāstra* in order to set aside primary usage where the usage is only secondary, is in the nature of a qualifier.

[The use of the word *brāhmaṇa* to one who has only some of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* is secondary usage but as the word is the same, one might mistake it for primary usage. The use of the negative particle makes the intention of the speaker clear. In this way, it becomes a qualifier.]

268. It is seen that a qualifier does not set aside the thing qualified. Therefore (in *abrāhmaṇa*) a part of the meaning of the word expressive of the universal is set aside.

[It is now clear why the *Bhāṣya* points out that, in the *uttarapadārthaprādhānya* view, on hearing '*abrāhmaṇam ānaya*' one would bring a *brāhmaṇa*. In a compound like *rājapuruṣa*, the first constituent qualifies the second one without setting it aside and so it can be a qualifier. Here the negative particle sets aside the meaning of the second constituent and, so, it cannot be a qualifier. It is as good as meaningless and so, on hearing *abrāhmaṇam ānaya*, one would bring just a *brāhmaṇa*. This, of course, is wrong. So the correct interpretation is that the negative particle negates the existence of a part of the attributes for which the universal-expressing word *brāhmaṇa* stands. The remaining attributes stand. In this way, the use of the negative particle has a purpose and it becomes a qualifier.]

A difficulty is now pointed out.

269. In every *brāhmaṇa* some attribute or other is always missing and so the negative particle is useless as it does not do anything new.

[Even so, the negative particle appears to be useless, because, in every *brāhmaṇa*, there is a deficiency of some required attribute and so in every case, the word is applied on the basis of a part of the qualities only. Even to one who has all of them the word is applied on the basis of birth. Thus, it is not due to the negative particle that the word is understood to stand for only a part of the qualities.]

270. (Moreover) the word (*brāhmaṇa*) qualified by the negative particle would become the synonym of the word not qualified by it. And the correctness (of the negative compound) would be understood from the fact of its being derived according to grammar.

[That being so, the words *brāhmaṇa* and *abrāhmaṇa* become synonyms because both would mean one in whom only a part of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* is present.]

The difficulty is met as follows—

271. It is true that a qualifier is a word which does not set aside the meaning of the main word. (Here also) the negative particle reveals the nature of the meaning of the word (*brāhmaṇa*) namely, that it has only secondary existence.

[The difficulty is removed as follows:—The word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound has not got its primary meaning, but only a secondary meaning, that is, one who is thought of as a *brāhmaṇa* though he has not all his qualities. It is this fact which the negative particle reveals and so it qualifies without setting aside the meaning of the word.]

272. As a thing exists in the objects qualified, so it is conveyed by the words which bring about differentiation.

[Other qualifiers besides the negative particle do the same thing. In *rājapuruṣa* or *nīlotpala*, the qualifying word refers to something which actually exists in the thing qualified. Similarly, in *abrāhmaṇa*, the negative particle reveals that the meaning of the second constituent has no external existence, that it is only conceived by the mind. Therefore, it is right to call it a qualifier. The M. Bhā. also says : *ihāpi tarhi nañ viśeṣakaḥ prayujyate* = “if so, (it may be said) that here also the negative particle is used as a qualifier” (M. Bhā. I. p. 411, l. 2.)]

An objection is now raised—

273. If the properties are absent how can a word standing for only a part be applied to them? It is not right that a word should be applied without a basis (*nimitta*).

[To the question : What is the nature of the meaning qualified by the negative particle, the answer given is : *nivṛttapadārthakaḥ* = “something in which the attributes are absent”. (Ibid, l. 3.) To this, it is objected that even when the meaning of the word is something fashioned by the mind, it should be based on something external. By identifying what figures in the mind with what is external, the meaning of the word appears to have external existence. If the word *brāhmaṇa* stands only for a part of the qualities, how can it be applied, without a basis, to a *kṣattriya*?, so that the negative particle may reveal that condition?]

274. If the same word can, like the word *ārāt*, be applied in its own right to opposite things, the use of the negative particle is useless.

[If it is argued that, just as the word *ārāt* means both far and near, in the same way, the word *brāhmaṇa* would mean both a *brāhmaṇa* and a *kṣattriya* in its own right. If that is so,

even without the negative particle, it would denote the *kṣattriya* from the context. What then is the use of the particle and what is the use of teaching the derivation of the negative compound? The meaning in a particular context, of a word having more than one meaning, does not necessarily depend upon the use of another specifying word. This is what the M. Bhā means by saying : *Yadi svābhāvikī niṛttiḥ kim nañ prayujyamānaḥ karoti ?* (Vol, I, p. 411, l. 4-5).]

275. If even what is natural has to be explained by words, then, this being not well known, it must be proclaimed that objects are set aside by the negative particle.

[If it is maintained that the negative particle would not be useless because it would reveal the otherwise unintelligible natural meaning of a word, then it should be openly declared that the well-known natural meaning of a word disappears when the negative particle is used. But if it is the nature of a word sometimes to denote an opposite meaning without the help of another word, then the negative particle becomes useless.]

276. Even though the word may stand for both, the main one is understood. From the bare root *sthā* (*tiṣṭhati*), going away cannot be understood even though it is its meaning.

[After having rejected the view that the fact that a certain thing is not included in the meaning of a word is the result of the use of the negative particle, it is confirmed that exclusion of certain things from the meaning of a word is natural. The negative particle only makes it known, just as a lamp only makes known the presence of some objects in a dark place. It is well-known that the root *sthā* means staying. Even though it means going away also, it cannot express it without the preposition *pra*. Similarly, the word *brāhmaṇa* can mean

one who is not a *brāhmaṇa* also but not without the use of the negative particle. Going away is not the meaning of *pra* in *pratiṣṭhate*. It is the meaning of the root *sthā*. *Pra* only reveals it. That is what happens in *brāhmaṇa*.]

277. If the main meaning is possible why is the word *brāhmaṇa* considered to be expressive of something different from it.

[If the main meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* is not applicable to a *kṣattriya*, how is it said to be expressive of a *kṣattriya*? And why is the word used at all in the compound? And why hold the view that the negative particle reveals that the word is used in a secondary meaning? As the *M. bhā* puts it: *Yadi puṇar ayam nivṛttapadārthakaḥ kimarthaṃ brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ prayujyate*? = “if its own meaning has disappeared, why is the word *brāhmaṇa* used at all? (*M. Bhā. I. p. 411, l. 12-13*)]

278. In order that one may understand that such and such a thing does not exist in a *kṣattriya* and the like, the word expressive of it is used.

[The question raised in the previous stanza is answered as follows—The word *brāhmaṇa* is used in the compound in order to indicate the main meaning of which word does not exist. Through ignorance or wrong instruction, the word *brāhmaṇa* is sometimes applied to a *kṣattriya* and the like. In order to show what is set aside by the negative particle, the word *brāhmaṇa* is used.]

279. In regard to what has been determined by the mind, one understands from a word its existence or non-existence (*pravṛttir va nivṛttir vā* - action or absention from action). It is the word which is connected with meaning.

[It is not only here but everywhere that one understands

from a word something which is created by the mind. It is that which is the basis of usage and it does not take into consideration whether something corresponding to it exists outside or not. Words convey something which may or may not exist, something which is common to both existence and non-existence. Therefore, a word may express a qualifier which is of a positive or negative nature.]

Something is now being said about a negative compound when the meaning of the second constituent is predominant.

280. Either through faulty instruction or through some cause of doubt, a word is applied to a wrong object. It is not applied to a clod of earth and the like because of the non-existence (of the above two circumstances).

[Either through wrong instruction or through mistake due to resemblance, a word is wrongly applied to an object. But it is always applied to something which resembles the real thing. Seeing some common properties, the word *brāhmaṇa* may be applied to a *kṣattriya* but never to a clod of earth because there is no resemblance at all. From the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa*, one understands that the main meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* does not exist in the person concerned who is the substratum of a superimposition. The compound does not stop at conveying the negation. As the negative particle negates the actuality of the superimposition expressed by the second term, the latter is supposed to be predominant in the compound.]

Another point is now being made in connection with the predominance of the second constituent.

281. When there is predominance (of the second constituent) forms like *anekasmāt*, *asaḥ* become possible. Thus, in connection with the prescription of the

suffixes *tva* and *tal*, it is right to consider that it is the main word which is dependent.

[By adopting the view that in a negative compound, the second constituent is the main one, the compound *anekam* is explained. In this compound, the second constituent *eka* being the main one, the singular number is used and its being a pronoun (*sarvanāma*) is also preserved and so we get forms like *anekasmai*. Negative compounds like *asaḥ* where the rule *tyadādīnām aḥ* (P. 7. 2. 102) is applied would also be explained. When we have to make a compound in the sense of *na brāhmaṇasya bhāvaḥ*, the question arises whether *na* and *brāhmaṇa* should be compounded first and then the suffix *tva* should be added or *brāhmaṇa* should be joined with *tva* first and then the negative compound formed. After discussion in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 5. 1. 119, the conclusion reached is that *na* and *brāhmaṇa* should be compounded first and to the compound *abrāhmaṇa* thus formed, the suffix *tva* should be added. It is only thus that the compound *abrāhmaṇatva* will get the *udātta* accent on the last syllable which is desired. If the process is reversed, the negative particle would get it, which is not desired. These are the only two abstract suffixes which are added after the formation of the negative compound. The others are added before.]

282. The word *eka* being the main word (in *anekam*), even in the presence of the qualifying word (the negative particle) its main attribute (of being in the singular number) is not set aside and so the compound does not get any other number.

[If the second constituent of the compound *anekam* is the main word, even though it denotes other numbers, it takes the singular number, that is, the number of the main word.]

283. It is the meaning of *eka*, qualified by the negative particle, which is the main one here,

because it is to be qualified. Two and other numbers give up their own properties, being identified with one.

[This is said in answer to the objection that the numbers two etc. identified with one, are here the meaning of the compound and so when the negative particle sets aside the idea of one, two etc. are understood and so the compound should have one of those numbers and not the singular. The answer is that the numbers two etc. are coloured by the number one and identified with it and so lose their own attributes. Thus, the compound takes the singular number.]

284. Just as *kṣattriya* and the like are identified with a *brāhmaṇa* when the latter is associated with the negative particle, in the same way, unity (*ekatvam*) is superimposed on two etc. because of association with the negative particle.

[Just as the word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound stands for *kṣattriya* etc. because of association with the negative particle, in the same way, in *anekam*, *eka* stands for other numbers because of association with the negative particle. From *anekam*, a meaning similar to that of the second constituent is understood as in the case of *abrāhmaṇa*.]

285. After having superimposed unity, it is removed from two, etc. That word *eka* stands for them (two etc.) as the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for *kṣattriya*, etc.

[What the negative particle in *aneka* sets aside is the unity superimposed on two, etc. If the word *eka* were not there what would the negative particle set aside ?]

286. Just as the word *eka* with its fixed number is used in a sentence to denote other numbers, in the

same way, in a compound also, it being the main word, its own number is not set aside.

[To indicate the object of negation, the word *eka* is used and it follows its own properties both in the sentence and in the compound. In a sentence, the word *eka*, without giving up its own number, can stand for other numbers. Similarly, in the compound *aneka*, *eka* is the main word and it does not give up *an* its own number.]

287. According to the nature of the meaning to be set aside, a second constituent is used. If other numbers are used, that idea would not be understood.

[In order to indicate the object of the negation, the second constituent is used even though its meaning is not wanted. It is used in order to show what is superimposed. Unity is superimposed and that has to be set aside. Unless the second constituent is in the singular number, what is to be set aside would not be understood. If the dual and other numbers are used, the number one would not be understood as something to be set aside. So the use of the singular number is a means of understanding the number meant to be conveyed.

288. Just as from the word *aśukla* black or some other colour is understood, in the same way, from *aneka*, other numbers are understood.

[The negation in *aneka* can be understood either as *prasajya-pratiśedha* or as *paryudāsa*. The former would be simple negation amounting to 'not one'. So the latter is resorted to so that the other numbers may be understood.]

289. When, because of the action mentioned, all objects come to the mind and one is set aside by the

negative particle, the others which come to the mind are understood.

[A verb expressive of an action brings to the mind its accessories in general. When one says : *āsaya*, one naturally thinks of somebody as the object of the action of seating. But whether that somebody is to be one or many is not yet certain. Then one hears the word *anekam*. This excludes the number one and so one thinks of more than one person as the object of the action of seating: See . Bhā. I. p. 412, l. 4.]

290. If *prasajyapratishedha* is adopted, the mention of the action (would bring something to the mind). In *paryudāsa*, something else having some other number would be conveyed.

[If the negation in *anekam* is understood as *prasajyapratishedha*, then the mere negation of number one would be understood and the mention of the action, by its own power, would bring to the mind the accessories which are not prohibited. In the *paryudāsa* view, on the other hand, the word *aneka* itself would bring to the mind something similar to the meaning of the second constituent, that is, the numbers other than one.]

291. The meaning of a root in the nature of action, determined by its accessories, brings to the mind, at the very beginning, all the objects.

[When the meaning of a transitive verb, of a varied nature such as seating etc. and determined by such things as the prompter and the agent, is first mentioned, then, being of a varied nature, it cannot be accomplished by the same accessory and so many are suggested at the very beginning and when it is set aside, the others are understood.]

292. Where the negative compound *anekaḥ* is first mentioned in relation to an action (*ākhyāte*) the

substratum of the power of the accessory of which is known and then the verb *tiṣṭhati* is added.

293. There the action, being something to be accomplished (*sādhya*tvāt) is brought to the mind by the substance which is an accomplished thing (*siddhena* *dravyeṇa*). The substance is already mentioned and so the action is qualified by what is mentioned first.

[The above two stanzas relate to what is said in M. Bhā. I. p. 412, l. 5-6. In the previous stanzas, those cases were considered where the actions are mentioned first and the negative compound next. Now those cases are considered where the negative compound comes first and then the verb, as, for instance, in *anekas tiṣṭhati*. Here, for some reason or other, the substance which is the substratum of the power of the accessory is thought of as one, but this number is set aside as being unsuitable to the action still to be expressed. Then the verb expressive of the action is mentioned. As the substance mentioned first is for the sake of something else (that is, for the action), it brings to the mind a suitable action. Thus, it differs from the previous cases where the action brings the substance to the mind. Here also, as the setting aside of the number one is in relation to the accessory which is understood, one understands the latter without the number one. Thus, even though, as in the previous case, the verb is not mentioned first, the sentence does not stop merely at the setting aside of the number one, because there is the requirement of an action. Therefore, when the number one is set aside, an accessory having another number is understood.]

Now a reference is made to an illustration given in the M. Bhā. of the negation of the number one leading to the understanding of other numbers.

294. Even, in a sentence, the number one, when

set aside, requires some other number. Therefore, there is not the mere setting aside of the number one.

[The *M. Bhā.* gives an illustration to show that even where no action is meant to be conveyed, the setting aside of the number one results in the understanding of some other number. In a sentence like *na na ekaṃ priyam* or *na na ekaṃ sukham*, uttered with the doubling of the negative particle by one who is bothered by the many happy events happening to an enemy (P. 8.1.10.) the setting aside of the number one by the negative particle results in the understanding of other numbers in connection with the *priya* and *sukha* happening to the enemy. When a particular thing is negated, it means that the others are allowed. If all are negated, there would be no point in saying 'one'. So some other number is understood. When this is the case in a sentence, what to say of a compound? There the negation of one does not stop there. It necessarily leads to the understanding of other numbers.]

Why, when the number one is negated some other member is understood and not something totally different is now explained.

295. When eating with oil is a possibility, its prohibition results in the determination (*avaccheda*) of the meal by some other fat, because that would be the nearest and not by some other wet substance (like curds or milk).

[When somebody says : 'have your meal with something else than oil' (*bhojanamatailam vidheyam*), one would naturally think of something of a similar nature like clarified butter but not of curds or milk. Similarly when the number one is negated, one would think of something similar, that is, of another number.]

The predominance of the meaning of the outside word in a negative compound is now referred to.

296. When the non-existent in general and the meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa* refer to the same object and denote an outside object like *kṣattriya* (then there is predominance of the meaning of the outside word).

[We see that these negative compounds denote something which is the opposite of what the second constituent denotes. If the view is that the second term denotes something on which the meaning of the second term is superimposed, then the meaning of the second form is predominant, as already explained. But if the view is that the negative particle stands for non-existence in general and it enters into the relation of qualifier and qualified with the meaning of the second constituent which is of a positive nature and together they denote something external, then this external thing is predominant. *Abrāhmaṇa*, for instance, would mean something of which the *brāhmaṇa* is not the substratum, that is, the universal *kṣattriya* which is external because it is not the meaning of any one of the two constituents.]

To show that even if the meaning of the outside word is predominant in a negative compound, it is not a *bahuvrīhi* but a *tatpuruṣa*, an illustration is given.

297. Just as in *śastrīva śyāmā kanyā*='the girl is dark like a dagger', something external is referred to, in the same way, the two words *asan* and *brāhmaṇa* convey outside objects like a *kṣattriya*.

Remark. Though all the manuscripts and the two previous editions have *śyāmeva śastrī kanyeti*, the correct reading should perhaps be *śastrīva śyāmā kanyeti* in the first *pāda* of this stanza.

[According to the view that it is the second constituent which is the predominant one, the meaning of the compound rests within the compound itself. But it may be looked upon

as being similar to the compound *śastrīṣyāmā* = 'dark like a dagger'. This compound refers to something outside itself like *kanyā* = girl. In that sense, though it is a *talpuruṣa*, it has been formed in the sense of something external. *Abrāhmaṇa* is in the same position.]

298. It is like the expression: 'a cow without a dewlap' which refers to a *gayal*, a different species altogether and not to a cow with dewlap missing.

[Another illustration is now given. The negative compound *aśāśnaḥ* refers to a 'gayal' because it means : 'that which has no dewlap'. It refers to something which has no dewlap but otherwise resembles a cow, an animal belonging to a different species. That is also what happens in *abrāhmaṇa* which means somebody who has not got the universal *brāhmaṇatva* but otherwise resembles a *brāhmaṇa*.]

299. It is like our understanding the *khadira*, which had been declared to be similar, as really belonging to another species than *kharjūra* because of its thorns.

[Another illustration. One first understands the *khadira* to be similar to a *kharjūra* and, later, because of its thorns, it is understood as belonging to a different species than *kharjūra*. Similarly, one first understands identity because of the presence of some of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* but when the expression *abrāhmaṇa* is heard, one understands that the person concerned belongs to a different caste though other properties are the same.]

300. Through the inclusion of a comparison, it (the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa*) conveys an outside object, similar to a *brāhmaṇa* in whom *brāhmaṇya* is absent.

[After giving the above illustrations, an application is made to the present case. The three compounds *sastrīśyāmā*, *asāśnaḥ* and *kaṇṭakavān* refer to an external object on the basis of comparison. Similarly, the compound *abrāhmaṇa* refers to an outside object like *kṣattrīya* on the basis of resemblance: that is, except for the universal *brāhmaṇatva*, the other properties of a *brāhmaṇa* are present in the person in question. One does see other negative compounds also based on resemblance. For example : *avarṣā hemantaḥ* = "winter without rain". It means that there is resemblance between winter and the rainy season.]

301. Days when there is no rain but which are covered with mist and clouds are said to be 'rainless' (*avarṣāḥ*). Winter being such, it is identified with it.

[How the compound *avarṣā* is based on resemblance is now explained. When mist (or snow) is everywhere, the sky is covered with dark clouds but it is not actually raining, one can say that the days are *avarṣāḥ*. When the winter day is dark, it is like a rainless day in the rainy season. One can then say *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, on the basis of resemblance. The negative compound (*avarṣā*) applied to a winter day on the basis of resemblance refers to an outside object. In itself, it is a *tatpuruṣa* compound which stands for the meaning of its own constituents (*svapadārthe*) but as it involves comparison, it points to an outside object (*anya-padārtha*). If it were treated as a *bahuvrīhi*, the *ā* of *varṣā* would become short because it would be an *upasarjana* word. (P. 1. 2. 48.). Some, therefore, think that, in the compound *abrāhmaṇa* also, the meaning of the outside word is predominant, because of the comparison which it involves.]

302. Others declare that the negative particle is compounded with words like *brāhmaṇa* expressive of the universal when the compound expresses an outside individual object.

[Some explain in another way, how a negative compound like *abrāhmaṇa* denotes an outside object. All words denote

the universal. So does the word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound *abrāhmaṇa*. But the compound as a whole denotes the individual, something different from what the constituent word denotes. In other words, it denotes an outside individual object. Of course, the compound cannot denote an individual in which the universal *brāhmaṇatva* exists, because of the negative particle. So it denotes an individual *kṣatriya* or somebody else.]

303. A *bahuvrīhi* compound having this scope does not exist. *Agur aśvaḥ* is a *bahuvrīhi* whose scope is not encroached upon by the negative compound.

[In this way, the difference between a *bahuvrīhi* and a negative compound also becomes clear. The *bahuvrīhi* is taught in the sense of *matup*. Like the negative compound it does not denote an outside individual characterised by a particular universal. In the expression *agaur aśvaḥ*, the negative compound *agauḥ* means 'not a cow,' 'not having cowness' and it qualifies 'horse'. The *bahuvrīhi* would be *agur aśvaḥ*. Here the *bahuvrīhi* *agauḥ* means: 'not having the cow.' The idea of possession, one of the meaning of the suffix *matup* is expressed here. Thus, the difference between the two is clear.]

Though the meaning of the negative compound can somehow be explained according to the view that it denotes an outside object, the *M. Bhā.* points out a technical defect in it which is now explained.

304. Since the gender of the second constituent is restricted to a *dvandva* and to an *ekadeśīsamāsa* (P. 2.2.1.), the desired gender and number would not result in the compound *avarṣāḥ*.

[The technical defect pointed out is that in *avarṣāḥ heman-taḥ*, the negative compound *avarṣāḥ* would get the masculine gender and singular number as it would be looked upon as the

qualifier of *hemantaḥ* whereas the feminine gender and the plural number are desired. Nor can the desired gender result from P. 2. 4. 26, because vā. 7. on it restricts it to *ekadeśisamāsa* formed by P. 2. 2. 1. and so it does not apply to a negative compound.]

The *anyapadārtha* view being thus defective, something is now going to be said about the view that it is the meaning of the first constituent, that is, the negative particle, which is predominant.

305. When a word like *brāhmaṇa* is a qualifier of non-existence, the meaning of the negative particle, connected with an action, then the non-existence is understood as specified by its object.

[The first constituent, the negative particle, means non-existence. When it is the main meaning, it is that which is naturally connected with action. It is determined, specified, qualified by the meaning of the second constituent *brāhmaṇa*. This is the position according to this view.]

How the non-existent is connected with action is now explained.

306. As it is non-existent as a *brāhmaṇa*, it is said to be non-existent; even though non-existent, it exists in another way. It is the existence (as a *brāhmaṇa*) of what exists (as a *akṣattriya*) which is negated.

There is no contradiction in the non-existent being connected with action. That which exists as a *kṣattriya* does not exist as a *brāhmaṇa*. Thus the negative particle expresses non-existence as connected with a particular thing and not total non-existence. Therefore, it can be connected with action. It also explains how we understand something similar to what is negated. Non-existence, not specified by something positive, cannot enter

into verbal usage and so something which exists in one way is denied existence in some other way. Thus, as it involves something positive also, it is connected with action.]

307. As the compound follows its basis, it would denote substance in general and so it cannot have gender and number or it would have only a common attribute (that is, general gender and number.)

[If the meaning of the first term is predominant, that being an indeclinable, the whole compound would become indeclinable too and we cannot have forms like *abrāhmaṇau* and *abrāhmaṇāḥ*. In a sentence, the negative particle means non-existence in general and not substance. In a compound also, it means the same thing, qualified, of course, by the meaning of the second term. Therefore, the compound cannot have gender and number. Even if it is held that the compound denotes substance and not *asattva*, it would be generic substance and, therefore, there can only be singular number and neuter gender and we could only have the form *abrāhmaṇam*.]

308. Before (entering the compound) it (the negative particle) expresses non-substance (*asattva*) but in a compound, it denotes substance. Following up of the basis (*nimittānuvidhānam*) does not take place everywhere, because that is the nature of words.

[The above objection is answered by reference to the natural power of words. Though compounds are supposed to be formed in the meaning of the corresponding uncompounded words, still there is a difference in the meaning of the two. In a sentence, the negative particle has some independence. It denotes negation apart from what is negated and that being *asattva*, it has no gender and number. In a compound, the negative particle denotes what is negated to which the negation is subordinate. What is negated is predominant and so the compound

has gender and number. This difference is based on the natural power of words. See. *M. Bha.* I. p. 410, l. 18.]

309. If the basis is followed up, there would be no connection with an action. Being thus unfit for verbal usage (*avyapadeśyatvāt*,) its inclusion in grammar would be useless.

[The basis (*nimitta*) referred to is the idea of non-existence, non-substance, the meaning of the negative particle. If this is followed up in the compound, the meaning of the latter would not only be incapable of having gender and number, but it could not be connected with action either. There would be no point in teaching a nominal form the meaning of which cannot become the accessory of an action. It would thus become unfit to be grammatically formed. But we do see that negative compounds are connected with verbs expressive of action in a sentence as, for instance, in *abrāhmaṇam ānaya*, and *abrāhmaṇaṁ paśya*. The conclusion is that a negative compound denotes substance and can have gender and number because, in it, the basis (*nimitta*) is not followed up.]

So far the possibility of gender and number in general in a negative compound has been stated as due to the natural power of words. How it acquires a particular gender and number is now explained.

310. That which denotes non-existence in general is specified by the particular substrata which are mentioned and so takes their gender and number.

[Non-existence or negation in general, qualified by the meaning of the second constituent, is the meaning of the negative compound in the *pūrvapadārthapradhānapakṣa*. In order to specify it, words expressive of the particular are used and the compound is qualified by it and becomes fit for use. It is right that it should take the gender and number of the particular. Objects

are different from one another and so something like *kṣattriya* is the substratum of the absence of *brāhmaṇattva* and so the compound should take the gender and number of the word *kṣattriya*. Moreover, objects can have any gender but the word expressive of it restricts it to one of them. The same object can be referred to by words having different genders. *Kṣattriya* and *kṣattram* refer to the same thing, though they have different genders. Similarly, the masculine word *abrāhmaṇa* can also refer to the same thing as the neuter word *kṣattram*. It is nature which regulates gender and number just as it is the natural power of words which regulates that a compound should denote a substance and not *asattva*.]

311. From the very beginning, the particular substratum is implied in the general but when it is actually mentioned, it is brought out, as it were, from the general.

[Even though the general implies the particular, it does not specify which of the many possible particulars is meant but when it is actually mentioned, it is brought out, as it were, from the general.]

312. In the compound, its own meaning is heard and, as a result, some substratum having that (non-existence) is understood. The non-existence in general implies some substance having gender and number.

[Before it was said that in a compound, the negative particle denotes something concrete (and not *asattva* as in a sentence) and so can take gender and number. It implies substance in general qualified by non-existence. Now it is pointed out that a negative compound conveys its own meaning (and not that of an outside word) so that a *kṣattriya* or the like is understood as qualified by the non-existence (of *brāhmaṇatva*) and as its substratum.]

How the negative compound conveys *svapadārtha* (something belonging to its own constituents) or *anyapadārtha* (something belonging to an outside word) is now explained.

313. In it (the negative compound) the two words which stand for two different things together stand for one thing. The non-existence implies all the particulars.

[Before the formation of the compound, the negative particle in the sentence means negation and the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for something in which real *brāhmaṇatva* is denied. Thus the two words stand for two different things. The compound, on the other hand, stands for one thing, namely, the meaning of the negative compound as qualified by that of the second constituent, whatever it may be. The second constituent does no more than specify the particular thing which is negated. All possible things are implied in the negation itself. Its meaning is, therefore, predominant and the compound conveys *svapadārtha*.]

314. Because of not fully understanding the meaning of the negative particle, those objects which are conveyed by words like *kṣattriya* or by pronouns become, as it were, meanings of an outside word.

[Those who hold that the negative compound denotes an external object do so under a misapprehension. When a word like *kṣattriya* or *vaiśya* is used in apposition to *abrāhmaṇa*, it makes explicit what is implicit. If it is not used, what is implied would not become clear. The word *kṣattriya* does not bring in something which is not already included in *abrāhmaṇa*. In that sense, it is not an outside meaning. But this meaning of the negative particle is not understood by some. Non-existence in general, qualified by that of the meaning of the second constituent and specified by a particular substratum like *kṣattriya*, this is the meaning of the negative particle. But this is not understood by

some and so they think that the compound stands for the meaning of an outside word.]

315. If a word expressive of the particular is not used, the required gender and number would not result. There would be difficulty in *avarṣāḥ* etc. because *hemantaḥ* (different from *varṣā*) is here the substratum.

[Extension of gender and number becomes necessary according to the view that it is the first constituent which is predominant in a negative compound. If the compound means non-existence in general, qualified by the meaning of the second term, when words like *ṣaṭtriya* are used in apposition to it, it is natural that the compound should have the gender and number of these words. But when they are not used, the compound would take the common neuter gender and the common singular number. Nor could we get forms like *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, *anāpaḥ pṛthivī*, because in *avarṣā hemantaḥ*, the gender of *hemantaḥ* would prevail. But this view (*pūrvapadārthaprādhānya*) is also wrong, because, according to it, there should be a short vowel at the end of *avarṣāḥ* which would be wrong. The accepted view is that, in a negative compound, it is the second constituent which is predominant. Therefore, the compound would get the gender and number of the second constituent and there would be no need for the extension of gender and number. A negative compound is not like a qualifier or a *bahuvrīhi* compound which are based on difference between their own meaning and that of the outside word and which, therefore, take the gender and number of the word which they qualify. So we can have expressions like *abrāhmaṇaḥ ṣaṭtram*, *abrāhmaṇaḥ ṣaṭtriyaḥ* etc. where the gender of the negative compound is according to that of the second constituent. So is number. That is why they are said to be natural. In *asaḥ* and *asarvasmai*, we see that *tad* and *sarva* are treated as *sarvanāma* because the two terms of the compound are in apposition to each other. It is only when the two terms are not in apposition to each other (*vyadhikaraṇa*) that the *sarvanāma* becomes *upasarjana* and loses that name as in *atisarvāya* where *sarva* is not treated like a *sarvanāma*. It is because *varṣāḥ*

does not become *upasarjana* that its final vowel is not shortened in *avarṣāḥ*. According to what has been said above, if the first term of the negative compound is the predominant one, extension of gender and number is necessary.

Now gender and number in connection with words expressive of the Universal (*jāti*) are going to be considered.

316. When the universal is understood as the expressed meaning of all words, that being one it is right that only one word should be used.

[On the ground that all words denote the universal which is One, the teaching of *ekaśeṣa* has been declared unnecessary. The use of several words would be necessary only if the things denoted are many. Where *ekaśeṣa* is taught, there the different words denote the same universal and so the use of just one word would result naturally. Thus there is no need to prescribe the retention of one.]

317. There would be a fixed gender as when one refers to a herd of cattle and though the individuals may be many, the universal being one, the singular number would be used.

[*Ākr̥ti* is said to be *āviṣṭaliṅgā*, that is, it has a fixed gender. What it means is that even though all genders are everywhere a word has a particular gender and so it presents its meaning, the universal, as having that particular gender. That is what happens when one refers to a herd of cattle by the expression '*gāva imāḥ*'. Here the feminine gender is used even though there may be males in the herd. But when one refers to a herd of calves, one uses the masculine gender, even though there may be females in the herd, as in the expression '*vatsā ime*'. That is the meaning of P. 1. 2. 73.]

How is the universal said to have a fixed gender (*āviṣṭaliṅga-*
t ā) if it is presented by words having different genders?

318. The universal is connected with the fixed gender of their substrata. Therefore, the prohibition relating to universals in connection with qualities taking the gender and number of what they are connected with is unnecessary.

[Thus the universal is expressed by means of words having different genders. And yet one speaks of it as being *āviṣṭa-liṅgā*=having a fixed gender. All the three words *vrkṣa*, *pādapa* and *taru* mean 'tree' and have the masculine gender. But names of particular trees like *śiṃśapā* are feminine or neuter like *panasa*. Some words have two genders and others like *taṭa* have all the three. This is what is meant by *āviṣṭaliṅgatā* of the universal, namely, that it is conveyed by words having a fixed gender. That is why the prohibition *ajāteḥ* in P. 1.2.52. is unnecessary because words expressive of the universal do not take the gender of the word in which the *taddhita* suffix has been elided (*lup*).]

319. If the worldly conception of gender were adopted, everything in the world would have to be designated by a word having a fixed gender and as that would result in contradiction, it has not been adopted.

[This characteristic of the universal, namely, that it has a fixed gender would not be possible if what is called gender were identical with sex. That is why grammarians have their own conception of gender. According to this conception, words like *dārāḥ* (masculine plural) and *kalatram* (neuter singular) can denote a wife and three words having three different genders can denote the same thing as in the case of the three words : *artha*, *vyakti* and *vastu*.]

320. The worldly conception of gender cannot apply to what is denoted by words like *sāmānya*, *ākṛti*, *bhāva* and *jāti*. Therefore, another has been adopted.

[These four words have different genders but they all denote the same thing to which the worldly conception of gender cannot apply. So the *śāstra* has adopted another conception of gender.]

What it is has been stated as follows—

321. The general characteristic of gender is said to be activity (*pravṛtti*) and it is diversified into appearance, disappearance and stay.

What the grammarian's conception of gender is has been set forth in the *M.Bhā.* on P. 1.2.64. and 4.1.3. The qualities of things are constantly changing and change in general, irrespective of any particularity in the change, is called *pravṛtti* and that is gender. This change may be *āvirbhāva* = coming into being or *tirobhāva* = disappearance or *sthiti* = staying as it is. These are the three different genders. By qualities *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *spṛśa* and *śabda* are meant and they are based on the more fundamental *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the three qualities of primordial matter *prakṛti*. When *rajas* is active, some of the five qualities come into being and that is *āvirbhāva*, the masculine gender. When some of the five qualities are submerged, that is *tirobhāva*, the feminine gender. For more details on the grammarian's conception of gender, see my *Bhartṛhari*, pp. 359-370.]

322. All objects are active and they are never devoid of the three kinds of activities and it is such objects that words express.

[As the *M.Bhā.* says : All objects are always endowed with *saṁstyāna* and *prasava* that is, disappearance (*tirobhāva*) and coming into being (*āvirbhāva*). It is such objects that words express. They become capable of being expressed by words only when they assume a definite form due to the constant change. In that way, they become connected with gender according to their natural power.]

323. As to the entity which is devoid of all activity and is understood as consciousness it seems to follow, as it were, the multiple activities of others.

[One can understand that *prakṛti* and its evolutes should be constantly active, because of the *rajas* element in thm. But the Self is free from *rajas* and yet it is referred to by three words having three different genders, namely. *ātmā*, *citi* and *caitanyam*. The definition of gender, namely, *pravṛtti*, does not exist in the Self but the three words which express it have gender. The explanation is that experience results when the light of the Self is reflected on the mirror of the Intellect and it is that reflection, coloured by the objects experienced, which comes into worldly usage. It is that which comes within the range of speech. It follows, as it were, the infinite activities of the things to be experienced. Thus, the gender of the manifested objects (*ābhāsa*) is attributed to that which is not a manifestation (*nirābhāsa*).]

324. That is how the form and the time of the consciousness of the experiencer is diversified. It has no diversity of form of its own.

[The consciousness of the Experiencer is diversified by the objects mirrored in the Intellect. It appears as distinct with each object experienced. In other words, knowledge differs with the object known. Consciousness appears to have spatial and temporal distinctions, on the basis of such distinctions belonging to the objects. Really speaking, the Experiencer who is pure Consciousness has no inner diversity nor any based on time and space. Consciousness is not different from the Experiencer because the latter is pure consciousness. Those who do not know the distinction between consciousness and the objects mix the two up in their transactions.]

325. That which is projected on the insentient forms of the Intellect as a reflection, it is that which is the basis of the use of words.

[The Intellect, because of the predominance of its *sattva*, has a certain transparency and so the light of the Self is reflected on it when the object is also mirrored on it. It is such a reflection which comes within the range of words. That is how it seems to have gender. The pure consciousness does not come within the range of verbal usage.]

326. There is no condition of an object which is not associated with a gender. Sometimes, when it is not taken seriously, it is only for the sake of the correctness of the word.

[It has been shown how the Experiencer and the experienced get gender distinctions. There is nothing over and above these two. The universal would also come within these two and that would also get gender distinctions. Objects do not go beyond the three conditions mentioned, namely, *āvirbhāva*, *tirobhāva* and *sthiti*. This is true of the eternal universal also. It means that all the three genders are present in everything and which gender a word should express is a question of *vivakṣā*. See *M.Bhā.* I. p. 245, 1. 18.]

327. The definition of gender adopted in the *śāstra*, namely, that it is the condition of the *guṇas* does not go against the things denoted by the words ending in the primary and secondary suffixes. Therefore, the universal (of activity) is gender.

[The object expressed by a primary suffix (*kṛt*), when it differs according to the condition of the *guṇas*, gets different genders and is expressed by words having different genders. For example *pākaḥ*, *paktiḥ*, *pacanam*. The same is true of objects expressed by words ending in secondary suffixes (*taddhita*). For example, *garimā*, *gurutā*, *gurutvam*. Anyone of the three conditions can be constantly changing and so expressed by words having different genders. For example: *saṁstyānam*, *saṁstyāyaḥ* and *saṁstyā*. Therefore, the definition of gender accepted in the *śāstra* is the right one, namely, that it is the condition of the

guṇas. In other words, the universal of change or activity is gender.]

328. There is no difference in the conception of gender even in the view that all words denote substance (*dravya*, as distinct from *jāti*). The seven possibilities which have been mentioned (*liṅga samuddeśa* 3.) constitute what is meant here by fixity of gender.

[It has been shown that the definition of gender adopted in the *śāstra* agrees with the view that all words denote the universal. It also agrees with the view that all words denote the substance or the concrete individual. The individuals, devoid of their peculiarities, would amount to the universal. So the definition of gender, adopted in the *śāstra* would apply to both views.]

329. Since the use of number in regard to substance (individual) is regulated by the *śāstra*, the latter can be differently explained even if the universal is considered to be the meaning of words.

[The *sūtra*—*bahuṣu bahuvacanam* (P. 1. 4. 21.) and the like regulate the use of number according to the view that words denote substance (individual). That *sūtra* can be explained even according to the view that universal is the meaning of words.]

How that is done is now stated.

330. When that which inheres in many and is characterised by its many substrata is meant to be conveyed in its diversity, the *śāstra* teaches the use of number (the plural).

[When the different individuals in which the universal inheres are emphasised, then the plural number is used. Similarly a word ending in the dual number, conveys the universal inhering in individuals characterised by the number two. This applies to words ending in the singular number also.]

331. When the universal is understood as diversified because of the diversity of its substrata, then there would be no difference from the *dravya* view (that is, the view that words convey the substance, the individual).

[When the universal which is one is looked upon as many because of the many substrata where it inheres, then the use of the plural number would result. Then as many words as there are substrata would have to be used and, as that is not desired, the retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) would have to be taught. So ultimately, there would be no practical difference between the *jātipakṣa* and the *dravyapakṣa*. But this way of looking at the matter is not approved by the *M.Bhā.* which has declared the teaching of the retention of one (P. 1. 2. 64.) to be unnecessary.]

332. As there is non-differentiation (of the universal), the use of one word and the use of different numbers through the *śāstra* would result. Therefore, the retention of one need not be taught.

[The universal is expressed by words having different numbers because of the diversity of its substrata, following P. 1.4.21. But the main meaning, the universal, is one and one word would naturally be used. So the retention of one need not be taught.]

333. If the individual is not the expressed meaning of a word, how can a service, based on its existence, be rendered to the universal, the individual being non-existent ?

[Here a question arises. If the universal is the meaning of words and not the individual, how can gender and number based on the individual result? The grammatical form of a word is based upon its meaning. That meaning which is not expressed by the word is as good as non-existent as far as its grammatical form is concerned.]

This doubt is answered as follows—

334. In the *śāstra* in question (P. 1. 4. 21.) no statement has been made on the basis of the expressed meaning. What is called *dravya* has not been ruled out.

[In P. 1.4.21., there is no statement (*vyapadeśa*) that numbers are based on the substrata of that which is expressed. It is understood in a general way. Therefore, the universal with its different substrata, takes on different numbers. To one who considers the universal to be the meaning of a word, it is not that the individual is not so and vice versa. So the word which expresses the universal which is connected with different substrata takes on different numbers. See *M.Bhā.* I p. 246, l. 14.]

335. Substance is not thought of as the secondary expressed meaning. But it is useful (to the universal) and, therefore, secondary. Such is the interpretation.

[To the upholder of the universal, that is the expressed primary meaning of the word. Though substance is not the expressed meaning, it renders service to the universal and so is subordinate to it. It is as in the world where what serves another is considered to be secondary and subordinate to it.]

336. Unless the word is considered to be expressive of the non-substance, substance would not become subordinate. That is why the universal has been shown to be the predominant meaning.

[Substance (or individual) is not the secondary expressed meaning. It is subordinate to the universal to which it renders service. If the substance is considered to be the expressed meaning, the universal would specify it and in that case, substance would become the predominant meaning and the universal the secondary one. What is secondary cannot take on the gender of the main thing. If, on the other hand, substance is not the

expressed meaning, it would specify or differentiate the universal and become subordinate to it and render it service by lending it its gender and number.]

337. Some think that there is the relation of primary and secondary (between the universal and substance) as in the case of the two elements of a noun or a verb and not as in the case of a compound word where what is meant for something else is subordinate.

[Some think that the substance and the universal can stand towards each other in the relation of primary and secondary even if both are the expressed meanings of words. They give as examples words like *pācakaḥ* and *pacati*. Here both action and accessory (*sādhana*) are the expressed meanings of the two elements of the words. The noun *pācaka* denotes primarily the substratum of the power called *sādhana* and the meaning of the root qualifies that of the suffix. The meaning of the root, namely, action is here secondary, because it is not understood as a process. Even though secondary, it is understood as something distinct. The verb *pacati* on the other hand denotes action, helped by a particular accessory, as the main thing. Action is here presented as a process and it is qualified by the accessory which is active even though it is qualified by the suffix. The accessory, though secondary, is understood as something distinct. That is why words can be used in apposition to the accessory as in *devadattaḥ pacati*. With its number it renders help to the action as in *pacataḥ*, *pacanti*. Applying all this to the subject under discussion, to the upholder of the universal, that is the main meaning of the word. To the upholder of substance, that is the main meaning and the universal the secondary one. There is a difference between compounds on the one hand and words like *pācaka* and *pacati* on the other. In a compound, the meaning of the *upasarjana* word gets merged in that of the main word and is not understood distinctly and does not become the cause of the form of the compound. That is why a qualifier of the *upasarjana* cannot be used outside the

compound in apposition to it. In *pācakaḥ* and *pacati*, the two elements related as *kāraka* and *kriyā* to each other are distinctly perceived. Similarly, the universal and the substance, both expressed meanings, can be related to each other, as primary and secondary.]

338. What is subordinate being multiple, it is the universal which is the cause of the use of one word only. Because of the connection with the multiplicity of the substance, the use of different numbers is explained.

[If substance also is an expressed meaning, a difficulty would arise. As the plural number results because of the multiplicity of the substance (individuals), in the same way, as many words as there are individuals would have to be used and as that is not desired, the need for the *śāstra* which teaches retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) becomes clear. And so, it should not have been declared unnecessary. According to the upholders of the universal, substance being secondary, the use of many words based on the multiplicity of substance (individuals) would not be right. The universal is one and so only one word should be used even if the individuals are many. The plural number can, however, be rightly used because of the individuals which are also part of the expressed meaning. The number of words to be used is based upon what is primary. What is secondary can, however, help the primary by being the cause of the number.]

339. Just as in verbs the accessories which are secondary diversify action, in the same way, substance (the individual) diversifies the universal expressed by the same word.

[In a verb, the action, expressed by the root, is the predominant meaning and yet it gets its number on the basis of the accessory which is secondary in a verb. Similarly, in a noun it is the universal, the primary meaning, which is the cause of

the use of one word and the substance, secondarily expressed by the same word, is the cause of number. The secondary substance lends its number to the primary universal. It is because something renders help to another that it is called *guṇa*. So the relation between the universal and the substance is more like the one between action and accessory in a noun or in a verb than the one between primary and secondary in a compound word.]

340. The words, in the matter of conveying the meaning, being identical, because of similarity of form and there being an understanding of a meaning (the substance, individual) qualified by the universal.

341. Because of the relation of identity of the universal with their substrata even though they are not conveyed by the same word, the required gender and number result.

[So far the question has been considered according to the view that both the substance and the universal are the expressed meanings of the word. How the required gender and number result according to the view that only the universal is the expressed meaning is now stated. The universal is superimposed on that, in which it inheres. So the word denotes substance as identified with the universal. The universal is identified with the substance (individuals) as one with it. And so substance is also understood as it has the universal in it and its gender and number are followed. Substance is understood as identical with the universal and words follow understanding ultimately, the words, though expressive of the universal only, reach as far as the substance. In the former view, the universal and the substance are the primary and secondary meanings of the word. In this view, both are understood because of identification. The ultimate result, namely, that the word gets the gender and number of the substance is the same.]

342. Before connection with the universal, a thing can be referred to only by a pronoun. *Tyad* etc. are used to denote just a thing, in a very general way.

[As long as the universal is not superimposed on the substance (individual), the latter is formless. It is the universal which gives it a form and brings it within the range of verbal usage. As long as a thing is not specified by its universal and its own word, no special word can be used in regard to it. It can only be referred to by a pronoun and it would stand for something very general. In order to specify it, the universal has to be superimposed on it and it should be identified with the universal. It is only that it can be referred to by a word expressive of the universal like *gauḥ*. Because of this identification of the substance with the universal, the former is also expressed primarily and the word gets its gender and number accordingly.]

343. Some consider the substratum to be the differentiating agent though not mentioned as in *pākau*, *pākāḥ*. This is the attribute of words expressive of qualities.

[Another view is now stated. The word *pāka* denotes an action and not the substratum of the action. And yet the substratum plays a part by giving the word its number. So we say *pākau*, *pākāḥ*. The action of cooking is known to reside in the thing cooked and according to the diversity in the things cooked, the word takes different numbers. Words expressive of quality take the gender and number of this substrata though they do not express them. Similarly, words expressive of the universal, though not expressive of the substance, take its gender and number.

But this is not the correct view. An action differs with its substratum and ultimately the number becomes that of the action itself. Quality words become identified with their

substrata and they are given as analogy in the *M.Bhā.* I.p. 246, l. 18. The universal, like a quality, inheres in the substratum.]

344. If the view is that the substratum is not expressed and that the (word expressive of the) universal gets its attributes (that is, gender and number), then it has been considered before.

[The view which is being considered now is that the word expresses only the universal and that it gets the attributes, namely, gender and number of the substance because of identification.]

345. Words expressive of the universal first convey the universal and through a relation which does not come within the range of the word, the individual is also understood.

[The word is first applied to the universal which is the basis. As the universal must have a substratum, the latter is also understood through their invariable association even though the relation does not come within the range of the word.]

346. The substance is conceived as having the attribute of the universal through their identification and the differentiation which exists in it (the substance) is attributed to the universal.

[Because of the superimposition of identity, the substance is considered to be the universal. So the word, originally expressive of the universal, is applied to the substance (individual) identified with the universal. The substance is mixed up with the universal and so the word expressive of the latter is applied to the former which lends its number to the word. It is not that the substance is directly expressed by the word. The word denotes the basis (*nimitta*) that is, the universal and as the latter is present in the *nimittin* (substance, individual) the word conveys the latter also. The universal cannot be seen apart from the individual. From the word, a unified object with

the universal in it is understood. Afterwards, we analyse our cognition and see different elements in it. The word does not convey its meaning in stages.]

347. Just as the word cradle (*mañca*) while continuing to denote that object, expresses by identification what is on it, so does a word expressive of the universal, denote the substance (individuals).

[In the expression *mañcāḥ krośanti* = 'the cradles are crying', one understands by cradles the children on them, and connects the action of crying with them. In the same way on hearing the sentence 'bring the cows,' one brings individual cows as the universal cow cannot be brought by itself.]

348. That is why the word is said to be expressive of the universal. The universal, devoid of any gender, is superimposed on the substance.

[In spite of what has been said before the accepted doctrine is that the word denotes the universal, because, even if the word brings the substance to the mind, it does so as identical with the universal. It might be said that it would bring all the individuals as one to the mind. Considering that they are all identified with one and the same universal and so diversity of number would not result and yet that is desired. The fact is that the universal with which the substance (individual) is identified has neither gender nor number and, therefore, the gender and number of the substrata, that is, the individuals would result.]

349. When a word denotes something either through the relation of possession or through identification, on the basis of the property of another, that is said to be the expressed meaning.

[Words expressive of quality denote that which has quality either through the elision of the *matuṣ* suffix or through

identification. Words expressive of the universal denote the substratum of the universal through identification. There is no need to bring in any *matup*-elision here because the universal is never perceived apart from the individual.]

350. The primary thing has no form till it has been determined by the mind. Then the substance is perceived as identical with the attribute.

[The object in the nature of substance, though fit to be connected with an action, does not enter into worldly or verbal usage in its pure form. It is only as determined by the mind that it enters into usage. It is as coloured by or as mixed up with some attribute that it is determined by the mind. The attribute may be a quality like white or the universal. It becomes identified with such an attribute and then enters into usage. In other words, the *nimittin* is identified with the *nimitta*.]

351. When an attribute is presented as distinct (from other things), it is the primary thing. The word which is based on connection (of an attribute with a thing) does not express the thing directly.

[When substance is meant to be conveyed as the primary thing, it is expressed as determined or conditioned by the universal. When a quality is presented as the main thing and as something different from other things, then it is conveyed as one with its own universal. When the universal is meant to be conveyed as the main thing, then it is conveyed as one with the form on the word itself. The fact is that words do not convey the pure thing, but convey it as determined, specified by some property or other. That is why a word is called *saṃsargaśruti* in this stanza, that which denotes connection with an attribute (*saṃsarga*). The pure thing cannot be grasped by the mind and so cannot come within the range of words which are based on determination by the mind.]

352. When a word, after expressing the universal denotes the substance also, then the universal alone is not accepted as the expressed meaning.

[When a word, primarily expressive of the universal, denotes substance also as qualified by the universal, then the latter alone is not the expressed meaning of the word.]

353. The application (to substance) of words already applied (to the universal) is described (in the *śāstra*) on the basis of identity. What are merely means of understanding do not follow the truth.

[Words do not convey their different meanings with intervals. They do not convey the universal first and then the substance. To explain the process by saying that words convey the universal primarily and the substance through identification based on resemblance is only a method. The fact is that from a word, a unified qualified object is understood and it is by analysis that we see different elements in them. These methods of explanation do not follow the truth. In the end, they are abandoned. The truth is that both the universal and the substance are understood at the same time without any interval in between.]

354. If the universal is emphasised even though substance, not conveyed by a separate word, may be touched upon, the universal is the meaning of the word.

[Even according to the view that the word conveys both the universal and the substance, the emphasis may be on one more than on the other. In the sentences : *brāhmāḥ śuśrūṣayitavyāḥ*, *yo'yaṃ pāṇiyaṃ pibati sa gauḥ padā na spraṣṭavyaḥ*, *gaur anubandhyaḥ*, the emphasis is on the universal. So the number of the word should not be taken seriously.]

355. When the substance is touched upon and it

is the expressed meaning of the word, then that is the main meaning.

[In the sentence, *brāhmaṇam imaṃ bhojaya*, it is the substance which is mainly connected with the action, the universal only qualifies it and so the word has substance as the main meaning. That is pointed out in the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 246, l. 15.]

356. When, though conveyed by the same word, the universal, like relation in a compound, does no more than qualify, then also substance is the main meaning.

[Though both are conveyed by the same word, Vyāḍi and others look upon substance as the main meaning because it is capable of being connected with action. The function of the universal is only to specify the substance (individual). It is like the function of relation in a *tatpuruṣa* compound like *rājapuruṣa*. The second constituent is the main one here and the relation which is the meaning of the compound as a whole, only serves to specify the thing related. Words like *gauḥ* convey the unified specified object and not the universal and the substance one after another with an interval. That is what the compound *rājapuruṣa* also does: it conveys a specified thing. But in *gargālī* which is also a complex formation (*vytti-taddhita*), an interval exists between the understanding of the meaning of the stem and that of the *taddhita* suffix, namely the idea of offspring.

357. The two words, which convey totally different things, namely the universal and the substance, become expressive of both when what is not the expressed meaning is looked upon as being helpful to the other.

[There was also the view that the word denotes either the universal only or the substance only. Where either is not conveyed by the word, it helps to qualify or modify what is

expressed by the word. This is the view of Pāṇini himself. That is why he has written the two *sūtras* 1. 2.58 and 1. 2.64, the former based on the view that the word expresses the universal and the latter based on the view that it conveys the substance.]

358. By accepting diversity of number on the basis of the substrata in which the universal inheres, it has been declared that, if the universal is the meaning of the word more than one word need not be used.

[If the word conveys the universal only, it gets its gender and number from the substrata of the universal. As the universal is only one, there is no need to use more than one word. So the *sūtra* which teaches *ekaśeṣa* (P.1. 2.64) is declared unnecessary. Even if the substance is part of the expressed meaning of the word, it can be so only secondarily and it cannot be the cause of the use of more than one word.]

Thus has come to an end the consideration of how qualifying words take the gender and number of the words expressive of their substrata, a point which arose while considering the nature of complex formations (*vṛtti*).

Now begins the consideration of compounds involving comparison taught in P. 2.1.55. A comparison involves a standard of comparison (*upamāna*) an object of comparison (*upameya*) and a common quality (*samānadharma*). The *M. Bhā.* definition of *upamāna* is going to be stated in the following stanzas.

359. That by which what is not specifically known is specifically known is called 'measure' (*māna*) like a *prastha*. Through it what is to be measured is fully known.

[A measure is that by which what is generally known is

made known in a specific way. It is of three kinds: *parimāṇa* = measure of capacity volume like *prastha*, *pramāṇa* = linear measure like 'diṣṭi' and *unmāna* = measurement of weight, like *pala*.]

360. The well-known object by means of which the less-known is understood to resemble it is called a secondary measure (*upamāna*) because one does not know a thing completely through it.

[The well-known thing by means of which the less-known is understood to resemble it is called a secondary measure (*upamāna*), because it only helps to get some idea of it and not a complete knowledge of it. It is based on resemblance. Because it can help only in giving some knowledge of an object, scholars are not agreed as to whether it should be recognised as a separate means of valid knowledge at all.]

361. A compound word is formed of words expressive of the standard of comparison with words expressive of the common quality of the standard and the object of comparison.

[Once *upamāna* is defined, the *upameya* also stands defined. So the present stanza begins the explanation of the common quality. That attribute due to which two objects are related to each other as the standard and the object of comparison is the common quality. P.2.1.55 means that words expressive of the standard of comparison are combined with words expressive of the common quality. The example given in the *M. Bhā.* is *śastrīsyāmā* (devadattā) = dagger-dark Devadattā.]

362. The difference which results in the darkness (*śyāmatva*) because of difference in the substratum is not meant to be conveyed. The quality is understood as one though it exists in different substrata.

[Even though the common quality conveyed by the word *śyāmā* differs with each substratum, that difference is ignored in the *sūtra* P. 2.1.55. The common point is emphasised.]

363. The quality (as existing in the two substrata) is distinct and yet, it is the same because of the universal. If it is exactly the same or totally different, there could be no comparison.

[If two objects are absolutely identical, there cannot be any resemblance between them, because resemblance is based on difference. Nor can there be any resemblance if they are totally different from each other. So the common attribute is different in each substratum and yet, it is the same because of the universal which runs through both. All things conveyed by words are of this nature, that is, they stand for the universal and not for the extreme particular.]

364. If the universal alone were adopted, there could be no comparison. The quality of being dark (*śyāmatva*) exists in the attribute as found in the two substrata.

[If only the quality of being dark, without any reference to any variation due to the difference in the substratum, is meant to be conveyed, then one would see the same thing in two different places. One would not cognise one thing as resembling the other.]

365. That cause by virtue of which the dagger (*śastrī*) is called dark (*śyāmā*) does not differ from the one by which Devadattā is so called.

[The quality by virtue of which the *śastrī* is called *śyāmā* is exactly the same as that by virtue of which Devadattā is so called. To understand this does not involve any comparison. As Helārāja puts it: *ubhayor śyāmatvamityeva pratītir nopamārthaḥ kaścīd atra* = The cognition takes the form: 'both have the quality of being dark' (*śyāmatvam*). There is no comparison here.]

366. It is due to the difference in the attribute caused by the substratum and the identity caused by the universal that the substance (that is, the *upamāna* = standard of comparison) performs the function of determining (*śavyāpāraḥ*) the object of comparison).

Remark. In the first line of the stanza, the text should be *cāviśiṣṭatā* and not *ca viśiṣṭatā* as printed.

[*Dravyātmā śavyāpāraḥ* = the standard of comparison performs the function of measuring or determining, to a certain extent, the object of comparison. Where there is absolute identity or absolute difference, this cannot take place.]

367. This usage involving resemblance is based upon difference and unity. It rests on a combination of the ideas of unity and diversity.

[Where there is identity, the cognition takes the form: 'it is the same thing.' Where there is difference, it takes the form: 'it is something quite different.' Where there are both, the cognition takes the form: 'it is like the other.']

368. If only the universal were meant to be conveyed, the word *śyāmā* would have been used by itself. There is no use of mentioning words like *śastrī*.

[If only the universal *śyāmatva* was meant to be the qualifier of the word *Devadattā*, there was no need to add the word *śastrī*. *Śyāmā* by itself can convey the bare universal.]

369. The peculiarity which does not exist in darkness in general but only in some dark objects and for which there is no special word is what is required here (for effecting comparison).

Remark. For the above translation, I have changed the *sa* of the first line of the stanza into *na*, found in I and P.

[The quality of darkness, with some peculiarity, due to the difference in the two substrata, becomes the object of comparison. The particular substratum, therefore, becomes important. From the very compound *śastrīśyāmā* = 'dagger-dark', one understands the dark colour as existing in the particular standard of comparison and the object of comparison and not as existing anywhere. Any dark object does not serve as the standard of comparison.]

370. In some dark objects, there is a common peculiarity and in all dark objects, there is something in common and there can be a peculiarity in the darkness of one particular object.

[The darkness of certain things has a common peculiarity and that can be the basis of comparison. All dark objects have something in common but that cannot be the basis of comparison. There can be a peculiarity in the darkness of one particular object and that can also be the basis of comparison. For example, it is the peculiarity in the brightness of the moon which makes it the standard of comparison for the brightness of the beloved's face.]

371. Where there is fragrance, it is a distinguishing factor as in the case of the *jāti* (jasmine) and *utpala* (lotus) flowers. Resemblance is also seen between fragrances which differ from one another.

[Flowers like jasmine and lotus have not only got smell in general but also a fragrance which distinguish them from other flowers having no fragrance. Thus, fragrance is the peculiarity of the smell of some flowers. There can also be a resemblance between the fragrances of the fragrant flowers. That would then be a common peculiarity, not so comprehensive and yet a common property (*aparasāmānya* = less comprehensive common property). What is true of smell is also true of colour.]

372. Peculiarity in qualities arises from difference in the substratum or from within themselves or from

some indefinable circumstance or through combination (with the qualities of other objects).

[How does a peculiarity arise in qualities? It can arise from some peculiarity in the substratum. The darkness of a lotus is not the same as that of *tamāla*. Here the difference is due to the difference in the substratum. Sometimes, the peculiarity arises from the quality itself spontaneously. Sometimes, it arises due to indefinable causes as in the case of wine etc. which acquire a special taste and fragrance due to passage of time or maturity (*pariṇāmaviśeṣa*). Sometimes, a peculiarity is brought about by mixture. For example, wine mixed with the fragrance of mango or oil mixed with the fragrance of *mālatī* flowers. Thus common peculiarities arise in qualities and so compound words can be formed by combining words expressive of the standard of comparison with words expressive of a common peculiarity.]

373. Everywhere, the standard of comparison is what is known as superior in quality. As far as the object of comparison is concerned, nothing is debarred from being so whether it be superior or equal in quality.

[That which is superior in quality, really or known to be so, becomes the standard of comparison. The face of the beloved is inferior in quality to the moon, but due to poetic tradition, poets make it the standard of comparison for the moon. Only what is thought of as superior in quality becomes the *upamāna*. There is no such restriction as far as the *upameya* is concerned.]

It is now stated that others understand the *M.Bhā.* which defines *māna* differently.

374. Others declare the universal etc. to be the measure (*māna*) of the object to be defined (*bhedya*). Because, it is through that that the unknown is measured.

[Others look upon the *M.Bhā* definition of *māna* differently.

Substance, unless determined by something, cannot enter into cognition. So the universal or quality or action is resorted to in order to determine it, to specify it, to measure it, so to speak. So they become the measure (*māna*).]

375. A well-known substratum of some attribute (that is, universal etc.) measured by its own measure, proceeds (is used) to measure some other substratum through its own attribute.

376. That which, with its attribute, proceeds to measure other objects having different attributes, is called the *upamāna*, the standard of comparison.

[A substratum, that is, an object which has already been measured by its own measure, that is, by the universal, quality or action, is used to measure some other object through its own measure, even though that object has other attributes. Then it is called an *upamāna*—‘a standard of comparison.’ The fact of one thing being used, to measure another is what is meant by the word *saṃsparśa* in the stanza 376. Helārāja explains the word as *sambandha*=relation, that is, the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya*. Darkness, which exists in both *śastrī* and *Devadattā*, is the basis of the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* in the expression: *śastrīśyāmā* (*Devadattā*).]

377. An attribute like darkness, common to the standard and the object of comparison, when thought of as the main thing, is qualified by some other quality.

[An attribute like darkness, which ordinarily determines the relation of standard and object of comparison, may be thought of primarily as the object of comparison. Then it would be like a substance and would have to be qualified by some attribute which exists in it and that attribute would bring about the relation of standard and object of comparison.]

An illustration is now given.

378. When the darkness of *śastrī* and *kumārī* is seen to be similar, some cause, existing in the two

attributes, due to which it is said to be so, becomes clear.

[The darkness of *śastrī* and *kumārī* is said to be similar due to the presence of some attribute like brightness in the darkness of both. When this brightness becomes, in its turn, the main thing, then some other common attribute would have to be sought for the sake of comparison.]

379. When those that have the common property become one, as it were, with it, then the standard and the object of comparison are mentioned as different.

[When the standard and the object of comparison, having the common attribute, become one, as it were, with it because of the identification of the quality and the qualified with each other, then their separate mention is based on difference. In order to indicate their mutual relation, the word *iva* is used and then the comparison becomes complete. In *gaur iva gavayaḥ* etc. the standard and the object of comparison are presented as one with the common attribute. Their relation has become part of their meaning. The *iva* brings out this relation. Because of the use of words expressive of the standard of comparison, the object of comparison and the comparison itself, the comparison is said to be complete.]

380. The cases where identification is intended and difference disappears are said to be those of hidden comparison, because of being covered by the common attribute.

[In sentences like *gaur vāhikaḥ*, *siṃho māṇavakaḥ*, two objects are identified, as it were. Their difference is obliterated. They are not presented as *upamāna* and *upameya*. In these sentences, a word is applied to an object other than its own. From this effect, its cause, namely, the presence of a common attribute is postulated. For this reason, Yāska and others consider these as examples where the comparison is hidden because of identi-

fiction. The comparison is hidden because the common attribute is hidden and not openly mentioned.]

381. The darkness of the dagger (*śastrī*), being well-known, is a measure (*māna*) and it is measured by it. The other darkness (that of Devadattā) is similar to it and is not fully measured by it.

[That which fully determines a thing is called a measure. That is what the darkness of *śastrī* is. It is well-known as a determinant. Even though Devadattā is also dark, her darkness is not well-known. It is, therefore, measured by that of the dagger. But not fully. Nothing is fully measured through perception of resemblance to something else.]

382. One calls the *śastrī* which, because of the completeness of its quality, measures another substratum whose quality is incomplete, a secondary measure (*upamāna*).

[The *śastrī*, which through its full darkness, determines another substratum, namely, Devadattā, whose darkness is incomplete, is called a secondary measure (*upamāna*).]

The attribute is usually mentioned as existing in the *upamāna* or in the *upameya*, but not in both. How is it then the common property?

383. The attribute, actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison is inferred as related to the other. Similarly, what is mentioned as existing in the standard of comparison is inferred as existing in the object of comparison.

[The relation of the standard and the object of comparison is based on a common property. 'It cannot be presented as existing in both at the same time through a compound word. In *śastrīśyāmā devadattā*, the relation is with the quality of darkness actually mentioned. Even if the power of the word is

exhausted after referring it to one of the two, it is inferred as existing in the other also. Thus, it becomes the common attribute.]

384. It is seen that in the sentence the *kṣattriyas* study like the *brāhmaṇa*, the plural number relates to the object of comparison (*kṣattriya*) which is multiple.

[In the sentence *adhīyate brāhmaṇavat kṣattriyāḥ*, the objects of comparison, the *kṣattriyas* are many and the plural number in *kṣattriyāḥ* and *adhīyate* presents the common attribute, namely, 'study' (*adhyayana*) as existing in the objects of comparison. But by implication, it is understood as connected with the *Brāhmaṇas*, the standard of comparison.]

385. In the *sūtra* (P. 2. 1. 56.) that word is said to be expressive of the common attribute which presents an attribute existing in one thing as common to another.

[A word is said to be expressive of a common attribute even if it does not present it as existing in both the standard and the object of comparison. Even though the word may denote darkness as existing in one thing only, it is inferred as existing in the other also and thus the word becomes expressive of the common attribute.]

According to what has been said above, the common attribute amounts to the universal of the quality (*guṇajāti*). Even if it is understood as standing for the quality itself, the word expressive of it can be called *sāmānyavacana*. That is what is explained in the following.

386. An attribute existing in two things is presented neither in its identity nor in its peculiar aspect. Of the two attributes, one is mentioned and the other is understood.

[The attribute common to the standard and the object of comparison is never presented by the word as identical. It is presented as determined either by the standard of comparison or by the object of comparison and so not as an identical attribute. Nor is it presented in the particular form in which it exists in one of the things. Words never convey the absolutely peculiar feature of an object. They convey the universal. An attribute, as existing in one particular thing only, is not useful for comparison. So the word *śyāma* denotes the quality, not in its peculiarity and yet as existing in one of the things. It is, however, understood by implication as existing in the other thing also. In this way, the word becomes *sāmānyavacana*, a word expressive of the common attribute.]

So far the intention of the *M. Bhā.* I, p. 397, ll. 9-10. has been explained. It is now shown that this explanation is based on the text itself.

387. Since the secondary measure being based on the common property, does not measure a thing completely, the object of comparison is understood as being near it.

[That which determines or measures a thing fully is a measure (*māna*). Measures like *prastha* and universals etc. are examples. That which is near the object of comparison is a secondary measure (*upamāna*). Nearness is based on similarity of attributes. The secondary measure can determine a thing only through resemblance and so it does so incompletely. *Śaṣṭrī* can determine Devadattā only as being dark. It does not say anything more about her, it does not refer to the feminine and the like in her. So it is an incomplete measure. It does no more than go near the object of comparison. *Tatsamīpe yan nāty-antāya mimīte tad upamānam*, as the *M. Bhā.* passage says.]

This *M. Bhā.* sentence is now differently explained.

388. Or it is proximity to the primary measure because of resemblance which is understood. The

primary and the secondary measures resemble each other because both are determinants.

[In the previous stanza, the word *tat* in *tatsamīpe* etc. of the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2. 1. 55. was taken as referring to the object of comparison. It can be taken as referring to the primary measure. The secondary measure is that which is near the primary measure. The latter determines an object and so does the former. The only difference is that the former does it incompletely and the latter does it completely.]

In *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, ll. 5-6, a question is asked whether the standard and the object of comparison are the same thing or whether they are two different things. The purport of this question is now explained.

389. When the common universal is taken into consideration, the two are understood as the same. When the difference is taken into consideration, they are understood as different.

[When the individual differences of the standard and the object of comparison are ignored and their common attribute, namely, the universal of quality is kept in mind, then they are understood as identical. When, on the other hand, their peculiar features which distinguish them from other objects are kept in mind, then they are understood as different. The meaning of the question is whether absolute identity is relevant to the state of being a standard of comparison or whether absolute difference is so.]

Considering that in the word *upamāna*, the suffix *lyuṭ* has been added in the sense of *Karaṇa* and in the word *upameya*, the suffix *yat* has been added in the sense of *Karma*, their difference is very obvious. How can the question of their identity arise?

390. Inasmuch as the quality of being *Karaṇa* (instrument) and that of being object (*karma*) are taken as being different from each other, there cannot be any doubt here based on their identity.

[As the two words are formed with suffixes having different meanings, there cannot be complete identity between them. That is admitted. But there is nothing to prevent a doubt regarding identity arising on the basis of a common attribute of two admittedly different things.]

An illustration is now given.

391. Even where there is difference one sees the expression “those rice-grains”, because of resemblance and what are different are spoken of as the same because of the same universal.

[Due to common attributes, difference is ignored and a different rice is referred to as the same. Similarly, we use such expressions as ‘the same clothes are being worn’. Understanding of same-ness is due not only to the existence of a common property, but also to the same universal, as in the expression: ‘let four brahmins bring the water pot’. The individual differences of the brahmins are ignored and they are all referred to by the same word, because of their common *jāti*. Similarly, here also due to proximity arising from a common attribute or a common universal, the question of the identity of the standard and the object of comparison can arise.]

It is now stated that the question of their difference can also arise.

392. It has been said: “how can something totally different be a part (*avayava*) of another? Where there is absolute difference, there is separation and not identity.

[This is a reference to *M. Bhā.* on P. 1.2.10—*Halantācca*. Taking the word *anta* in the *sūtra* to mean final part, somebody raises the objection: *Katham hi iko nāma hal antaḥ syāt, anyasyānyaḥ*? = how can a consonant (*hal*) be the final part of a root ending in a vowel included in *ik*, a part of something totally different? The question presupposes that the whole and the

part are totally different things. Similarly, here also, even though, on the basis of a common attribute or the universal, the *upamāna* and the *upameya* may be thought of as one, that is ignored and the question of their total difference from each other is raised.]

393. When identity is meant to be conveyed, the collection and the things collected are one. Two things belonging to a group are not identical with each other and so they are declared to be different.

[One can think and speak about a collection of things as one or as many. When we say 'a forest,' we think of the trees as one and ignore their difference. When we say 'trees,' we are more conscious of their difference. We never think of the trees as identical with one another. Similarly, the phonemes that go to make up a word are different from one another. That is why the *M. Bhā.* says: *anyasyānyaḥ*. Thus difference and identity can be pure or mixed. Here they are thought of as mixed. That is why the question raised by the *M. Bhā.* relates to both difference and identity. The question is: what is known as the *Upamāna* and the *upameya* in the world, are they the same or are they different? Worldly usage is taken up for consideration?]

394. If the common property of two things is resorted to, there would be no comparison. That which is the cause of one cow being perceived as a cow exists in the other cow also.

[When the well-known attribute of something is used to describe a less-well-known thing, there is comparison. It would be pointless for anybody to say: 'the cow is like a cow'. There would be no comparison in such a statement, nor would it say something not known before.]

395. If one thinks of absolutely differentiating properties, it would be of no use in going from one idea (that of the standard of comparison) to another (that of the object of comparison).

[This and the previous stanza relate to *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, ll. 6-8. where the purpose of comparing two identical objects like two cows or two totally different objects like a cow and horse is raised.]

The answer to the above question is given in the following.

396. When there is a common attribute and differences also (there can be comparison). In all cows there is the common attribute, cow-ness and also differences like being motley-coloured etc.

[This refers to *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 8. Comparison between two things is possible only when there is resemblance as well as difference between them.]

397. It is darkness etc. which is the common attribute and it is common to two things and that is also the difference between the two, being well-known in one and not well-known in the other.

[In the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.1.55, it has been said that *sāmānya* does not stand for the universal which inheres in a very large number of individuals but other less pervasive attributes. That which exists in two things only is also *sāmānya*. See *M. Bhā.* I. p. 398, ll. 16-17. Darkness exists in *śāstrī* as well as in *Devadattā* and so it is *sāmānya*. In the former it is well-known and in the latter, it is not. That is the difference.]

398. According to others, darkness is the common attribute which exists in both. It is called the distinguishing feature because it is complete in one as compared with the other.

[Darkness exists in two things and is different in each but the difference, being too subtle, is not noticed and so it is looked upon as the common feature. In one, it is complete and in the other it is not. Completeness or otherwise is the basis of difference.

Before, being well-known or otherwise was mentioned as the difference.]

399. If the universal is the common attribute, its peculiarities found in some places (substrata) are understood and they are resorted to here.

[The universal can also be the basis of comparison. Some peculiarities co-exist, in the substratum with the universal and when they are looked upon as modifying the universal, the latter becomes the basis of the relation of the standard of comparison and the object of comparison, provided that the words present it so. The universal which exists in the two darknesses that exist in the *śāstrī* and *Devadattā* becomes differentiated by the peculiarities of the substrata and produces the cognition of resemblance. In *gaur iva gaur*, even though the substratum differentiates the universal, that is not understood from the words and so there is no comparison. In *śāstrīśyāmā Devadattā*, the difference is understood because of the difference in the substrata.]

After explaining the *M. Bhā.* text, the conclusion is now stated.

400. When the universal is thus one and yet differentiated, it is said to be resemblance. Through that, something is sometimes said to be similar to another.

[When the universal is thus one and yet differentiated, it is called resemblance. Through this resemblance, something is sometimes said to be similar to another, not everything. That is why attributes like mere existence (*sattva*) or the mere fact of being known (*jñeyatva*) which are common to all objects in the world do not constitute resemblance. Through them, one never gets the cognition that one thing is similar to another.]

In order to delimit the scope of the cognition of resemblance, what is different from it is now explained.

401. That object in regard to which the perception of identity never varies is said to be one because of the absence of differentiation.

[That object in regard to which the cognition of one-ness never alternates with that of difference, which may pass through many states and yet the resultant difference is never perceived, is said to be the object of the cognition of unity or one-ness.]

402. Where, even when the object has variations, it is recognised to be the same, it is the universal element which functions there, so they declare.

[This stanza explains recognition as distinct from the cognition of resemblance. When, in the midst of its variations, an object is recognised as the same, it is said to be due to the functioning of the universal in it. In the cognition of resemblance, the universal does not play a part.]

403. Cognition of identity is based on the universal aspect of an object and the perception of difference on its individual object.

[This explains how cognition grasps an object as the same or as different. It is said that this is due to the universal or the individual aspect of an object.]

Now the cognition of resemblance is going to be explained.

404. The common attribute (*nimitta*) involving identity and difference, found in one object is observed in another object as being somewhat different.

405. It first relates to its substrata and then extends to the objects where the latter are found. Such is the scope of resemblance, so say others.

[The quality of darkness (*śyāmatva*) which exists in the dark colour of *śastrī* is observed to exist in Devadattā's dark colour also, but as something slightly different because of its different substratum. It is also perceived as being the same. It is the same and yet not the same: *bhedābhedasamanvitam*. The darkness exists in the dark colour and the latter exists in the object which is dark. The darkness first causes the perception of resemblance in the two dark colours and then in the two objects which are their substrata. The relation between darkness and the dark colour is *samavāya* and that between the object and darkness is *samavetasamavāya*. The relation of standard and object of comparison is between the two objects, the substrata of the dark colour. Thus, resemblance, consisting of difference and identity, is different from the universal which is entirely identity. Before, it was said that two substrata become *upamāna* and *upameya*, if they are partly alike and partly different. Now it is stated that two substances become standard and object of comparison through resemblance of their common attribute. The resemblance of the common attribute ends in the resemblance of the substrata.]

406. Just as the name 'cause' is applied to something in respect of something else, in the same way, they call something secondary measure (*upamāna*) in respect of something else.

[It is now stated that there is no fixity about what is *upamāna* and what is *upameya*. This is explained by means of an example. The name 'cause' is applied to something in regard to something else, namely, the effect. Similarly, what is well-known is a secondary measure (*upamāna*) in regard to something else which is less-known and, therefore, the *upameya*.]

407. Like the notions of teacher, pupil, father, son, action, time etc., that of (the standard of) comparison is also relative.

[Now other examples are given. Nobody is a teacher in regard to a teacher, nor a pupil in regard to a pupil, nor a son

in regard to his son, nor a father in regard to his father. An action is so called in regard to its accessories (*sādhana*) and not in regard to another action. An action with a fixed and well-known dimension can be a measure of other actions and thus called Time. Like the above conceptions, that of qualifier and qualified is also relative. A 'gayal' can be a secondary measure (*upamāna*) to a forest-dweller to whom it is well-known, but to a town-dweller, it would be an *upameya*. To a lover, the beloved's face can be *upamāna* in regard to the moon, but to others, it would be just the other way. Thus all these notions are relative.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 13-14 in which an example of P. 2.1.55 is given is going to be discussed.

408. If in the compound (*śaṣṭrīśyāmā*) the word *śyāmā*='dark' is taken as referring to the standard of comparison (*upamāna*=*śaṣṭrī*) then the object of comparison (*upameya*) an outside object, would be conveyed by the compound as a whole.

[In the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above, the example given of a compound formed by P. 2.1.55 is *śaṣṭrīśyāmā*='dagger-dark'. If, in this compound, both the constituents refer to the *śaṣṭrī*, that is, the standard of comparison, the object of comparison would be understood from the compound as a whole. That would mean that this compound has been formed in the sense of something different from the meanings of the two constituents. In other words, it is formed *anyapadārthe*, though it is a *tatpuruṣa*. But it is the *bahuvrīhi* which has been taught in P.2.2.24 in the sense of an outside word. It is true, but sometimes other compounds like *tatpuruṣa* and *avyayībhāva* are also formed in the sense of an outside word. That is how one can explain the discussion in the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 410, ll. 8 ff: Whether a negative compound is *pūrvapadārthapradhāna*, *uttara-padārthapradhāna* or *anyapadārthapradhāna*. This discussion itself shows that, according to the *M. Bhā.* a compound other than the *bahuvrīhi* can be formed in the sense of an outside word. Therefore, there is no need to suspect *śaṣṭrīśyāmā* to be a *bahuvrīhi*. It cannot be so as

it is formed by a *sūtra* which precedes P. 2.2.23 from where the topic of *bahubrihi* begins.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 9-10 is going to be explained.

409. The word *śyāmā* would continue to end in the suffix *ṭāp* even when the compound refers to a word like *caitra*. As, in the *sūtra* concerned, the word *sāmānyavacanaiḥ* does not end in the first case-affix, a word like *śyāmā* is not the *upasarjana* (by P. 1. 2. 43).

[If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to *śastrī*, it would be in the feminine gender and when the compound as a whole refers to an object of comparison (*upameya*) expressed by a masculine word, the compound would not get the required masculine gender. Instead of that we would get the expression *śastrīśyāmā caitraḥ* which is not desired. If, on the other hand, *śyāmā* refers, not to *śastrī* but to the *upameya*, the compound would get the desired gender.]

410. Even if it is maintained that the word *śyāmā* is *upasarjana* because it remains in the same case-ending (*ekavibhakti* P. 1. 2. 44) or because it is subordinate, there would be the difficulty that in the compound *tittirikalmāṣī*, the desired feminine suffix would not result.

[This stanza refers to *M. Bhā.* I, p. 397, ll. 15-17. It might be said that *śyāmā* in the compound under discussion is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.44. because, in the analytic sentence, (*vigrahavākya*) it remains in the same case-ending. Or that it is *upasarjana* because it refers to the *upamāna* and is, therefore, subordinate to the *upameya*, conveyed by the compound as a whole. In the world, what is subordinate to something else is called *upasarjana*. It is true that the word *upasarjana* has a technical meaning which must be preferred to its worldly sense. But the *śāstra* does not completely ignore the worldly sense. The technical meaning of

the word is resorted to where a word expressive of the primary (not subordinate) has to be put first in the compound. Ordinarily, it is what is subordinate which is put first. In the compound *puruṣavyāghraḥ* = 'man-tiger', the first word stands for what is primary in the worldly sense but technically, by P. 1.2.43, the word is *upasarjana* because it stands for what is put in the first case-affix in the rule teaching this compound, that is, P. 2.1.56. Its technical status gets priority and the word *puruṣa* is put first in the compound. The same is true of the first word in the compounds *pācakaṇḍārikā*, (P. 2.1.62) *pūrvakāyaḥ* (P. 2.2.1.) and *ardhapīpalī* (P. 2.2.2.). The worldly and the technical meanings have each their own scope. Sometimes, they coincide in the same case. For example, in the compound *niṣ-kaṣāmbiḥ*, the word *kaṣāmbi* stands for what is subordinate in the worldly sense and it is also *upasarjana* in the technical sense because it remains in the same case-ending in the analytical sentences while the full form of *niḥ* appears in different case-affixes in those sentences: *nirgataḥ kaṣāmbiḥ*, *nirgataṃ kaṣāmbiḥ*, *nirgatena kaṣāmbiḥ* and so on. It has been made *upasarjana* technically by P. 1.2.44 in order that it may not be put first in the compound. In *niṣkaṣāmbiḥ*, *niḥ* is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.43 and 2.2.18 and *kaṣāmbi* is *upasarjana* by P. 1.2.44. In other words, both are *upasarjana* technically but what is so by P. 1.2.44 cannot be put first. In the case under discussion, *śyāmā* can be looked upon as *upasarjana* only in the worldly sense. But if the worldly sense of *upasarjana* is resorted to everywhere it would lead to other difficulties. For example, in *tittirikalmāṣi*, there is *niṣ*, only because, technically, *kalmāṣa* is not *upasarjana* and so *niṣ* has been added by P. 4.1.14 and 4.1.40. If the worldly sense of *upasarjana* is resorted to here, *kalmāṣa* would become so and P. 4.1.14 would not operate and so P. 4.1.40 cannot be applied, so we would get *tittirikalmāṣa* by P. 4.1.4 and that is not desired. On these technical points, see Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*, *kāma-dhārayāhnikā*, edited with translation and explanatory notes by Dr. S. D. Joshi and Dr. J. A. F. Roodbergen, pp. 107-108.]

411. As the accent which comes at a later stage is stronger, even if the feminine suffix *niṣ* is added

after the formation of the compound, the *upamāna* accent (P. 6.2.2) would not result. Therefore, the second constituent, already ending in the feminine suffix, is combined.

[It was pointed out above that if the word *upasarjana* is taken in the worldly sense, there would be difficulty in regard to the feminine suffix *nīṣ*. To get over the difficulty, it is suggested that the *nīṣ* is added after the compound is formed. But it is shown that it would lead to a difficulty in regard to accent. Taking *tittirikalmāṣī* as an illustration, here the first term *tittiri* is masculine. If the second term refers to the same object as the first term, it would also be in the masculine gender. One would then say *tittirir iva kalmāṣaḥ* before the compound is formed. Here there is no feminine suffix at all. When the compound is made, the second term would be *upasarjana* in the worldly sense and so P. 4.1.14 would prevent the addition of *nīṣ* taught in P. 4.1.40. Even if it is added on the ground that the whole compound is not *upasarjana* even if the second term may be so then the accent of *nīṣ*, which comes at a later stage would be retained, being *saṭiṣīṣṭa* and, therefore, stronger and the accent of the first term, expressive of the standard of comparison, taught in P. 6.2.2., would be set aside. But that is not desired. If the accent of the *upamāna* is to prevail, the feminine suffix must be added before the compound is formed and not as the last grammatical operation.]

All this difficulty arises according to the view that the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison.]

412. If the common attribute refers to the standard of comparison, the main thing would not depend on it and so it would not be possible to see a clue in the mention of *vyāghra* etc.

[There is another reason for concluding that the word expressive of the common property does not refer to the standard of comparison. In the sentence *puruṣo 'yaṁ vyāghra*

iva śūraḥ, there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* because the word expressive of the common property (*śūra*) is mentioned in the sentence and P. 2.1.56 prohibits the formation of a compound in such cases. Where both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* are mentioned, the former is always the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the latter the *viśeṣya* (qualified). Here *puruṣa* is, therefore, the *viśeṣya*, *vyāghra* is *upasarjana* in the worldly sense but not technically because in P. 2.1.56. the word *vyāghrādibhiḥ* is in the third case-affix. Really speaking, in this sentence, the syntactic connection (*sāmānyā*) is between *puruṣa* and *śūra* and not between *puruṣa* and *vyāghra*. For that reason there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra*. There was no need to prohibit it by saying *sāmānyāprayoge* = 'when the word expressive of the common quality is not used', and yet it has been done. That gives a clue that when the main word in the worldly sense is connected with a word outside the compound, the latter can still be formed. This can be understood as a clue only in the view that the word expressive of the common property (*śyāmā*) refers to the object of comparison (*upameya*).

413. Even though it may be subordinate (according to the analysis in question) it is the main thing (according to another analysis). It is not such a thing which is meant to be *upasarjana* in the *śāstra*.

[The analysis in question of the compound *śāstrīśyāmā* (Devadattā) is: *Yathā śāstrī śyāmā* (*tadvad iyaṁ Devadattā*). The other analysis envisaged is: *śāstrīva syāmā* (*Devadattā*). In this analysis, *śyāmā* refers to the *upameya* and, therefore, it is not subordinate, but predominant (*pradhāna*).]

Thus it has been shown that in *śāstrīśyāmā* the word *śyāmā* cannot refer to the standard of comparison. So it is proposed that it should be taken as referring to the object of comparison, namely, Devadattā. Then the analysis would be *śāstrīva śyāmā* (Devadattā) = 'Dark Devadattā is like a dagger'. The difficulty here is that it is not stated in what respect dark Devadattā is

like a dagger. In other words, no common property is mentioned. An object, like dagger, has many attributes but it is not stated which of them is the common one. This analysis of the compound would explain its gender and would also confirm that in the compound the second constituent is predominant. But, as said above, the common quality, the basis of the comparison, is not mentioned. This difficulty is sought to be removed by *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 19. where it is stated that even what is not actually mentioned is understood by the hearers. The following stanza refers to this passage.

414. The quality 'dark', as existing in the object of comparison is actually mentioned. Though not presented as existing in the standard of comparison, it is so understood.

[The quality 'dark' existing in the object of comparison, is conveyed by the word *śyāmā*. The word cannot do anything more. As no property is presented as common to both, what is actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison, is understood as existing in the standard of comparison also.

An illustration is now given.

415. Though only two substances the moon and the face may be mentioned, a particular quality existing in the moon is understood and not the others like spots (*upaplava*).

[*M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 20 gives an illustration. When one says: *candramukhī Devadattā* = 'Devadattā, the moon-faced,' one hears only two substances, the moon and the face, mentioned. No quality is mentioned. And yet people do understand the quality of being pleasant to look at as existing in both the substances and as being the basis of a comparison between the two. When this is the case when no quality is mentioned at all, what to say of a case like *śāstrīśyāmā* where a quality is actually mentioned as existing in the object of comparison the hearer would have no difficulty at all in understanding

that quality as existing in the standard of comparison also and as the basis of the comparison between the two objects.]

416. Due to the persisting impression (*bhāvanā*) of diversity, it is attributed to the compound also. (In reality), the compound is a totally different word and denotes an object qualified by a quality differentiated (by the standard of comparison).

[Thus the view that the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison has been considered in many ways. If we take it as referring to the standard of comparison, we get one kind of analytic sentence. If we take it, as referring to the object of comparison, we get another analytic sentence. The impression of this diversity in the analytic sentence persists and one thinks that the analytic sentence and the compound have the same meaning and attributes this diversity to the compound also. In reality, the compound is a different kind of word altogether. It is indivisible and denotes the object of comparison, qualified by darkness as distinguished by the standard of comparison.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 22-23, is going to be explained.

417. If a compound is formed of words referring to two different objects, on the basis of special injunction there would be no masculine form of the first term when a compound is formed of *mṛgiva capalā*.

[The *sūtra* P. 2.1.55 is found in a context where compounds of words with others in opposition to them (*samānādhikaraṇa*) are taught. If *śyāmā* refers to Devadattā (the *upameya*) and *śastrī* to the *upamāna*, it means that they do not refer to the same object, that they are not *samānādhikaraṇa*. How then can they be compounded at all? If it is held that they can be compounded because of the special injunction (*vacana*) namely P. 2.1.55, even then another difficulty would arise, namely, that when we make a compound of *mṛgiva capalā* we cannot get the

form *mṛgacapalā* with the first term in the masculine form by P. 6.3.42, because that is also conditioned *sāmānādhikaranyā*.]

A possible way of getting out of this difficulty is now referred to.

418. The masculine form would result because the first term is not in the feminine gender as in the compound *mṛgadugdha* = 'deer's milk', unless the meaning of female is meant to be conveyed.

[A way of getting over this difficulty has been suggested elsewhere, that is, in vā. 2 and 3 on P. 6.3.42. To explain how, in the compound *mṛgakṣīram* = 'deer's milk', the first term is in the masculine gender whereas it should be feminine, considering that milk comes from the female, it is pointed out that the purpose of the word is only to exclude some other kind of animal. For that, even a masculine word would do. The same is true in *mṛgacapalā* = 'quick like a deer'. It is only the *cāpalya* (quickness) of the deer that is meant, as distinguished from that of other animals. There is no intention to refer directly to the quickness of the female deer. The compound should, therefore, be analysed as *mṛga iva capalā* and not as *mṛgīva capalā*. If the *cāpalya* of the female is meant to be conveyed, then the analytic sentence would be *mṛgīva capalā* and then of course, the masculine form would result only through some rule.]

Now *M. Bhā.* I.p. 397, l. 23, which states the view which is free from defect is explained.

419. The word *śāstrī*, which means *śāstrīva* and the word *śyāmā*, both refer to Devadattā. That is why it has been said that in the *śāstraic* analysis, both refer to the same thing.

[It was said before that if the word expressive of the common property refers to the standard of comparison, then the object of comparison would be conveyed by the compound as a whole.

But in the accepted view, both the constituents of the compound refer to the object of comparison. The first term *śāstrī* would mean not 'dagger' but figuratively, something which is like it: *śāstrīva*. That is, it would refer to the object of comparison. Thus both the terms would denote the same object, namely, Devadattā the object of comparison. In this way, *sāmānādhikarāṇya* results and the masculine form in *mṛgacapalā* also would come to be by P. 6.3.42. The context of *sāmānādhikarāṇya* would also be respected. *Śāstrī* would stand for the *upamāna*. There would be superimposition of identity between the two, resemblance or comparison or the meaning of *iva* would be implied as when one says *siṃho māṇavakaḥ* or *siṃham adhyāpaya*. In the same way, here, *śāstrī* refers to Devadattā. This is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *tasyām evobhayaṃ varttate*. But of course, the compound is indivisible and it is only in the *śāstra* that it is analysed in different ways.]

The view that both the terms in *śāstrīśyāmā* refer to the *upameya* is the correct one according to the *M. Bhā.* I. p. 397, l. 24. This is now going to be stated.

420. As, in order to make the masculine form possible or to bring in the desired feminine suffix, one would have to supply much, it has been stated that both the terms refer to the same thing (that is, the *upameya*).

[The view given in the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above is the correct one. If any of the other two views is adopted, one would have to supply much to get over the difficulties that would arise. If the word *śyāmā* is taken as referring to the *upameya* and the compound is analysed as *śāstrīva śyāmā Devadattā* then the two terms would refer to two different objects, there would be no *sāmānādhikarāṇya* and so no compound can be formed at all. To make the formation possible, one would have to say that P. 2.1.55 allows the formation on its own strength even if there is no *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. But then one could not explain the masculine form in *mṛgacapalā* because that is also conditioned by the presence of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*. One would

then have to say that the first term in *mṛgacapālā* is not meant to be a feminine word but one expressive of the universal only as in *mṛgakṣīram*. But this restriction of what is meant (*vivakṣāniyama*) is not based on the actual words and so causes delay in understanding. The procedure becomes complicated because one has to supply much. If one takes the view that *śyāmā* refers to the standard of comparison and the compound is analysed as: *yathā śāstrī śyāmā tadvad iyaṃ Devadattā*, then the required feminine suffix would not result in *tittirikalmāṣī*. In order to make it possible, one would have to say that it is the whole compound which expresses a particular colour and not the second term only and that the term *upasarjana* should not be taken in its worldly sense. In any case, there would be difficulty in regard to the accent. Thus here also the procedure would become complicated and one would have to supply much. That is why the *M. Bhā.* has declared that both the terms refer to the same object.]

The idea that one would have to supply much (*bahvapekṣyam*) is now explained differently.

421. *Śyāmā śāstrī yathā, śyāmā śāstrīkalpā*, so are the analytical sentences put. In them, the adjective *śyāmā* is to be supplied for the *upamāna* and the *upameya* respectively.

[If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to the *upameya*, the analytic sentence would be: *śyāmā śāstrī yathā*. The *M. Bhā.* puts it as: *śāstrīva śyāmā (Devadattā)*. In this case, another word *śyāmā* would have to be supplied to qualify *śāstrī*. If the word *śyāmā* in the compound refers to the *upamāna*, the analytic sentence would be: *śyāmā śāstrī kalpā*. The *M. Bhā* puts it as: *yathā śāstrī śyāmā tadvad iyaṃ Devadattā*. In this case another word *śyāmā* would have to be supplied to qualify *Devadattā*. Because, when a quality is mentioned as related to one, it has to be understood as related to the other also, because comparison between two things is based upon the existence of a common property. This necessity of having to infer what is mentioned as related to one as related to the other also is what is meant by *bahvapekṣyam*.]

An attempt is made to meet this difficulty as follows—

422. If one says *śāstriśyāmeveyaṃ śyāmā* 'She is dark as the dagger is dark', one understands only as much as from *śāstri yathā iyaṃ śyāmā* 'She is dark like a dagger.'

[The analytic sentence is usually similar to the sentence used in the world and in them, the word *śyāmā* may be used with both the *upamāna* and the *upameya*. In a compound, on the other hand, one of them is implied and need not be used. So where is the defect of having to supply much ?]

423. If the mention of a quality is merely for stating a fact, then even if it is mentioned separately as related to both, it would not convey what is intended (that is, comparison).

[If a quality is mentioned only to state a fact, that is, to characterise something, then even if it is mentioned more than once, the idea of comparison would not be conveyed. The dagger mentioned as dark, may determine (*paricchedikā*) dark Devadattā through some other quality. Mere mention more than once would not achieve the desired object.]

424. If the qualities perform the function of determining the object of comparison which is the meaning of the compound, then even if they are mentioned only once, they would convey the whole.

[If the quality is mentioned, not merely to state a fact but to determine the object of comparison through its relation with the standard of comparison and to convey its special feature, then even if it is mentioned only once in connection with the *upameya*, it would be as good as describing the *upamāna* also and so there is no need to mention it twice. The quality is, after all, mentioned to determine the relation between the two on the basis of resemblance. Thus if it is mentioned as related to one, its relation with the other also would be required and this is what is meant by *bahvapekṣyam*. That is why the *Bhāṣyakāra*

has come to the conclusion that both the terms relate to the same object.]

A difficulty mentioned in *vā.1. M. Bhā. I. p. 398, l. 6.* is now referred to.

425. When a word, due to difference in form or substratum, at the time of connection with another word, refers to the particular, how can it be said to be a word expressive of the common property?

[The author of the *vārttikas* has raised a difficulty in looking upon *śyāmā* as expressive of the common property on the ground that it denotes the particular. When an attribute is presented as existing in the standard or object of comparison, how can it be said to be a common attribute? If it were presented as such, apart from any substratum, it can be said to be a common attribute. But then it can become involved in a comparison only on the basis of some other attribute which exists in it. When there is superimposition of identity, on the basis of a common property, then the word expressive of the latter is not used at all. A *samānādhikaraṇa* compound is formed when the words expressive of the substance and quality are in apposition to each other. A word is said to be *sāmānyavacana* when it denotes the common property as well as the object which has it. When a common property is found in a particular substratum, it becomes modified by it or by another property existing in it. Even though it has been said that what is mentioned in regard to one is understood in regard to the other also, it has to be understood through the expressive power (*abhidhā*) of the word. The word *śyāmā*, while it is expressive of a quality, becomes expressive of the particular if it is associated with the word expressive of the *upamāna* or the *upameya*. The compound is really an indivisible unit but when it is analysed into the first constituent and the second constituent, it must be done according to the division of the meaning. Then it is found that the word *śyāmā* denotes the particular. How then can it be said to be *sāmānyavacana* ?]

The above difficulty is removed as follows on the basis of vā. 2. *M. Bhā.* I. p. 398, l. 10-19.

426. By *sāmānya* (common property) some understand mere resemblance existing in two things. Or it is meant to be a quality looked upon as identical, though, as existing in two things, it has variation.

427. Or it is the function of the universal aspect of the quality in the two substances which is meant. Because of the (common) form it is said to be expressive of the common attribute. Or because it was so before it entered into the compound.

[The difficulty is sought to be removed as follows—By the word *sāmānya* what is meant here is resemblance existing in two things. Resemblance presupposes difference and identity—two things. Even though an attribute may be presented as existing in one thing, it brings the other to the mind, so that it is really by the expressive power of both that the attribute is understood as existing in both. Even though the attribute is modified by a particular form and substratum, it is meant to be understood as existing in both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* by the word *sāmānyavacana*. What is called resemblance is nothing more than an attribute presented as existing in more than one thing. As the *M. Bhā.* has said: A word can be said to be *sāmānyavacana* even if it presents an attribute as existing in two things only, not necessarily as existing in many things. Even though the universal of a quality, inhering in all substrata and, therefore, identical everywhere is not very useful for a comparison, still when it is coloured by the subtle peculiarities of the substrata, it becomes a minor universal (*avāntara-sāmānya*) and is then called resemblance and is useful for making comparisons. Thus the word *sāmānyavacana* is expressive of a quality like darkness, diversified from the universal and existing in both the standard and the object of comparison. A word like *śyāmā* becomes *sāmānyavacana* when it denotes a qua-

lity existing in both the *upamāna* and the *upameya* and considered to be identical because of resemblance. It is said to be expressive of substance because of identification of quality with substance.

Another way of removing the difficulty is stated in the *M. Bhā.* as follows. Every word, when associated with another in the sentence becomes particularised. So the word *sāmānya vacanaiḥ* in P. 2.1.55 means: "with words expressive of the common attribute before they enter the compound." In a compound the meanings of words are mixed up in an indivisible manner. In the sentence stage, the meanings of words are connected, but separate. In the compound, there is integration. Because of resemblance, they are identified. That is why the formation of a compound is explained with the help of meanings obtained by analysis. Even though the word *syāmā* in the compound is mentioned in relation to the *upameya*, it is still said to be expressive of the common attribute as in the sentence, it was not related to any of the two in particular. It was expressive of the universal there. So, even though it denotes the particular in the compound it is still called *sāmānyavacana* on the basis of its previous state in the sentence.]

Now the points mentioned in the *M. Bhā.* on P. 2.1.56 are explained.

428. When the word *vyāghra* refers to the meaning of the word *puruṣa* because of the quality of courage (existing in both), then the formation of the compound becomes possible as the two constituents do not refer to two different objects.

[P. 2.1.56 teaches the formation of a compound of a word expressive of the object of comparison with one of the words in the group beginning with *vyāghra*, provided that the word expressive of the common attribute is not used. Thus in the sense of *puruṣo' yaṃ vyāghra iva śūraḥ* we cannot say *puruṣavyāghraḥ śūraḥ*. In *puruṣavyāghraḥ* the first constituent stands for the object of comparison and the second constituent for the standard

of comparison. Thus, the two words do not stand for the same object, they are not *samānādhikaraṇa* and yet the compound has been formed even though the rule is given in the section dealing with *samānādhikaraṇa* compounds. How? If the word *vyāghra* is understood as referring to the *puruṣa* due to superimposition based on common qualities, then both the words refer to the same object and the compound becomes possible.]

429. When the word *śūra* is used the word *vyāghra*, stands (for its own meaning), for a particular kind of animal. As then the two words would refer to two different things, there is no possibility of a compound.

[When the common attribute is expressed by its own word in the sentence, then the word *vyāghra* would denote only a particular kind of animal, the standard of comparison. It would not refer to the object of comparison at all. The two objects would be different from each other. The difference would be made clear by the word *iva* and there would be no superimposition at all. As the two words would not be *samānādhikaraṇa*, there would be no compounding in any case. Why then prohibit it by saying *sāmānyāprayoge* ?]

430. Even if both the words refer to the same object (*sāmānādhikaraṇye' pi*, as there is the possibility of alternative common properties, the word *śūra* may be used (for restriction) even when the compound is formed.

[This stanza says why the prohibition has been made even when the question of the formation of the compound would not arise in any case owing to the absence of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Even if the word *vyāghra* is taken as referring to the *puruṣa* due to superimposition based on a common attribute, the word *śūra* might be used merely to specify the common attribute. There are many properties in a tiger besides courage. For instance, it is cruel and strong also. To specify the common property

which is the basis of the identification, the word *śūra* would be used. That need not prevent the formation of the compound. But as the formation in such cases is not desired, the prohibition has been made.]

431. As the word which stands for praise and honour and those which stand for blame and disapproval may be based on different reasons, a particular one is mentioned for the sake of restriction.

[It might be argued that there is no need to use a word for specifying the common attribute because a word like *vyāghra* or *siṃha* is used in order to express praise and honour and one would naturally understand a quality like courage and not cruelty or something like that. That is true, but the qualities of a tiger that stand for praise and honour for the object of comparison are many and depend upon the context. They are not understood from the mere word *vyāghra*. A word like *śūra* has to be used to specify one of them, especially when the context does not help one to understand it. Then the formation of the compound would become possible, unless prohibited. As the formation is not desired, it is prohibited.

Really speaking when the word expressive of the common quality is used as in *puruṣo vyāghra iva śūraḥ*, there cannot be a compound of *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* because the word *puruṣa* is connected with the word *śūraḥ* which is outside the compound to be formed. It is *sāpekṣa* and so there is no *sāmarthyā* between *puruṣa* and *vyāghra* according to the principle : *sāpekṣam asamarthaṃ bhavati*. So they cannot be compounded, even if there were no prohibition. The prohibition has been made and that gives a clue that a compound can be formed if the main constituent is connected with an outside word and not if the subordinate constituent is so connected.]

432. Even if the formation of the compound is not possible, this (the use of the word *sāmānyapārayoge*) is still a clue just as the use of the 'acveḥ' (in P.3.1.12.)

is a clue, even in the absence of 'cvi' after the words belonging to the *bhṛśādi* group.

[The two words have no syntactic connection, not only because one of them is linked with a word which would not enter into the compound, but also because they do not refer to the same object. The main constituent can form a compound with the other even if it is connected with a word which would not enter into the compound. The secondary constituent is not in that position. It cannot form part of a compound if it is connected with an outside word. The use of the word *sāmānyāprayoge* in P. 2.1.56 is an indication (*jñāpaka*) that the main constituent, even if connected with a word outside the compound, can form a compound with the secondary constituent. It is like the word 'acveḥ' in P. 3.1.12. which is a clue that the suffix *kyavi*, added to a word in *bhṛśādi* group, expresses the same meaning as 'cvi', namely the idea of something becoming what it was not before (*abhūtataadbhāva*) and so it cannot be added to a word ending in *cvi*. On the points mentioned in the stanzas 359-432, see Dr. S. D. Joshi and Dr. J. A. F. Roodbergen op. cit. pp. 87-136.]

Compounds are not the only complex formations (*vṛtti*) which can involve comparison. The *vṛtti* called *taddhita* can also involve comparison. Something is now going to be said about it.

433. The comparison which is understood from the sentence of which the word ending in the suffix *vati* is a part is conveyed by the suffix taught in the *sūtra* and the mode of its mention is now to be considered.

[In expressions like *brāhmaṇavad adhṛte*, *kṣattriyavad yudhyate* of which a word ending in *vati* is a part, the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is understood. Here the common property, namely, the action of studying or fighting, is mentioned as related to the object of comparison. But it is also understood as related to the standard of comparison. Thus comparison is understood from these expressions. The *sūtra* in question relates to a stem

and to a suffix. The comparison is based on action. If the action is presented as existing in the standard of comparison, it is also understood as related to the object of comparison and vice versa. That is because the relation of two objects as *upamāna* and *upameya* is based on a common property. Still, one has to determine with which of the two the action is really connected.]

434. Even though the word *kriyā* should be the qualifier of the meaning of the stem which is mentioned first, the stem cannot be expressive of action.

[In P. 5.1.115, there is, first of all, the word *tena*. It stands for the standard of comparison and the element which expresses it is the stem to which the suffix is to be added. The third case-affix indicates that the standard of comparison is subordinate to the object of comparison, that it is the meaning of the stem and is fit to be connected as the meaning of the suffix. The word *tulyam* stands for the meaning of the suffix *vati*. After that comes the word *kriyā*. It is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The question is : does it qualify the meaning of the stem or that of the suffix ? As the word *tena* comes first in the *sūtra*, one naturally thinks that it qualifies what it stands for, that is, the stem which denotes the standard of comparison. There is no reason to by-pass what comes first. It is as in the *sūtras* '*sāśya devatā* (P. 4.2.24.) and *tena raktam rāgāt*' (P. 4.2.1.) where the words *devatā* and *rāgāt* qualify what comes first. Now the difficulty is that the third case-affix is added to a word expressive of *sattva* and not to a word expressive of action which is *sādhya*. How then can the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* qualify the meaning of a word ending in the third case-affix ? This is the difficulty in the view which holds that the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the stem (*prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.)]

435. A word expressive of *sattva* (substance) can take the third case-affix either in the sense of relation in general (*śeṣa*) or in the sense of an accessory (*sādhana*). As verbs express non-substance (*asattva*), they cannot take it in either sense.

[That in which the universal, quality and action inhere, that which can be referred to by a pronoun like this 'or that', is called substance (*sattuva*). A stem which expresses that can take the third case-affix. The meaning of a stem, fit to render service to something else, is different from it and takes a case-ending which expresses that difference. That difference may be based on relation in general or on the relation of action and accessory. In the sentences *adhyayanena*, *vasati*, *dadhnā jaḍaḥ*, *tapasā kṛṣaḥ*, *dhanena kulam*, this relation in general takes the form of causality (*hetuhetumadbhāva*). Where the difference is based on the relation of action and accessory, there also the third case-ending is used as in *dātreṇa lunāti*, *paraśunā chinatti*. These two cases of the use of the third case-ending cannot apply to verbs expressive of action. Action consists of the activities of accessories and has its parts spread out. It is something yet to be, a process and is different from a thing, a substance, which is already there (*siddha*). It cannot be the substratum of the powers (*sādhanaśakti*) which help in bringing about the process. Thus, the third case-ending cannot come after a verb. It is just to make clear that a word expressive of action (a verb) cannot take a case-ending that a verb has not been declared to be a *prātipadika*. From the nature of its meaning also, it becomes clear that it cannot take the third case-ending. As the suffix *vati* has been taught in the sense of resemblance (*tulyam*), one must presume that the third case-ending is based on relation in general and not on that of action and accessory.]

436. Words like *pāka* can take the third case-ending because their meaning has the attributes of substance and is not designated as action, as for example for the purpose of being connected with the suffix *kṛtvasuc*.

[It might be said that, even though a verb cannot take the third case-ending, there are words like *pāka* which denote an action and can take the third case-ending. The fact is that words like *pāka* ending in the suffix *ghañ* and the like express the action denoted by the root as a thing, as a substance. So such words are not really considered to be words expressive of

action. That is why it has been said that an action expressed by words ending in a *kṛt* suffix is like a thing or substance. They can take gender and number. Of course, their meaning is only *like* a thing, it does not fully become a thing. It is still referred to as action because it was so when a verbal suffix was added to the same root as in *pacati*. Once it becomes like a thing, it ceases to be a process. That is why suffixes expressive of the repetition of an action like *kṛtvasuc* cannot be used with words ending in *ghañ* etc. One cannot say *pañcakṛtvah pākaḥ*. So such words are not considered to be expressive of action.]

437. As for the indeclinable words ending in *kṛt* suffixes and expressive of a meaning having the attributes of an action, they denote non-substance and so do not differ from verbs.

[As for the *kṛt* suffixes which are used to form indeclinables (like *tumun*, *ktvā* etc.) words ending in such suffixes are like verbs because they denote a process and not a thing. Like verbs they cannot take case endings.]

438. As for the action expressed by words like *śayitavyam* in association with the suffix *kṛtvasuc*, there the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is quite impossible.

[It might be said that an action expressed by a *kṛtya* suffix can be the means (*sādhana*) of another action and so a word ending in such a suffix can take the third case-ending. But the fact is that it is not such a word which is meant to be the stem to which the suffix *vati* is added by P. 5.1.115. It is true that the suffix *kṛtvasuc* can be used in connection with such a word. One can say *pañcakṛtvah śayitavyam*. So *śayitavya* is a word expressive of a process. But the suffix *vati* is used only, when the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is understood. Here it is not understood. In *śayitavyam* there is the root *śī* and the suffix *tavya*. The former expresses the action of lying down. What action different from that does the suffix express? It is not added in the sense of the root itself (*svārthika*) because it has been taught in the sense of *bhāva* or *karma* by P. 3.4.70. The position is that

here the root expresses an action which was once a process, but not now. The suffix in *śayitavya* denotes the accessory and as the latter implies an action, it is also understood. In *pacati devadattaḥ*, the suffix in *pacati* denotes the agent and because of that, the root expresses action as a process. In *āsyate devadattena*, the verbal suffix in *āsyate* stands for *bhāvanā*, and because of association with it, the root expresses a process. The action denoted by the verbal suffix is different. Here also the verbal suffix expresses an action which is rightly different from what the root expresses.]

439. Neither pure substance nor pure quality nor that which has quality can be compared with the action denoted by such words as *śayitavyam*, because there is no basis for comparison.

[How the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* is not possible with the action denoted by words like *śayitavyam* is now explained. If a comparison is possible, it would be between the action expressed by *śayitavyam* and pure substance or pure quality or substance having quality. As there is no common attribute between these pairs, there cannot be comparison. All comparison is based upon the presence of common attributes.

440. Even when the bare substance without any attribute is mentioned, common attributes in the form of action or quality, based on convention are understood.

[It might be argued that no comparison is understood in these cases because no word expressive of the common attribute is used. But that is not the true position. In *candravan mukham*, no word expressive of the common attribute is used and yet one does understand something. In the same way, here also, we would understand some common attribute if there can be comparison between two things. If we do not understand it, it is because no comparison is possible between action and substance etc.]

Could there be comparison between action and what is nearest to it, namely, the agent ?

441. In the expression, the sacrificer (*hotā*) is like the act of sacrificing (*hotavya*), the idea of comparison is purposeless because of contradiction. Therefore, the substratum of action (the agent) cannot be compared with action.

[Even in expressions like *śayitavyena tulyaḥ śāyakaḥ*='One who lies down is like lying down', *hotavyena tulyaḥ hota*='the sacrificer is like the act of sacrificing', there is no purpose served by seeing any comparison. Action is a process to be accomplished (*sādhya*) whereas the agent is an object which is already there (*siddha*). The former cannot be the *upamāna* of the latter as they are two very different things. No purpose would be served by comparing them.]

Why not say then that the comparison is between two actions themselves ?

442. An action cannot be compared with another of the same kind because of their identity (*tadbhāvāt*). Nor when it is of a different kind as actions like cooking are really quite different from one another.

[When an action is compared to another, the latter is either of the same kind or of a different kind. If it is of the same kind, there would be no point in the comparison. It would be like saying that a cow is like a cow. Nor can there be comparison if the two actions are totally different from each other. Nobody would say : *vaktavyena sadṛśaṁ paṭhitavyam*, 'studying is like speaking'. Thus a comparison with action seems to be impossible from every point of view. It is true that such attributes as existence, knowability etc. are common to action, substance and quality, but they are too comprehensive and cannot form the basis of comparison.]

A difference is now pointed out between actions of the same kind.

443. When difference results on account of difference in substratum, there can be comparison as in: 'the studying of *vaiśyas* is like the studying of *Brāhmaṇas*'.

[The same action is different with a different substratum. An action, as existing in one substratum can be compared with the same action, as it exists in another substratum: A *vaiśya*'s studying is like that of a *Brāhmaṇa*.]

444. When, through the meaning or through the context, what it depends upon is understood, the requirement having been fulfilled, the complex formation would result.

[The question arises whether, when a word expressive of action depends upon a substratum, it can take the suffix *vati*. It is maintained that if the substratum, even when not mentioned, can be understood from the context, the word ending in a *kṛtya* suffix and expressive of action can take the suffix *vati*. There can be the relation of standard of comparison and object of comparison if a common property can be understood as in *sthātavyena tulyaṃ gamanaṃ*, *nṛttena tulyaṃ gamanam* etc. A word ending in a *kṛt* suffix usually conveys action as substance or as a thing but sometimes also as an action as in *bhoktum pākāḥ* = 'cooking for eating', *boddhum pāṭhaḥ* = 'study for understanding', *kāraṇasya gatiḥ* = 'going in order to do'. In these expressions, the suffixes *ṇvul* and *tumun*, added according to P. 3.3.10. which requires that a word expressive of action should be the neighbouring word when these two suffixes are added to the root. The first two examples show that the word *pākāḥ* and *pāṭhaḥ* are considered to be action-words, though they end in *ghañ*. When, however, the question is of adding the suffix *kṛtvasuc* to a numeral in order to express the idea of the repetition of an action, *pākāḥ* is not considered to be an action-word. So we cannot say: *pañcakṛtvāḥ pākāḥ*. If some verb is

brought into the sentence, the suffix can be added as in *pañcakṛtvah pāko vartate*. Here *pāko vartate* is the verb and it presents the action as a process. So *kṛtvāsu* has been added to a numeral. In *odanasya pākah*, one can argue that *odana* is the object of the action denoted by the root in *pāka* and not of the action denoted by the suffix *ghañ* in it because that is a thing and not a process. One cannot use the same reasoning about *pañcakṛtvah pākah* and say that there is counting of the repetition of the action denoted by the root in *pāka*. That would involve contradiction.]

445. When one wants to say that cooking in clarified butter is like cooking in oil, the use of the suffix *vati* is possible like other grammatical operations based upon a word expressive of action.

[A word ending in a *kṛt* suffix expresses action as a substance, a thing and, therefore, undergoes grammatical operations like taking gender and number. Not only that. In association with it, another root can take the suffix *tumun* as in *bhoktum pākah*. It can take the suffix *vati* also according to P. 5.1.115. Thus one can say *tailapākavat ghṛtapākah*. As the word *tailapāka* denotes not only the action of cooking, but also its substratum or medium, namely, oil there is no external dependence (*sāpekṣatvam*) standing in the way of the addition of the suffix *vati*.]

446. Thus the mention of the word *atiñ* (P. 2.2.19.) is meant to prevent the compounding of expressions like *gamaṇaṁ kārakasya* (P. 3.3.10.). As to the suffix *ñvul* taught elsewhere (P. 3.1.133), there is no possibility of compounding there.

[It is now shown that according to the author of the *vārttikas* also, the suffixes *tumun* and *ñvul* can be used in association with a word ending in a suffix like *ghañ*. When the purpose of the exclusion denoted by the word *atiñ* in P. 2.2.19. is questioned, considering that the two words *sup* and *supā* from previous sūtras are present in this sūtra, kātyāyana points out that the prohibition relates to nouns whose meaning is similar to that of verbs, in other words, to nouns which denote an action.

When the neighbouring connected word (*upapada*) is expressive of action, it cannot be compounded with what is connected with it semantically. That is why there cannot be a compound of the following pairs of words: *kāraṅkasya gatiḥ*, *kāraṅkasya gamanam*, *kāraṅkasya vrajyā*. In these expressions, the neighbouring words *gatiḥ*, *gamanam* and *vrajyā* express action and so they cannot be compounded with a word ending in the suffix *ṇvul*.

Thus it has been shown that words ending in a *krtya* suffix or in *ghaṇ* etc. can express action and can end in the third case-affix and thus support the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.]

If such words can express action and take the third case-affix, why does the author of the *M. Bhā.* first say that all words mean normally a combination of qualities but that sometimes they may stand for a part of them only. So a word like *brāhmaṇa* normally means a combination of the three qualities: austerity (*tapas*), learning (*śrutam*) and birth (*yonih*), but sometimes may stand only for just one quality like learning, or a particular mode of study. On this basis, the word *kriyā* in P.5.1.115 has been connected with the word *tena* in the same and interpreted to mean: "if the word ending in the third case-affix means action." In other words, the words *kriyā* has been interpreted as a qualifier of the meaning of the stem. Why this has been done is now stated.

447. The idea that words normally stand for a combination of qualities has been adopted in order to meet all objections. Otherwise, as it is possible to have a word expressive of pure action, the suffix could not be added to words like *brāhmaṇa*.

[It is in order to meet all objections that the author of the *M. Bhā.* has stated that words ordinarily stand for a combination of qualities. Otherwise, the suffix *vali* could not be added to a word like *brāhmaṇa* as in the expression *brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣattriyaḥ*, because there are words like *śayitavya* which express pure action primarily and the suffix would be added to them

preferably. The word *brāhmaṇa* can stand for action only secondarily as, primarily, it stands for a combination of qualities. If by P.5.1.115, the suffix *vati* is to be added to a stem expressive of action, it would preferably be added to a stem which does so primarily rather than to one which does so secondarily. Or the *Bhāṣyakāra* may mean that a word expressive of pure action cannot take the third case-affix.]

448. When it is meant to be the standard of comparison, the original nature of action disappears. Because, by merely hearing it, its nature as the standard of comparison is not completed.

[When the action denoted by words like *pāka* is thought of as the standard of comparison, it loses its original character of *asattva* = non-substance, that is, a process. Merely by hearing the word meant to be the standard of comparison, its nature of being the standard of comparison is not completed. That depends upon the common property also.]

Let it depend upon the common property. Why should that take away the original nature of action when it becomes the standard of comparison?

449. The third factor, the distinguishing attribute existing in the two things (*upamāna* and *upameya*) is active (*vyāpāravān*). The whole of one thing is not identical with the whole of the other.

[It is not on a functionless common property, the third factor in all comparison, the other two factors being *upamāna* and *upameya*, that there is dependence but on an active one (*vyāpāravān*). It inheres in the other two factors. As the common property inheres in the action it is active in making it the standard of comparison. Then it loses its character of being a process and becomes substance, a concrete thing. Because of the common property which inheres in it, it becomes capable of determining or measuring the object of comparison. If it were confined within itself, it could not perform the function of

determining something else. Thus, what is conveyed by the word *tailapāka* can be referred to by a pronoun and becomes the substratum of the common property and a substance. So is the case with what is conveyed by words like *hotavya*. When these words end in the third case-affix, they are not expressive of action. It is not objects of the external word which are here spoken of as action or as substance, but what is conveyed by words. Words can present one and the same thing like sound, for instance, as action quality or substance. It is with such things that grammar is concerned. So words ending in *kṛt* suffixes do not present action as a process but as substance, a thing. Why the common property is said to be active here is this: there is some common property but the whole of one thing is not absolutely identical with the whole of the other thing. Otherwise, there would be no difference and therefore, no resemblance, the basis of the relation of the standard and the object of comparison.]

450. Whether it be substance or action, resemblance (*sāmya*) would result only from the presence of its cause (*the common property*). As (*pure*) actions would be present, a complex formation (*vṛtti*) would not be possible (by adding the suffix *vati*) to words like *go*.

It cannot be said that substance, as a standard of comparison may require a common attribute which is the same and yet different, but not action as a standard of comparison. Whether the standard of comparison is an action or a concrete thing, it depends upon a common attribute for performing its function of determining or measuring the object of comparison. When action thus becomes like substance, it gives up its original nature and becomes substance. When it is presented as the main thing and as brought about by the activities of the accessories (*sādhana*), it is called action. But when it is presented irrespective of the activities of the accessories and as the substratum of some other attribute, it ceases to be action. It becomes as good as substance, something which can be referred to by a pronoun. If pure action, without the common attribute, can be the standard of comparison, then the

suffix *vati* would be preferably added by P. 5. 1. 115 to a word expressive of that and not to words like *go* or *brāhmaṇa* which can express action only secondarily.]

451. As pure action does not exist, that which has action is understood. If the main meaning is not applicable, the word *kriyā* would denote its secondary meaning.

[When, in interpreting P. 5.1.115, the word *kriyā* is connected with *tena* which comes first and is thus taken as a qualifier of the stem, then, as has been pointed out it becomes the substratum of the common property and loses its original nature and ceases to be pure action. Thus the word ending in the third case-affix would denote substance qualified by action, because the former is the substratum of the latter and they are always found together. In this way, a word like *brāhmaṇa*, standing only for a part of its meaning, would denote action and become the stem for the suffix *vati*. The same reasoning applies to words like *śayitavya*.]

452. Action-words, depending upon some common property (in the form of action) are used to render service to (that is, to measure) another action, just as one uses words like *brāhmaṇa*.

[In order to render service to, that is, to measure, through resemblance, an action like the studying of a *kṣattriya*, a standard of comparison like the action of studying of a *brāhmaṇa* is used, based on some action as a common property. It is like using a word like *brāhmaṇa*, expressive of substance, as the standard of comparison for determining or measuring a *kṣattriya*. Thus both action-words and words expressive of substance can stand for the standard of comparison and take the suffix *vati*.]

453. As everywhere degree has some other basis, in the same way, a word expressive of quality, like one expressive of substance depends upon such a basis.

[Substance, in itself does not admit of any degree. It is on the basis of some property in it that one can speak of difference of degree in it as when one says *śuklataraḥ paṭaḥ* = 'whiter cloth.' Here degree in cloth is expressed through the quality 'white' which exists in it. But when one wants to express degree in the white itself, then the white becomes a kind of substance and degree in it has to be expressed through some other quality like 'brightness' which exists in it, as when one says: *śuklataraṃ rūpam aśya* = 'its colour is whiter.' Here brightness (*bhāsvatā*) understood, even though not mentioned, is the basis of difference of degree in the white.]

454. Whatever word is uttered is based on its form. Similarly, in comparisons also, dependence on some basis or other is never absent.

[Just as, for the expression of degree some quality or other is always postulated as the basis as long as words can express it or just as a form of the word is always postulated, in the same way, in the matter of comparison also, some common property or other is always postulated as the basis, so that three things are always involved in it, namely, the standard of comparison, the object of comparison and their common property. When one says *brāhmaṇavad kṣattriyo' dhīte* = the *kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*', the action of studying is the common property. When one says: *brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyaṃ kṣattriya'dhyayanam* = the *kṣattriya*'s action of studying is like the *brāhmaṇa*'s action of studying, a quality like excellence is the common property. And if the two excellences are compared, then some common property, existing in both, would have to be postulated. As the process would end somewhere, the defect of regressus ad infinitum would not result.]

455. As the word ending in the third case-affix cannot thus stand for (pure) action, the root *yuj*, the instrument of whose meaning, namely, propriety is well-known, has been used in the *Bhāṣya*.

[In the *M. Bhā.* passage, it is stated: *idam ayuktaṃ vartate*= 'it is not endowed with it' (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 363. l. 11.). What it is not endowed with is not mentioned, because it is well-known. Whatever accessory (*sādhana*) can be easily understood by reflecting on the nature of the action in question is not mentioned, as in the use of words like 'arhan', 'varṣati' etc. whose *karman*, honour and water respectively, can be easily understood.]

456. If the instrument is included in the meaning of the root itself then it could not be separately mentioned in *nyāyenāyuktam* just as the object *prāṇān* cannot be used with the verb *jīvati*.

[The verb *jīvati* includes the object *prāṇān* in its own meaning and so one cannot say *jīvati prāṇān*. Similarly, the verb *asti* includes *ātmānam* as *karma* in its own meaning and so one cannot say *asti ātmānam*. *Jīvati* and *asti* are usually explained as *prāṇān dhārayati* and *ātmānam bibharti* respectively which means that *prāṇān* and *ātmānam* are already included in their meaning. If the instrument were included in the meaning of the root *yuj*, one could not say *nyāyenāyuktam*, where the instrument *nyāyena* is used separately. But one can say that, which shows that the instrument is not included in the meaning of the root *yuj*.

457. For the purposes of grammar, the word *ayuktam* is analysed into parts. Really speaking, it is a conventional word which means 'not right', 'not connected'.

[What the author of the *M. Bhā.* means here is that the word *ayuktam* is an indivisible word. There is no root in it denoting the action of uniting (*yujikriyā*), so that there is no point in looking for a *karaṇa* of that action. In the world, this indivisible word is used in the sense of 'not right', 'not connected', 'unjust' or 'not well-knit'. There is no root *yuj* in it denoting the action of uniting and so one should not look for that with which something is united. That is why the author of the *M. Bhā.* has not mentioned any *karaṇa* (instrument) here.]

458. How can the word expressive of the condition be in a case-ending different from that of the stem? If one were to change the case-ending, one would have to postulate some other scope for what is being changed.

[Why the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* is not acceptable is now pointed out. According to this view, the stem ending in the third case-affix would be the thing to be qualified and, therefore, the main thing. How can the word *kriyā* which denotes action and ends in a different case-affix, namely, the first one be the condition (*upādhi*)? They are not in apposition to each other. Only that which is in apposition to another can be its *upādhi*. One sees this apposition in the case of the *upādhis* mentioned in P. 3.2.25; 4.2.24 and 4.2.57. Here on the other hand, the *upādhi*, namely, *kriyā* is in the first case-ending whereas that of which it is the *upādhi* is in the third case-ending which is not right. Nor can the difficulty be got over by changing the first case-ending to the third one at the time of interpretation, because the use of the first case-ending in the *sūtra* would become useless. One would have to postulate some scope for it elsewhere, which is not easy.

459. That which has a particular case-ending in one place may be inferred to have another case-ending in another context.

460. Because of resemblance, it would be recognised to be the same word...

[If the case-ending actually used in a particular place has already played its part there, it can be changed if necessary in another place to suit the new context. As the stem would remain the same, the word with the changed case-ending would be recognised as the same. But this change of case-ending is not allowed in the original place where it is taught. This process of change is called *ūha* by the Mīmāṃsakas in their *sāstra* and it takes place only in connection with *vikṛtiyāgas*. In Grammar also, it can take place in a similar manner. For ins-

tance, in P. 1.3.1., the word *dhātavaḥ* ends in the first case-ending and the *sūtra* is interpreted with that very case-ending. Thus, that case-ending has played its part in that *sūtra*. When the word *dhātu* is brought into the later *sūtras*, to complete their meaning, the first case-ending may not fit there. For instance, in P. 1.3.12. the word *dhātu* is brought in to complete the meaning but now the fifth case-ending is added to it. Sometimes, though rarely, the case-ending actually used may be actually meant to stand for others also. For instance, in P. 1.1.56., the word *analvidhau* is a compound in which the term *al-vidhi* has been deliberately used in the following senses: *alaḥ-parasya vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *alo vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *ali vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*, *alā vidhiḥ* = *al-vidhiḥ*. But that is not the case here. Here the word *kriyā* must be interpreted with its first case-ending.]

461. If, from the word *tena*, the stem is understood as ending in the third case-affix, how can the word *kriyā* be in the first case-affix ?

[A change of case-ending has been shown to be impossible. How can there be any connection when there is difference in case-ending ?]

462. With the use of which word is one to postulate the form *kriyayā* ending in the third case-affix ? It has no connection with the word *tena* found in the *sūtra*.

[Even if the case-ending is changed, the word *kriyayā* thus obtained would not agree with the word *tena* found in the *sūtra* because of difference in gender. With which word to be used would the word *kriyayā* agree ?]

After having pointed out the difficulty in connecting the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* with *tena*, it is now shown how it can be got over.

463. As the *sūtras* are meant to be completed (*sopaskāreṣu*), the required portion is brought into

the (explanatory) sentence. Thus one understands as follows : 'if what ends in the third case-affix is expressive of an action.'

[As usually there is no verb in the *sūtras*, it has to be supplied according to the requirements of the context. The word *cet* in the *sūtra* enables us to complete its sense as follows : *yat tattṛtīyāsamarthaṇi kriyā cet sō bhavati* = "if what ends in the third case-affix is (expressive of) an action." (M. Bhā. II, p. 363, l. 11.). In this way, a connection between *kriyā* and *tena* results. There is no need to change the case-ending in the *sūtra* itself. The change can be made in the sentence which explains the *sūtra*. The word *tena* in the *sūtra* only tells us that the stem for the suffix *vatī* ends in the third case-affix. The word *cet* enables us to change it in the explanation according to the word expressive of the condition (*upādhi*).]

It is now shown that the condition for the operation of a grammatical rule is not always indicated in the same way.

464. Sometimes the word expressive of the condition (*upādhi*) is actually used in the (explanatory) sentence. Sometimes, it is not mentioned but left to be understood.

[In P. 4.2.57, the words *tad asyām praharaṇam* is an imitation, in a general way, of sentences like : *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam asyām krīḍāyām* = 'a game in which a stick is the implement', *muṣṭiḥ praharaṇam asyām krīḍāyām* = 'a game in which the fist is the implement.' In these sentences the words expressive of the implements are put in the same case-ending as the word *tat* in the *sūtra* and the word expressive of the game is put in the same case-ending as the word *asyām* in the *sūtra*. The implement and the game constitute the condition (*upādhi*). For the use of the suffix *ṇa* taught in this *sūtra* and found in the words *daṇḍā* and *muṣṭā* formed by this *sūtra*. The *upādhi* is put in the same case-ending in the *sūtra* as the one found in the explanatory sentences. The adoption of this parallelism (*samānaśabda*) is one way of indicating the *upādhi*. Another way of indicating it is not

to mention it at all in the explanatory sentence but to leave it to be understood. Nor to have an imitation of it in the *sūtra*. That is the case here in P. 5.1.115. In explaining the expression *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*, formed by this *sūtra*, one says: *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte (kṣattriyaḥ)* = 'the *kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*'. In this explanatory sentence, the action of studying is not presented as connected with *brāhmaṇa*. It is left to be understood. This is another legitimate way of indicating an *upādhi*. One cannot therefore object to the word *kriyā*, expressive of the *upādhi*, being put in the first case-affix, because connection can be shown by means of the completing sentence (*vākyādhyāhāra*).]

An illustration of where the *upādhi* is left to be understood is now given.

465. In the sentence *nīlam utpalam*, no word expressive of the relation (*taddharma*) has been used either with the qualified or with the qualifier.

[In the sentence *nīlam utpalam*, which explains the compound *nīlotpalam*, one understands from the apposition of the words to each other, their relation of qualifier and qualified, though the words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* have not been used in the sentence. These two words are used only in the *sūtra* P. 2.1.57.]

466. As it (the relation) is fully understood, no purpose is served by change of case-ending in the *sūtra* or in the explanatory sentence.

[As the relation of qualifier and qualified is implied and understood, there has been no change of the third case-ending found in the *sūtra* into the first case-ending in the explanatory sentence shown above. From the apposition of the two words to each other itself, it is understood. As the words *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* are not used in the sentence at all, these two words found in the *sūtra* are not imitations. Therefore, the third case-ending of the *sūtra* has not been changed into the first case-ending in

the sentence. In such cases, there is no question of change of case-ending.]

This analogy is now applied to the case under discussion.

467. In the explanatory sentence the word *kriyā* ending in the third case-affix is not used but in the other case, the words of *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam* and *kriḍāyām* are seen.

[In the explanatory sentence: *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte kṣatt-riyaḥ*, the word *kriyayā* with its third case-ending is not used. The action (*adhīte*), mentioned as related to the object of comparison, is understood as related to the standard of comparison also. Otherwise, the relation, namely, *upamānopameya-bhāva*, would not result. So this is not a case of change of the third case-ending into the first case-ending in the *sūtra* because the third case-ending is not found in the sentence at all. All that has happened is that the *upādhi* (*kriyā*) is mentioned somehow in the *sūtra*. In the sentence: *daṇḍaḥ praharaṇam asyāṃ kriḍāyām*, on the other hand, the word *praharaṇam*, expressive of the *upādhi*, is actually used. Without it, one would not understand that the stick (*daṇḍaḥ*) is the implement in the game. The use of the word *praharaṇam* in P. 4. 2. 57. is, therefore, an imitation of it.]

A more appropriate illustration is now given.

468. In the *sūtra* which teaches the suffix *gha*, the word *saṃjñāyām* has been used but it is never found in actual usage.

[In P. 3. 3. 118 where the suffix *gha* is taught, the word *saṃjñāyām* is given in order to indicate the condition (*upādhi*). It means that the suffix *gha* is added provided that the word so formed is a name. But, in actual usage, it is never mentioned because it is understood without it. Similarly, the word *kriyayā* is not used in the explanatory sentence.]

469. If the words expressive of the condition, even without being mentioned in usage, can qualify the main meanings, they are used even with different case-endings.

[One cannot argue that the qualifier should follow the qualified and so the word *kriyā* in P. 5. 1. 115 should be changed to *kriyayā* to agree with *tena* which stands for the qualified. If, even without any such change, the qualifier can perform its function of rendering service to the qualified, there is no need to make any change. The only purpose of the qualifier is to exclude other things (*vyavaccheda*) and that can happen even if the case-ending is not changed. Secondly, even if the case-ending is changed, difference of gender would remain. The conclusion is that no matter how the condition is mentioned, it could perform its function.]

470. Words stand for a combination of associated qualities and that when neither option (*vikalpa*) nor addition (*samuccaya*) is meant.

[In order to explain how an action-word can end in the third case-affix, the *M. Bhā* (II. p. 363, l. 12. 13) states that a word like *brāhmaṇa* stands for a combination of qualities like fair colour, clean conduct, reddish-brown hair etc. associated with birth in a particular caste. Even though these qualities may not be invariably present, still they are expressed by the word which denotes that caste. The close association of these qualities with a caste is what is meant here. In this way, there would be no confusion. A word like *brāhmaṇa* denotes only qualities associated with a particular caste, even though it stands for a combination. What is meant by combination is that neither option (*vikalpa*) nor addition (*samuccaya*) is meant to be conveyed.]

471. In case adding up takes place when words stand for each item separately, then they would take a number depending upon multiplicity.

[Option may be opposed to combination but adding up amounts to the conveying of many meanings at the same time. Why should it be opposed to combination? What is meant is this: If the word can express each item of the combination separately, the combination would be conveyed by adding up the items. If all the items are conveyed as equals, they would be conveyed by being added up. Then, multiplicity being fully manifest, the word would take the plural number, like the word *vrkṣāḥ*. When the multiplicity is hidden, then the singular number would be used as in *vanam*. But then, there would be no adding up which is based on multiplicity. Similarly here, if the word stands for combination, it cannot stand for adding up.]

The difference between this view and the view that the meaning of a word is the substance qualified by the universal is now stated.

472. Cognitions of hearers take place which are qualified by all the associated things. Therefore they are all said to be the meaning of the word.

[In cognition, objects figure as characterised by the universal qualities and actions and as words convey objects as cognised, from them also objects are similarly cognised. That is why a combination of these things is said to be the meaning of a word. As purposive action is applied to substance, that is the main meaning of a word but as qualified by the universal etc. As the whole thing is one, the singular number is used. In the view that substance is the meaning of a word, what is meant is substance in which the universal inheres. As such a substance cannot be devoid of action and quality, these latter are also understood. In this view, on the other hand, they all come within the range of the word. That is the difference.]

473. In the cognitions, all the helpful things are connected with one another and so the word is expressive of all of them such as they figure in the cognition.

[The external object, in its very nature, is a qualified thing. Nobody speaks about it as a combination of separate things. But as such it does not come within the range of cognition. Due to our eternal predisposition, it is divided into parts, each being cognised separately. Thus it is in cognition that the elements universal, action, quality and substance figure separately and then join. This is what is meant by combination (*samudāya*) Words which convey what is cognised identify it with the external object. Thus words are said to be expressive of the combination of elements that figure in the cognition. As in the external object, in the cognition also, the different elements stand in the relation of primary and secondary to one another and so the word conveys substance as qualified by the universal, action and quality.]

474. The form of bare objects cannot be cognised and a word cannot express them if their form is not cognised.

[As expression through words is preceded by cognition and as the bare substance is not cognised in this view it is the substance as characterised by its properties that is expressed by the word. Words expressive of a combination can express one of the elements also. That is why *pūrve pañcālāḥ* = 'the eastern *Pañcāla*' is given as an illustration. The word *pañcālāḥ* means a country and a country being one, it cannot be qualified by the word *pūrve*. So here the word expressive of the whole is used for a part of it.]

475. As the word *pūrva* is used, the word does not cease to express combination nor does it express a part. Nowhere does a word abandon what is established.

[The relation between word and meaning being eternal, the word *pañcālāḥ* here does not give up its meaning because of the use of the word *pūrve*. Nor does it become expressive of a part. Giving up an established meaning and conveying a new meaning, this is not desired as far as words are concerned.]

476. If, while expressing the whole it qualifies the part, then difference of case-ending would result as in *pūrvakāya*.

[As a country is one, the word *pūva* cannot qualify it. And yet the two words are connected. If, in order to explain the connection, it is held that the word expressive of the whole qualifies a part, then it would take the sixth case-affix as in *pūvaṃ kāyasya*. Thus difference of case-ending would result. One would have to say *pañcālānāṃ pūvaḥ*. While the two words are in apposition to each other, the word *pañcālāḥ* cannot give up its meaning, namely, the whole country. It can denote a part only because the whole has been superimposed on the part.]

477. One does see the use of the *pañcālāḥ* for the whole or for the part. That is how the use of the adjective *sarva* (all, the whole) becomes explicable.

[If the word *pañcālāḥ* the name of a country, is looked upon as a derivable word (*vyutpanna*) on the basis of being a place of residence, then the whole of the country as well as a part of it can be the place of residence of its masters (*svāmiviśeṣāṇām*). A country is not a whole like the body, it is more like the whole called forest. The whole with all its parts cannot be seen at the same time. It becomes a place of residence through its parts and becomes connected with action also in the same way, as in *pañcālān praviṣṭaḥ*. So the word becomes applicable to the whole as well as to a part. If it is not a derivable word, then also it can be applied to both. So there is no question of abandoning or taking anything. Just because the word can denote both, the adjective *sarva* (all) is sometimes used with it in order to avoid ambiguity.]

The support of the author of the *M. Bhā.* for this view is now pointed out.

478. Thus, in the compound *ardhapippalī* which means *ardhaṃ ca pippalī ca*, the word *pippalī* stands for a part and serves to exclude other universals.

[The compound *ardhapippalī* (P. 2. 2. 2.) has been explained in the *M. Bhā.*, as *ardhaṃ ca sā pippalī cārdhapippalī* (*M. Bhā.* I. p. 479. l. 14.). That means that the word *pippalī* which normally stands for the whole has been used for a part. It is a word expressive of the universal and the universal exists in a part also irrespective of its size. Whether this compound is interpreted as formed out of words standing in apposition to each other as shown above or out of words not standing in apposition to each other as in *ardhaṃ pippalyāḥ = ardhapippalī*, the word *pippalī* stands for a particular universal and would therefore, exclude other universals.]

479. A part of the Pañcāla country is also different from other countries. So when the word is used to exclude other countries, the difference (between the whole and the part) is not cognised.

[Just as the whole of Pañcāla country is different from other countries, so is a part of it like a village. So when the word is used to exclude other countries, the difference between the whole and the part is not cognised.]

480. They are especially known as standing for the whole and it is through purpose (*artha*) context etc., that they are ascertained as denoting the part.

[Even though the whole and the part are conveyed by the word, a word like *pañcālaḥ* is known as standing for the whole and it is from the context that it is ascertained to stand for the part.]

481-482. Words like *brāhmaṇa* stand for that which manifests the universal (*brāhmaṇatva*), which is invariably associated with certain acts, which is understood, through established convention, to possess certain qualities, irrespective of whether it is a combination of them or only a part, without any difference.

[Similarly words like *brāhmaṇa* also denote a combination as well as a part. They denote that which manifests the universal (*brāhmaṇatva*) and is perfected by such ceremonies as *upana-yana* which is invariably associated with such acts as performing sacrifices and officiating at sacrifices, which is endowed with qualities like clean conduct, faith, learning, gentleness, truthfulness, freedom from rancour etc. In the first instance, because of established convention, they stand for a combination of all of them. But, when they are used to exclude other universals than *brāhmaṇatva*, the question of combination or part does not arise and so the word can stand for a part also. That it stands for a part is understood from the context and so it is a kind of secondary meaning.]

483. A word is found to be expressive of a part also, when, due to similarity of sound and form, it is identified with what stands for the combination.

[What the *M. Bhā.* means by saying that words expressive of the combination can denote a part also (*M. Bhā.* II. p. 363, l.17.) is that because of similarity of sound and form, the two are looked upon as one. It is not meant that a word gives up the meaning of combination and denotes a part. That would result in the non-eternality of meaning which is not accepted.]

The other example given in the *M. Bhā.* passage namely *tailaṃ bhuktam, ghṛtaṃ bhuktam* is now explained.

484. Here the word expressive of the universal is understood, by the very nature of things as standing for medicated or polluted oil etc., of a definite quantity.

[By the word *taila*-oil and *ghṛta*-clarified butter, what is meant here is a definite quantity of medicated oil or clarified butter. As this quantity consists of so many small units of measurement, it may be looked upon as a combination of them. Or it may mean a limited quantity of oil or clarified butter polluted by some animal like a dog. The word should not be taken to stand for the universal and therefore, capable of denoting the

whole or a part as the universal inheres in both. As it stands for medicated stuff, the dose taken everyday is felt to be the same and thus the word stands for a part also. The same applies to what is polluted.]

How this is the meaning of the *Bhāṣyakāra* is now shown.

485. In the case of universal and quality words, difference in the size of the object is not relevant. They are only based on the distinction resulting from their connection with the universal or quality.

[Words expressive of the universal or of a quality are applied to objects irrespective of their size or quantity. Their purpose is only to distinguish them from others on the basis of the universal or a quality. Measurement words like *droṇa*, on the other hand, stand for objects having a definite size or quantity. If words like *taila* merely stand for the universal they could denote both the whole and the part equally well. That is why the author of the *Bhāṣya* has used it in the sense of medicated or polluted oil.]

In the same context *śuklaḥ*, *nīlaḥ*, *kṛṣṇaḥ* are given as examples. That is now explained.

486. Epithets like black are applied when the quality (blackness) pervades all the parts. Sometimes, they are used as qualifiers of objects like a piece of cloth when the quality in question is found in a part only.

[It has already been stated that quality words can be applied to objects irrespective of their size. Normally, of course, an epithet like 'black' is applied to an object when all its parts are black. Sometimes, however, even when only a part of it is black, the whole is called black, especially to exclude objects which are not even partly black.]

487. When words like cloth are used for a part then like the words 'oil' etc. they are said to be words expressive of the universal.

[When a piece of cloth a part of which is black is said to be black, there are two possibilities : (1) What is wholly black is superimposed on the part that is black, (2) the word cloth itself stands only for a part and the word black denotes primarily the black part which is entirely black. The word cloth really stands for the whole but here it is used for a part only, especially when it is used to exclude other universals. The word *bhukta* should be understood here as used when the part is superimposed on the whole, if one can see that an action-word like *bhukta* has an object of limited quantity. When there is doubt as to whether the medicated or polluted oil has been eaten and when one says, in order to make sure that it has been eaten, 'the oil has been eaten,' there is no intention to emphasise the whole or the part and so the word expressive of the whole can denote the part. So the position is this: when the cloth is primarily meant, then the word 'white' denotes the part; when the white part is primarily meant, then the word cloth stands for the part. The same applies to the expression: 'the oil has been eaten.' Similarly, in a statement meant to exclude other countries, the use of the word *Pañcālāḥ* for a part is a case of primary usage.]

488. Words whose mention is for the sake of excluding others, the distinction (between whole or part) is irrelevant in their case, whether used for the whole or for the part, the quality word would exclude others.

[Where the purpose of the statement is the exclusion of others, there the difference between the whole and the part is irrelevant and a quality-word like black, whether it denotes the whole or a part, does exclude other things and such a use of it is primary use.]

489. The word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa* and its resemblance to the act of studying of a *kṣattriya* and others can be seen.

[In this stanza, the application of the illustrations given to the present case is shown. In the expression: *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*

kṣattriyah, the act of studying is mentioned in connection with the object of comparison (*upameya*) and that is why resemblance is understood. Therefore, here, the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes the act of studying only. As the word primarily stands for the combination of qualities like austerity, learning, birth etc. its application to the act of studying only is secondary usage. So the suffix *vati* is added to the word *brāhmaṇa* which denotes the act of studying and ends in the third case-affix.]

It is now stated that this view is not right.

490. If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa*, then one would have to say on the basis of which attribute there is resemblance between the two acts.

[If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes the act of studying only, then the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* would be between the two acts of studying and not between the two persons who study. One would then have to state the common property like excellence of the two acts of studying. Once that is done, the act of studying would cease to be an action it would become a thing, capable of being referred to by a pronoun. Then the condition for the addition of the suffix *vati*, namely, that the stem should be expressive of action and end in the third case-affix would remain unfulfilled.]

The author now states his own view which is the accepted one.

491. When it is held that the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes one who studies, then the action which exists in such a person who studies, becomes the basis (of the comparison).

[As it is not possible to have a pure action-word ending in the third case-affix a word expressive of substance, qualified by action, is understood as the stem. The word *brāhmaṇa*, though expressive of a combination, is here understood as standing for substance (that is, a person) characterised by the act of studying, a part of that combination. So the suffix *vati* is added

to the word *brāhmaṇa* ending in the third case-affix and denoting a person qualified by the act of studying and we get the expression: *brāhmaṇavad adhīte (kṣattriyaḥ)* from which we understand the relation of *upamāna* and *upamāya* between *brāhmaṇa* and *kṣattriya* on the basis of the act of studying actually mentioned.]

Somebody points out the difficulty in another way.

492. When the word *caitra*, if it denotes courage only, is connected with the word *siṃha* it would take the sixth case-ending as when it is connected with words like *śaurya*.

[If the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying, a difficulty would arise. If the word *siṃha* = 'a lion' were to denote courage only, then when it is connected with a name like *Caitra*, the sixth case-ending would have to be added to the latter word and we would get the expression *Caitrasya siṃhaḥ*, which is not desired. It would be like saying *Caitrasya śauryam*. But if the word *siṃha* were to denote one who is courageous, then we could put the two words in apposition to each other and say *Caitraḥ siṃhaḥ*, the standard and the object of comparison being identified with each other.]

Another difficulty is now pointed out.

493. If the word (*brāhmaṇa*) stands for action only in expressions like : "One should give to a *vaiśya* as to a *Brāhmaṇa*" its association with the functions of Recipient (*Sampradāna*) etc. would be inexplicable.

[If it is held that the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes only the act of studying, then one cannot have expressions like: *brāhmaṇavad vaiśyāya dātavyam*, *brāhmaṇavad vaiśyād adhyetavyam*, *brāhmaṇavad vaiśye varitavyam*, because a mere action cannot fulfil the functions of *saṃpradāna*, *apādāna* and *adhikaraṇa*. One cannot study from the *brāhmaṇa*'s act of studying. But if the word denotes a person who studies, all these expressions would be possible.]

It is now stated that this view is also opposed to the *Bhāṣya*.

494. If they denote pure action, it would not be necessary to include words ending in the suffix *vati* in the list of indeclinables.

[Words ending in the suffix *vati* have been included in the list of indeclinables referred to in P. 1.1.37. This cannot be justified, according to the *M. Bhā.* if, words like *brāhmaṇa* are taken to denote pure action, and the word *kriyā* in p. 5.1.115. is taken as a qualifier of the stem. It can be justified only in the view that the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix and that it means, not pure action, but one who acts.]

The author now concludes his view.

495. Therefore, while denoting a part, word does not abandon the universal or substance. As the word *kriyā* (action) is actually mentioned, the word stands for what has action.

[The difficulty which results if the word *brāhmaṇa* is taken to denote pure action has been pointed out. Even if it stands only for a part of the combination it does not abandon the universal or the substance. The universal comes in here as the standard of comparison. As the word *kriyā* is mentioned as a qualifier of the meaning of the stem, the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes substance qualified by action. The other associated attributes are ignored.]

496. Since the mention of the word *kriyā* here is to exclude that which is not action the word is understood to stand for that which is characterised by action.

[As a word expressive of pure action cannot end in the third case-affix the word *kriyā* mentioned here to exclude other things stands for that which has action. When the primary meaning of the word, namely, action, is not suitable, it would denote its secondary meaning, as one has seen the word *Gaṅgā* do.]

What about words like *hotavya* which denote pure action?

497. As in *hotavya* etc. another action has to be postulated just as in the case of the word *brāhmaṇa*, therefore, none of these words stands for pure action.

[Just as, when one says *brahmaṇavad*, some action has to be postulated as the common property, in the same way, in the expression: *brāhmaṇahotavyena sadṛśaṃ kṣattriyahotavyam* = 'the *kṣattriya*'s act of sacrificing is like the *brāhmaṇa*'s act of sacrificing, some other action has to be postulated as the common property. Thus words like *hotavya* are like *brāhmaṇa*, expressive of substance. If the action denoted by *hotavya* becomes the substratum of some other property, it ceases to be action and becomes a thing. So it is right to understand that which has action, if pure action is not suitable.]

498. Where a word is used for the combination or a part, it has been said to be expressive of the particular which is based on difference.

[Whether a word denotes the combination or only a part of it, it is said to be expressive of the particular. When it is used for a part, it excludes the other parts and thus it stands for the particular. When it is used for the combination, even then, it does not denote all the parts and thus again, it stands for the particular. So, from the word *brāhmaṇa* which really stands for the combination, a part only, namely, substance qualified by action is understood, why it cannot be pure action has already been explained. As the word denotes substance having action, through the latter, resemblance is understood.]

If, in any case, the word stands for the particular what is it that is *sāmānyavacana*, expressive of the common feature?

499. Whether it be accumulation, or alternation or all the parts taken together, they are said to be particulars and so is the undifferentiated generic feature.

[Whether all the parts are expressed one after another to be added up or in turn as alternatives, words are expressive of the particular. The different parts may be on the same level or they may be alternatives or they may be related as primary and secondary. These are the three possibilities. In all of them, some parts are excluded and so in all of them, the word stands for the particular. Even the very general, when presented as the main thing, is as good as the particular, as it excludes the particulars. This is what the *M. Bhā.* means by saying: *sāmānyam api yathā viśeṣas tadvat* = 'even the general is as good as the particular' (*M. Bhā.* I, p. 422, l. 5.)]

As it is through action or quality that something becomes the standard of comparison, what happens when the word is expressive of the combination?

500. The word *brāhmaṇa* does not refer to any part nor does it exclude any. So it denotes the combination.

[Unless the context tells us otherwise, the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the combination. No part is excluded. Thus the word denotes action and quality also. They can therefore become the basis of the comparison. So even by being expressive of the combination, a word can stand for the standard of comparison.]

If a part is to be conveyed, some effort should be made for the purpose.

501. Where an action is resorted to, there that part is understood. If (other words are) not used, neither that nor any other nor all would be there.

[Where an action is the common property, there it becomes the expressed meaning of the word which stands for the combination. In the sentence *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte* = 'he studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the act of studying is the common point. This is understood from the presence of the other words in the sentence. So the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes that part of the combination. If

other words are not used, neither that part, nor any other part nor all the parts would be understood. Therefore, in a comparison, it is through some effort like the use of other words in the sentence that a word which ordinarily stands for a combination denotes a part.]

502. The mention of the verb in relation to the object of comparison makes known that the standard of comparison is an action and thus the word becomes expressive of a part.

[In *brāhmaṇavad adhīte Kṣattriyaḥ* = the *Kṣattriya* studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the action of studying, mentioned in relation to the *kṣattriya* indicates that the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for the act of studying. The relation of standard and object of comparison depends upon a common property and so here the action is common to both. Thus, the word expressive of the *upamāna* stands for a part. It is not that the verb mentioned in relation to the *upameya* expresses the action present in the *upamāna*, but from it we understand that the *upamāna* stands for an action.]

503. When resemblance of an action to another action is meant, then the suffix is added to a stem expressive of that which has action.

[In the sentence : *brāhmaṇādhyāyanena tulyaṃ kṣattriyaādhyāyanam* = 'the act of studying of a *kṣattriya* is like the act of studying of a *brāhmaṇa*, two actions are presented as resembling each other. Action becomes the substratum of a common property like excellence (*śauṣṭhava*). It is the meaning of the stem and is like a substance (*dravyāyamānā*). The suffix *vali* is added to the stem expressive of substance qualified by action.]

504. When the resemblance of what has action to another thing having action is meant to be conveyed as in *adhyetā brāhmaṇa iva* = 'one who studies is like a *brāhmaṇa*, then the suffix is not inapplicable.

[Why words ending in *vati* are included in the list of indeclinables (*svarādi*) is now explained. When two substances qualified by action are related as *upamāna* and *upameya* as in *brāhmaṇena tulyo' adhyetā, brāhmaṇa ivāyaṃ kṣattriyo' adhyetā* = 'this, *kṣattriya* is one who studies like a *brāhmaṇa*, the suffix would not be inapplicable and so one would say *brāhmaṇavat*, which is an undesired form. The word thus formed being expressive of substance (*sattva*) it would be liable to take gender and number and so it has to be included in the list of indeclinables, as, otherwise, it cannot become one].

505. If the meaning is 'one who has action', one would use the masculine gender as in *adhīte tulyaḥ* = 'the one who resembles, studies'. If action is the meaning, the word *tulya* would be in the neuter gender.

[If *vati* is interpreted as having been taught when two substances qualified by action resemble each other, then they being *sattva*, the word *tulya* would take their gender as in *brāhmaṇena tulyo' dhīte kṣattriyaḥ* = 'the *kṣattriya* who resembles a *brāhmaṇa*, studies'. But then one would not necessarily understand that resemblance is based on action. One can also understand that the *kṣattriya*, resembling a *brāhmaṇa* in some other respect, studies. Thus, as resemblance between actions is not understood, the word would not take the suffix *vati*. But, if resemblance is due to action, then the suffix would be added. Then the word *tulya* would refer to action which is *asattva* and would take the common gender, namely, the neuter, as in *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte*, and one would necessarily understand that the resemblance is due to action and the suffix *vati* would be added. As the word so formed would have no special gender, it would naturally become an indeclinable without being included in the list.]

506. Even if the meaning of the stem is qualified (by the word *kriyā*), that of the suffix is not and so

a complex formation (*vṛtti*) by the addition of the suffix *vati* would become possible in the sense of *putreṇa tulyaḥ kapilaḥ*.

[Another difficulty in the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*, pointed out in the *M. Bhā.* II, p. 63, l. 21, namely that the suffix *vati* could be added to a word in the third case-ending expressive of action in the sense of resemblance in some quality, is now explained. As the word *kriyā* is mentioned only once in the *sūtra*, after qualifying the stem, it becomes exhausted, and does not qualify the meaning of the suffix and so the suffix could be added to a word ending in the third case-affix when there is resemblance in respect of some quality. One would say *putravat kapilaḥ* in the sense of *putreṇa tulyaḥ kapilaḥ*. But this is not desired.]

But how is the word *putra* an action-word ?

507. To the word *putra*, the meaning of which is qualified by actions which are meant to be conveyed by the word in the world, the suffix could be added when there is resemblance in respect of some quality.

[In the world, one who obeys his father, continues the family line and behaves well is commonly called a 'son'. In other words, the word *putra*, like the word *brāhmaṇa*, stands for a combination of actions like obeying one's father and so on. To that word, expressive of a part of the combination and qualified by action, the suffix would be liable to be added. But that is not desired.]

508. Even though in pure conventional words, there may be a hidden basis of formation (*nimitta*), there are some actions, invariably associated with the word and accepted in the world like the meaning of the word itself.

[The word *putra* is usually explained as 'one who protects the parents from the hell called *put*.' Disregarding that, why is

it explained on the basis of actions like obeying the parents etc.? The fact is that the word is a pure conventional word (*rūḍhi*). Its etymological meaning, if any, is disregarded and the meaning associated with it in usage is taken into consideration. In worldly usage, nobody is called a son because he protects his parents from any kind of hell. It is on the basis of actions like obedience that the word is applied in the world.

[Thus the difficulty pointed out above remains.]

To meet the difficulty, another interpretation is proposed.

509. By disregarding sequence, the word (*kriyā*) would become the qualifier of the meaning of the suffix, because it would then serve what is dominant and because of the same-ness of the case-ending.

[In view of the difficulties pointed out, it is proposed that the word *kriyā* in the *sūtra* P. 5.1.115. should be taken as a qualifier of the meaning of the suffix referred to by the word *tulyam*. The word *tena* no doubt comes first in the *sūtra* but that consideration would come under the authority called *krama* (sequence). But stronger than that is direct statement which would include sameness of case-ending. *Tulyam* and *kriyā* are in the same case-ending (*samāna vibhakti*). Secondly, the meaning of the suffix is the dominant one. So it is better to take the word *kriyā* as a qualifier of *tulyam* which stands for the meaning of the suffix. This would also save one from the necessity of resorting to *adhyāhāra* = bringing in what is not mentioned in the *sūtra* to explain it. This is what one had to do in the *prakṛtyarthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.]

It is now stated that in this new interpretation also the same difficulty would arise.

510. As the stem would not be qualified, an undesired form in the reverse order [would result, that is,] the suffix would be added to words expressive of

quality when the son etc. resemble in respect of some action.

[If the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix as proposed it would not qualify the meaning of the stem and so the *sūtra* would mean that to a word denoting quality (not action) the suffix *vati* can be added when the resemblance is based on action. We could say *sthūlavat putraḥ* in the sense of *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ*. But this is not desired. See M. Bhā. II. p. 363, l. 23-24.]

511. In *sthūlena tulyo yāti*, the mention of the action is external and so it is not the cause of the addition of *vati*. But *vati* is desired when the sentence is *tulyam yāti*.

[Some hold the view that no example is given in the M. Bhā itself for the second interpretation and that *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ* is not a good example. Instead of that, they propose *sthūlena tulyo yāti* as the example. But this is not alright either, because the suffix cannot be added even here. Here *yāti* is in apposition to the masculine word *tulyaḥ*. Therefore resemblance due to action is not necessarily understood. The sentence *sthūlena tulyo yāti* can mean : 'One (say Devadatta), similar in fatness, goes. Once the first two words are connected, one is understood as similar in fatness and the occasion for adding the suffix *vati* has arisen. The action denoted by the verb which follows cannot be the occasion. It is understood from another word and is, therefore, something external (*bahiraṅga*) and cannot be the basis of comparison. Thus, there is no difference between *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ* and *sthūlena tulyo yāti*. When the sentence is *sthūlena tulyam yāti*, the verb is in apposition to a neuter word and the action becomes the dominant meaning. It being *asattva*, the word *tulyam* is naturally in the neuter gender. Now the suffix *vati* can be added to the word *sthūla* and we can say *sthūlavat yāti*. Here at the very time that the words expressive of the stem and the suffix are connected, an action actually expressed by the word is understood. It is therefore, *antaraṅga* as in *brāhmaṇavad adhīte*.]

512. That which is mentioned as the qualifier of one would qualify both. The word *tulya* presupposes that the property in question exists in both.

[To remove this difficulty which has been shown to be the same in both the interpretations, *M. Bhā.* II, p. 364, l. 1-2, shows the following way :—

The word *kriyā*, though mentioned only as the qualifier in relation to one, would be understood as the qualifier of both the meaning of the stem and that of the suffix. The word *tulya* denotes resemblance which always presupposes two things. That word would make us understand that the qualifier exists in both.]

513. It is only when the standard and the object of comparison have the same property that one can explain the word *tulya* as that which has been compared (weighed) in the balance.

[It has been said in the *M. Bhā.* passage referred to above that what has been weighed, compared (*sammitam*) in the balance (*tulayā*) is *tulya*. The action of weighing or comparing is implied in the word *tulya*. Just as the balance determines or measures something, in the same way, the common attribute determines or compares something to another. So though the common attribute is mentioned only in regard to one, it is understood in regard to the other also. Even when it is mentioned as the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it becomes the qualifier of the meaning of the suffix also. Nothing can be similar to an action except another action.]

514. What is mentioned in the *sūtra* is understood as existing in both identically. An action not actually mentioned is not understood (from the word *putra*) because it is a common word.

[Even though mentioned only in regard to one, the word *kriyā* is understood as related to both. Where no word expressive of action is mentioned at all, there the suffix *vatī* cannot be added at all as in *putreṇa tulyaḥ sthūlaḥ*, *sthūlena tulyaḥ putraḥ*. The word *putra* cannot be looked upon as such a word, because it may denote one that has action or one that has not equally well. So it is a *sāmānyaśabda*, a common word.]

515. Well-known properties like obedience, not actually mentioned, are understood (in a general way) but not any particular one from words like *putra*.

[From the word *putra* actions like obeying the words of parents are understood because of being well-known in worldly usage. As there is no word directly expressive of them, they are understood only in a general way from the word *putra*. No particular action is understood and that is why the suffix *vatī* cannot be added in such cases.]

516. Therefore, nothing that is devoid of action is similar to something which has action. It is only when action is actually mentioned that something having action is understood.

[As, in the two sentences given above (514) there is no verb, no particular common action is understood. Therefore, no relation of *upamāna* and *upameya* based on an action is understood. Hence the suffix *vatī* cannot be used there.]

Even though the common difficulty which arises in the two interpretations has thus been removed, the *M. Bhā.* shows a distinct preference for the *pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa*.

517. As the difficulty in both has been removed the preferability of taking (the word *kriyā*) as a qualifier of the meaning of the suffix is stated on the ground that the suffix is invariably expressive of something which is non-substance.

[After having removed the difficulty which arises in both the interpretations it is stated that the second interpretation, namely, the *pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* is preferable because according to it, the suffix necessarily expresses an action which is *asattva* and therefore, the word is devoid of gender and number, that is, an indeclinable. No special effort in the form of including it in the list of indeclinables need be made.]

This is further explained.

518. As the suffix denotes pure action which is non-substance, there is no need to take the word *kriyā* in a secondary sense.

[This is further explained : According to this view, the suffix denotes pure action and not substance having action. In the first view where the word *kriyā* is taken as the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it is understood as standing for substance having action (not pure action) because otherwise there cannot be apposition to a word ending in the third case-affix (*tena*). Here it can denote pure action and so there is no need to resort to a secondary meaning when the primary meaning fits. So, as the suffix is expressive of pure action, it automatically becomes an indeclinable, without having to be included in any list.]

519. As, according to the view that it (the word *kriyā*) is the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, it is that which has action that is taken as the meaning of the stem, if the comparison is with pure action, it is established that the word is expressive of non-substance.

[According to the view that the word *kriyā* is the qualifier of the meaning of the stem, the latter is that which has action (and not pure action) and the object of comparison expressed by the suffix is action itself. Thus the word formed denotes a

meaning which is not pure substance and it therefore, becomes automatically an indeclinable.]

520. When two things having action resemble each other in action, then, that which has action being the expressed meaning of the word formed, it would naturally be expressive of substance.

[If the view is that the meaning of the suffix is that which has action, then the position would be this :—As in the *sūtra*, the word *tulyam* is used in the neuter gender, it is understood that it is action itself which resembles another. When an action measures another through some such quality as excellence then it is that we have the view that the meaning of the suffix is qualified. When what is compared is that which has action, there are two possibilities : Either that which is intertwined with action is predominant or that which is merely associated with it. If it is the former, then the word in question would naturally be an indeclinable. As the object of comparison is expressed by the verb and as the verb denotes something which is non-substance, it would naturally be indeclinable.]

521. In the other view, a word ending in *vati* would have to be included in the list of indeclinables and the suffix would result even if one wanted to say: *brāhmaṇena samo 'dhyetā* = 'a student similar to a *brāhmaṇa*'

[Words like *svaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 38) denote substance because their meaning can become *karma* or some other accessory according to the context. That is why such words are not included in the list beginning with *ca* which are expressive of non-substance. They are called indeclinables by being included in another list altogether. If a word ending in *vati* expresses substance, it can become indeclinable only by being included in a list. Otherwise, a word expressive of substance cannot be an indeclinable. In the opinion of the three munis, that which does not change its

form is indeclinable and if the word *kriyā* qualifies the meaning of the suffix, the word formed becomes an indeclinable without being included in any list. That is why the *pratya-yārtha viśeṣaṇa-pakṣa* is superior. In the other view, it can become indeclinable only by being included in a list and secondly, the suffix would result even if one wanted to say : *brāhmaṇena tulyo'dhyetā* = 'a student similar to a *brāhmaṇa* student.']

522. Apposition (of the word *kriyā*) with the word *tulyam* expressive of the meaning of *vati* is actually stated. In the other view what is not stated would have to be supplied.

[It is implied in the *M. Bhā.* that the word *tulya* in P. 5.1.115. has the meaning of *vati*. A qualifier is used in order to determine or specify something which is well-known. So the *M. Bhā.* means that the word *kriyā* is in apposition to the word *tulya* which expresses the meaning of *vati*. This is, of course, the case in the *pratya-yārthaviśeṣaṇapakṣa* according to which the *sūtra* is interpreted as : *yat tat tulyam kriyā cet sā bhavati*. Thus the apposition is stated in the *sūtra* itself. In the other view, some kind of apposition has to be brought by supplying what is not in the *sūtra*. One has to interpret as follows—*yat tat tṛtīyāsamarthanam kriyā cet sā bhavati*. In other words, the first case-ending has to be substituted for the third. This is a round-about way, compared to the previous view which is therefore, preferable.]

523. According to the view that it is the meaning of the suffix which is qualified, when the resemblance is between two persons who study as in : *adhyetrā sadṛśo' dhyetā* = 'the student is similar to the student' the suffix *vati* is not taught.

[Another advantage in this view is that the suffix *vati* would not have to be added when the agent is expressed and not action. As action has been qualified as being similar, the suffix would result only when the agent is intertwined with

action and not when he is predominantly substance. The suffix is added when the agent is presented through the verb which is expressive primarily of action as in *brāhmaṇena tulyam adhīte*. Thus, the second view, that is, the *pratyayārthaviśeṣanapakṣa*, is better because in it, the apposition is stated in the *sūtra* itself, there is no need to include the word formed with *vati* in any list of indeclinables and the suffix would not result when the resemblance is between two persons who study.]

Something is now going to be said about the suffix *vati* taught in the sense of *iva* in P.5.1.116. The previous *sūtra* teaches *vati* in the sense of *tulya*. Though *iva* and *tulya* have the same meaning, the previous *sūtra* teaches *vati* after a word ending in the third case-affix and when the resemblance is between two actions and the present *sūtra* teaches it after a word ending in the seventh or sixth case-ending and when the resemblance is between substances or qualities. It would be argued that the previous *sūtra* covers the latter cases also. That argument is now stated.

524. The meaning of the third case-ending taught by P. 2.3.72. does not differ from that of all the other case-endings, even though there is difference in the case-ending itself.

[It is like this. The meaning of the third case-ending taught by P. 2.3.72. does not differ from the meanings of the different case-endings which are used in association with *iva*, even though the case-endings may not be the same. As in the word formed by either *sūtra*, the case-ending is elided, there cannot be any difference in meaning due to the difference in the case-ending. Because of the absence of any essential difference, one might argue that what the later *sūtra* does can be done by the previous *sūtra*.]

This idea is now explained by means of an illustration.

525. *Bhojyate brāhmaṇa iva* is equal to *brāhmaṇena (dvijātīnā) tulyam bhuktam; paśyati brāhmaṇam iva* is equal to *tulyam vipreṇa paśyati*.

526. *brāhmaṇeneva vijñātam* is equal to *tulyaṃ jñātaṃ dvijātinā*; *dīyatām brāhmaṇāyeva* is equal to *tulyaṃ vipreṇa dīyatām*.

527. *brāhmaṇād iva vaiśyāt tvam adhīṣvādhyayanam bahu* is equal to (*vipreṇa tulyaṃ vaiśyāt tvam adhīṣvādhyayanam bahu*). In such examples, the third case-ending is not different from the other case-endings.

[The third case-ending is taught optionally in the sense of a *śeṣa* relation in P. 2.3.72. in association with words expressive of similarity. We can say *tulyo devadattena* or *tulyo devadattasya*. In association with the word *iva*, all the case-endings can be used in the sense of the different accessories (*sādhana*s). As the relation coming under *śeṣa* is the result of a previous *sādhana* relation, the third case-affix indirectly refers to all the *sādhana* relations. Thus there is no essential difference between the two kinds of usage. How what is conveyed by the third case-affix can be conveyed by the other case-endings in association with the word *iva* is seen in the three stanzas translated above. Examples of the sixth and seventh case-affixes are: *brāhmaṇasyeva vaiśyasya dhanam etad upasthitam* is equal to *vipreṇa tulyaṃ vaiśyasya dhanam etad upasthitam* : *guṇā vipra ivātraite kṣattriye bahavaḥ sthitāḥ* is equal to *vipreṇa tulyaṃ tiṣṭhanti kṣattriye bahavo guṇāḥ*.]

A difficulty is here pointed out.

528. In *tulyaṃ madhurayādhiye* = 'I study like Madhurā' and *mātrā tulyaṃ smarāmi tām* = 'I remember her like my mother', how can there be resemblance between Madhurā and mother, on the one hand and the actions mentioned on the other?

[All this was said in order to show that P. 5.1.116 is unnecessary because what it teaches is covered by the previous *sūtra*. But there is a difficulty. The present *sūtra* teaches the suffix *vati* in cases like this : *madhurāyām iva Pāṭaliputra*

adhīye = 'I study in Pāṭaliputra as I do in Madhurā = *madhurāvat Pāṭaliputre adhīye* : *mātur iva Devadattāyāḥ smarāmi* = I remember Devadattā like my mother = *mātrvat Devadattāyāḥ smarāmi*. If such cases are sought to be brought under the previous *sūtra*, the analysis would be : *madhurayā tulyam adhīye* = I study like Madhurā, *mātrā tulyam smarāmi* = I remember like mother. The resemblance would be between Madhurā and the action of studying, and the mother and the action of remembering. But we do not see in Madhurā and mother any action that resembles the act of studying or the action of remembering respectively. Even if it is maintained that the same action, existing in two different substrata, becomes differentiated and the differentiated actions resemble each other, their substrata would be agents and the suffix *vati* would come after words expressive of the agent and not of the abode or of the object (*karma*) as contemplated by P. 5.1.116. Thus the previous *sūtra* would not cover these cases.]

How these cases can be brought under the previous *sūtra* is now stated.

529. Studying in Mathurā and the remembering of the mother are respectively identified with Mathurā and mother.

[In *madhurayā tulyam adhīye* = 'I study like Madhurā, the act of studying is mentioned as related to the object of comparison but it is understood as related to the standard of comparison also, because a comparison is based on a common property. Such expressions are used when the location of an action is identified with the action. In the other example, the action of remembering is identified with the object of remembrance. Mother, the object of remembrance, stands for the action of remembrance. So *Madhurayā tulyam adhīye* would mean : my studying (in Pāṭaliputra) is similar to my studying in Madhurā. The other example would mean : my remembering of Devadattā is similar to my remembering of my mother. Even though technically mother is *śeṣa* here by P. 2.3.52, still, it is *karma* which has become *śeṣa*.]

530. Just as the word *uṣṭra* = camel stands only for the face of the camel (in the compound *uṣṭra-mukha*), in the same way, the word *madhurā*, stands for its palatial buildings which the houses (of *Pāṭali-putra*) resemble, (in the expression *madhurāvat pāṭali-putre gṛhāḥ*).

[While explaining the previous *sūtra*, it was pointed out that words sometimes stand only for a part of their meaning, as, for instance, the word *brāhmaṇa* which, though normally expressive of a combination of qualities, may sometimes denote only a part of them, such as the action of studying well. In the same way, according to the present *sūtra* also, the suffix *vati* is added to a word which stands for a part of its normal meaning. The word *Madhurā*, for instance, stands normally for all that that city contains but when one says : *Madhurāvat pāṭali-putre gṛhāḥ* = the houses in *Pāṭali-putra* are like those in *Madhurā*, the latter word stands for its palatial houses only, because it is only they which resemble the houses of *Pāṭali-putra*. This kind of thing happens elsewhere also. For instance, in the compound *uṣṭramukha* = 'one who has a camel face', the word *uṣṭra* stands only for a part of its normal meaning, namely, its face.]

531. Just as the resemblance of the two acts of studying is presented as that of the students, in the same way, through the qualities (resemblance) of the actions, it is the substrata of the means which are conveyed.

[In *brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣattriyāḥ*, the resemblance between the two actions of studying ends in the resemblance of the two students who accomplish the actions. It is through the act of studying that the two students stand in the relation of standard and object of comparison towards each other. So in *Madhurāvad. adhīte* and *mātrvat smarati*, through the resemblance of the two acts of studying and the two acts of remembering, it is the substrata of the means of the two actions which are conveyed. It is through the acts of studying and remembering that their

abode and object respectively stand in the relation of standard and object of comparison towards each other. It is not only the agents which become connected through action. Action is invariably concomitant with means. Thus, the suffix *vati* can be added in cases like : *madhurayā tulyam adhīte, mātṛā tulyam smarati* by P. 5.1.115. and so there is no need for P. 5.1.116.]

532. Between what has been taught in regard to the meaning of *iva* and what has been taught in the previous *sūtra* (i.e. P. 5.1.115), there is no difference if an action-word is used.

[If one thinks that there is a difference between the two cases, it is answered as follows—where an action-word is used. P. 5.1.115 covers the scope of P. 5.1.116. So the latter is not necessary.]

533. Though elsewhere (in P. 3.2.25 for example), the condition (*upādhi*) is not mentioned, here, because of the absence of differentiation (that is, because it is mentioned in a general manner) the particular action is not understood from the suffix and so it has to be mentioned.

[In P. 3.2.25, the suffix 'in' is taught after the root *hr* = to carry, to wear when the latter governs the word *ḍṛti* or *nātha* expressive of the object (*karma*) when that which carries is an animal and so we get the expressions *ḍṛtihariḥ* = 'that which carries a water-bag made of leather and *nāthahariḥ* = 'that which wears a nose rope'. Here the condition is that that which carries or wears should be an animal, though the word *paśu* is not found in the ready-made word *ḍṛtihariḥ*, as the suffix expresses it. Here, on the other hand, the condition, namely, that the common property should be an action is mentioned in a very general way in the *sūtra* and so the particular action has to be separately mentioned.]

534. It is like the use of *vi*, *ut* and *pari* in the case of *pucch* or of *su dur* etc. (in the case of *manas*) because of absence of difference in the suffix even though all the meanings in question are included in that of the suffix.

[This is explained by means of an illustration. P. 3.1.20 teaches the suffix *ṣiṇ* after the words *pucch*, *bhāṇḍa* and *civara* in the sense of a particular action (*karāṇe*). After the word *pucch*, the particular action may be lifting or turning round, the suffix being capable of expressing both. In order to specify which, the preposition *ut* or *pari* is placed before *pucch* and thus we get *utpucchayate* and *paripucchayate*. Similarly, in P. 3.1.12, the suffix *kyan* is taught after the words *bhīṣa* etc. in the sense of something becoming what it was not (*abhūtatadbhāva*). In the list of words, one finds *abhimanas*, *su-manas* and *durmanas*. Here the suffix is really added to *manas* in the above sense which can have many shades within it. The preposition is prefixed to *manas* in order that it may manifest one of these shades. The suffix being the same, it cannot convey any one of the shades of meaning without the help of the preposition. Similarly, here also, *vati* is taught when action is the common property. To specify which action, a verb has to be used.]

535. Thus the suffix *vati* would come here also through the previous *sūtra*. Whether it be specification (of what is already mentioned in a general way) or fresh mention, there is no difference as far as the use of the verb is concerned.

When *vati* comes by P. 5.1.115 a verb has to be used in order to specify the particular action because the *sūtra* mentions action only in a general way. When it comes by P. 5.1.116, it expresses only resemblance. The word ending in *vati* does not express action even in a general way. So a verb has to be used. Thus in the matter of using a verb, there is no difference at all. Thus P. 5.1.116 is not necessary.]

536. The suffix *vati* is taught again when the resemblance is due to substance etc. When the resemblance is in action only, it would come by the previous *sūtra*.

[The purpose of this *sūtra* is now shown. P. 5.1.115 teaches *vati* when the resemblance is due to action. Therefore, one cannot say *govad gavayaḥ* in the sense of *gavā tulyo gavayaḥ* because the resemblance is not presented as due to action. P. 5.1.116 teaches *vati* in the sense of *iva* = 'resemblance'. Even if the resemblance is due to substance or quality, *vati* can be added by this *sūtra* which is, therefore, necessary.]

537. In cases like *Madhurāyām iva grhāḥ* = 'houses like those in Madhurā,' *brāhmaṇasyeva pāṇḍurāḥ* = white (teeth) like those of a *brāhmaṇa*, where the resemblance is in substance and quality, the suffix *vati* cannot come by the previous *sūtra* (P. 5.1.115).

[When one says that the houses in Pāṭaliputra are studded with precious stones like those in Mathurā, the resemblance is between two substances (houses). When one says that somebody's teeth are white like those of a *brāhmaṇa*, the resemblance is due to quality. In these two cases, the suffix *vati* cannot come by the previous *sūtra* which is restricted to resemblance in action.]

538. If it is held that P. 5.1.116 is for the purpose of excluding the suffix *vati* where the resemblance is due to action, even then it is not necessary. The purpose can be achieved by not mentioning the word *kriyā* = 'action' in the previous *sūtra*.

[If it is accepted that P. 5. 1. 116 is for the sake of teaching *vati* where the resemblance is due to substance or quality, even then it is not necessary. The purpose can be achieved by merely omitting the word *kriyā* in the previous *sūtra*. The

omission would make the teaching of *vati* very general and it could be added even when the resemblance is based on substance or quality.]

539. That the word *Madhurā* would stand for its parts has already been explained before. Similarly, the word *brāhmaṇa* would stand for the teeth which are part of a *brāhmaṇa*.

[It might be argued that P. 5. 1. 116 can be dispensed with only if the suffix can be added to the word *Madhurā* ending in the third case-affix. But it cannot be because the houses are not like *Madhurā*, but like the houses *in* *Madhurā*. So it has to be added to the word *Madhurā* ending in the seventh case-affix, and so a separate *sūtra* is necessary, as the previous *sūtra* contemplates the addition of the suffix ending in the third case-affix only. But this objection is not valid. As shown in verse 530, the word *Madhurā* here means the houses in *Madhurā* which are its parts. So the suffix can be added even when the word ends in the third case-affix.]

Now the need for the *sūtra* is going to be pointed out.

540. Except in relation to an outside word, the sixth case-affix is not taught in association with *iva*. Therefore, the suffix *vati* would come by the previous *sūtra*.

[If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, then the suffix would have to be added even when one wishes to say : *gauriva gavayaḥ*. The sixth case-affix is not taught in association with *iva*, except in relation to a totally external word. The word *iva* is connected with a word ending in the first case-affix and not in the sixth case-affix.]

541. In association with the word *tulya*, difference (*ādhikya*) is implied. There the sixth or third case-

affix would result, because the word *tulya* is *vācaka* (expressive).

[But the previous *sūtra* takes *vati* after a word ending in the third case-affix. How can it then be added to a word ending in the first case-affix? The fact is that the word *tulya* denotes something independent and concrete and so when it is connected with a word expressive of substance, what it is connected with becomes something different. Therefore, by P. 2.3.72, the word expressive of it takes either the third or the sixth case-affix, both of which imply difference. But when the synonym *iva* is used, the position is different as follows—]

542. When the word *iva* is used, it is a manifestor (*dyotaka* and not *vācaka*) that is used and so there would be no difference (*ādhikya*) in the standard of comparison without an outside word.

[The word *iva* is used as related to the meaning of another word, it throws light on some peculiarity in it, it has no independent meaning of its own and therefore, does not bring about any difference. So when *iva*, a synonym of *tulya* is used to show resemblance, a case-ending implying difference cannot be used. If the word *kriyā* were not used in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would come by that *sūtra* even when *iva* is used. In order that this may not happen, the word *kriyā* must be used in the previous *sūtra*. Thus the purpose of P. 5.1.116 would be to teach *vati* when the resemblance is not due to action. This *sūtra* would not allow *vati* after a word ending in the first case-affix, because the words *tatra* and *tasya* specify that it is to be added only after a word ending in the seventh or sixth case-affix.]

543. The difference which is understood when *iva* is used is due to *prāsāda* (mansion) etc. When *tulya* is used, on the other hand, difference based on its own meaning, is brought about.

[In *Madhurāyām iva pāṭaliputre prāsādāḥ* = the mansions in Pāṭaliputra are like those in Madhurā and in *Devadattasyeva Yajñadattasya dantāḥ* = Yajñadatta's teeth are like those of Devadatta : a difference is understood because of the seventh and sixth case-affixes. This difference is not dependent upon the meaning of *iva*. Irrespective of its meaning, the difference is understood because of the words *prāsāda* and *danta* which are necessarily different from Madhurā and Devadatta where they are found and which are external related objects. The suffix *vati* comes after a word ending in the seventh or the sixth case-affix. The *vati* which is taught in the sense of *tulya* by the previous *sūtra* is taught after a word ending in the third case-affix which implies difference not depending upon an external object but on the meaning of *tulya* itself. Thus there is a clear difference in the scope of the two *sūtras*.]

544. The suffix *vati* would be added when one wants to say; *gavayena samo'naḍvān* = 'the bullock is like a 'gayal' (*gavaya*)'. In *gaur iva*, no difference based on *iva* is understood.

[If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would be added even in cases like *gavayena tulyo'naḍvān* = 'the bullock is like a gayal (*gavayaḥ*)', where the resemblance is between two substances. Therefore, the word *kriyā* must be mentioned there. If that is done, then a separate *sūtra* becomes necessary if *vati* is to be used when the resemblance is based on substance or quality. Through the separate *sūtra*, there would be no *vati* in *gavayena tulyo'naḍvān*. As difference based on the meaning of *iva* is not possible and as it depends upon an external object and as there is no such thing here, *vati* cannot be added in this case. Nor can there be *vati* in *gaur iva gavayaḥ*, because difference based on the meaning of *iva* is not possible and there is no outside object here either. As there is no difference there is no sixth case-affix, but only the first case-affix. P. 5.1.116, does not teach *vati* after a word ending in the first case-affix. When there is an outside object as in *goriva gavayasya samsthānam* = 'the shape of a *gavaya* is like

that of a cow', then *vati* is added:—we can say *govat gavayasya samsthānam*.]

545. Before connection with the object of comparison, difference due to external words like *prāsāda* is understood and the case-affix (the seventh or the sixth) comes due to that and not due to the meaning of similarity.

[Once the need for the word *kriyā* in P. 5. 1.115 is established the need for the next rule is also established. The scope of the two rules can be delimited as follows :—In the examples of P. 5.1.116, before connection with the object of comparison (*upameya*) takes place, difference due to *prāsāda* (mansion) and *danta* (teeth) is understood and the case-affixes based on that, namely, the seventh and the sixth come into being and then only does the connection with the meaning of *iva* take place and with the object of comparison to express which the suffix *vati* is added. Thus the case-endings here are due to connection with the external word *prāsāda* and *danta*. They are said to be external because they are different from the words actually involved in the formation of the word. This is not what happens in the previous *sūtra*. There the difference is understood from the meaning of the word *tulya* which is not something external but is included in the word to be formed and the third case-ending is based on that and the suffix *vati* is added to the word ending in that. For the understanding of difference there is no need to resort to an external word. If the word *kriyā* is not mentioned in the previous *sūtra*, the suffix *vati* would come even if the resemblance is due to something else than action as in the sentence *brāhmaṇena tulyaḥ kṣattriyaḥ*. Thus P. 5.1.116 is necessary in order to cover cases where the resemblance is not due to action.]

546. In association with *iva*, the third case-affix is not taught and that is why, even though it is already under consideration, it has been abandoned and another case-affix adopted.

[In P. 5.1.116, the word *iva* indicates the meaning of the suffix. If the third case-affix were taught in the sense of *śeṣa* in association with *iva*, then the suffix *vati* would be added to a word ending in the third case-affix in the sense of *iva*. But P. 2.3.72. does not teach the third case-affix in the sense of *iva*. Because *iva* is only a manifestor (*dyotaka*) and is not expressive of the meaning of *tulya*. Thus when the connection is internal, the third case-affix does not come in association with *iva*. But a case-affix expressive of a *kāraṇa* relation can come according to the nature of the relation with action. The third case-affix, expressive of a *kāraṇa* relation does not cover all the case-affixes as the third case-affix expressive of a *śeṣa* relation does as shown before. Therefore, in P. 5.1.116, the third case-affix already mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is abandoned and the sixth and seventh case-affixes, based on a relation with an outside word, are taught. The word *tulya* cannot be connected with them. Therefore, another meaning of *vati* is here indicated through the word *iva*. Therefore, when the connection is internal the previous rule applies, and the present one applies when the connection is with something external. Thus, there is difference in the scope.]

547. The seventh case-affix is also not available in this case. It has been mentioned as a clue. It is desired in the sphere of relation in general, considering that case-affixes are restricted to their proper spheres.

[The difference based on connection with an outside word is covered only by the sixth case affix. So the seventh, like the third, is not available here. So it should really not be mentioned. If *vati* is taught only after a word ending in the sixth case-affix, how can cases like *madhurāvat Pāṭaliputre prāsādāḥ* be explained? It is the meaning of the sixth case-affix which comes under *śeṣa*. The meaning of the seventh case-affix is abode (*ādhāra*) which comes under *sādhana*. *Sādhana* and *śeṣa* are opposites. It has been said that what is called *śeṣa* results when no *sādhana* is meant to be conveyed. One cannot

convey *sādhana* and *śeṣa* at the same time. Even if *vati* is added to a word ending in the sixth case-affix, as no particular case-affix is actually seen in a complex formation (*vytti*) and only the relation of standard and object of comparison is understood and as relation in general (*śeṣa*) includes all particular relations the object of comparison can end in the seventh case-affix. The word ending in *vati* denotes only resemblance and as, in ordinary worldly usage, it cannot denote the particular, in the *śāstra* also, it is understood similarly and so *vati* is taught after a word ending in the sixth case-affix expressive of relation in general. As all particulars are included in the general, when the word expressive of the object of comparison is put in the seventh case-affix, then it is meant to be the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) and so the standard of comparison is also the abode. The meaning of the stem, the standard of comparison is subordinate to that of the suffix *vati* and so the particular standard is understood from the object of comparison. That is why it has been declared that any doubt in regard to the standard is dispelled by the object of comparison. But according to this reasoning, the suffix *matuṣ* also need not be taught separately after a word ending in the seventh case-affix, because it would be understood in the way mentioned above. But it is taught separately. The reason is that the meaning of the sixth or the seventh case-affix is the main meaning of a word ending in *matuṣ*. Therefore, the fact of being the abode is understood from the word itself in an expression like *vykṣavān parvataḥ* = 'a mountain with trees on it.' It is, therefore, natural that the rule teaching *matuṣ* should mention abode (the meaning of the seventh case-affix) separately. When *vati* is added, the meaning of the stem is subordinate and so only resemblance, the meaning of the suffix is understood as the main thing and so it has to be connected with the sixth case-affix which would cover the seventh also. The latter need not, therefore, be separately mentioned. If it is mentioned separately by the word *tatra* (in P. 5.1.116) it is only to serve as a clue (*jñāpaka*). Each case-affix has its own scope and does not encroach upon that of the others. Here the mention of *tatra* separately is a clue that, just as the sixth case-affix is used in connection with

iva, similarly, the seventh case-affix is also used on the basis of connection with an outside word.]

548. If, in such cases, the other case-endings could also be used because of difference (based on an outside word) the third case-affix itself would indicate this deviation (of the case-affixes from their proper sphere).

[The clue relates only to the seventh case-affix. It is only that one which can be used in association with *iva* in the sense of a *śeṣa* relation based upon an outside word. Not all the case-affixes can be so used. If they would be so used, that fact would have been made known through the third case-affix mentioned in P. 5.1.115 and which is already under discussion. The very fact that that has not been done and that the seventh case-affix has been brought in in the next *sūtra* is a proof that the others cannot be so used. That is why one cannot say *devair iva nāma* just as one can say *deveṣviva nāma*.]

549. If the third case-affix is continued, deviation would be certain without the mention of the seventh case-affix. But as the seventh case-affix is mentioned, it shows that the other case-endings are not covered.

550. The sixth case-affix would be set aside in this matter by the seventh which is meant to be a clue. So it is mentioned, so that it may be brought in again.

[Why has the sixth case-affix (*taśya*) been also mentioned in P. 5.1.116? The seventh case-affix (*tatra*) by itself would have been enough because the fact of being the subject-matter (*viśaya*), which is the meaning of the seventh would cover also the meaning of the sixth, so that the latter need not be separately mentioned. To remove this objection, the purpose of mentioning the sixth is now explained. Normally, the seventh case-affix is not used in association with *iva*. The very fact that

it is so taught here shows that normally it does not occur in that sense. If the sixth is not taught because it is covered by the seventh, then where the seventh is not possible, the sixth also would not be possible. But it is desired that the sixth should always be possible in association with *iva* and for that it is necessary to mention it separately in the *sūtra*. It might be argued that if the sixth is not mentioned separately but only the seventh is mentioned, the latter would be alright only as expressive of the abode (*adhikaraṇa*) on the basis of connection with an outside word and not as expressive of *śeṣa*. If the sixth case-affix were also there, one could decide that the seventh is expressive of *śeṣa* because of its association with the sixth. If the sixth is not mentioned at all, the mention of the seventh would not be a clue that it can also be used as expressive of *śeṣa* in association with *iva*. So there is no question of the seventh setting aside the sixth altogether if the latter is not mentioned. Though there is some truth in this argument, the real position is as follows :—The very fact that both the case-affixes are mentioned when one of them would have been enough to cover the other also shows that one of them is only meant to be a clue. It is the seventh which is meant to be a clue because the sixth cannot be used in the sense of the seventh. The suffix *vati* is desired to be added to a word ending in the sixth also. So, in its own sphere, the sixth cannot be set aside. It might be objected that if the mention of the seventh here is a clue, that the seventh here is in the sense of *śeṣa*, then the suffix *vati* cannot be added to a word ending in the seventh expressive of abode, as for instance in *madhurāyām iva pāṭalīputre prāsādāḥ*. If *vati* is added to a word ending in the seventh expressive of *śeṣa*, then the word expressive of the *upameya* cannot end in the seventh. We would have to say *pāṭalīputrasya prāsādāḥ*. Therefore, we have to take the word *tatra* twice in P. 5.1.116. One of them would teach *vati* after a word ending in the seventh expressive of the abode and the other would indicate that the seventh can be used in the sense of *śeṣa*. This is what the Bhāṣyakāra means. Others argue that the relation of abider and abode (*ādhārādheyabhāva*) can be covered by the sixth. So even if the *upameya* is put in the seventh case-affix, the suffix *vati* can be understood to have been

added to a word ending in the sixth. This *sūtra* does not prevent *vati* from being added to a word ending in the *adhikaraṇa-saptamī*. All that it does is to say that the seventh can be used in association with *iva* in the sense of *śeṣa*].

Now something is going to be said about P. 5.1.117.

551. The suffix *vati* in the sense of deserving is already taught by the two previous rules, provided that one adopts another explanatory sentence. One of them is given as an illustration.

[*Rājānam arhati vṛttam* = *rājavad vṛttam*. This has been given as an example of the suffix *vati* taught by P. 5.1.117. In this rule, the word *kriyā* has to be brought from P. 5.1.115. So the suffix *vati* is added to a word ending in the second case-affix in the sense of the agent of the action of deserving, when the agent also is an action. The suffix is added when the agent of the action of deserving, that is, of being worthy (*arhati*) is the action of behaving, that is, conducting oneself. *Rājānam arhati vṛttam* means behaving, conducting oneself, in a manner worthy of a king. This idea is understood even when *rājavad vṛttam* is explained as follows—*rājñā tulyam vartate* = he behaves like a king. If that is so, the suffix *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.115. In expressions like *rājavad dhairyam* in the sense of *rājānam arhati dhairyam* or *brāhmaṇavad upāsamaḥ* in the sense of *brāhmaṇam arhaty upāsamaḥ*, the suffix *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.116. As in these two expressions, the resemblance is not in action P. 5.1.115 cannot apply. To say that the courage (*dhairya*) of somebody is worthy of a king is equal to saying that his courage is *like* that of a king. The difference is only in the explanatory sentence and not in the facts. When the Bhāṣya says that the *vati* can be explained by P. 5.1.115, it is only an illustration. All that is meant is that the *vati* taught by P. 5.1.117 can come by other *sūtras* and P.5.1.115. is mentioned as an illustration. It can come by P. 5.1.116 also.]

552. The suffix *vati* of which an action is the qualifier can be added by P. 5.1.115. As to the expres-

sion *rājavad vartate rājā* = 'the king conducts himself as a king', here also it can come when the same thing is differentiated.

[The suffix *vati* of which an action is the qualifier by specifying the meaning of the suffix which has the meaning of *tulya* is already taught by P. 5.1.115. The fact is that *rājānam arhati vṛttam* = 'the conduct befits a king' is equal in meaning to *rājñā tulyam vartate* = 'he behaves like a king'.

But here a doubt may arise : Can the suffix *vati* come by P. 5.1.117 when one wants to say *rājavad vartate rājā* = 'the king conducts himself like a king?' It can come, when the same thing is thought of as two different things.]

How one thing can be thought of as two is now stated.

553. Kings from Prthu to Yudhiṣṭhira, known as model kings are taken as standards of comparison for other kings.

[Ancient kings like Prthu were perfect kings and they are taken as standards of comparison for later inferior kings and one says : *rājavad ayaṁ vartate* = 'this king behaves like a king', that is, the present king behaves like an ancient king. As a present king is capable of behaving in an unworthy manner, he is said to behave like a king when one wants to praise him. Thus differentiation has taken place and comparison is possible.]

554. The difference between the standard and the object of comparison is due to perfection and imperfection. Everywhere the imperfect is compared to the perfect.

[Everywhere the relation of standard and object of comparison is based upon perfection and imperfection. It has already been said that where there is total difference or complete identity there cannot be comparison. Due to clarity and

distinctness, a Brāhmaṇa's recitation is known to be perfect and it becomes the standard for the less perfect recitation of others. Similarly, the royalty of kings like Bharata who ruled over the whole earth was perfect. About any one of them, nobody would say that he behaves like a king. Only about an imperfect king would one say sometimes to praise him that he behaves like a king. Similarly an imperfect Brāhmaṇa would be compared to a perfect one like Vasiṣṭha.]

After having pointed out what is already taught by P. 5.1.115, what is already taught by P. 5.1.116 is now going to be stated.

555. When one wants to say something about the (present) king, one would get the form *rājavad rūpam asya* = 'his (the present) king's beauty is like that of an ancient king (like say, Bharata)' by the second rule which covers cases where the resemblance is not due to action.

[It has been established that P. 5.1.116 is for the purpose of teaching *vati* where the resemblance is not based on action but on substance or quality. Even the next rule cannot bring the suffix *vati* in such cases because it is meant for teaching *vati* when the agent of the action of deserving or being worthy is an action.]

556. When no comparison is meant, a property which acts as the agent of the act of deserving is used for restriction (that is, exclusion of others). For that, the suffix has to be taught again.

[When the word *rājan* is used in the sense of king in general, that is, in the sense of the universal, the relation of standard and object of comparison based on difference is not understood, as no particular is meant. What is meant to be conveyed is that the conduct befits a king and not anybody else. By excluding anything else, the main idea is confirmed.

That is what is conveyed by an expression like *rājavad idam vṛttam vartate* = 'This conduct befits that of a king'.]

557. The expression *kṛtahastavat* = 'as befits a practised hand', is used only in regard to well-known persons. Similarly, one says *rājavad* in regard to a person who is well-known as a model king.

[Even when one of the ancient model kings is mentioned, there need not be any idea of comparison. The word *kṛtahasta* means a practised hand. Arjuna and others are known to be such. About him, one can say: *ciccheda kṛtahastavat* = 'he cut like a practised hand.' Here no comparison is meant between Arjuna and somebody else. All that is meant to be conveyed is that he did the job in an excellent manner, worthy of his training. Similarly in *Pāṇḍor vidura ! rājavad pretakāryāṇi kāraya* = oh Vidura ! get the funerals of Pāṇḍu performed as befit a king'. There is no comparison of Pāṇḍu with anybody else. All that is meant is that the funerals should be performed as befit a king.]

The exact scope of P. 5.1.117 is now stated.

558. Those qualities which are absolutely impossible in one who is not a king, they are restricted to a king. Those which deviate are abandoned.

[When it is intended to emphasise those qualities which are found in a king only, then the suffix *vati* is used for the purpose of restriction. Restriction usually implies exclusion of others. There is a two-way restriction: (1) the conduct befits a king only. (2) only the conduct befits a king. The *Bhāṣya* further means that the agent of the act of deserving is an action, a mode of behaviour, a conduct. When such an agent is meant to be different from other agents then the suffix *vati* is added by this rule. That action or conduct befits the meaning of the word ending in the second case-affix. In *rājavad rūpam* = 'beauty like that of a king' *rājavad dhairyam* = 'courage like that of a king,' the suffix *vati* comes by the previous rule. It cannot come by this rule because this teaches *vati* when the agent of deserv-

ing is an action. So the conclusion is this: Where the difference is meant, the suffix comes by the previous rule. Where no difference is meant, no comparison is involved and the effect aimed at is restriction, the suffix comes by P. 5.1.117.]

559. When the agent of the action of befitting is an action, then the *vati* is desired and not when the agent is something else as in *rājānam arhati cchatram* = 'the umbrella befits the king'.

[By P. 5.1.117, the suffix can come only when the agent of the action of befitting is an action and not a substance. So we cannot have it in *rājānam arhaty etad vāsaḥ* = 'this dress befits a king', *rājānam arhaty eṣa kamaṇḍaluḥ* = 'this water-jug befits a king', because what is intended cannot be conveyed.]

560. The *Śāstra* explains the formation of words actually used. If this rule is meant to allow *vati* even when the agent is umbrella etc., the (former) rejection would become invalid.

[Grammar only teaches the forms which are actually used. The suffix *vati* is not used when the agent of the action of befitting is a substance because the intended meaning would not be conveyed. There is no point in explaining the formation of what is not used. Secondly, if the *vati* can come even when the agent is not an action but a substance, then the reason given before for rejecting this rule would become invalid.]

561. In other systems of grammar no rule corresponding to *tad arham* (P. 5.1.117) has been taught, because even here there can be comparison by artificially postulating difference.

[Those who follow the schools of Āpiśali and Kāśakṛtsna have no *sūtra* corresponding to P. 5.1.117. The author of the *Bhāṣya* often says in his own words what he has understood from other systems. What is not rejected in the other systems must be understood as approved. Why have the other Ācāryas

not included a rule corresponding to this in their systems? It is because, according to them, the *vati* can come in these cases also by the previous *sūtras*, as in these cases also there can be comparison by artificially postulating difference.]

562. When an action, to be done in a case, is thought of as having the same feature as one done previously and, therefore, well-known, a difference is mentally postulated.

[In *ciccheda kṛtahastavat* = 'you cut off, like a practised hand', the suffix *vati* can be explained by the previous *sūtras*. What it means is this:—Just as you cut off neatly in a previous fight because of practice, in the same way, on another occasion also, you would act in a similar manner. Here, though the agent is the same, he is thought of as two as he acts at two different times. The previous one, already known, becomes the standard and the later one, not yet known, becomes the object of comparison. In this explanation, the *vati* comes by P. 5.1.115. In the same way, in *rājavat pāṇḍoḥ pretakāryāṇi kāraya* = 'get the funerals of Pāṇḍu done as in the case of previous kings', what was done before and, therefore, well-known becomes the standard of comparison for what is yet to be done and, therefore, not done.]

563. If the rule is there, the suffix *vati* would come in such a case but association with the word *iva* is not possible (unless there is difference).

[It has to be understood in the manner stated above. The suffix *vati* may come as it is taught in a rule, but association with the word *iva* is not possible unless there is difference.]

564. In the hymn addressed to Indra, the expression *dasyuhā indra iva* = like Indra, the dasyu-killer, has been used when what is meant is: like the Indra whose action on a previous occasion is known.

[One sees elsewhere also the use of *iva* in connection with an artificial difference. In 'indra iva dasyuhā bhava' the word *iva* shows the relation of standard and object of comparison on the basis of artificial difference. In this sentence, the object of comparison is also Indra. What the sentence means is : as you destroyed *dasyus* before, become their slayer now also. Indra who is known to have done something on a previous occasion is desired to do the same thing on another occasion. The unknown Indra is compared to the known. Thus a difference within the same thing is brought about.]

565. One expresses oneself similarly when one says 'you are like yourself' by referring to a later age in relation to an earlier age.

[One sees a person of a mature age compared to the same person at a younger age in the expression—you are like yourself. A difference is assumed within the same person and the two are compared.]

566. Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, the object of comparison is itself used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. A well-known example is : *rāmarāvaṇayor yuddhaṃ rāmarāvaṇayor iva* = Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight is like Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight. The expression : *rājēva tvaṃ rājā* can be explained in this manner. If so, the *vati* would come by the previous rule and so the present rule (P. 5.1.117) is unnecessary.

567. Even, real difference depends upon the mind. So, in this matter, there is no difference or identity.

[It might be objected that when what is really different is available, why should what is only artificially so be made the

basis for the addition of the suffix ? The fact is that even real difference can do nothing unless it is grasped by the mind. In verbal usage, what the mind conceives is what really matters. Whether the difference is real or not is immaterial.]

It is now stated that on this point there is support from the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*.

568. On the basis of what figures in the mind, describing him through causes of differentiation like the wearing of armlets and ear-rings, Caitra has been said to be like that.

[While pointing out the difference between *upadeśa* (direct instruction) and *uddeśa* (indirect description), the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.3.2. describes distant Devadatta as “wearing armlets and ear-rings, broad-chested, having long reddish eyes and muscular arms, Devadatta is like that.” Here Devadatta is not said to be like somebody else. He is said to be like somebody who figures in the mind of the speaker as possessing these attributes. It is Devadatta himself who so figures in the mind. So it is clear that the relation of the standard and object of comparison is based on what figures in the mind.]

569. The object is understood as agreeing with the image produced in the mind by these words.

[What happens in this kind of description is this. The speaker wants to say : “Understand that object seen by you in the outside world to be Devadatta by seeing which there arises in your mind an image having the properties described by the words: ‘wearing armlets and ear-rings’ etc.” In this way, a kind of identification takes place between what figures in the mind and what is seen outside.]

570. Operations based on difference are understood through difference made by the mind. All meanings of words seem to be created by the intention of the speaker.

[It is now stated that everywhere it is artificial difference which is useful. In Grammar, whatever operation is based on difference is carried out on the basis of difference created by the mind. The treatment of something as a particular *kāraka* is based on the intention of the speaker. The fact is that words take their form on the basis of notions brought by the intention of the speaker irrespective of whether there is anything corresponding to it outside or not. Words mean what the speaker intends them to mean. Though Kaṃsa and others have been dead and gone, they acquire a kind of present existence when they are pictured in the mind and what is pictured in the mind is further thought of as the agent (*prayojaka*) and the object of action (*prayojya*), one gets expressions like : *Kaṃsaṃ ghātayati* = 'he is getting Kaṃsa killed', *Balim Bandhayati* = 'he is getting Bali bound'.]

571. Where cognitions are differentiated in regard to an external object, even existing resemblance in it is not perceived.

[In regard to objects which are grasped as different from one another, as long as some common property is not perceived, cognitions relate to differentiation and so even existing resemblance is ignored by the perceiver.]

572. Even when the object is totally different, as long as it is not cognised, recognition of it as the same is not prevented in the case of anybody.

[Even when the object is totally different, if it is not so cognised, only the common property is grasped and so the cognition of identity follows. When an object is seen in poor light or from a distance, distinctions are not perceived and one remembers only what had been seen before and so one identifies it. Even when the object is near and the light is good, former impressions are aroused quickly and one recognises the object as the one seen before.]

573. It is this difference which is shown separately by the *sūtra* (P. 5.1.117). Even though already

taught (by the previous rule), being difficult, the unintelligent understands (through this rule).

[As the relation of standard and object of comparison can be based on difference created by the mind, the *vati in rājavad vṛttam*, can be explained by the previous *sūtra*. So P. 5.1.117 has been given only for the benefit of the less intelligent. This rule tells us that this difference created by the mind is different from the real one. The *śāstra* has to serve everybody. The explanation of *rājavat* as *rājānam arhati* is for the benefit of the less intelligent.]

574. A grammarian does not always talk like a grammarian. Therefore, even he is told: 'Talk like a grammarian'.

[One does see the same thing becoming the standard as well as the object of comparison. So even the unintelligent should not have any difficulty in understanding. When a grammarian talks incorrectly like a villager, he is told : 'Talk like a grammarian', (*vaiyākaraṇavad brūṣva*). Here the same person is the standard as well as the object of comparison.]

575. Some men speak like women and some women speak like men. Where there is deviation, one's own norm is again asked to be followed.

[When somebody deviates from his norm, he is advised to observe the norm. A man who speaks like a woman is told to speak like a man and vice-versa. In this admonition to speak according to one's norm, the person spoken to is the object of comparison and the person like whom he is asked to speak, that is, the standard of comparison is also himself. So one and the same thing becomes both.]

576. When one says in the world, 'you are like yourself,' the possibility of another standard of comparison is excluded.

[The expression : *sadr̥śas tvaṃ tava* = 'You are like yourself', is used when one wants to praise somebody by excluding other standards of comparison. Thus, everywhere, the same thing can become both. That is why there is no rule corresponding to P. 5.1.117 in the other systems of grammar. In the Pāṇinian system also, where comparison is meant, this rule is considered unnecessary. The two previous ones would do.]

577. The rule *tadarham* (P. 5.1.117) is taught when no comparison is meant, when the meaning meant to be conveyed (by *rājavat*) is : 'suitable, appropriate' to the king.

[This rule is not necessary if comparison is meant. But when suitability or appropriateness is meant to be conveyed, it is needed, and the absence of something corresponding to it in the other systems of grammar only shows their incompleteness. Even in *vaiyākaraṇavad brūhi*, if appropriateness, not comparison, is meant, the suffix can come by P. 5.1.117.]

578. The remaining teaching concerning *vati*, being connected with what was the subject-matter is now stated. Because of its connection with the standard of comparison, the suffix *vati* was considered in this section.

579. As a word is taken in its secondary sense if the primary sense is not suitable, when the suffix *vati* is taught after a preposition, the word *dhātu* clearly stands for the meaning of a *dhātu*.

[In P. 5.1.118, the word *dhātvarthe* is used. The necessity of the word *artha* is questioned, considering that even without it, its meaning would be understood, because no suffix can be added to express a root which is only a word and not a meaning.

580. In P. 5.1.118, the words *svaṃ rūpam* make known to us that, like the form, the meaning is

also to be taken. Therefore here (in P. 5.1.118), from the word *dhātu*, its meaning which is near to it would be understood.

[Why the meaning of a *dhātu* would be necessarily understood even if the bare word *dhātau* had been used in the rule is now explained. Like its form, its meaning is also very near to a word. This is clear by the use of the words *svam rūpam* in P. 1.1.68. Two things are very near to a word, its form and its meaning. Both are its *svam*. If the word *svam* only had been used, one could understand either from it. If it is intended to exclude meaning, it is necessary to use the word *rūpa* also, in order to specify what is meant.]

581. From this rule one understands that the means, as such, is made by the root, that is, it is brought about by the meaning of a root (that is, action.)

[Just as the word *rūpam* has been deliberately used in P. 1.1.68, in the same way, the word *artha* has been deliberately used in P. 5.1.118. In the compound *dhātvartha* of this rule, the word *kṛta* has been elided. *Dhātvartha* means *dhātukṛto' rthaḥ*. The word *kṛtaḥ* has been elided. The word *dhātu* means *kriyā*=action. *Dhātukṛto' rthaḥ* means something brought about by action. The elision of *kṛta* in the compound is according to P. 2.1.72. What is brought about by action is *sādhana*=the means. It is action which makes something a means. Nothing is a means except in relation to an action. If something becomes a means, it is due to the action in the accomplishment of which it plays a part. The conclusion is that P. 5.1.118 means that, in the Vedas, the suffix *vati* is added to a preposition in the sense of the means to an action.]

582. Where a word is not used because of its meaning being understood, one speaks of its elision (*lopa*) as it is not seen (heard) in its sphere.

[What is meant by elision of the second term (*kṛta*) is now explained. It is difficult to avoid the use of a word if its meaning has to be conveyed. But if its meaning is somehow understood, it is not used and then it is said to be elided. The word *dhātu* means an action. What is caused by action is also called *dhātu*. Thus what is caused by action becomes *dhātvartha*. It is the means (*sādhana*). Thus, by taking *dhātvartha* as a compound coming under the group *mayūrvyaṁsakādi* (P. 2.1.72.), the word means *sādhana*. So P. 5.1.118 means : “the suffix *vati* is added in the Vedas to a preposition (having the meaning of *sādhana*) and is indicative of the meaning of the stem itself (*svārthe*). The compound *dhātvartha* can be taken as a *bahuvrīhi*. It would then be analysed thus : *dhātuḥ kriyā arthaḥ prayojanaṁ yasya sa dhātvarthaḥ*, “that is called *dhātvartha* the purpose of which is to help in the accomplishment of the action”. This again amounts to *sādhana*.]

583. The suffix *vati* is taught in the same meaning (*svārthe*) as that of the preposition *pra* etc. which are expressive of action, means and substance.

[Because of the use of the word *artha*, one gets *sādhana* (means) as the meaning of the prepositions and consequently of the suffix *vati* which is added to them. Even though theoretically *sādhana* is only a power in grammar, and not a *sattva* and therefore, a word ending in *vati* can only be an indeclinable incapable of taking gender and number, in reality the word formed with this *vati* is not an indeclinable, because by *sādhana* what is meant is concrete substance (*dravya*) which is the substratum of power. Therefore, the word ending in *vati* which has the same meaning as the preposition to which it is added, namely, action, means and substance, is not an indeclinable and does take gender and number.

584. *Pra* etc. without the suffix (*vati*) is not used in that sense. When the word (formed with *vati*) is analysed, a division in the meaning is indicated.

It is true that ordinarily prepositions like *pra* when found in a sentence, are expressive of action with some peculiarity in it. In this matter, one has to follow the natural power of words according to which when *pra* etc. occur in a sentence, they cannot express substance but when they are part of a compound they are capable of doing so. *Ud-vataḥ* means *ud-gatāni* and *ni-vataḥ* means *nigatāni*. The stem *ud*, or *ni* means substance to which action and power are subordinate and the suffix *vati* stands for the same meaning (*svārthe*) as the stem. All this is made known by the use of the word *artha* in P. 5.1.118. If the *sūtra* had only *dhātau* in it, it would first convey action and then the power to accomplish it, always associated with it. But as the word used is *dhātvarthe*, it means substance which is identical with its power, whether we take it as a *tatpuruṣa* or as a *bahuvrīhi*.]

585. If power (*sādhana*) is understood as pure power and not associated with substance, then the word would be devoid of the case-endings like words ending in *taṣil* etc.

[If, by *sādhana*, only power were meant, the word ending in *vati* would express power only and so the different case-endings, all expressive of different powers, cannot be added to it, because power cannot be added to power. Secondly, the word would always end in the singular number. Thus the word would become an indeclinable which is not desired. Because of the use of the word *artha*, the meaning is not power only but substance to which action and power are subordinate. So the word ending in *vati* is expressive of concrete substance and is capable of taking all genders and numbers.]

586. Those who consider words ending in *vati* to be indeclinable because of their inclusion (in the *svarādi* group) would have to make special provision for the retention of case-endings in *udvataḥ*.

[It might be said that as words ending in *vati* are taught in the *svarādi* group, they must be looked upon as indeclinables. If that is so, then the case-endings expressive of gender and number would have to be elided but that is not desired. So provision would have to be made for the non-elision of the case-endings in *udvataḥ*.]

587. The suffixes *nañ* and *snañ* do not cover the meaning of *vati*, because the form *puṃvat* is actually seen (in P. 6.3.34) This ready-made form (*nīpātana*). sets aside the exception (taught in P. 4.1.80.)

[Now the addition of *vati* to the stems *strī* and *puṃān* is explained. P. 4.1.87 says that the suffixes *nañ* and *snañ* should be added to the stems *strī* and *puṃān* in all the meanings mentioned up to P. 5.2.1. The meaning in which *vati* is taught comes within this limit. So, after these two words, *vati* would be set aside by *nañ* and *snañ*. Then the forms *strīvat* and *puṃvat* would remain unprovided for. So the *vārttika* says that *vati* should be allowed to be added to these two words. The *M. Bhā.* however, says that it is not necessary because the very fact that Pāṇini uses the word *puṃvat* in P. 6.3.34 shows that *vati* sets aside *nañ* and *snañ* and not the other way.]

588. The suffix *nañ* and *snañ*, pass without touching it, the meaning of *vati*. If they were applicable, the original rule (P. 5.1.118) would be set aside.

[It has been established in the *śāstra* that ready-made forms (*nīpātana*) given by Pāṇini in his rules, can set aside relevant rules. So *puṃvat* in P. 6.3.34 sets aside P. 4.1.87.]

589. The indication (furnished by the use of the ready-made word *puṃvat* (by Pāṇini) is interpreted to mean that the whole of the rule which teaches *nañ* and *snañ* does not cover the section which teaches *vati* (that is, three rules).

[How the form *strīvat* is also correct is now explained. P. 4.1.87 does not cover the meanings mentioned in P. 5.1.115, 116 and 117. The use of the word *puṇvat* by Pāṇini is an indication that the whole of P. 4.1.87 does not cover the meaning of *vati*. So *vati* is added to the stem *strī* also, as that is also included in P. 4.1.87.]

590. The standard of comparison, while remaining one, serves many objects of comparison, just as (in ritual) change of number of the standard of comparison is not done any more than that of the *aṅgas*.

[The suffix *vati* has been considered. Now another question is raised. When many objects of comparison are connected with one standard of comparison, does the latter also become many, following the number of the objects of comparison? The answer is that it does not. Remaining one, it serves all the objects of comparison. To strengthen this point, Bhartṛhari points out that in Vedic ritual, the number of the *aṅga*, mentioned in connection with the original (*prakṛti*) *yāga* is not changed for the *vikṛtiyāga*, because it is understood from the changed number of the *aṅgin*. Similarly, the number of the standard of comparison mentioned in connection with the *prakṛtiyāga* is not changed for the *vikṛtiyāga*.]

591. In connection with the offering (*caru*) consecrated with *gavedhu* grass, one sees the use of the singular number for the standard of comparison of the two objects of comparison, namely, *govikarta* and *akṣavāpa* in the sentence: "these two (killers of) animals are like Rudra.

[Another analogy is now given from Vedic ritual. In the Veda, in regard to the offering consecrated with the grass called *gavedhu*, it has been stated that *govikarta* and *akṣavāpa* are like Rudra. Here two objects of comparison are connected with one

standard of comparison, namely, Rudra. This also shows that one *upamāna* can serve many *upameyas*.]

592. If the standard of comparison becomes many, then the suffix *añ* would be expressive of the plural and then, even in the sense of images, there would be elision of the suffix *añ* in *Kāśyapa* (resulting in the form *Kāśyapāḥ*.)

[If the number of the standard of comparison follows that of the objects of comparison, there would be an undesirable consequence. According to P. 5.3.99,100, the form *Kāśyapaḥ* results in the sense of images of *Kāśyapa*, showing the elision (*lup*) of *kan* taught by P. 5.3.96. Here *Kāśyapa* is the standard of comparison and the images are the objects of comparison. If the standard of comparison is more than one because the images are many, then there would be elision of the suffix *añ* in *Kāśyapa* according to P. 2.4.64. and then we would get *Kāśyapāḥ* and not *kāśyapāḥ* in the sense of images of *Kāśyapa*. But *Kāśyapāḥ* is wrong. The correct form is *Kāśyapāḥ*. So the word *Kāśyapa* ending in *añ* and denoting the standard of comparison must be taken as ending in the singular number. In other words, the standard of comparison remains one even if the objects of comparison are many.]

593. In this way, there would be singular number according to the number of the stem (taught in P. 1.2.51). Perhaps when the word formed refers to a human being, the elision of the suffix (*lup*) is taught in order that only the gender of the stem is retained.

[Here it might be objected that if the suffix *kan* taught in P. 5.3.96. is elided by P. 5.3.99. (*lup*), then the resulting word should have the gender and number of the stem by P. 1.2.54, we should then get the form *Kāśyapaḥ* even when the images are many. That would, of course, be incorrect. The fact is that, according to the *Vārttikakāra*, the *lup* of the suffix expressive

of image is taught in order that the gender of the stem may be retained by P. 1.2.51 but not its number. The number of the image will prevail and not that of the stem, that is of the original. That is how we get *cañceva manuṣyau cañce*. Here we have the gender of the original and the number of the images.]

594. When the objects of comparison are many and one standard of comparison serves them all, then always the gender and number of the stem prevail.

[When P. 1.2.51 extends both the gender and number of the stem to the word where *luṭ* has taken place, how can gender alone be extended here? The position is this: when there are many images all of which are objects of comparison, there are two possibilities: either one standard of comparison serves all of them or there is a separate standard of comparison for each. If there is only one standard of comparison and the images are many, then P. 1.2.51, operates.]

595. When there is a separate standard of comparison for each object of comparison, there arise many words each ending in a *taddhita* suffix, because of the plurality of the external object.

[When there are many objects of comparison and a separate standard of comparison for each, then for each object of comparison, that is for each image, a separate word will be formed and that word will be *Kāśyapa*, with the *luṭ* (elision) of the suffix *kan* taught in P. 5.3.99. and with the gender and number according to P. 1.2.51, that is, masculine gender and singular number. The same process will take place for the second image, the third image and so on. Each time the word *Kāśyapa* will be formed. Thus, if there are, say, ten images, there will be ten words. Then P. 1.2.64 will operate and we will get the form *Kāśyapāḥ*, standing for all the ten images. At this stage P. 1.2.51, cannot apply because it has already been applied once. So there cannot be any singular number, based on the original singular number of the stem.]

596. Just as a word expressive of several *dvigu* words like *pañcapūli* gets the plural number (*pañcapūlyah*) in the same way, when there is a plurality of words ending in a *sup* suffix, there is plural number.

[Here it might be said that even when *ekaśeṣa* takes place according to P. 1.2.64 it is the meaning of the elided suffix (*kan*) which attains plurality and so P. 1.2.51 should apply. This is explained by means of an analogy. We have the expression *pañca pūlāḥ samāhṛtāḥ pañcapūli*=five bundles collected together are called *pañcapūli*. This is a *dvigu* compound and it is in the singular number according to P. 2.4.1. But when we want to refer to several such collections, we get the expression *pañcapūli ca pañcapūli ca pañcapūli ceti pañcapūlyah*, according to P. 1.2.64. This plural number cannot be set aside by P. 2.4.1. *Pañcapūli* is a *dvigu* but not *pañcapūlyah* which is *ekaśeṣa* of several *pañcapūli* words. An *ekaśeṣa* is different from *dvigu* and so P. 2.4.1. does not apply to the former. Similarly, an *ekaśeṣa* of several *lubanta* words is not a *lubanta* word. So P. 1.2.51 cannot apply to such an *ekaśeṣa*.]

597. When the collections are many, the total number of bundles is also many. Nor does one see any difference in meaning whether the words ending in *luṣ* (involve one *upamāna* or more).

[This analogy is questioned by some. From the word *pañcapūli*, the meaning of the *dvigu* compound is understood, namely the idea of collection of five bundles. It is not the same idea which is understood, from the word *pañcapūlyah*. From this word, the idea of collection of five quintuplets is not understood. From the former word, one understands an object qualified by the number five. From the latter, one understands at least three objects, each consisting of five items. The chief difference is that, from the latter, one does not understand a collection at all, because it is an *ekaśeṣa* and not a *dvigu* compound. While this can be said about the word *pañcapūlyah*, brought in for the sake of analogy the same thing cannot be said about the word *Kāśyapāḥ*.

which is the subject of discussion. Whether each object of comparison, the image, is compared to a separate standard of comparison and then an *ekaśeṣa* is made of all the words so formed or whether all the objects of comparison are compared to one single standard of comparison, the same meaning is understood in both cases. As there is no difference in meaning, the meaning of *luṭ* is present even when an *ekaśeṣa* is made of all the words made at first separately. Therefore P. 1.2.51 would apply and the resulting word would have the singular number of the stem, that is, the *yukta*. It might be said that there is a difference in meaning as follows—If each image is compared to a separate standard of comparison and the plural number comes through *ekaśeṣa*, then each image is compared to Kāśyapa. But if many images are compared to a single standard of comparison then one Kāśyapa would be the standard for all. It is true that there is this much difference. But it is the image which is the meaning of *luṭ* that attains plurality and not any other meaning, and so P. 1.2.51 should apply. If it is applied, there would be singular number. Therefore the form *Kāśyapāḥ* has to be justified in some other way.]

598. Where another word expressive of the object of comparison is not used, then, according to some, the plurality of the standard of comparison is desired.

[The other way is now explained. Where no word other than the one ending in *luṭ* and denoting the object of comparison, the image is used, there the standard of comparison *Kāśyapa* attains plurality, that is, there are many standards of comparison. If the word expressive of the object of comparison is used, the idea of plurality would be understood from that itself and one standard of comparison would serve all the objects of comparison. For example in *Kāśyapa iva Devadatta-Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrā imā pratikṛtayaḥ* = these images of Devadatta Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are like Kāśyapa. But if the word expressive of the object of comparison is not used as when the mere word *Kāśyapa* is used, a doubt arises as to whether it is

the standard of comparison of one image or of more than one. If it is the standard of comparison of more than one, then its singular number can be justified by P. 1.2.51. Therefore, in order to indicate, the plurality of the objects of comparison, the word *Kāśyapa*, having become the standard of comparison attains plurality, and we can say *Kāśyapāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ*.]

599. It is like the use of the singular number when the things to be cooked are mentioned and the use of the dual and the plural numbers when they are not mentioned.

[An illustration is now given. *Guḍa-tila-taṇḍulānām pākaḥ* = the cooking of jaggery, sesame and rice, *tāmraḥ palāśeṣu babhūva rāgaḥ* = the colour of the *palāśa* leaves became red. In such sentences, even though because of the plurality of the things to be cooked, the cooking is also understood as being more than one, the word *pāka* is put in the singular number. When words indicative of the plurality of the things to be cooked or of the substrata of the red colour are not used and only the word *pāka* or *rāga* is used, a doubt arises as to whether the cooking relates to one thing only or to many and whether the colour has only one substratum or more than one. In order to resolve the doubt, one has to use the dual or the plural case endings.]

600. The diversity of what is connected is understood when words expressive of what is connected are used. That is why the diversity of the object of comparison (the image) is not understood.

[What is in itself one and not diversified becomes diversified when connected with diverse things and words expressive of them are used, just as cooking is when words denoting jaggery etc. are used. Where words expressive of connected things are not used, then the diversification of cooking etc. is not understood. Similarly, when words expressive of the images are

not used, then the diversification of the object of comparison is not understood. In that case, the standard of comparison has to be put in the plural, so that the plurality of the objects of comparison may be understood.]

601. In order to prevent it from becoming a common word, the diversity of the objects of comparison is seen in the standards of comparison.

[When the mere word *Kāśyapa* is used, the meaning understood may be 'offspring of *Kāśyapa*' and not necessarily 'the image of *Kāśyapa*'. Even if a connection with the standard of comparison is understood, one would understand an object of comparison which is common to one or more standards of comparison. So the word expressive of it would become a word expressive of a common characteristic. In order to prevent that and in order that the diversity of the object of comparison may be understood, the standard of comparison assumes diversity.]

602. Sometimes one standard of comparison is used for many objects of comparison and sometimes, each of the many objects of comparison is compared to a different standard of comparison.

[These are the two possibilities. The first one is now going to be illustrated.]

603. Where many elephants resemble one Garuḍa, then, in regard to the particular way of arraying them (*vyūha*) the word *Garuḍa* is used.

[A particular way of arranging many elephants is called *garuḍa*, the name of the bird used by Viṣṇu as his transport. Similarly, a particular disposition of horses is called *makara* (a crocodile). A particular disposition of bricks is called *śyena* (hawk). In these cases the things are many and yet the word

expressive of the disposition is put in the singular number. *Garuḍa* is the standard of comparison and it is not the elephants which are compared to it, but the way in which they are arrayed for battle. When one says : “these elephants are like *garuḍas*”, each elephant becomes the object of comparison and not the way of arraying them.]

604. The different images might be understood as similar to one *Kāśyapa*. Therefore, it (the standard of comparison) is connected with each object of comparison.

[*Kāśyapa iva imāḥ pratikṛtayaḥ Kāśyapāḥ* = these images are *Kāśyapāḥ* because they are like *Kāśyapa*. Here the singular number is used after the word expressive of the standard of comparison. One might, therefore, understand that, just as the elephants are similar to *Garuḍa* when arranged in his shape, in the same way, the many images are similar to *Kāśyapa* because of some shape or mode of being in him. One would not understand that for each image, *Kāśyapa* is the standard of comparison. In order that it may be understood, the word *Kāśyapa* must be connected with each image, the object of comparison, separately. Before, it was said that when the word expressive of the object of comparison is not used, the standard of comparison becomes diversified, in order that the diversity of the object of comparison may be understood. Here it is stated that, when the word expressive of the object of comparison is used, the standard of comparison, being separate in each case, it is presented as many from the very beginning, in order that one may understand that each object of comparison is compared to a separate standard of comparison.]

605. When one says : ‘the clouds are like a mountain’, they (the clouds) are jointly understood as resembling a single mountain. Each one is in a different position.

[A more well-known example of one standard of comparison serving several objects of comparison is now given. From the sentence : *Śaila ivāmi valāhakāḥ* = "These clouds are like a mountain" one understands that the clouds, taken together are like a mountain and not each one separately. Each cloud is not like a mountain, but taken together they are so. The word expressive of the standard of comparison is in the singular number and it serves several objects taken together. When the words expressive of the objects of comparison are actually used, there is not one combined object of comparison. In order that one may understand that each object of comparison is connected with a separate standard of comparison, *Kāśyapa*, the standard of comparison, assumes plurality, from the very beginning. That is why the word *Kāśyapāḥ* is put in the plural.]

606. As *cha* is taught by this very *sūtra*, it is not to *cha* that the word *tad* in P. 5.3.106 refers. In *kāka-tāliyam*, what is well-known determines something else.

[As the standard of comparison is the topic under discussion, something is going to be said about P. 5.3.106 which teaches the suffix *cha* after a compound expressive of the standard of comparison. The word *tad* in the *sūtra* cannot refer to the suffix *cha*. If it did, the *sūtra* would mean that the suffix *cha* comes after a compound which cannot be formed otherwise than for adding *cha*. This is what is meant by saying that the compound is *chaviṣaya*. But this interpretation is not right. It is this very *sūtra* which teaches *cha*. No previous *sūtra* has taught *cha* after a compound. So no *chaviṣaya* compound is available to which the suffix *cha* may be added. Secondly, if a compound is already *chaviṣaya*, there is no point in teaching *cha* after it.]

607. Whether a compound like *rājāśva* is within the scope of *cha* or some other is not clear. Therefore, before the suffix *cha* is taught, there is nothing which bears the name (*chaviṣaya*).

[If *tad* refers to the suffix *cha*, it is not clear which compound would be considered to be *chaviṣaya*, so that the suffix may be added to it. If a compound becomes *chaviṣaya* by merely becoming the stem for adding *cha*, then any compound would become so and there would be no point in teaching *cha*, after a compound which is *chaviṣaya*. So one has to understand that the word *tad* refers to something else than *cha*. *Tadviṣayāt* cannot mean *chaviṣayāt* merely because *cha* is the main thing here as it is taught by the *sūtra*. If *tad* cannot refer to the main thing, one must take it as referring to what is only secondary, in this case, the meaning of *cha*, that is the meaning of *ivā*. But how can the *prakṛti* of the suffix *cha* be the *viṣaya* of the meaning of the suffix? This is possible only by postulating two functions for the meaning of *iva*. One function is to qualify the meaning of the *prakṛti* and the other function is to be the meaning of the suffix. The *sūtra* would then mean that the suffix *cha* having the meaning of *iva* is added to a compound formed in the sense of *iva*. But it might be said : if the compound is already qualified by the meaning of *iva*, how can the suffix having the meaning of *iva* be added to it? It cannot be added merely because there is a rule to that effect, because, then, it can be added to a compound like *śaṣṭrīṣyāmā* which also involves the meaning of *iva*.]

608. Both the meanings of *iva* are based on meaning. One of them is connected with the part and the other with the suffix *cha*.

[What the two functions of the meaning of *iva* are is now explained. In compounds like *kākatālīyam*, two meanings of *iva* are understood. One of them is connected with each term of the compound, namely, *kāka* and *tāla*. The compound conveys that and in that sense, it is *ivārthaviṣaya*. Or one might say that the compound which is the stem of the suffix *cha* can be looked upon as a part in relation to the full word formed with *cha*. That compound is connected with the meaning of the word *iva* through its parts and not directly. The suffix *cha* is connected with the other meaning of the word *iva*. In *śaṣṭrī-*

śyāmā, on the other hand, just as Devadattā is compared to a dagger whose darkness is well-known, so is another *upameya* and so the *upamāna*, namely, *śāstrī*, does not depend upon a particular *upameya*. So there is only one meaning of *iva*.

609. The arrival of Caitra is like the arrival of the crow and the arrival of the bandit is like the falling of the *tāla* tree.

[The meaning of *iva* which is connected with the part is now explained. In *kākatālīyam*, the coming of the crow is the standard of comparison and that of *Caitra* the object of comparison. Similarly, the falling of the *tāla* is the standard and the arrival of the bandit the object of comparison. The common quality in both is the fact of happening unexpectedly. This is expressed by the compound to which *cha* is added.]

610. The suffix *cha* is intended to express that other action like murder etc. which is produced as the object of comparison when the two come in contact.

[The meaning of *iva* which is expressed by the suffix *cha* is now explained. When the crow and the *tāla* tree come in contact, some other event results, namely killing or breaking of limbs, cracking of bones or whatever else one might choose to say. With that event is compared the murder of Caitra by the bandit. In the second meaning of *iva* involving the relation of *upamāna* and *upameya*, the suffix *cha* is taught.]

611. The word expressive of substance denotes the action which inheres in it. The words *kāka* and *tāla* stand for the actions of coming and falling.

[The arrival of the crow is the standard of comparison for the arrival of Caitra, not mentioned in the compound. Similarly, the falling of the *tāla* tree is the standard for the coming of the bandit which is also not mentioned in the compound. In

other words *kāka* and *tālā* are not connected with each other at all. How can they then give rise to a compound meaning and if they cannot, no compound meaning can qualify the meaning of the suffix *cha*. The answer is that *kāka* means an action, the coming of the crow. Similarly, *tālā* means the falling of the *tālā* tree. As these two words do not stand for two substances only but for two actions there can be connection between the two. The connection is that the two actions can be standards of comparison to each other, the common property being unexpectedness. Once they are connected, they can qualify the meaning of the suffix *cha*. The two words can be compounded to express the *upamānopameyabhāva* between these two actions, and the other two actions, namely, the arrival of Devadatta and the coming of the bandit. The suffix expresses the same relation between the killing of the crow and that of Devadatta.]

612. Such a sentence (in which mutual fact of being the standard of comparison) is postulated merely for the purpose of word formation.

[It might be argued that it is useless to bring in the mutual *upamānatva* of *kākāgamana* and *tālāpatana*. Why not compare directly the two unexpected killings? The answer is that this mutual *upamānatva* is only a stage in the process of word formation (*prakriyā*) and not real. It does not play any part in worldly usage in which *kākatālā* cannot be used without the suffix *cha*.]

613. It is accepted that the suffix *cha* comes after the stem in the form of a compound of *kāka* and *tālā*, standing as the standard of comparison for any two objects which come into contact by chance.

[The compound *kākatālā* is formed in the sense of *iva*. It means : the killing of the crow unexpectedly brought into contact with the falling tree. It is the stem for the suffix *cha* which means that the killing of Devadatta unexpectedly brought into contact with the bandit who arrived by chance.]

614. The *cha* is desired to be added in the sense of the other event, the object of comparison, namely, the killing by the bandit which is like the killing of the crow by the *tāla* tree.

[It is now stated in which sense the suffix *cha* is added. It has already been shown that the meaning of the compound stands for one meaning of *iva*, namely, that the coming into contact of Devadatta and the bandit is like (*iva*) the coming into contact of the crow and the *tāla* tree. The other meaning of *iva* is expressed by the suffix *cha*. Just as, by the accidental falling of the tree, the accidentally arrived crow is killed, in the same way, the accidentally arrived Devadatta is killed by the accidentally arrived bandit. The suffix *cha* expresses the wonderful coincidence. The *cha* is taught as expressive of another event which is like the accidental event (killing) of the crow due to its accidental contact with the tree. In other words, any accidental event, due to an accidental contact between two things can be called *kākatāliya*.]

615. Others have declared that the words *cañcatka* = 'like what is moving', *bṛhatka* = 'like what is big' refer, through resemblance, to a precious stone, or a frog or a fire-fly.

[As the meaning of *iva* is being considered in connection with the standard of comparison, another matter is now explained. P. 5.4.3. teaches the suffix *kan* after the words *sthūla* etc. when *prakāra* is to be expressed. In that connection, there is the *vārttika* : *cañcadbṛhator upasaṃkhyānam*, which means that *cañcat* and *bṛhat* must also be included among the words to which *kan* is to be added in the sense of *prakāra*. The words formed would be *cañcatka* and *bṛhatka*. What they mean is this: The word *prakāra* in the *sūtra* means resemblance. So the word *cañcatka* means: "moving like". That which is not moving but looks like moving is called *cañcatka*. Similarly, that which is

not big but looks like big is called *byhatka*. A precious stone in clear shaking water looks as though it shakes.]

616. A fire-fly is compared because of the brightening and dimming of its lustre, a frog because of its constant breathing in and out and a precious stone because of its scintillating lustre.

[The resemblance in these cases is now explained. The fire-fly, even though not moving, looks like moving, being enveloped in its own lustre. It is then called *cañcatka*. Its own lustre brightens and dims alternately in a continuous manner. So it looks like moving. Similarly, because of its constant breathing in and out, the frog looks moving even when it is not. A precious stone, because of its constantly scintillating lustre, looks moving even when it is not.]

617. The word *byhatka* is used for a precious stone, which, though small, is cognised as big when its lustre spreads all round.

[What *prakāra* means in connection with the word *byhatka* is now explained. A precious stone, though small, looks big because of its lustre spreading all round.]

618. Some think that *prakāra* always means resemblance. Others, on the other hand think that the word *prakāra* can be applied for variety (*bheda*) also.

[The different views on *prakāra* are now explained. The word *prakāra* occurs in P. 8.1.12., 5.4.3. and so on. Everywhere it means resemblance. The words *yathā* and *tathā*, when used together point to resemblance between two things. The word *paṭujātīya* (P. 5.3.69.) means primarily what is *paṭu*, that is, it also stands for resemblance. The expression *paṭupatuḥ* (P. 8.1.12.) also means resemblance subordinated to what is *paṭu* (clever), The

same is true of the expression *sthūlaka* = 'like who is fat'. Others think that *prakāra* means 'variety, class' everywhere. As two varieties of the same thing must resemble each other, resemblance is also understood even where variety is the meaning. If the variety and resemblance are understood everywhere one should be looked upon as the expressed meaning and the others as the implied meaning. In *paśuprakāro devadattaḥ*, Devadatta is not understood as a variety of *paśu*. Here *prakāra* can only mean resemblance. Even in *paśur devadattaḥ*, where identity is expressed, resemblance is understood. In neither of these two cases is variety understood.]

619. Some suffixes while expressing *prakāra* really denote that which has *prakāra* while others, after having expressed *prakāra* only, go beyond it (in association with something else).

[Another point to be considered is this : If the suffix *thāl*, taught after specific stems like *kim*, *sarvanāma* and *bahu* supersedes *jātiyar*, taught after any stem, how can the word *kim-jātiya* be formed ? If *thāl* itself expresses *prakāra*, how to explain the formation of *tathājātiya* where one finds both *thāl* and *jātiyar* ? The position is this. The suffixes *jātiyar* and *kan* and repetition are all taught in the sense of *prakāra*. They convey *prakāra* secondarily and *prakāravān* = 'that which has *prakāra*' primarily. *Thāl*, on the other hand, expresses *prakāra* only and not *prakāravān*. But, after having expressed *prakāra*, it can express *prakāravān* in association with *jātiyar*. It is not like the word *śukla* which straightaway expresses that which is white. Therefore, *thāl* and *jātiyar* have different scope and so do not go against each other. Thus, the expression *tathājātiyaḥ* can be explained. In the sentence *yathā devadattas tathā yajñadattaḥ*, the word ending in *thāl* does not by itself denote that which has *prakāra*. What happens is that some verb expressive of action is required here to complete the meaning of the sentence and the *prakāra* which is the meaning of the word ending in *thāl* becomes the *karaṇa* in regard to the action denoted by that verb.

Yena prakāreṇa devadatto vartate tena prakāreṇa yajñadatto 'pi, this is the full meaning of the sentence.]

620-621. The word *sādrśya* mentioned in the *sūtra* (P. 2.1.6) stands for *sadrśa*, (the *dharmī* and not for *dharma* only.) When an *avyayībhāva* is formed of two words expressive of two objects which resemble each other it is the word *saha* which is expressive of what is similar.

The indeclinable expressive of the meaning of *yathā* enters into the compound in the sense of repetition and resemblance and that has been shown separately.

[If *thāl*, taught in the sense of *prakāra* really means *sādrśya*, why is *sādrśya*, mentioned separately in P. 2.1.6 which teaches the formation of *avyayībhāva* compounds, considering that *yathā* has already been mentioned before. The reason is that there is really no repetition here, *sādrśya* here means *sadrśa*. The former is a *dharma* which presupposes the *dharmī*, its substratum. The example given is *sakhyā sadrśaḥ sasakhi*. In this *avyayībhāva*, the *avyaya* is *saha* which has become *sa* and stands for the *dharmī* and not *dharma* only. As the word so formed expresses the *sadrśa* which is something concrete, a substance, it should not really be an indeclinable, but being an *avyayībhāva*, it is indeclinable according to P. 1.1.41. The *avyayībhāva* formed in the sense of *vīpsā*, one of the four meanings of *yathā*, namely, *pratyartham* expresses *dharma* only. So, it can be an indeclinable. No compound of this kind can be formed in the sense of *sādrśya*, the fourth meaning of *yathā*. The *sūtra* P. 2.1.7. also makes this point clear.]

622. Some believe that the *yogyatā* which is expressed by *anu* is really resemblance whereas resemblance in concrete substances is expressed by *saha*.

[Another way of looking at this matter is now explained. The 'fitness' (*yogyatā*) which is conveyed by the word *anu* is resemblance (*sādrśya*) considered to be one of the meanings of *yathā*. In that sense, the compound can take place. One can say, for instance: *anurūpaṃ surūpo vahati* = 'the good-looking person wears what is similar to or in keeping with his ornaments.' Thus, *anurūpaṃ* is an *avyayībhāva* formed in the sense of resemblance (one of the meanings of *yathā*) to *rūpa* = ornamentation. The meaning of *yathā*, namely, fitness is connected with or based upon resemblance, which is a mere *guṇa*, quality. The resemblance which is found in objects, substances, and is due to particular shapes is expressed by *saha*, as in *sasakhi*. This kind of resemblance is referred to in the *sūtra* by the word *sādrśya*, whereas the word *yathā* in the rule refers to resemblance in qualities. Thus, they have different scopes. If, on the other hand, *yogyatā* is understood as something quite different from resemblance, that is, as fitness, then the former explanation for separate mention of *sādrśya* in the rule must be accepted.]

623. In the attainment of a particular condition also, there is resemblance based upon what figures in the mind. Here, in the cognition, it is only a bit of difference (not real difference) which is meant to be conveyed.

[The view that everywhere *prakāra* means resemblance has been questioned by some as follows—P. 2.3.21. teaches the third case-ending after a word expressive of a particular state of a thing (*prakāra*). Thus, we can say: *kamaṇḍalunā chātram* = 'student having a *kamaṇḍalu*'. Here the student having a particular condition is a variety of the genus 'man.' Thus, *prakāra* here obviously means variety and not resemblance, because there is nobody else to whom he is compared. But the view that *prakāra* everywhere means *sādrśya* is justified as follows:—Even in P. 2.3.21. the particular state or *prakāra* involves resemblance, because an expression like *kamaṇḍalunā chātram* is possible only if there is resemblance between the image created in the mind by the expression and the outside object to which

it refers. The correspondence between the mental image and the outside object is what is called *prakāra* here and it is a kind of resemblance. Similarly, in P. 5.3.42 also where the suffix *dhā* is taught after a numeral in the sense of *vidhā* or *prakāra*, a particular mode of action, resemblance is implied. When one says: *pañcadhā bhuñkte*, what is understood from the words corresponds to outside reality. The numeral stands for mode of action. *Pañcadhā bhuñkte* means: 'he eats in five modes'. The action of eating is one but it can be performed in different ways. The numeral stands for the number of ways. What figures in the mind resembles outside reality. Thus, here also, *prakāra* means resemblance.]

624. In the matter of repetition (taught in P. 8.1.12.), the sentence *gaur vāhikaḥ* = 'the *vāhika* is a cow', involving resemblance, is given as the counter example. As words like *śukla*, well-known as quality words (*guṇavacana*) are available, the word 'go' denoting *vāhika* is not repeated.

[The support of the *M. Bhā*, for the view that everywhere *prakāra* stands for resemblance is now shown. In P. 8.1.12. where repetition of a word expressive of quality is taught, *agnir māṇavakaḥ* = 'the student is fire', *gaur vāhikaḥ* = 'the *vāhika* is a cow' are given as counter examples. This can be justified only if the word *prakāra* occurring in the *sūtra* stands for resemblance. The *vāhika* cannot be looked upon as a variety (*bheda*) of *go* nor the student that of fire. This shows that elsewhere than in the matter of repetition also, *prakāra* means resemblance. In *gaur vāhikaḥ*, the word *gauḥ* is not repeated because it is not a word expressive of quality as the rule in question requires. It is true that the word *gauḥ* is applied to a *vāhikaḥ* because of identification based on common qualities. But it is not words like *go* which are meant by the word *guṇavacana* in the *sūtra*. It is words like *śukla*, *paṭu* which are so meant. The word *śukla* stands for the quality white and for someone who has that quality. The word 'go', on the other hand,

first means a universal (*gotva*). When it is applied to a *vāhika*, it is not a *guṇavacana* word, because primarily it denotes a universal. So P. 8.1.12. teaches the repetition of a word which denotes quality secondarily and substance primarily as in *śuklaśuklaḥ paṭaḥ* = 'a very white cloth', *paṭupatuḥ*—'very clever' or of a word which teaches quality only as in *śuklaśuklaṃ rūpam*—'very white colour'.]